

Independent evaluation of the UN-IFI Partnership Facility

(formerly the Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding and Partnership Facility)

Final report

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Queries and feedback:

Ian D. Quick
ian@iandquick.com

Sarah Cramer-Smith
sarah@pointeast.net

About this document

The UN-IFI Partnership Facility was established in August 2019 with the purpose of strengthening collaboration between the UN Country Team and WBG in fragile settings. Since this time, it has provided small grants and technical advisory support in 50+ countries and regional contexts.

The present evaluation was commissioned to assess the overall achievements of the Partnership Facility, including lessons about successful approaches and operational practices. The approach and methodology were developed through an inclusive design phase with all relevant stakeholders, which is documented in detail in a separate inception report (July 2024).

This final report reviews the strategic positioning of the Facility relative to broader normative and policy agendas for how the UN and World Bank work in fragile settings; discusses the outcomes that have been achieved from 2019 to present; and assesses its delivery model and operational design. The report concludes with a set of recommendations for how the Facility can best act as service provider, as learning platform, and as a strategic portfolio manager.

Time-poor readers may wish to refer to the separate **key messages** document, which summarises the substantive findings and recommendations in five pages.

Table of contents

1. SCOPE AND PURPOSE	3
1.1 About the UN-IFI Partnership Facility.....	3
1.2 Why this matters / broader relevance	5
1.3 About the evaluation / how to read this report.....	7
2. METHODOLOGY	7
2.1 Overview of approach	8
2.2 Evaluability & data review.....	10
2.3 Analytic framework	12
3. POSITIONING & RELEVANCE	13
3.1 Contribution to broader institutional goals	13
3.2 Coherence & complementarity.....	19
4. OUTCOMES ACHIEVED	21
4.1 Strategic alignment.....	21
4.1.1 Contribution pathways.....	23
4.1.2 Effectiveness of different models.....	25
4.2 Enabling effective delivery	27
4.2.1 How did PF projects contribute to effective delivery?	28
4.2.2 How effective were different models?	29
4.3 System-level learning.....	31
4.3.1 How did the PF contribute to system-level learning?	31
4.3.2 How effective is the PF's support for system-level learning?	32
5. DELIVERY MODEL	34
6. RECOMMENDATIONS.....	37
Annexes.....	41
A1. Terms of reference	41
A2. Adapted evaluation questions	42
A3. Case studies.....	43
Case 1: Somalia	43
Case 2: The Gambia.....	45
Case 3: Chad.....	48
Acronyms.....	50
References.....	51

1. Scope and purpose

This section introduces the purpose, goals, and operating model of the UN-IFI Partnership Facility. We go on to outline where this within the broader policy agendas of the UN and World Bank systems as concerns crisis-affected contexts. The last sub-section discusses the remit and scope of work for the present evaluation.

Key messages in this section:

- The Partnership Facility was established in 2019, on the premise that good partnering in crisis-affected places is an essential enabler for the institutional mandates of both the WBG and UN.
- This premise has become still more compelling over the evaluation period due to (i) increasing concentration of multi-dimensional vulnerability in fragile places, and (ii) rapid changes in the landscape of international cooperation in these settings.
- Both the WBG and the UN are pursuing high-level change agendas to stay relevant and support positive results in fragile contexts. The relevance of the Facility turns upon its contributions to these broader institutional goals as they continue to evolve over time.
- The Partnership Facility is small in financial size but sits on an important growth / innovation edge for both organisations. This report discusses an important set of experiences in their ability to partner and deliver effectively in the most challenging contexts.

1.1 About the UN-IFI Partnership Facility

In 2017, the heads of the United Nations system (UN) and the World Bank Group (WBG) signed a Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations. This framework articulated a common ambition for **coherent and complementary action to address the drivers, causes, and impacts of crises**, and defined a set of guiding principles and operational commitments. It responded in part to General Assembly and Security Council resolutions urging the Secretary-General to explore options for strengthening UN-World Bank collaboration in conflict-affected settings.

The organising premise was that **good partnering in crisis-affected places is an essential enabler for the partners' respective institutional mandates**. In this respect the Facility was a practical mechanism to accompany the research and policy collaboration between the two institutions on the landmark 2018 report [Pathways for Peace](#), which started from the shared commitment “to the prevention of conflict as a contribution to development progress”.

For the World Bank this point has been reiterated and further developed in its [Fragility, Conflict and Violence Strategy](#) (2020-25), for which a recent mid-term review has noted mounting evidence of a “different development trajectory” in fragile contexts. The [Proposed Strategic Directions](#) for the upcoming replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA21) note in like fashion that its focus areas must be “inclusive of everyone” and “resilient to shocks”, and for this reason approached through a fragility “lens”.

Within the UN context, the importance of strategic partnerships with international and regional financial institutions has been repeatedly re-affirmed over time. Significant political milestones include the 2020 [twin resolutions](#) on peacebuilding and sustaining peace; the 2022 General Assembly resolution on [financing for peacebuilding](#); the Secretary-General's [New Agenda for Peace](#), and the [Decade of Action](#) for the Sustainable Development Goals. The intention to continue to strengthen collaboration at the country level, especially in crisis-affected settings, was most recently reiterated in a September 2024

meeting between the UN Secretary-General meeting and the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of eight multilateral development banks.

The Partnership Facility was established in support of these broad agendas in August 2019, and succeeded an existing Joint Trust Fund for UN-WBG collaboration. The stated intent was to use small grants and technical advisory support to **strengthen collaboration between UN Country Teams and the WBG in crisis-affected contexts**. The general approach was to provide guidance, expertise and resources where needed to support the closer alignment of analysis, strategy and planning. Over time this has encompassed grants and technical advice in 50+ countries and regional contexts.

The **goals and delivery model** of the Facility have evolved over its five years of operation, and two revisions of its governing project document. The initial name—the Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding and Partnership Facility—has given way to its more focused current name. It was also critical to respond to a changing policy and process landscape on both sides of the partnership. This included most notably the WBG’s orientations for the IDA20 replenishment, including most notably the Fragility, Conflict and Violence Envelope and accompanying FCV strategy; and structural reforms of both the UN Development System and its peace and security “pillar”.

Alongside the small grant modality, the “phase 2” project document (2021-23) added components for (i) inter-institutional / headquarters-level policy analysis, collaboration and knowledge management, and (ii) a Fast Track modality for the deployment of short-term technical advisers responding to a surge of demand for flexible and timely support during COVID-19 with a prevention angle. Most recently, in the “phase 3” project document in May 2023, the initial focus on the UN-WBG partnership was expanded to encompass other international financial institutions (IFIs), reflecting UN leadership attention to the complementary role of regional MDBs and the increased focus on the latter on fragile contexts.

The **organisational design** of the Facility is unusual. It is legally constituted as a project funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), with the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) as managing entity and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) as the fund recipient and operational partner. This allows the Facility to take advantage of the Fund’s established processes and governance without creating an entirely new structure. Behind this arrangement, there are a small number of committed funding partners who support the Facility indirectly through “preferenced” contributions to the PBF that are effectively earmarked for this specific purpose.

In practice this means that for each phase of the project, i.e. revision of the Facility’s governing project document, UNOPS has received a single block of funding. This funding is then applied at the request of PBSO (technically the Assistant General for Peacebuilding Support or as delegated) for three specific purposes, namely:

- recruitment and support of the Facility’s senior programme manager and its other staff, who are based in PBSO within an integrated PBSO-UNOPS team;
- transfers of grant funding to agencies at the country level via UN-to-UN contribution agreements; and
- recruitment and support of individual consultants where relevant.

Within PBSO the Facility sits within the Peacebuilding Strategy and Partnerships Branch (PSPB), under the oversight of a Senior Partnership Advisor. The latter has a broader remit within PSPB to deepen engagement with the World Bank and other IFIs, following upon the 2019 restructuring of the UN’s

peace and security “pillar”, and the post is accordingly included within the UN Secretariat’s regular programme budget rather than the Partnership Facility’s project budget.

The **delivery model** differs between the Regular Track modality (grant-funded projects up to USD 400,000) and the Fast Track (\$50,000 renewable once) modality. Procedurally both tracks entail a review process coordinated by PBSO, followed by an instruction for UNOPS to either transfer grant funding to the end-recipient UN Organisation (for Regular Track projects), and/or directly contract short-term experts (under the Fast Track).

It should be noted upfront that while activities and outputs are designed to support the UN-IFI partnership, for example through shared analytic products and coordination capacities, the Facility itself is a UN-managed vehicle and grant funding is passed through UN entities. (While there were early discussions around the World Bank’s Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund acting as a counterpart or “sister” instrument to the Partnership Facility, this has not in practice materialised.)

Figure 1a: Key facts and figures

(source: project data shared as at December 2024)

Funding partners: The Facility is supported by preferred contributions to the UN Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund, with contributions from Canada, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. It has received a total of USD 11.2 million since 2019, with the “phase 3” project extension (2023 to March 2025) budgeted at USD 3.5m.

Portfolio: The Partnership Facility has supported 48 projects for a total of USD 6.06m, of which 11 are ongoing at date of writing. Most grants have targeted specific countries (32 grants, 80%); six have had a cross-border/regional focus; and five have supported global policy processes. There have been 15 regular-track grants, averaging USD 340,000 and which account for 79% of all disbursed funding. There have been 33 fast-track grants, averaging USD 47,000.

Advisory support: Technical advisory and inter-institutional coordination, while harder to quantify at the activity level, are core functions of the Facility. The Facility’s project budget supports two Professional-level staff who work in an integrated team with two regular-budget DPPA staff. This team provides advice and support across the broader UN system on IFI partnerships in crisis-affected settings. In 2024 this included advisory support to about twenty UN country teams and regional teams, and where relevant to their WBG counterparts. The balance of the Facility’s budget, after the Regular Track and Fast Track support noted above, goes to these staff and indirect costs.

Geographic focus: Contexts in sub-Saharan Africa have been the focus for 68% of targeted grants, and a similar proportion of funding. Other regions included Europe and Central Asia (13%); MENA (10%); and South America (2%). Global / headquarters-level projects accounted for 10% of grant funding.

1.2 Why this matters / broader relevance

The 2019 project document commenced with an inset on the “changing nature of crisis”, and it is fair to say that the pace of change has only accelerated over the reference period for this evaluation. The first important trend has been **the accelerating concentration of multi-dimensional vulnerability in crisis-affected settings** (or at least recognition of those vulnerabilities). It is widely observed that:

- armed conflict globally is at its highest level since the end of the Second World War, following a with a decade of upward tendency ([PRIO 2023](#), [IISS 2023](#), [UN 2023](#));

- extreme poverty will be mostly found in FCS by 2030 (though exact estimates vary: [CGD 2024](#));
- there is much slower progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals, and in many cases reversals, alongside a declining reporting rate ([OECD 2022](#)), [UN 2024](#));
- climate vulnerability is disproportionately high, while access to climate finance is lower by an order of magnitude ([UNDP 2021](#), [IMF 2023](#)).
- exposure to global systems risks is high and increasing, including ecosystem decline, food price shocks, and pandemic preparedness / response (see e.g. [CEPI 2024](#), [Food Systems 2020](#)).
- rapidly increasing exploitation of “critical minerals” and offshore food security pose unfamiliar political and human security challenges (see e.g. [Pulitzer Centre 2019](#), [Climate Diplomacy 2024](#)).

These trends have been accompanied by **substantial changes in the landscape of international cooperation in fragile settings**. Far from the historical stereotype of aid/diplomacy “contact groups”, the contemporary landscape increasingly includes regional development banks with their own approaches to fragility; climate finance actors ([GCF 2023](#); [GEF 2024](#)); development finance initiatives including the [ARIA partnership](#) and mechanisms for “peace-positive” investment (e.g. [AfDB / Finance for Peace 2024](#)); and sovereign wealth / trade promotion funds. This diversity has been recognised in for example the 2022 In many contexts this list also includes transnational security partnerships addressing violent extremism, serious organised crime, and/or regional stability.

Both the WBG and the UN are already pursuing **change agendas to stay relevant and support positive results in this changing context**. These policy and normative agendas, itemised non-exhaustively in Figure 1b, form the broader context for this evaluation. The funding partners for the Facility were clear that it is important to understand how it fits into this bigger picture of financial and non-financial support to peacebuilding—in a context where “everybody is seeing new donors and new approaches”.

Figure 1b: Intersections with policy and normative agendas

(source: authors)

WBG	UN
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ FCV strategy (2020-25) + Mid-Term Review (2023) ▪ IDA20 replenishments (“Building Back Better from the Crisis”) + FCV envelope ▪ IDA21 (Proposed Strategic Directions): five focus areas “inclusive of everyone” and “resilient to shocks” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SDGs: Decade of Action with “no-one left behind”. ▪ Twin resolutions on Sustaining Peace; 2022 resolution on Financing for Peacebuilding; Our Common Agenda / Agenda for Peace.. ▪ Peacebuilding Architecture Review: Stronger relationships between UNDS and peace & security pillar, EC/DC, RMRs. ▪ UNDS reforms: RC system independent, impartial, empowered. ▪ IASC: New Way of Working & HDPN

Below we use these change agendas as touchstone criteria for the relevance and responsiveness of PF projects (always alongside nationally-owned priorities). While the Facility's original project document relies heavily on the 2017 Partnership Framework, both institutions acknowledge that the commitments therein were made “a full Secretary-General and two World Bank Presidents ago”, and it is therefore important to understand how the partnership, and behind this the Partnership Facility, supports both institutions’ missions and results now.

All this to say: **The Partnership Facility is small in size financially, but sits on an important growth / innovation edge for both the UN and World Bank systems.** From this perspective the findings in this report discuss an important set of experiences in how the work of these institutions can and should evolve in fragile places, and the recommendations discuss how to embed and scale the lessons that have been learned.

1.3 About the evaluation / how to read this report

The evaluation of the Facility has been commissioned to **assess the overall achievements of the Partnership Facility from 2019 to present**, and to judge its added value in promoting the partnership between the UN and IFIs in crisis-affected situations. This includes identifying lessons about successful approaches and operational practices, as well as areas where support was less effective than hoped. (The full terms of reference are attached in Annex 1.)

It was a core process goal to develop an inclusive approach that responds to the needs and expectations of a cross-institutional stakeholder landscape. We accordingly organised work around **an in-depth design and inception phase in June / July 2024**. These consultations, and our supporting technical contributions, are summarised in an inception report delivered in August 2024. This comprised a detailed evaluability assessment; approach & methodology; discussion of potential case studies; and delivery plan. It remains the point of reference for a detailed discussion of these issues.

In this final report we first provide a non-technical summary of our approach and methodology (Section 2 below). The following sections then discuss the Partnership Facility's strategic positioning (§3); emergent outcomes (§4); and the sustainability and efficiency of its delivery model (§5). A short final section sets out recommendations for the potential renewal and evolution of the Facility.

2. Methodology

This section summarises how the overall objectives of this review were translated into actionable evaluation questions, a sampling strategy across the Facility's portfolio, and supporting evaluation instruments. This is followed by review of the evaluability of existing data and reporting; and the analytic-methodological framework that underlies our findings. (For a fuller discussion of these topics the point of reference is the inception report completed in August 2024.)

Key messages in this section:

- The evaluation is for the Facility as a whole, rather than the impact of individual grants. The design goal of the analytic-methodological framework was accordingly to enable structured qualitative analysis across a heterogeneous group of cases (and not multiple “mini-evaluations”).
- The core methodological challenge is that the Facility supports small interventions in very large, very complex systems. A separate inception report (finalised in August 2024) discusses the methodology that we developed in response and how we selected the five main case studies.
- Our overall analytic-methodological framework is realist evaluation. This looks for patterns in contribution pathways: what worked where under which conditions.
- Empirical methods included outcome mapping with key informants (based on a semi-structured interview guide); review and coding of the documentary record; and summative quantitative review.

2.1 Overview of approach

The stated evaluation objectives were to (i) assess the relevance and appropriateness of the Facility’s activities; (ii) document good practices and lessons learned, and (iii) provide actionable recommendations. The indicative evaluation questions followed the [OECD-DAC criteria](#) for development assistance evaluation, with adjustment for the specific principles of investment by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (concerning catalytic effects, time-sensitivity, and risk tolerance / innovation: [UN PBF 2020](#)). It is important to note in this regard that **the evaluation concerns the Facility as a whole rather than the delivery and impact of specific grants.**

The first principle in applying the OECD-DAC criteria is that they are not a methodology, to be relayed mechanically from page to key informants, but rather a starting point for an appropriate evaluation design ([OECD 2019](#), [2021](#)). With this in mind, this section discusses the “why”, the “who/what/where” and the “how” of the evaluation.

The guiding intention—the “why” of the thing—was to find **practical ways to assess the Facility’s contribution to stronger partnerships and better outcomes.** Our point of departure for this is found in the Facility’s theory of change, below in Figure 2a. (The text in italics was added in “phase 3” of the project, i.e. the 2023 project document, and the annotations at right are added by the authors.)

Figure 2a: PF theory of change

Given that shared data and analysis, assessments, guidance capacity and joint operational frameworks are needed to enhance the collaboration between the UN and World Bank across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus;	Context & assumptions
And that lack of <i>capacity</i> , <i>IFI literacy</i> , financing for joint analysis, assessment, planning, evidence and prioritization is a constraint for UN-World Bank collaboration in crisis-affected settings;	
If the UN has access to guidance, expertise, support and HDPP Facility resources dedicated to enable joint analysis, assessment, planning, evidence and prioritization;	Project contribution
Then , more UN Resident Coordinators and UNCTs, and other UN entities will partner with the World Bank to align strategies and strengthen their collaboration with the World Bank;	Intermediate outcome
Which will <i>lend the collective weight of the UN and World Bank behind reforms critical to addressing drivers of conflict/ sources of resilience and scale up resources and achievement of results for collective outcomes across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus.</i>	Downstream outcome

We consulted extensively on this theory of change during the inception phase, and received a great deal of feedback. (For interested readers, this is summarised in the finalised inception report in August 2024.) There is also considerable experience to draw upon from other initiatives that have sought to strengthen the coherence of international engagement in fragile contexts (often including many of the same institutional stakeholders). These include most obviously meta-reviews of Recovery and Peacebuilding

Assessments, experiences with the humanitarian-development-peace “nexus”, and the UN’s policy framework for Integrated Assessment and Planning.¹

The inception report organised stakeholder feedback into specific questions about each of the three components of the theory of change in Figure 2a, namely context & assumptions, project contributions, and outcomes & impact. Taken as a whole these questions constituted the core evaluation instrument—the semi-structured interview guide—that we used in conversation with our interlocutors (Figure 2b). It is important to note that this guide was not applied with strict consistency, as one would for a survey instrument, but as flexible prompts to co-produce findings with interlocutors who were the ones bringing the critical expertise and experience to the conversation.

Figure 2b: Interview guide

Context and enabling conditions

- Who and what triggered the development of a proposal for the Facility? What were the key factors for the timing and targeting of the project?
- Following project design, what were the most noticeable enablers and constraints? What adaptations were made over time to respond to this context?
- How did the project fit into the broader relationship between the UN system and IFIs? What was the division of labour with other processes and mechanisms (e.g. sectoral coordination, HDPN outcomes, platforms for aid coherence?)

Project contributions:

- If the project is successful, who would be doing what? What did we want to see change within partner institutions (government, WBG, UN, other), and in their external interactions?
- What had to happen at headquarters for the project to get off the ground? Did this happen when it needed to?
- How significant were the transaction costs – time, energy, and attention – to develop and deliver the project? How long was the timeline from idea to execution?
- Were there opportunities to centre women’s and youth perspectives?

Planned and emergent outcomes:

- Was the project intended to support HDP collective outcomes, or more specific prevention and peacebuilding results?
- How do we know if these outcomes responded to the interests and aspirations of women, girls, youth?
- What would sustainability look like here? Mainstreaming into strategy and programming processes; testing and scaling; replication in different contexts?
- Were there significant unintended outcomes?

Turning to the “how” of the evaluation, we approached Figure 2b from two perspectives. The first was at global level—comprising stakeholders who support or depend upon Facility-sponsored projects, and key informants with experience across multiple country contexts. Non-exhaustively this included funding partners; PBSO and the broader Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA); the World Bank’s FCV Group; the UN’s Development Coordination Office; and a sample of relevant UN agencies, funds and programmes.

¹ Indicatively see [Quick and Demetriou 2017](#) on RPBAs; [IASC 2020](#) and [European Commission 2022](#) on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus; and [UNSDG 2023](#) on the UN approach to Integrated Assessment and Planning.

The second perspective was at the country level, where we traced the development and evolution of specific Facility-supported projects. This initially focused on a set of primary case studies. These were selected according to a panel of criteria, with the most important consideration the top-level outcomes of the WBG-UN partnership (Figure 2c).

Figure 2c: Primary cases & selection criteria

	Chad	Somalia	The Gambia
Outcomes	Prevention (shocks / crisis overflow)	Remaining engaged / Turnaround	Turnaround
Contribution	Strengthening national capacities	Standing coordination capacity for UN-WBG	Support to joint monitoring mechanism
Context	Emergency task force; reinforced UNCT; PRA	Special political mission; AU mission; TAA	Support to political transition; TAA

It should be underlined at this point that our purpose was not to evaluate these specific cases—this would have required a quite different design—but to develop hypotheses about the operation of the PF as a whole. We then tested these hypotheses through a lighter-touch review of a further sample of projects, comprising:

- interviews and content analysis for a non-random (“snowball”) sample of Fast Track projects identified during the inception phase as of interest (Haiti and Mozambique); and
- content analysis for a random sample of 3 further projects at later stages of delivery (Nepal, Sudan, Niger).

2.2 Evaluability & data review

The Facility’s Results Framework is appropriately light-touch and straightforward. Within the current (“phase 3”) project document, the overall outcome is that “The strategic partnership between the UN, the World Bank and other IFIs advances collective outcomes in crisis affected situations”, and this is supported by outputs to (i) “strengthen partnerships at country level”, and from 2021 onwards, (ii) “to improve overall UN literacy and capabilities to partner with IFIs”.

How to actually measure these outcomes has been a rather more difficult question. The indicators that are linked to the outcome and outputs quoted above have evolved over time, in the successive 2019, 2021 and 2023 iterations of the Facility’s project document. After several versions of indicators looking at “joint” strategy documents and resources mobilised, the latter focuses on the perceptions and self-reported capacities of UN country-level leadership viz. partnerships with IFIs. In practice there are also different sets of data for fund-level reporting (based on system-level metrics), and grant-level reporting (based on the outputs and indicators specified in individual project proposals).

The inception report discussed in detail where and how the available data can best be used.

Summarising, **the core methodological challenge is that the Facility supports small interventions in very large, very complex systems.** Crisis situations are by definition subject to a wide range of stressors and shocks, both internally and externally. The consequence is that while the headline question of effectiveness can be clearly formulated—what policy and partnership outcomes are achieved in cases where the PF provides support, compared to those where it does not?—it is very difficult to causally isolate these contributions.

At a somewhat more technical level we identified the following challenges. These informed the development of the analytic framework set out in the following sub-section, and we also provide specific recommendations on evaluability (§6 below).

(i) Validity (measuring what we want to measure)

It was clear from all conversations that the right configuration of the UN-WBG partnership depends upon the strategic and institutional context. One consequence is that it has been difficult to identify portfolio-level indicators for policy outcomes. The specific indicators defined in the Facility's successive Results Frameworks have been either too constrictive to be used consistently ("joint strategic frameworks" or "amount of funding mobilised"), or too general to have a self-evident / intuitive meaning ("strategic partnership" or more arguably "joint priorities"). It follows that while there are accumulated narrative accounts of changes at country level, there is no aggregate or quantitative metric that we were confident in relying upon.

With this in mind, later project documents anticipated the increased use of survey data to track if and how the perceptions of key stakeholders were changing. This is undoubtedly the correct direction of travel, but **challenges remain around selection of an estimator** (i.e. what specifically we are trying to observe). The available data is held as a single pool for all responding entities, and it is thus difficult to compare a "participating" group with a "non-participating" group. It is also evident that the respondent group for the survey tools has changed significantly between iterations. This makes it difficult to construct valid time-series data, i.e. tracking aggregate improvement over time for the *same* contexts / country teams.

(ii) Unobserved covariates (correlation vs causation)

This is a more difficult underlying problem. In plain language there are many contextual factors that influence policy outcomes in fragile contexts—some of them very powerfully. It follows that we cannot straightforwardly infer causation or significant contribution from a simple arithmetical comparison between "supported" and "non-supported" contexts; nor between the same context "pre-support" and "post-support". There are certainly econometric and quasi-experimental approaches that can mitigate these challenges, but the former is difficult without substantial additional data collation (well beyond the scope of this evaluation), and the latter is difficult to do after the fact.

(iii) Reliability (consistency across measurements)

The Result Framework's output indicators, and corresponding survey questions, relate to "general knowledge" about IFIs and capacities "to leverage opportunities". Both questions require complex qualitative judgments. While to some extent this is unavoidable with the nature of the Facility's work, experience suggests there are challenges with consistency in how such questions are interpreted when a survey addresses a wide range of staff at different grades, in different roles, and with different disciplinary and educational backgrounds. A sample of data also indicated that in most cases different respondents, within the same country context and UN entity, had completed the survey from one cohort-year to the next. (These challenges are compounded with the broader Partnership Monitoring survey which relies upon an additional step of qualitative coding.)

Turning to **opportunities with existing data sources**, there is a wealth of narrative commentary in the project-level reporting on enablers, constraints, and intermediate outcomes. This guides us towards the kinds of change that the Facility's direct partners have seen as relevant and impactful in the short to medium term, alongside the higher-level / longer-term outcomes specified in the portfolio-level Results

Framework. In practice it is these **narrative outcomes** that have made up the bulk of reporting for the Partnership Facility in its semi-annual PBF Project Reports and the broader UN-WBG [Partnership Monitoring Reports](#).

Indicatively, our sample of written project reports specified project contributions relating to:

- The articulation of national priorities, and how this orients the WBG-UN partnership;
- progress towards policy clarity in contentious areas, including milestone events for consensus-building and the solution seeking stage of “white papers”;
- specific collective action problems faced by the international community (e.g. proper resourcing of coordination platforms; investment in data generation);
- organisational agility and transaction costs for the ongoing partnership.

In the next sub-section we discuss how to best use this range of qualitative data for **structured qualitative analysis across cases**, i.e. avoiding a collection of “mini-evaluations” that do not speak to overall relevance and outcomes achieved for the Facility as a whole.

2.3 Analytic framework

Responding to this context, our overall analytic-methodological framework is **realist evaluation** (Pawson and Tilley 1997; de Weger et al 2020). The central contention here is that projects do not “work” per se. They rather offer resources that trigger choices, made selectively by institutions according to their preferences and circumstances, which then lead to patterns of outcomes. This can be paraphrased more simply as **what works for whom in what circumstances**. As a logic of enquiry it orients us to look at three kinds of evidence in individual cases:

- (i) Context: including the key enabling conditions within both the country context and the institutional contexts.
- (ii) Contribution pathways: with close attention to how institutions and stakeholders have responded to the project inputs.
- (iii) Outcomes: with specific emphasis on “intermediate” outcomes alongside the higher-level outcomes identified in the Results Framework.

The inception report includes further discussion of the foundations of this approach in interpretivist social science. At the empirical level we have used a mix of methods which include summative quantitative analysis wherever possible (both project-and portfolio-level), but in the main collecting and collating qualitative data that responds to the three categories of evidence noted above.

To organise qualitative work (interviews and document review) we used **an adapted Outcome Mapping approach**. This methodology, as popularised by the International Development Research Centre, is specifically designed for institutional behavioural change (Earl, Carden and Smutylo 2001; Buell, Malallah and Mason 2020). It prompts us, in reviewing contexts where the Facility has provided support, to clearly identify:

- boundary partners, i.e. the individuals and organisational units with whom the project interacts and who hold decision responsibility for intermediate outcomes; and
- progress markers, i.e. observable behaviours relating to specific institutional processes, priorities, activities, and resource allocations.

This is relatively technical language, but our intent was straightforward—to work with our interlocutors to co-produce a grounded narrative about who was doing what differently following support from the

Facility. This was supported by the main evaluation instrument, the interview guide reproduced above in Figure 2b, but not confined by it.

3. Positioning & relevance

The top-level outcome of the PF project document is that “the strategic partnership between the UN, the World Bank and other IFIs advances collective outcomes in crisis affected situations”.

This section unpacks what this means in practice, and we discuss in turn: (i) how the Facility's work contributes to the high-level goals of the UN and WBG in fragile contexts (i.e. its broader relevance), and (ii) how it fits in with other mechanisms and initiatives targeting the same contexts (coherence and complementarity).

Key findings in this section:

- The Facility is highly responsive to ambitions to prioritise conflict prevention and to address “multi-dimensional risks of crisis”, in the sense described in *Pathways for Peace* and the Sustaining Peace agenda. Several projects were described by stakeholders as “the practical application of *Pathways*”.
- Many stakeholders believed it was “unthinkable” to attempt these goals in crisis-affected settings without engaging IFIs—but emphasised these cultivating these partnerships has in the past been a structural weakness of the UN development system.
- In both regards, the Facility has supported good partnering by the UN system through dedicated resources for analytic / strategic work that required a holistic and “non-agency” perspective. In many cases stakeholders felt that this could not have been achieved other than by Partnership Facility support.
- There is concern but also pragmatism about overlap between the PF and other mechanisms to support “good partnering” by the UN (notably support to the RC system and Peace and Development Advisors). It was agreed that the Facility providing targeted support in crisis-affected contexts was net-positive in a context where a system-level approach to UN-IFI partnerships will be difficult to achieve with scarce coordination resources.
- The “pipeline” for projects has historically been informal and demand-driven. There is space to be more intentional about system-level priorities for collaboration—linking to mechanisms for crisis prevention / sustaining peace, and goals to build strategic relationships with other IFIs.

3.1 Contribution to broader institutional goals

The 2017 Partnership Framework defined the shared objectives of the UN and WBG as to “[b]uild resilience of the most vulnerable people, reduce poverty, enhance food security, promote shared prosperity, and sustain peace”. While the Framework is not itself referenced very often in the present day (§1.2 above), these goals remain very current for both institutions.

As a point of departure, the WBG’s [FCV Strategy](#) (2020-25) sets out four “pillars” of engagement in FCS contexts, namely preventing violent conflict; remaining engaged during conflict and crisis situations; helping countries transition out of fragility; and mitigating cross-border “spillovers”. The first three of these categories are associated with specific allocations under the IDA20 FCV Envelope to strengthen responsiveness and delivery in relevant contexts ([IDA20 Replenishment Report](#): Annex 4). These are referred to as Prevention and Resilience Allocations, Turnaround Allocations, and Remaining Engaged in Conflict Allocations (or in shorthand, PRA, TAA, and RECA).

At the same time it is important to note that the pillars of the FCV Strategy, as overall orientations for the Bank's work, do not relate solely to allocations from the FCV Envelope. Most notably there have been specific RECA allocations in only a few settings, but the underlying goal—of “maintaining a development approach in areas where security is sufficient to implement efforts that build resilience, support service delivery, and promote livelihoods and job creation”—applies more broadly. This includes at least two of the case studies that we reviewed (Chad and Somalia). Relatedly it is important to note that the [Proposed Strategic Directions](#) for the IDA21 replenishment (mid-2025 onwards) organise the WBG's work around five specific focus areas for global action at scale, but also note that these must be “inclusive of everyone”, “resilient to shocks”, and where relevant approached through a fragility lens. It will be essential to define how UN partnerships can contribute to these system-level goals.

While the Facility has had much less direct experience to date with other IFIs, the same considerations apply. The Islamic Development Bank (2019), the Asian Development Bank (2021) and the African Development Bank (2022) all have their own institutional approaches to fragility, and how this shapes wider institutional goals and operations in relevant contexts. It will be essential here to identify issue areas, and country/regional contexts, where there is a concrete value proposition for UN partnership. The Facility's early experiences here include support to country and regional-level assessments with the African Development Bank in Burkina Faso (2019-2020), Central African Republic (2024), Mozambique (2021) and the Mano River Union (2022-24); and with the Inter-American Development Bank in Haiti.

On the UN side of the partnership, the Partnership Facility responds to multiple normative and policy goals. The first relevant angle is **sustaining peace**. In this regard the Secretary-General's 2023 policy brief [A New Agenda for Peace](#) calls for “an explicitly universal approach to the prevention of conflict and violence”, with “national ownership and nationally defined priorities” at the centre, and “prioritizing comprehensive approaches over securitized responses”. In practice it is recognised that the latter requires “multidimensional approaches” and, where appropriate, “policy convergence” with the World Bank and other major development institutions ([Peacebuilding Architecture Review 2020](#): p19). The landmark research synthesis Pathways for Peace (2018: ch 8) suggested a range of specific measures in this regard—including integration or alignment of security and development planning, targeting of periphery areas, mitigation of the impact of shocks, and targeting resources to “arenas” (i.e. sectors or policy issue areas) of contestation.

Alongside this, UN Member States have paid particular attention to **peacebuilding financing**. Most notably this includes GA Resolution A/76/305 (September 2022) which “*recognizes* the important role of international and regional financial institutions in peacebuilding and sustaining peace, and *encourages* the implementation of the strategies adopted by the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as the relevant strategies adopted or being developed by other regional and international financial institutions focusing on operating in peacebuilding settings and conflict-affected countries and regions, including addressing drivers of conflict, and *further encourages* continued efforts towards strengthened partnership and strategic cooperation between the United Nations and international financial institutions at headquarters and field levels and consideration of joint initiative and analysis, where applicable, and shared priority-setting towards collective outcomes, complementarity and coordination in implementation, in line with national priorities”.

Another key normative orientation is the alignment of the UN Development System (UNDS) in support of the **Sustainable Development Goals**. Critically this includes awareness of a clear and growing attainment gap for FCS contexts, and the commitment to “no-one left behind” within the [Decade of Action](#) to 2030, including through SDG16. At a policy level, the linked agenda for UNDS reform

includes steps to strengthen the “outward orientation of the UN’s plans and programmes”, including alignment of the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework with the broader development financing landscape ([SWSD](#) 2019 p9; [UNSDCF guidance](#) 2019). Another important step has been a “reinvigorated” Resident Coordinator system to help align the full UN system in support of national priorities; and strengthen inter-linkages between sustainable development, humanitarian action and peacebuilding ([GA Res 72/729](#)).

For the most part, **Facility-supported projects have been intentional in responding to high-level institutional agendas for fragile settings**. At portfolio level the appraisal criteria (Oct 2021) note explicitly that Regular Track projects are supported “especially in contexts where the World Bank has new resources from IDA19” (now IDA20), and that they should normally be in contexts that are eligible for such allocations; and that Fast Track support should prioritise settings where “IFI partnership has been highlighted as a strategic concern by the UN leadership”. It is also a baseline expectation that it is the UN Resident Coordinator who submits proposals, and ensures alignment with in-country strategic planning and national priorities.

At the project level, in practice, we summarise the specific positioning of the five case studies in Figure 3a (overleaf). This is a difficult area to summarise neatly—any summary of policy processes in international cooperation rapidly becomes a sort of acronym soup—but the bottom line is that **most projects were designed with explicit links to UN/WBG country engagement processes**. This included direct support to:

- Joint assessment and strategy processes, notably the Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment in Haiti and Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment in Mozambique.
- Capstone analytic products used internally by one of the partners, e.g. the WBG’s Risk and Resilience Assessment in Somalia; and a UN Conflict and Development Analysis in The Gambia, and with the intention of supporting analytical convergence with the counterpart institution;
- Targeted analytic products to supplement core country-level strategy processes, e.g. a joint Political Economy Analysis for Chad with the intention of contributing to the WBG Risk and Resilience Assessment as well as the UN’s Common Country Analysis;
- Collaborative monitoring and review of allocations made under the WBG’s FCV envelope, including Turnaround Allocations in both Somalia and The Gambia.

At the less visible end of the spectrum, several projects were framed with the objectives and vocabulary of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, and specifically the internal UN language of the New Way of Working. This was the case for example, for the Regular Track project in Chad. It was correspondingly difficult to locate any specific points of contact with overall WBG objectives, despite the high rate of change in Bank strategy over this period including a brief suspension of engagement in 2021 (under [OP7.30](#) on de facto governments); a Prevention and Resilience Allocation in 2021, and a new Country Engagement Note in 2023. The Facility team noted in this regard that the project concept was to use a new, government-owned HDP roadmap as a point of convergence for UN and WBG priorities. It is also relevant to note that an anticipated further project is anticipated to embed in-country coordination capacities, and that stakeholders had concrete and specific ideas how this could contribute to collaboration challenges (see below p18).

In general, this earlier experience in Chad seems to be an outlier. In this regard the Facility team noted an ongoing challenge of “filtering out” proposals, especially under the Fast Track modality, that did not specifically address the WBG relationship but rather the broader coordination responsibilities of the

Resident Coordinator's office. The change in name from the "HDP" Facility to the "UN-IFI Partnership" Facility appears to have been a positive change in this regard.

Figure 3a: Positioning & relevance of selected PF projects

Policy context	Intended contributions
The Gambia	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Complex political transition from 2017- with successive National Development Plans. WBG: Turnaround Regime (IDA19) followed by Risk & Resilience Assessment (2021); Turnaround Allocation & accompanying strategy (2021); new CPF (2022-6). UN: Conflict & Development Analysis (2018-19) followed by CCA (2023) & new UNSDCF (2024-6). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collaborative monitoring of Turnaround Allocation & accompanying Strategy. Joint studies to help enrich and align relevant UN and World Bank analyses (e.g. CCA and RRA).
Somalia	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Protracted fragility & difficult political transition 2020-22. Mutual Accountability Framework (2019/20); national development plan (2020-4) & stabilisation plan (2023). WBG: HIPC decision point in 2020 followed by TAA (2020). Suspension of operations in 2021-22 followed by RRA (2023) and new CPF (2024-8). UN: Special political mission (UNSOM); CCA in 2020 and new UNSDCF (2021-25). Large humanitarian portfolio: appeal for USD 1.6bn in 2024. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support regular UNS-WBG dialogue, joint strategic reviews and reporting. Define & monitor collective priorities through the Mutual Accountability Framework. Harmonise policy approaches vis-à-vis Use of Country Systems.
Chad	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Protracted fragility and complex political transition 2021-22 with new national development plan (2022-27). WBG: RRA (2020). Brief suspension of operations in 2021 followed by RRA, PRA, and new Country Engagement Note (2023-24). UN: CCA (2020) revised in 2021 and followed by UNSDCF (2024-6). Engagement by regional political mission UNOCA; and Executive Committee / DSG "task force" in 2022. Large humanitarian portfolio: Humanitarian Response Plan for ~USD1bn, including WBG support under the Host Communities and Refugees window. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (Fast Track) Country political economy study to inform UNSDCF and anticipated Risk and Resilience Assessment. (Regular Track) Enable systematic Government leadership for the Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding Nexus (HDPN) approach. Support to Ministry-led HDPN roadmap, information platform, policy mainstreaming. (Anticipated) Creation of dedicated coordination support / liaison role.
Haiti	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chronic fragility & political crisis 2021-4. WBG: Engagement through Crisis Response Window + Contingent Emergency Response Components UN: Special political mission (BINUH) and UNSDCF for 2023-7. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support UN engagement with Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment (2024), with EU, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank)
Mozambique	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Longstanding conflict in northern provinces; regional development & resilience strategy adopted in 2022. UN: Executive Committee engagement; conflict strategy for North; new UNSDCF for 2022-26. WBG: RRA and PRA in 2020; new CPF for 2023-27. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support UN engagement with RPBA process (2021) Support GoM with implementation planning for regional strategy to address root causes of conflict in northern provinces (2022-23)

Within this context, and within this spectrum of outcomes, we observed the following kinds of contribution to overarching WBG/UN goals enumerated above.

(i) Crisis prevention and sustaining peace

All of the cases in Figure 3a can (reductively) be called prevention and peacebuilding contexts. This includes UN Security Council mandates in two cases (Somalia and Haiti); good offices by regional political missions in two more (Chad and The Gambia); and decisions on upstream prevention at the level of the UN Executive Committee (in Mozambique and Chad). All are supported by the UN Peacebuilding Fund; and four of five have engaged with the Peacebuilding Commission.

Against this background one of the key questions for this evaluation, and for the overall relevance of the Partnership Facility, is the extent to which peacebuilding initiatives have been usefully complemented and reinforced by the broader activities of the two institutions.

In this regard, many of our interlocutors highlighted the case of The Gambia as illustrating the potential of the approach. Stated simply, the PF project was proposed (in part) to enable collaborative monitoring and review of the Turnaround Allocation, and the accompanying Turnaround Strategy, that was agreed between the WBG and the national government in 2021. The supporting theory of change was that the UN could provide value-adding contributions to the overall Steering Committee, and supporting Technical Working Groups in relevant sectors. Critically these included politically sensitive areas—seen as root causes of conflict for most commentators—such as land policy, reform of national security services, and transitional justice.

We look the project's effectiveness in supporting this result in §4.1 below. For the moment we note that **this is highly relevant to the ambition to address “multi-dimensional risks of crisis”**. There is another very clear illustration of this in the Somalia case, where one highly experienced staff noted that “that kind of distinction between development and peacebuilding doesn't really make sense here – it all has to relate to the same long-term strategy”.

In both case several interlocutors commented that **“this is the practical application of *Pathways*”** [for Peace], and contrasted peace-positive WBG engagement with the narrower peacebuilding paradigm that guides entities like the UN Peacebuilding Fund (consistent with its mandate). Others in roles looking at whole-of-system coherence noted that in the past mechanisms for upstream analysis and recognition of crises—for example the UN's Regional Monthly Reviews, a key risk monitoring tool—have “always struggled to connect with practice”. From this perspective the Facility provided one of a very limited number of direct contact points with the wider landscape of development cooperation, not “in a directive way”, but to explore areas of policy convergence.

It is important to underline that the Facility's role in this regard is not limited to country-level projects (as in Figure 3a). Staff in the UN peace and security pillar, for example the joint DPO/DPPA regional divisions, emphasised that the Peacebuilding Strategy and Partnerships Branch (within which the Facility advisory staff sit as part of an integrated team) is often the first point of call to create these “contact points” with the WBG before country-level support comes online, as well as in cases where that support is not (yet) needed. There was a clear appetite to increase engagement along the same lines for other IFIs, including for example better information-sharing with the African Development Bank in Sudan and Chad.

(ii) Resilience & development outcomes

All of the cases in Figure 3a are also complex development contexts—and ones in which IFIs in general and the World Bank in particular are playing significant roles. The implication, for most of our interlocutors, was that it was “unthinkable” to address overall development coordination without sustained dialogue with the WBG, and in some contexts with highly engaged regional development banks.

It was noted with equal emphasis, however, that this has been a historical weakness for UN Country Teams, and that strengthening partnerships with IFIs was often “nobody's portfolio”. (Along these lines see a recent UN/OIOS evaluation of RC support to UN policy advice: [OIOS 2024](#) p21.) The lived experience within the WBG is unfortunately that the experience with the Resident Coordinator system is “extremely uneven”. Both across the case studies and from our interlocutors’ broader experience, we heard accounts of being “approached by four or five agencies with competing proposals”, and “asking us to deliver the same information multiple times to their own colleagues and counterparts”. This reflects a situation where UN agencies, funds and programmes have both incentives and resources to pursue funding partnerships with IFIs, but system-level funding for UN development coordination and the RC function has consistently hovered at a small fraction of annual targets and requiring constant difficult decisions about priorities (see e.g. the current breakdown of the [Special Purpose Trust Fund](#) used for this purpose).

In this regard the PF initiatives that we reviewed were overall **highly relevant and responsive to the need for “good partnering” by the UN system**, and alongside this the goals of UNDS reform (§1.2 above). In the context of joint processes such as Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments, for example, it was repeatedly emphasised that (i) it is essential to have sustained and dedicated engagement by a “non-agency” interlocutor, and (ii) that this could not have been achieved with the RCO resources that were otherwise available. In the Chad case, to give another example, we received strong feedback that an anticipated Regular Track project to deploy a full-term coordination support resource “should actually be less strategic and more operational”. On its face this sounds negative, but it was reflective of the degree and extent of challenges arising with coherence between large-scale WBG projects in refugee-hosting areas on the one hand, and a large international humanitarian response on the other (the [2024 Humanitarian Response Plan](#) is budgeted at USD 1.1bn). Conversely there was some frustration with repeated “high-level” and “strategic” interventions that were not sustained, or at least not effectively translated into UNCT activities as the UN institutions that are actually present in-country.

Within this context, **the challenge was not to the relevance of the Facility’s contribution, but to its adequacy as a response to a structural problem for the UN system**. It was repeatedly noted that within the evolving development landscape in fragile contexts, engaging with MDBs and specifically the World Bank was increasingly “core business”. Consultants who have been engaged in delivering Facility projects recalled in this regard that “the question always comes: Why isn't this happening already?”.

(iii) Gender and youth sensitivity

There has been at least one project with an explicit focus on gender-linked issues, namely Fast Track support to the UN’s Spotlight Initiative to eliminate violence against women and girls, to develop its IFI engagement strategy. The broader picture is that gender and youth-sensitivity are mainstreamed cross the Partnership Facility’s activities. Gender and youth inclusion are key selection criteria for grants. Implementation of activities supporting gender equality, women’s empowerment and youth inclusion is monitored through the PF’s engagement with grant recipient teams and progress reports. Through its advisory work, the PF consistently advocates for inclusion of a gender lens and gender disaggregated data

in such exercises as Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments and review of national prevention and transition strategies.

The clearest evidence of this mainstreaming can be seen in the application of gender and youth-sensitive criteria for grant selection. For example, to be eligible for funding, proposals must achieve a Gender Equality Marker (GEM) rating of 2, indicating that gender equality and women's empowerment represent a signification objective of the proposed grant. At the development stage, proposals were systematically reviewed by PBSO's dedicated advisor on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). While the specific activities related to gender and youth inclusion vary significantly across grants, the focus on these cross-cutting themes in the appraisal process ensure scrutiny of the merits of each application from these perspectives. Examples of results achieved from the case studies include:

- The 2024 Conflict and Development Analysis in the Gambia was gender sensitive. To ensure women could speak freely, separate focus groups were convened for men and women based on the experience from the 2019 CDA.
- In Somalia, the UN-WB Liaison Officer helped initiate training for the Ministry of Finance in Somalia on gender sensitive budgeting delivered by UNSOM's gender unit and UN Women. The UN-WB Liaison Officer also supported the gender and vulnerability-sensitive targeting of shock responsive safety net payments in a context where women and youth are disproportionately affected by shocks.

3.2 Coherence & complementarity

We have noted above that multi-dimensional prevention / resilience, and supporting development outcomes in highly fragile contexts, are growth edges for the WBG and UN. By this we mean that there have been multiple ongoing change and reform agendas over the reference period for this evaluation (§1.2 above).

The question follows: **While the Facility's projects were responsive to high-level UN/WBG policy goals, how did they fit in amongst other change agendas?** Or to be more granular: The Facility's current "phase 3" budget is about USD 3.5m, and the intent is accordingly to provide technical advisory support on a flexible basis; surge support in a dozen or so countries using the Fast Track modality; and dedicated coordination support in 4-5 "key contexts" using the Regular Track modality. The key question for coherence is then how these activities have fitted into a wider landscape of UN-IFI engagement in FCS contexts, which includes:

- 39 countries on the WBG's [2025 list](#) of fragile and conflict-affected situations (which already does not include several ongoing PF projects, e.g. in The Gambia and the Euphrates/Tigris basin);
- 31 countries with Humanitarian Coordinators ([IASC 2024](#)) and a small number with uprated (ASG-level) Resident Coordinator posts due to the complexity of the context;
- 73 countries selected for deployment of Peace and Development Advisors ([UNDP-DPPA 2023](#)), although in practice funding has fallen well short of this target;
- Targeted initiatives deploying Climate Security Advisers (DPPA-DPO-UNDP-UNEP) and HDPN / "Nexus" advisers (UNDP and other agencies); and
- Working agendas for multiple "upstream" prevention mechanisms, including the WBG's Compound Risk Monitor and the UN's Regional Monthly Reviews.

Within these long lists of *potential* focus countries, **the development of a pipeline of cases has been informal and exploratory**. While the project document notes a list of mechanisms to indicate “UN system priorities”—including the Regional Monthly Review process, the Executive Committee / Deputies Committee, and the Peacebuilding Commission—outreach by the Facility team regarding these country contexts did not consistently lead to interest or viable requests for projects. In the period reviewed there was also no regular exchange between these risk-monitoring processes within the UN Secretariat and those used by the WBG (most notably the Global Crisis Risk Platform / Compound Risk Monitor).

Within this context, the Facility Team focused much of its outreach and project development efforts for the group of countries seeking eligibility from the WBG’s FCV Envelope financing, and more specifically a Prevention and Resilience Allocation (PRA) or Turn Around Allocation (TAA).

It was clear from the project life cycle in the case studies, and the feedback from the Facility team, that they it has been essential to be **flexible and opportunistic, with a “menu” of potential support**. Advisory support, sometimes intensive, usually preceded and supported formulation of projects. Where Resident Coordinators chose to progress to the project formulation stage, the project appraisal process specifies a number of specific criteria including favourable positioning within the WBG's country engagement cycle, expected eligibility for allocations under the IDA20 FCV Envelope, and evidence of interest and ownership by both sides of the partnership. This is consistent with the broader practice of the Peacebuilding Fund—the host of the Partnership Facility—which is by and large demand-driven and requires a relatively strict application package to test enabling conditions (PBSO 2023).

The feedback on the outcomes that have emerged from this process—the global distribution of the portfolio—was reasonably positive. In asking about UN-IFI partnering processes we consistently heard from both stakeholders and funders was that “you wouldn't design it this way, but we have to be pragmatic”, and that “the perfect should not be the enemy of the good”. When tested a little further, the specific assertion here was that while the development landscape is changing rapidly, and that better engagement with IFIs in both fragile and non-fragile contexts is clearly indispensable for the UN development system to evolve and stay relevant, *in practice* the Resident Coordinator system faces chronic funding shortfalls (UNSDG 2023). The same is true for multi-dimensional conflict prevention, where there have been drastic reductions in budget for Peace and Development Advisors. To their credit, staff responsible for each of these mechanisms stressed that **it was a net positive to have focused attention on IFI partnerships in at least some contexts**, given the broader challenges of properly resourcing and supporting coordination, while still noting that more could and should be done to align and rationalise priorities at a system level.

Building upon this last point, we did hear clearly that there are risks to a primarily demand-driven approach, including both “type 1” errors (missing important cases that do *not* arise organically) and “type 2” errors (where time and financial resources flow to contexts that are *not* high priorities). Illustratively, one funding partner felt strongly that the Facility “should be supporting this critical relationship in the most important contexts”, and conversely avoiding “low-hanging fruit”. Staff with long experience of the Resident Coordinator system also felt that needs for enhanced coordination support are not necessarily identified and escalated organically, and that it was always an ongoing conversation for the Development Coordination Office (which backstops the RC system) on how best to prioritise and provide additional support in complex cases.

Our own supporting observations are that: (i) it was exceedingly rare for a conversation about WBG-UN cooperation not to include multiple mentions of “the personalities” (for good or ill), and (ii) attempts to

“get the timing right” on PF projects have had mixed success. (We discuss the latter point fully in §4.1 below).

The question follows: **Is there scope to be more intentional about system-level priorities for UN-IFI collaboration?** It was often noted in this regard that the 2016 Peacebuilding Architecture Review encouraged PBSO to act as a “hinge” between the peace & security and development pillars of the UN system. We suggest that this must be extended more broadly if the UNDS is to stay relevant in a changing institutional landscape in fragile contexts (§1.2 above). It is also essential in better defining the specific-value added of PBSO/PSPB in supporting these partnerships, as distinct from the role of DCO and broader support to the RC system.

We found that while it would be deeply unhelpful to approach this directly, in the sense of a formal steering committee setting priorities, **there was scope to facilitate more conversations about the sites and priorities for policy convergence with IFIs**. It was felt that this could be a natural working-level complement to mechanisms created for proactive / upstream engagement with multi-dimensional crises, including the Global Crisis Risk Platform on the WBG side and the RMR / EC/DC processes on the UN side. It was also noted several times that **increased partnerships with regional development banks would benefit from careful thinking about “good cases” or “proof of concept”** rather than proceeding with the first case that presented itself.

4. Outcomes achieved

This section looks at the effectiveness of the Partnership Facility's activities. We approach this from three complementary perspectives: (i) strategic alignment; (ii) enabling effective delivery; and (iii) system-level learning.

4.1 Strategic alignment

Key findings in this sub-section:

- An early emphasis on joint analytic and strategy products, following the orientations of the 2017 Partnership Framework, proved unnecessary and sometimes counter-productive. Effective PF projects instead equipped RC offices to recognise a range of different “touch points” for the purposive alignment of UN and WBG strategies.
- In all five case studies RCOs believed that Facility support—including remote advisory support—had been a key catalyst for engagement with the country-level strategy and planning processes of the WBG. Absent this support, it is likely that they would not have had the skills & capacity to credibly engage.
- Alongside this: Support to standing capacities, including dedicated capacities as in Somalia and DRC, best strengthened the ability to recognise and act on opportunities for strategic dialogue and collaboration. There is stronger evidence for this approach than for a specific focus on discrete high-level planning processes (e.g. Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments).
- Fast Track projects strengthened UN involvement with high-level strategy processes in the short-term, but always faced a “cliff-edge” in sustaining the necessary level of effort.
- Regular Track grants faced a number of implementation challenges in the early going. These included unpredictable timelines for partners’ strategy processes (which must be expected to continue); and difficulties with fiduciary requirements and following the “de-linking” of the RCO system (which have largely been overcome).

We discussed in the previous section how the Partnership Facility is positioned with regard to broader UN and WBG goals. The bottom line was that it supports multiple policy and normative agendas in crisis-affected contexts. These include “remaining engaged” and preserving development outcomes; the sustaining peace agenda and national prevention strategies; and inclusion / leaving no one behind with regard to global goals (notably the SDGs and IDA21 focus areas).

The 2017 Partnership Framework suggested that these high-level outcomes could best be supported through the WBG and UN developing “a shared understanding of risks and drivers of conflict”, “aligning strategies for collective outcomes”, and “leveraging comparative advantages”. This language has carried over to the PF's current project document, in which the Facility's contribution is to “enable joint analysis, planning, evidence and prioritization” (§2.1 above).

In practice, at the project level, outcomes were defined in a variety of ways (Figure 4a). In four of five cases² the specific focus was on completion of formal strategy and country engagement processes. These included government-led and inter-institutional Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments (Haiti, Mozambique), a government-led Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding roadmap (Chad), and the monitoring and review of a World Bank Turn Around Allocation (The Gambia). Across Fast Track deployments this has also been a common modality, either through delivery of high-level analytic products or by providing inputs on key themes within it.

Figure 4a: Planned outcomes in case studies

(source: as formulated in approved project proposals)

Context	Outcomes
Chad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A dynamic, nationally led system of mapping HDP approach[es] in planning instruments and programmes is established. ▪ A government HDP roadmap which takes into account gender and age specific root causes and drivers of fragility and vulnerabilities is implemented
The Gambia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Joint UN-World Bank cooperation mechanism in support of the government's implementation of its Turn Around Strategy. ▪ Joint UN-World Bank studies to help enrich and align relevant UN and World Bank analyses (e.g., the UN's Common Country Analysis and the Bank's Risk & Resilience Assessment).
Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Focused attention on UN-WB Partnership in Somalia through regular dialogue, joint strategic reviews and reporting.
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Coordinate the [Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment] Technical Process on behalf of the UN. ▪ Prepare and finalize the RCIA report.
Mozambique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Represent and lead UN substantive contributions to the completion of the joint EU, UN, WB, Government of Mozambique Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment.

The balance of this section looks at how and where projects have contributed to the emergence of these outcomes (§4.1.1), and which models / modalities emerged as more effective (§4.1.2). With the exception of the Mozambique example, all of the projects were ongoing at the time of evaluation as a result of costed or no-cost extensions.

² For information on the sampling strategy used for case study selection, see section 2.1 and the detailed inception report.

4.1.1 Contribution pathways

Over the lifetime of the Facility, **an initial focus on joint products and resources has given way to more flexible and realistic definitions of successful partnership.** Within the first two iterations of the PF project document (2019 and 2021), outcome-level indicators were defined around “joint frameworks”, and the quantity of financial resources mobilised against such frameworks, reflecting early ambitions for a widespread application of (for example) Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment methodologies.

In the current version of the project document these have been reformulated to refer to UN field leadership seeing “improved capacity to partner”, and “improved knowledge related to IFIs” in key sectors / thematic areas. We received strong feedback that **a flexible and context-responsive definition of policy outcomes is better fitted to purpose.** Conversely there was a consistent view that the shape of the country-level WBG/UN partnership must be “mission-driven” and not defined prescriptively. It was clear that this does not typically require the formal / textual alignment of the partners’ high-level country engagement processes, including both analytic outputs³ and top-level strategy documents,⁴ and that attempting this can often cause unnecessary difficulties. This aligns with the UN Secretary General’s repeated calls for more systematic, strategic alignment of UN-World Bank efforts *at the country level*, including in respect of dialogue with governments as well as programming.

The most important factor here has been that overall process design, and the corresponding timelines, must respond to the needs and expectations of multiple stakeholders. Illustratively on the WBG side it was noted that the eligibility request → allocation process for the IDA20 FCV envelope requires extended dialogue with national government; alignment with broader country engagement processes including in many cases a full portfolio review; and review and approval by the WBG Board of Directors (on process see e.g. IDA20 Replenishment Report). It is unrealistic that this entire process, which includes some Bank internal processes and requirements, be a fully joint exercise with the UN. Rather, over several years’ engagement with the Facility team, a more specific and realistic expectation has developed that the UN should be systematically engaged in dialogue around milestones and indicators as part of the government-led, national “action plan” that forms a core part of the eligibility and annual review process. These national plans typically touch on multiple areas where the UN has comparative advantage in terms of mandate and data, and where there is complementarity between Bank engagement and initiatives supported by the UN Peacebuilding Fund. In 2024, the Facility advisory team supported pilot joint reviews of PRA/TAA in four contexts which were well received.

One concern for the World Bank, as a veteran of RPBA and RRA processes put it, is that “there is a direct trade-off between the inclusion of more partners and how useful it is for us”. An example of such a “joint” product that was mentioned several times was the Risk and Resilience Assessment for Central Asia (supported by a Regular Track project, with co-financing from the World Bank’s Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund and the UK FCDO) with consultants selected and managed by the Bank. The process included unusually intensive involvement of the UN and FCDO—but for WBG stakeholders the end product was found “not operational enough” to feed directly into country engagement cycles in the region, and it had to be re-worked and supplemented for internal use-cases.

³ Including the WBG’s Risk and Resilience Assessments, Systematic Country Diagnostic, Country Climate and Development Reports; the UN’s Common Country Analysis, Conflict and Development Analysis, Humanitarian Response Plan.

⁴ Most notably the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and Humanitarian Response Plan; the WBG’s Country Partnership Framework or Country Engagement Note.

There is a further difficulty with defining expected outcomes around specific country engagement processes. This is quite simply that the timing and sequencing of these processes depends upon a range of factors outside the control or influence of the Facility. In The Gambia, for example, the PF supported a “refresh” of the Conflict and Development Analysis. Our interlocutors agreed that this provided a useful point of convergence on thinking and strategy—especially through engagement of relevant Ministries—but it was finalised after the UN's Common Country Assessment and UNSCDF, and the WBG's Country Programme Framework (and indeed commitment of nearly all of the IDA allocation).

If one evaluates this project based on the narrow, expected outcome of “aligning” these high-level analytic processes in a one-off occurrence, then it clearly failed. But we agree with the current iteration of the PF theory of change that this is not the right problem framing. **Our interlocutors consistently stressed that high-impact strategy work was not a one-off, but rather had a “one-to-many” relationship with a wide range of institutional processes and products.** A representative comment was that even within the WBG products like a Risk and Resilience Assessment were not “self-executing” but rather an ongoing process of “struggle to get the thing used, and being opportunistic or tactical”. This encompassed both:

- strategy processes resulting in Country Partnership Frameworks, which are informed by multiple analytical products (e.g. Systematic Country Diagnostic, Country Climate and Development Report, Risk and Resilience Assessment, Country Private Sector Diagnostic); and
- the project cycle in key sectors that were particularly “strategic”, or significant, so far as drivers of risk and conflict were concerned (e.g. project concept notes, project appraisal documents)

Building on this, we found that **effective PF projects contributed to a range of “touch points” in which there was purposive alignment of UN and WBG strategies** (in all cases with national priorities as a point of departure). This is consistent with broader experiences across the UN and WBG systems, where meta-evaluations for analogous initiatives to strengthen inter-institutional collaboration have discovered and re-discovered for decades the impossibility of “one size fitting all”, i.e. of standard models that work for all different contexts and stakeholder geometries, and have consequently urged attention to function over form.⁵

In the Somalia case, for example, it was repeatedly noted that the days of tightly orchestrated donor policy forums, linked to the Mutual Accountability Framework and HIPC completion points, were over. But there were nonetheless observable moments where WBG and UN activities were aligned and mutually adjusted. Some of the examples cited include:

- joint advocacy messaging around extension of IDA grant financing;
- development of milestones for the TAA allocation in 2024;
- input to UNSOM political strategy on economic and fiscal context, including the critical topic of post-HIPC financing priorities;
- dialogue on “state affordability” modelling, with coherent policy approaches to government support an indispensable / critical issue; and
- collaboration with DPPA, including the Security Council Affairs Division, ahead of mandate renewals for UNSOM.

⁵ Indicatively see [Quick and Demetriou 2017](#) on RPBAs; [IASC 2020](#) and [European Commission 2022](#) on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus; and [UNSDG 2023](#) on the UN approach to Integrated Assessment and Planning.

There were similar touch points in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the recently deployed UN-IFI liaison officer noted that alongside the drawdown of the UN stabilisation mission (MONUSCO) there were multiple highly significant policy processes around government stabilisation strategy, development and governance initiatives in the East of the country, and IMF engagement.

In The Gambia, likewise, while it is true that the Conflict and Development Analysis was finalised after the partners' respective high-level strategy products (notably the UNSDCF and CPF), this is to some extent irrelevant. The CDA process was designed to proceed under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Interior, and with engagement of other relevant ministries. It was also noted that:

- there were many contact points between the CDA and large WBG programmes supporting good governance and human capital investments;
- the UNSDCF and individual agency country programmes were living documents that were used in dialogue with evolving country priorities;
- the technical working groups established under the TAA monitoring process provided a point of dialogue and (potential) strategic convergence in key risk areas (e.g. land governance); and
- the CDA provided an entry point for the perspectives and experiences of women and youth which cut across sectoral lines.

4.1.2 Effectiveness of different models

There are two different approaches or (loose) “models” of support indicated in Figure 4a. One focuses upon high-level strategy and country engagement processes (e.g. the WBG-UN-EU process to develop a RPBA), and one is rather more open-ended (e.g. a dedicated post in Somalia to support “regular dialogue, joint strategic reviews and reporting”). This distinction is replicated across the larger portfolio, where Fast Track projects in particular tend to focus on discrete strategy processes (e.g. RPBA) or analytic products (e.g. RRAs).

The track record for the former model—support to a specific high-level process—is not strong. Most notably, The Gambia was often mentioned as a success story—a true “first-ever” of the UN engaging and adding value in monitoring and policy dialogue around a Turn Around Allocation. At a macro level this is largely true. The Steering Committee and supporting working groups for the TAA were far from perfect—internal records indicate that they operated intermittently and with limited policy impact in some key areas—but they functioned. The involvement of the RCO at the steering level, and individual UN agencies within sectoral groups, was widely regarded as adding value. The UN’s engagement at country level was supported through the advisory functions of the Facility over an extended period.

However, while the Facility made a clear contribution through its *advisory function*, the PF-supported *project’s* contribution was less clear. Within the project document the modalities of supporting the TAA mechanism refer only to “facilitating the sharing of information and data” which had been identified as a priority for both the WB and the UN, and in practice there seems to have been relatively little direct support. (The main point noted was the provision of office equipment, which was itself considerably delayed.) The more important drivers were focused attention from both sides of the WBG/UN partnership—with a highly active Peace and Development Advisor and Fragility Coordinator—and good pre-existing working relationships. In this regard the Facility’s main contributions were momentum and consistent attention within the RCO; specific “entry points” for dialogue between UN and WBG counterparts; and technical advisory by the PF team. Conversely, it would not be accurate to say that the regular track project itself directly created a transferable model for “TAA support”.

In process tracing terminology this is termed a “hoop test”. If the theory of change for PF main track project support to a country engagement process—here a TAA allocation—does not play out when all the enabling conditions seem to be present, is it likely that it does so elsewhere? A generous interpretation would be while *project implementation* in The Gambia example fell foul of structural challenges -- including the administrative bar (now lifted) on Resident Coordinators Offices implementing projects -- but that the overall *Facility support* nonetheless contributed to achieving the intended strategic result, demonstrating the value-added of the UN partnership in a TAA allocation context and serving as “proof of concept” for other settings. The presence of a highly capable Peace and Development Advisory team was a key enabling factor.

In practice we did hear similar accounts in other cases with more challenging stakeholder environments. In Chad, a Regular Track project to support a Ministry-led HDP nexus roadmap, was delayed for several years, and eventually amended to focus on products at an analytic and operational level. This was largely attributed to difficulties in getting the project off the ground in a fluid and transitional political environment, including significant government staff turnover. In Mozambique, a Fast Track project to support a RPBA for the North of the country helped to deliver the UN-EU-WB process within the required tight timelines and despite the constraints of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, once the fast-track project ended, follow-up on the RPBA beyond the project was described as lacking the intensive and consistent engagement that would have been needed to reach any sort of strategic convergence.

This is consistent with experience elsewhere in the UN and WBG. The UN’s Development Coordination Office, which is specifically charged with supporting the Resident Coordinator system, emphasised that while it was impactful to provide surge support for country engagement processes such as a CCA, there was always a challenge of “playing tag” before and after.

Figure 4a: Challenges and Lessons Learned from Three-Way Contracting Modalities for Regular Track Grants

In the context of the Secretary-General’s reform of the development system in 2019, it was originally envisaged that Resident Coordinators should not implement project funds (because this would place them in competition with Agencies). Accordingly, the Facility was faced with the requirement to support RCOs who could not directly receive financial contributions (and even lacked separate field-level bank accounts). To manage this, three-way contracting modality was instituted whereby the RCOs were to designate an implementing entity on their behalf to manage the fiduciary and operational aspects of the grants: this role often fell on UNDP as a RCO service provider and given pre-UNDS reform arrangements. However, Facility managers reported that the small size of the grants as well as lack of clear roles/responsibilities between RCOs and UNDP meant that the Facility grants were often second to UNDP core delivery business, facing significant operational bottlenecks and delays. In several settings, challenges were compounded by internal UNDP business management updates and reforms beyond the control of individual country teams. All three ‘regular track’ case studies selected for review in this evaluation were UNDP-implemented grants.

Challenges with the three-way contract modality were identified among the Facility’s internal lessons learned in 2021, and contributed to the decision to offer the “fast-track” option of support that centralizes contracting in the UNOPS team and lifted the burden of small grant manage-

ment from field teams. The Partnership Facility also (i) diversified to other implementing entities where applicable, and (ii) shifted to direct RCO grant transfers as soon as DCO confirmed the modality of locally mobilised resources (LMR).

More broadly a meta-evaluation of the implementation of all RPBA's over the period 2009-17 found that there was no viable distinction between an “assessment” phase and an “implementation” phase, and that “strategic management involved cultivating linkages between national and international policy agendas, finding consensus on how to move forward on divisive issues, and ensuring all actors are mutually accountable” ([Quick and Demetriou 2017](#) pXII). A more recent meta-evaluation, the Mid-Term Review of the WBG's FCV strategy in 2023, noted that FCS contexts require “a set of tools and decision points to enable crisis and risk monitoring, risk scanning, and creating opportunities to change course as necessary with a focus on adaptive management” ([MTR 2023](#) pV).

None of this is to say that it is not important to have representation and engagement in high-level strategy processes. All five case studies provided targeted support to the UN Resident Coordinator's office, and in each case they stated clearly that (i) it was very helpful to have a concrete offer in engaging with other institutions, and (ii) they would otherwise not have had sufficient capacity to be a credible participant. However they were equally clear that this was an ongoing need, and indeed a structural challenge for the UN system (§3.2 above). It followed, for most of our interlocutors, that the Facility support was a necessary but not sufficient condition for closer strategic alignment.

Looking forward, the more fundamental point is that a focus on specific high-level processes rests upon an excessively linear model of policy-making. In empirical policy studies the separation of “strategy” and “implementation” has been essentially abandoned (Yanow 2011; Weible and Sabatier 2018; Cairney 2020 ch 1). This is especially true in transnational policy contexts where research finds ongoing processes of mutual adjustment and translation rather than specific moments of policy “transfer” (Clarke et al. 2015 pp6-40; Peck and Theodore 2015 ch 1).

With this in mind we suggest that the more helpful conceptual starting point is **a variable rhythm of country operations marked by periods of intensive activity** to align problem definitions and strategy; exploratory technical and programmatic work that explores the solution space; and episodic shifts in the political landscape. At its best, and in addition to its sustained liaison and advisory offer from Headquarters, the Facility's grants then fitted into this bigger picture in two ways:

- (i) Fast Track surge support during critical periods—which may be UN/WBG country engagement processes, but could equally be moments of policy transition in key sectors, or changes in the national political context.
- (ii) Regular Track support to equip key coordinating functions (the UN RC Office, including Peace and Development Advisors, but also the WBG FCV coordinator) with the needed capacities to recognise and respond to opportunities for strategic collaboration.

4.2 Enabling effective delivery

Key findings in this sub-section:

- Much of what the Partnership Facility has delivered has focused on strategic alignment, but there is growing awareness of the need to support operational effectiveness of UN-WB partnership at a country level, notably in settings where there are TPI arrangements.

- To date, PF projects main contribution to UN-WB operational effectiveness has been primarily through regular track grants relating to information management and data, process coordination and programmatic coordination.
- As with the strategic alignment, most positive results in operational partnership were reported from contexts where the Facility financed dedicated staff capacity for IFI partnerships over time. The flexibility of the co-financed UN-WB Liaison function in Somalia is a model worth replicating.
- While TAA/PRA processes are typically viewed from a strategic alignment perspective, further consideration should be given to the operational effectiveness of monitoring processes. While the secretariat function for the joint mechanisms in The Gambia were ultimately not delivered with support from a PF grant, the model is one that merits further exploration.

Whereas strategic alignment focuses on “what” partners will be working towards, there are still many questions of “how”, practically, they will work closer together. **Much of what the Partnership Facility has delivered has focused on strategic alignment, but there has been an increasing awareness of needs and support for operational effectiveness of UN-WB partnership at a country level.**

Through the 2017 Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations, the UN and World Bank committed to “ensure that operational policies, frameworks and tools used by both organizations facilitate co-operation and improve the efficiency and complementarity between our respective operations.” This emphasized upstream processes of strategic alignment with implications for operational effectiveness. While such alignment creates an enabling environment for partnership, there remains a tremendous amount of “last mile” work to translate policy into practice.

On the World Bank side, the operational “how” was a major focus of the [mid-term review](#) of the FCV Strategy. The review found that while the strategy remained fit for purpose, the WBG still needed to adapt its engagement to FCV challenges. The proposed ADAPT framework puts forward recommendations designed to strengthen operational effectiveness in challenging environments, an approach that consists of “Anticipating FCV challenges earlier and better; responding Dynamically at all levels; Advancing the WBG’s approach to engaging the private sector; focusing on critical Partnerships; and building strong Teams.” The ADAPT framework is carried forward in the proposed [strategic directions for IDA21](#), while the Evolution Roadmap speaks to the need to “deepen partnerships” including by “enhancing operational partnerships”. This will have to be considered by the PF going forward.

4.2.1 How did PF projects contribute to effective delivery?

Through its grant facility, the Partnership Facility has supported operational effectiveness in ways that can be grouped into four main categories –information management and data, process coordination, programmatic combination, and a flexible combination of all three (Figure 4b). Grants that focused purely on upstream analysis—without a direct link to operational planning and coordination—are not addressed in this section as they relate more directly to issues of strategic alignment (§4.1 above).

Figure 4b: Partnership Facility grants supporting effective delivery

(Regular Track initiatives bolded and underlined.)

Information management & data	Process coordination	Programmatic coordination
Initiatives primarily related to COVID—19 data & coordination <u>Afghanistan</u> , Niger, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Ukraine	RPBA coordination (<u>Burkina Faso</u> , Libya, Mozambique) PRA/TAA processes (<u>The Gambia</u> , Benin)	Programme options for water management & climate change (<u>Tigris-Euphrates</u>) Programmatic stakeholder mapping / needs assessments (Côte d'Ivoire)
Flexible support: HDP Nexus coordination (<u>Cameroon, Chad, Niger</u>) UN-WB liaison functions in <u>DRC</u> & <u>Somalia</u>		

Summarising this experience:

- Several grants provided targeted support for **information management and data**. Most of these were fast track initiatives focused on COVID-19 response and recovery efforts, with the exception of a regular track initiative in Afghanistan.
- A mix of regular and fast track grants supported **process coordination**, notably in relation to RPBAs and PRA/TAA processes. While some focused on coordinating inputs in early stages of development, others focused on implementation or follow up actions.
- Grants supporting **programmatic coordination** tended to have a geographic focus. For example, a fast-track initiative supported programmatic coordination in two regions of Côte d'Ivoire, whereas a regular track initiative sought to reach consensus around achievable programme options for climate-resilient water management in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin.
- An important fourth category of **grants provides support more flexibly across these categories** related to operational effectiveness through regular track grants framed around either the HDP nexus or UN-WB partnership. These regular track grants often include objectives related to one or more of the categories above, but enable support to be provided more flexibly based on evolving needs.

4.2.2 How effective were different models?

The wide range of projects within each of these categories makes it difficult to make broad statements about the effectiveness of these grants with regards to operational effectiveness. Moreover, the frequency and quality of reporting by grant recipients is highly uneven, making it even more difficult to examine the effectiveness of grants at a portfolio level. Too often, grant recipients report on positive examples of partnership without demonstrating how results are attributed to activities financed by the grant.

However, the case studies conducted for this evaluation reveal a mixed track record of results (**Figure 4c**), which echoes a trend seen across the portfolio. Some recipients struggled to implement “regular track” grants as envisaged either because of overly complex contracting modalities (necessitated by the ban then in place on RCOs directly managing projects), lack of capacity in the face of competing priorities and staff turnover (Chad, The Gambia), or evolving needs in a volatile context (Chad). Meanwhile, fast-track projects were appreciated but came with problems of sustainability (Mozambique). **The most positive feedback and implementation came from two contexts (Somalia and DRC) in which the Facility grant enabled recruitment of dedicated staff capacity for UN-WB Partnership for an extended period.**

Figure 4c: Results highlights across regular track grant case studies

	Information management and data	Process coordination	Programmatic coordination
Somalia	Compiled data on aid channelled through UN agencies to government “on budget” and “on treasury”, supporting the agenda on consistent and coherent use of country systems	Supported development of new milestones for the Turnaround Allocation (TAA) in 2024;	Practically supports six projects representing US\$510 million in contracts between the government and UN agencies to deliver components of WB-financed operations through indirect third-party implementation (TPI)
Chad	Mapping of “HDP activities” focuses almost exclusively on humanitarian activities and actors ⁶ and an assessment of provincial committees in the East and South		
The Gambia	Updated CDA	TAA monitoring mechanisms established and operational, but results were achieved using internal resources (including PF advisory support) without use of the grant (results unattributable to grant)	

The grant for Somalia has a wide range of documented results spanning all three categories. The flexibility, positioning, and longer-term nature of the support enabled the UN-WB Liaison officer to support strategic alignment and operational effectiveness in a diverse range of ways (for details, see case study in Annex 4). The positioning of the role as a joint asset – co-financed by the UN and the World Bank with dual reporting lines – ensures the role is positioned to support partnership as a “two-way street.” By facilitating interinstitutional translation (e.g. unpacking each institution’s terminology and shortcuts), the Liaison Officer enables more meaningful engagement and dialogue. A unique feature of example has been the Liaison Officer’s role in supporting the expanding World Bank portfolio, which relies significantly on indirect third-party implementation (TPI) arrangements whereby the government contracts UN agencies to deliver specific components of World Bank financed projects. This has included providing advice on contractual arrangements, risk management and monitoring of operational partnerships.

In contrast, the grant for Chad appears to have been used for a government-led exercise on the HDP nexus (for details, see case study in Annex 6). Deliverables include a mapping of HDP activities that focuses almost exclusively on humanitarian actors and activities. For example, the stakeholder analysis section only includes humanitarian actors as per the 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan. There was no mention of the World Bank or other actors working on the development or peace pillars of the nexus. Lessons have been learned from this experience. The PF has limited scope to address systemic, longer-term development challenges in Chad in keeping with the funding's small size, timebound and catalytic nature. The PF is in discussion with the UN RCO and World Bank CMU in Chad on directing future support towards a liaison position similar to those in Somalia and DRC, but with a greater focus on operational coordination.

In The Gambia, while the CDA produced has been useful in supporting strategic alignment (see section 4.1), there have been delays with the delivery of additional planned analytical products and operational

⁶ While a strong focus on humanitarian activities would have been justifiable in the context, the report shared with the evaluators is silent on the role of development and peacebuilding actors. The mapping did not include any World Bank-financed projects, which appears to be a significant oversight.

support for joint mechanisms or TAA monitoring (for details, see case study in Annex 5). Project level reporting has been irregular, and in discussion with the relevant country-level stakeholders we were not able to get a clear picture of how funds have been utilized for completed or ongoing work.⁷ While joint mechanisms for TAA monitoring have been successfully designed and implemented, grant resources were not utilized to support the originally envisaged process. Collaboration on the joint mechanisms was carried out by existing UN and WB staff. This was due in part to significant delays in the three-way arrangement between the Facility, the RCO (which could not receive funding directly) and UNDP (as the operational partner). Progress stalled after the departure of the PDA, after which there was a lack of clarity within the RCO as to who would take forward the grant-financed activities. Had implementation worked as originally envisaged, more could have been done with the grant to support the government with the operationalization, maintenance and reporting of the Technical Committee and its working groups (e.g. support for secretariat functions). While the model of supporting joint mechanisms for TAA monitoring offers promise for replication, it would be important for implementation arrangements to include clearer lines of accountability.

The Facility team wished to emphasise in this case that they strongly believed project support had contributed to overall UN engagement with the TAA process (section 4.1 above), and that further reporting on project activities was available.

4.3 System-level learning

Key findings in this sub-section:

- The PF is slowly building a body of evidence that can lead to a better understanding of best practices.
- The ability of the PF to inform system-level learning through its innovative initiatives would be enhanced if it focused on a smaller number and narrower set of interventions from which lessons could be extracted and shared more systematically.
- There is clear demand for learning on both strategic/policy issues as well as operational effectiveness, as long as they tackle specific, practical challenges with tangible outcomes. There is more demand for knowledge management and learning around specific challenges, and less for broader IFI literacy initiatives.
- The lines are currently blurred between visibility products that highlight successes and tools that capture lessons learned. More effort needs to be devoted to capturing the latter with an unvarnished lens, even if they are not disseminated as broadly.

4.3.1 How did the PF contribute to system-level learning?

For the purposes of this evaluation, system-level learning is defined as the ability of the Partnership Facility (PF) to capture lessons from individual experiences and utilize them to inform or influence decision-making in other settings. The PF supports system-level learning in four main ways:

(i) Cross-country sharing

Through its advisory services and grants, the PF is able to support the sharing of lessons and application of similar practices across countries –with adaptations to the local context. **This is slowly building a body of evidence that can lead to a better understanding and potentially further adoption of best practices.** For example, the UN-WB liaison function supported by the PF in Somalia was replicated in

⁷ The latest report on this grant shared with the evaluators was dated October 2022. The only output shared was the CDA.

DRC in 2024 and is under discussion with UN and WBG counterparts in Chad. Similarly, the experience of establishing joint TAA monitoring mechanisms in The Gambia is informing the design of PRA/TAA monitoring in other countries, including countries in which the PF provides advisory but not grant support. Blogs are used to increase the visibility of innovative forms of partnership.

(ii) Knowledge management and learning activities

The PF uses its convening power to hold events on specific topics related to partnership in conflict-affected settings. Much of this work is done in close collaboration with the FCV Group. For example, the PF supported two events at the 2024 Fragility Forum to share knowledge and give visibility to *i)* emerging collaboration PRA/TAAAs and *ii)* a PF-financed, NYU-produced paper on security sector reform. The PF and FCV Group are organizing a joint UN-WB workshop in Nairobi in Q1 2025 to share lessons and experiences related to third party implementation.

(iii) High-level policy dialogue

The PF supports high-level and strategic policy dialogue on partnership in conflict-affected settings. For example, the PF supported dialogue between ASG Elizabeth Spehar, World Bank, African Development Bank, African Union and other stakeholders at the 2024 Fragility Forum on principled engagement in complex contexts, strategic and operational collaboration in prevention contexts, and the application of conflict lenses.

(iv) IFI literacy

The PF supports learning within the UN system to enhance IFI literacy through targeted training and a weekly round up of IFI news. After launching a training on IFIs 101 with DCO and NYU/CIC and hosting several deep dives, training events have primarily consisted of peer learning sessions on UN-IFI partnership at the global retreat of Resident Coordinators, although additional training opportunities are under development. Weekly roundups are circulated to a mailing list of over 650 recipients covering the latest news related to IFIs, often focused on the latest approved financing at country level and newly released analysis.

4.3.2 How effective is the PF's support for system-level learning?

While difficult to measure concretely, anecdotal evidence gathered through interviews and case studies reflect a track record of the PF effectively supporting system-level learning with limited resources. Interviewees noted in particular the positive contributions made supporting high-level policy dialogue, knowledge management and learning activities, and cross-country sharing. Limited feedback was shared related to IFI literacy, and country-level stakeholders generally viewed more functional, mission-driven approaches as being the most impactful.

The PF has demonstrated effectiveness in supporting system-level learning notably through its performance of the following three key functions:

Interinstitutional liaison: The PF's ability to collect and disseminate lessons at a system-level requires maintenance of a complex network of relationships across multiple, complex institutions. The PF is widely appreciated for the ability of its team to connect the right people across institutions and to frame issues in a way that resonates within different institutional parlance, be it at country, regional or headquarters level. The team effectively maintains a broad –but strategic– network, often serving an inter-institutional translation function. For example, the PF maintains regular dialogue with FCV Group colleagues in DC as well as many field-based FCV country coordinators. These discussions enable

regular sharing of lessons and experiences that extend beyond the specific initiatives supported through grants.

Bridging policy and practice: The PF ability to connect the dots between headquarters discussions on policy setting and implementation at country level enables it to play a strategic role in system-level learning. Its support for high-level policy dialogue is greatly enriched by the team's direct experience supporting partnership at a country level through its advisory services as they understand the sticking points to deliver on policy commitments.

Translating, not replicating: The PF is able to support cross-country learning because it understands the importance of translating lessons to the country context, as opposed to replicating the same model. It largely relies on the expertise and experience of the PF team a wealth of experiences to bear in their support for initiatives at the country level. For example, the UN-WB liaison function under discussion in Chad is expected to have a much heavier (if not exclusive) focus on operational effectiveness than the liaison function in Somalia. Although the terms of reference from the position are expected to be significantly different, lessons of the Somalia post are informing the design of the position in Chad (e.g. contractual arrangements, reporting lines, etc).

Several areas for improvement have been identified to strengthen the effectiveness of the PF's contributions to system-level learning.

While the PF has used blogs and the UN-WB partnership monitoring reports to give greater visibility to innovative partnership, these tools are not the most effective at capturing lessons learned. For example, [the blog](#) entry highlighting partnership around the TAA in the Gambia successfully showcased UN-WB collaboration around the TAA governance and monitoring structures. However, while this example did benefit from the advisory support from the PF, the grant component designed to support the process was never delivered. A blog is not the appropriate vehicle to get into the weeds of how something is delivered, but this aspect of storytelling is critical for capturing lessons learned. Moreover, many lessons are learned from cases where results were not delivered to plan. Visibility products are not well suited for frank examinations of areas of improvement, something the PF could capture more systematically to inform system-level learning.

The PF team is stretched very thinly, which is in part by design as it represents a core component of PBSO's role as system-wide focal point for UN-IFI partnership in crisis-affected settings. However, the breadth of initiatives hinders its effectiveness as the PF is not able to devote enough resources to documenting unvarnished lessons from the initiatives it supports. The PF is highly reliant on the skills, experiences, relationships and lessons of the staff, but much of this experience is not documented and easily accessible/shared. Documenting lessons across all of the initiatives the PF supports is daunting because there is such a wide range of initiatives, notably for fast track grants. The reporting on regular track grants is uneven (some recipients non-compliant with annual reporting requirements, and the quality is uneven across those that do report), and there is limited documentation on fast-track initiatives beyond the collection of any outputs produced (e.g. analytical reports). The risk of losing this institutional knowledge could be mitigated, and greater efficiencies gained, if more resources were devoted to capturing lessons of fewer initiatives.

The effectiveness IFI literacy efforts is particularly difficult to determine. While there is added value in ensuring that standard introductory material (*i.e.* a WBG 101) is available and disseminated within the UN system, the effectiveness and efficiency of resource intensive efforts such as a weekly roundup of IFI

news around the globe in strengthening partnership is less certain. With limited internal resources, a shift from media monitoring to capturing lessons learned would likely strengthen the PF's effectiveness.

5. Delivery model

This section switches focus from the country-level work of the UN/WBG systems to the operations of the Partnership Facility itself. We first summarise for clarity the Facility's current ways of working, given its somewhat unusual design. We then discuss (i) strengths and comparative advantages and (ii) weaknesses and risks.

Key findings in this section:

- The Facility is a system-wide shared resource that would be extremely difficult for UNCTs or RCOs to replicate or otherwise access. It has clear comparative advantages in pooling resource mobilisation and expertise in this quite specialised area.
- Strategic selection of institutional entry points—as exemplified by its close partnership with the World Bank's FCV Group—is key for the Facility's efficiency to identify and support partnership opportunities as they arise across a diverse range of countries.
- The overhead costs of the Partnership Facility are relatively high, but this is justifiable given its focus on a growth goal / emerging challenge for the UN and WBG. It should not be directly compared with much larger mechanisms that can use more efficient modalities.
- There are opportunities to reduce transaction costs in the next phase of the Facility's work. The Fast Track modality, in particular, can prioritise speed and responsiveness for a recurring set of needs. There will also be efficiencies in simplifying the Regular Track modality to support coordination capacities and moving more design/strategy work in-country.

5.1 Current modalities

The PF is constituted through a project funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund, with the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) as managing entity and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) as the fund recipient and operational partner. UNOPS then holds the full budget (less indirect and secretariat costs) for project-level disbursements via two modalities:

- **Fast track (FT):** Direct recruitment of short-term consultants under IICA or LICA contract. These positions are administratively managed by UNOPS but substantively report through the Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) or another UN entity in-country.
- **Regular track (RT):** Pass-through funding by UNOPS to an implementing partner at country level, using a UN-to-UN contribution agreement. Implementing partners have included the DCO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNEP and UNODC, typically with agencies providing the administrative support for services substantively managed by RCOs. Grants have been used primarily to recruit short-term consultants or firms, with the exception of those supporting full-time liaison positions.

The grant approval cycle is unique to the PF as they are essentially mini-projects within a project. The normal oversight processes for Peacebuilding Fund projects operate at the level of the Partnership Facility project as a whole, which includes the block of funding for RT and FT grants, and the management of individual RT grants and FT deployments thus falls within the mechanisms set out in the project document rather than the PBF's more general mechanisms.

Within this context, the current standard operating procedures set out the following processes:

- **Fast Track** proposals are submitted by Resident Coordinators and reviewed by the PF Secretariat on a rolling basis. Approval is delegated to the deputy head of PBSO.
- **Regular Track** proposals are also submitted by Resident Coordinators on a rolling basis, with copy to their relevant IFI counterpart. After a preliminary review by PF Secretariat, they are appraised by the Project Appraisal Committee which is chaired by PBSO's Senior Partnerships Advisor. Approval authority for RT grants sits with the Senior Project Approval Group, chaired by the PBSO ASG.

5.2 Strengths & opportunities

The most important comparative advantage of the Partnership Facility is its **economies of scale as a shared technical resource that can be used flexibly across different country contexts**. Most obviously this enables consolidated fundraising for an issue where it would be extremely difficult to mobilise resources at country level. There was clear feedback that the transaction costs would simply be too high to mobilise funding at the small scale used for individual PF grants (e.g. a single coordination post, or time-limited surge support).

Funding partners emphasised in this regard that it was important for the UN to “have its house in order” and avoid a “profusion of different appeals for coordination roles”. It was noted that while there is potential overlap with general-purpose funding for the RCO system (the Special Purpose Trust Fund) and for Peace and Development Advisors (through the UNDP-DPPA Joint Programme), this was still vastly preferable to a high number of small uncoordinated appeals from individual RCOs. These considerations apply equally to the RT and FT modality.

There are also important economies of scale in consolidating expertise and experience in a highly specialised issue area. Our interlocutors in RCOs were at pains to stress that UN-IFI coherence is a niche area of expertise that is rare despite its growing importance (on the latter see §1.2 above). But **what is a very occasional or one-off task for a RCO head of office is the everyday work of the Facility's Secretariat**. The PF is in a unique position to help due to its depth of experience across cases; a strong informal network of potential experts; pooled rather than case-by-case funding; a consistent and “plannable” level of demand viewed at system level; and (for Fast Track projects) the established modalities with UNOPS.

With a small team, the PF is able to foster relationships across a wide range of countries through its **strategic selection of institutional entry points. By supporting functions with a cross-cutting coordination role, the PF is able to efficiently identify opportunities to support partnership**. The close partnership it maintains with the World Bank's FCV Group—both at headquarters and country level—has been central to its success. At country level, FCV coordinators are especially well placed to identify opportunities for collaboration of relevance to the PF, given their cross-cutting function, focus on FCV issues and instruments, and close collaboration with Country Management Units (CMUs). The PF is pursuing a similar strategy with other IFIs, which is sensible and should be carried forward.

Pursuing a broader range of partnerships with different units within IFIs (such as the World Bank Global Practices) would likely have a poorer return on investment. It would require significantly more resources from the Partnership Facility, both in terms of the time invested by its staff and the possibility that it would require hiring more staff with specialized expertise relevant to the targeted unit. Similarly,

while coordination with the State- and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) is logical to maintain as part of the PF's broader collaboration with the FCV Group, it should not be the focus of partnership efforts, given the limited opportunities for co-financing.

Due to the above advantages **the Facility is able to provide timely support. The feedback from country-level partners was overall very positive about the overall speed of Facility-managed recruitment and deployment process, and the responsiveness of the Facility's team in the critical early stages of scoping needs and role design.** (In contrast, the timeliness of recruitment by UN Agency recipients of PF grants has been a significant challenge, which is addressed further below.)

5.3 Weaknesses and risks

A number of risks and weaknesses, already acknowledged by the PBSO team in earlier internal reviews, relate to the management of grants by recipient Agencies. While the PF delivered timely support when deploying in-house resources or directly contracting consultants through the Fast Track modality, the timeliness of recruitment and delivery by grant recipients was sometimes poor. We heard reports of very long recruitment processes—a year-plus—due to difficulties with job design, three-way contracting arrangements (i.e. a different fund recipient agency performing the task on behalf of the RCO), and challenges identifying candidates with the relevant skill-set for this area of work. The latter point was also reflected in qualitative challenges, including at times lack of the necessary “grip” and perseverance for the inter-institutional dimensions of the challenge (whatever their level of technical skills).

In addition to being slower, the grant modality also carries higher indirect costs. As a PBF project, donor contributions are subject to the 1% administrative agent fees for the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, 3% pass-through fees to the PBF, and a portfolio-level 7% levy of indirect costs for UNOPS as the recipient organisation for the Partnership Facility. RT grants are then subject to a second layer of indirect costs (typically 8%) taken by the recipient agency which signs a UN-to-UN agreement with UNOPS given that RCs and their offices could not directly receive funding. As DCO moved to adapt their policy on Locally Mobilized Resources, the Facility took this into consideration in the design of later grants, including with a higher proportion going through UNOPS

These indirect costs are higher than some obvious points of comparison, notably the UNDP-DPPA Joint Programme, and the Special Purpose Trust Fund that funds the Resident Coordinator system. However to say this is to compare apples and oranges. The Facility represents 1.3% and 2.6% respectively of the total proposed budget of these mechanisms, and it is almost certainly true that at much larger scale the Facility could be constituted without a managing agency. There would also be substantial economies of scale—i.e. lower costs per project—in handling larger numbers of transactions.

While there are potentially opportunities to minimize indirect costs by managing more of the recruitment on behalf of RCO grant recipients, in general **higher overheads are a necessary compromise for a Facility addressing emerging / frontier trends in FCS contexts**, and doing so with a pilot-size budget.

Within the broader innovation literature it is widely accepted that this role tends to require bespoke implementation architecture to complement mainstream operating processes—because the latter are tuned to operate at large scale but with limited flexibility (e.g. Govindarajan and Trimble 2010; Christensen and Raynor 2013). In testing this hypothesis we encountered frank acknowledgement from those holding the relevant system-level mechanisms, most notably the Development Coordination Office, that there simply wasn't the bandwidth to engage at the necessary level of depth with IFI

partnerships. This is a pragmatic attitude that should be commended, and does not mean there is no work to be done on system-level coherence (as noted in §3.2 above.)

For its next phase, the Facility should be looking for **efficiencies and opportunities to reduce transaction costs**. One key fact here is that on the figures that we reviewed, the 14 RT grants account for 80% of disbursed funding, while the remaining 20% is made up across 27 FT grants. This suggests that the latter is the natural starting point for streamlining and reducing the time commitment and opportunity costs per transaction. A second key point is that it has been difficult to “get the timing right” at country level, and that flexible in-country capacities has generally been a more effective approach (§4.1.2). These factors suggest several orientations for streamlining:

- Pipeline of experts: The Facility has a strong comparative advantage here. This should be offered as the default for Fast Track initiatives, though always with space for local adjustment.
- Role design: There is scope to “do less” and streamline the offer. The clear majority of Fast Track projects fit into a short list of categories including RPBA or RRA processes, thematic analysis, conflict analysis, data coherence, and prevention-oriented Covid-19 recovery. Efficiency could be improved if the basic models of support are pre-defined and prioritized, leaving flexibility to be responsive to stakeholder configurations on the ground, and dynamics of the political context.
- Timelines: Building in more realistic timelines would reduce costs associated with the need to make regular revisions and extensions. There was consistent feedback that timelines were often unrealistic (e.g., several months of consultant support for processes that extend much longer).

We also identified a key dependency upon the presence of Peace and Development Advisors (PDAs) as a consistent country-level interlocutor. We heard repeatedly that the presence of a PDA is “absolutely instrumental”, both for interviewees within the WBG’s FCV Group, and for the Partnership Facility itself. In practice, proposals have nearly always been developed by a PDA and there was a notable drop-off in delivery as well as reporting in several of the case studies when this key post changed or was left vacant. This will certainly pose challenges in the short to medium term.

The wider context is that the Facility aims primarily to strengthen the Resident Coordinator function at country level, following the principles of UNDS reform. In practice, this must deal with a light standard staffing complement, which does not by default include expertise in FCV issues or IFI partnerships. Consequently this gap has usually been filled by a PDA post, which are funded separately under a UNDP-DPPA Joint Programme. But the number of PDAs is expected to decline substantially in the next few years. This poses a material contextual risk for the PF, given how it has operated to date, and warrants careful consideration.

6. Recommendations

This section draws on the findings set out in Sections 3-5 to provide a set of forward-looking recommendations.

Our starting observations here are that the Facility sits on a growth edge for both the UN and WBG systems in FCS contexts (§1.2 above), and that it currently operates with a pilot / startup mindset. By this we refer to its demand-driven approach to find opportunities with “early adopters” (§3); highly customised offer to each country-level client (§4.1-2); and specific focus on supporting system-level learning (§4.3). Equally it has focused on positive results in specific contexts and, to a large extent,

“parked” the exact division of labour with broader system-level mechanisms to support UN coherence (§3.2 above).

Several critical questions follow. Where is there potential to scale up impact from a smaller group of early adopters to the wider system of UN coordination in fragile settings? Which are the areas of proven comparative advantage that should be strengthened and consolidated, and to enable this which areas might be pared back or streamlined? And what new considerations and complexities arise in striving for broader / more mainstream relevance and embedding of lessons learned?

We group our recommendations in this regard around three overall roles for the PF, namely as:⁸

- **service provider:** drawing on its economies of scale for a shared, system-wide resource in a specialised technical area;
- **learning platform:** using its whole-of-system perspective to rapidly capture and transfer learning between country contexts; and
- **portfolio manager:** clarifying system-level priorities for UN-IFI collaboration in fragile settings, and reflecting these in resource allocation.

These roles are already present in the Phase 3 project document to varying degrees. Looking forward to the next phase, the following recommendations should thus be understood as evolutionary and incremental, in the sense of adding-removing-enhancing-subtracting.

PF as service provider

The Facility is a centre of expertise in an area that is growing rapidly in importance but still very specialised. There is an opportunity to achieve greater economies of scale in this work—as a shared, system-level resource for UN-IFI collaboration—by establishing a more streamlined offer. This can be separated into three “tiers” of support:

- **Tier 1: Advisory and liaison.** Define a clear, plain-language offer or “menu” of the thematic issue areas and processes where the PF can provide advisory support. At a planning level it is important to define the value proposition for both RCOs / UNCTs and the UN peace & security pillar, and include a protected time/budget.
- **Tier 2: Surge support (Fast Track).** There is clear value in the Facility developing and maintaining a pipeline of experts or informal roster. The default should be to provide a short-list of candidates to the “client”, subject always to country-level requirements, to avoid unnecessary bottlenecks in recruitment. (Conversely, stakeholders did not feel that the cost and administrative complexity of a formal stand-by roster were warranted at this point.)
- **Tier 3: Standing capacities (Regular Track).** There is good evidence for the effectiveness of flexible in-country support, and we agree with the current project document’s focus on dedicated UN-IFI “liaison” roles. This must however be carefully targeted given its high cost relative to the small size of the Facility.

We also suggest the following to **reduce transaction costs**, above all the opportunity cost of the Facility team’s time, for these three tiers of support:

- For advisory and liaison support, explore the scope to progressively transform recurring issues and challenges from a context-specific advisory service (one-to-one, not scalable) to a learning resource (one-to-many, highly scalable). This point is discussed further below.

⁸ On these three roles within organisational strategy see Porter 1987; Collis & Montgomery 1998; Ghemawat 2007.

- For surge support (Fast Track), focus on efficiency and responsiveness rather than high levels of tailoring to context-specific needs. In this regard it may help to identify recurring tasks and accompanying role designs, including initially (i) collaboration on PRA/TAA processes; and (ii) high-level strategy processes such as RPBA's. The overall time window should also be extended in many cases to "project-ise" role design work within the deployment rather than at the level of the Facility.
- For Regular Track support, establish a flexible and repeatable model from which RCOs (and other stakeholders) can elaborate on their specific needs. If it is essential to have detailed work on scoping or role design, there is a strong case for using the Fast Track modality rather than tying up scarce PF resources for extended periods. This will be especially important given the expected downscaling of Peace and Development Advisors over the next few years.
- For Regular Track support, avoid wherever possible three-way contracting arrangements at country level, i.e. where the fund recipient is different to the primary "client". In general the Facility should equip the primary "client" (normally the Resident Coordinator's office) to handle coordination and management issues in-country, including a budget for incidentals.
- Across these tiers, maintain the strategic selection of institutional entry points, focusing on fostering/maintaining partnerships with FCV counterparts in IFIs to maximize efficiency.

PF as learning platform

The Facility has a currently unique system-wide perspective for the capture and transfer of lessons learned. Conceptually this can be described as identifying innovators who are at the front of the adoption curve; identifying potentially useful lessons and experience; and finding channels to share this with the wider "mainstream" audience of RCs/UNCTs (Rogers 1962/2003). It is potentially the most scalable and cost-efficient dimension of the Facility's work, and we suggest the following as the main lines of effort:

- Systematic capture and transfer of (unvarnished) lessons learned. The Facility's current reporting products are essentially for improving visibility, showing possibilities, and building momentum. We agree that it is critical to cultivate stakeholder support for the Facility—there is no long term without this—but it is equally important to develop products that have the frankness and granularity to meet practitioners' needs.
- On the supply side this can be started simply and informally, perhaps with tools akin to those used by the DPO/DPPA Policy and Best Practice Service (After-Action Reviews for key processes, End of Assignment Reports for surge support, etc). On the demand side the PF might first explore entry points such as inductions and professional development for Resident Coordinators (e.g. the former Montreux retreats) and Peace and Development Advisors.
- Scope learning initiatives at the level of specific thematic issues or functional challenges which need to be "solved" by in-country leadership. The upcoming UN-WB workshop on Third-Party Implementation modalities and experiences, which has had a very high level of interest, is a good proof of concept in this regard.
- De-prioritise IFI literacy as a general goal. At global level the size and turnover of the UN's workforce mean that it is easy to imagine this task absorbing the PF's full budget while yielding minimal results (as one interlocutor put it, "boiling the ocean"). We suggest focusing on the development and dissemination of a small number of highly scalable products. One example that was mentioned several times was a revitalised "World Bank 101" offering akin to that published in the mid-2010s.

PF as portfolio manager

There is space to be more intentional about system-level priorities for collaboration between the UN and IFIs, and to manage the overall PF portfolio to signal and support these priorities. This should specifically reflect the Facility's positioning in PBSO as a potential "hinge" between goals for upstream prevention / sustaining peace, and the country-level mechanisms and objectives of the UN Development System.

We suggest approaching this through a working-level process to connect and synthesise perspectives—facilitating better conversations about the Facility's forward agenda—rather than a formal body to make decisions about who gets what. This is particularly essential in deployment of the third "tier" of support (standing coordination capacities) as the project document anticipates deployment in just 4-5 "key contexts" globally.

Specifically this more active portfolio management approach could include:

- Drawing upon both UN and WBG processes for upstream conflict prevention, e.g. the RMR process and the Bank's Crisis Risk Monitor, while being mindful that timelines for UN and WBG strategy are measured in multiple years and the Facility is not a viable "rapid reaction" tool.
- Identifying system-level priorities for strengthening partnerships with IFIs beyond the WBG. It is a valid, indeed very compelling, selection criterion to find good cases for "proof of concept" that can build confidence with new partners (and feed into system-level learning).
- Coordinating on priorities viz. general support of the Resident Coordinator system in fragile contexts (via DCO), and the deployment of Peace and Development Advisors (with UNDP-DPPA), given that both are critical enablers for Facility-supported projects. This could include exploring entry points for transfer of lessons learned by the Facility, for example within induction and training support for key personnel.
- Retaining flexibility to respond to emerging threats / opportunities—one interlocutor suggested a 70/30 rule for proactive vs reactive grants which may be a good starting point.

Annexes

A1. Terms of reference

This project evaluation presents an opportunity to assess the achievements of the Partnership Facility in an inclusive way and to determine its overall added value to promoting the partnership between the UN and International Financial Institutions towards shared peacebuilding outcomes for maximizes collective impact.

In assessing the degree to which the project met its intended objectives and results, the evaluation will provide key lessons about successful approaches and operational practices, as well as highlight areas where the project performed less effectively than anticipated. In that sense, this project evaluation is equally about accountability as well as learning.

Objectives of the evaluation:

- (1) Assess the relevance and appropriateness of the project in terms of:
 - Strategic alignment: Did the Facility effectively contribute to implementing the 2017 UN-WB Partnership Framework and subsequent SG-level policy guidance on alignment of UN-WB efforts on prevention and peacebuilding?
 - Responsiveness to clients: Did it effectively respond to clients' needs and circumstances, such as on learning and UN literacy?
 - Efficiency: Did the modalities used deliver value for money?
 - Gender/Youth-sensitivity: To what degree did the project address cross-cutting issues such as gender equality and women's empowerment, as well as youth inclusion in its various activities?
 - Innovation and catalytic effect: Did the Facility catalyse policy and/or finances beyond its own outputs?
- (2) Document good practices, innovations and lessons learned emerging from the project.
- (3) Provide actionable recommendations for future programming.

This evaluation will examine the project's implementation process, partnership and peacebuilding results, drawing upon the project's results framework as well as other monitoring data collected on the project outputs and outcomes as well as context. Evaluation questions are based on the OECD DAC evaluation criteria as well as PBF-specific evaluation criteria.

Evaluator(s) should ensure that evaluation of the peacebuilding results is the main line of inquiry. Peacebuilding projects frequently employ approaches that work through thematic areas that overlap with development or humanitarian goals. An evaluation of peacebuilding projects, however, must include not only reflection on progress within the thematic area but the degree to which such progress may or may not have contributed to addressing a relevant conflict factor. The evaluator(s) are encouraged to look into other dimensions such as behavioural/organizational change.

The evaluation should assess the project's theory of change (see [PBF Theory of Change Guidance Note](#)), and, if shortcomings are found, the theory of change must be reformulated/improved by the evaluator(s). Evaluator(s) are expected to create a theory of change for projects that did not have one at the design stage. Assumptions behind the project's theory of change must be clearly articulated and assessed for validity by evaluator(s).

(Indicative Evaluation Questions within OECD DAC criteria)

A2. Adapted evaluation questions

Relevance:

- Did the project adapt sufficiently (retaining relevance) to evolving needs for strengthened UN-IFI partnership, notably the shift from a broader focus on the HDP nexus to a more targeted focus on prevention and peacebuilding?
- Did the project's theory of change articulate relevant assumptions about the opportunities and constraints to constructive UN-IFI collaboration?
- Was the project relevant to the UN's peacebuilding mandate and the SDGs, in particular SDG 16?

Efficiency:

- Did the project deliver value for money, *i.e.* did it deliver results in an economic and timely manner?
- How did the operational set up of the Facility and programmatic scope of work influence its efficiency?
- Were the project's initiatives well-timed to address a conflict factor or leverage political windows of opportunity for engagement?

Effectiveness:

- Did the project's objectives and design effectively contribute to the implementation of the 2017 UN-WB Partnership Framework and subsequent SG-level policy guidance on alignment of UN-WB effort on prevention and peacebuilding?
- Did the project adequately capture evidence of results and its contribution to peacebuilding goals an appropriate level of attribution?
- To what extent did the project address cross-cutting issues such as gender equality and women's empowerment and youth inclusion?

Sustainability:

- Did the project effectively catalyse UN-WB partnership that was maintained or scaled up following the initial investment?
- Is there evidence of continued behaviour change as a result of funded initiatives?
- In instances where the project funded specific outputs/deliverables, is there evidence of these deliverables being used for their intended purpose and duration (*i.e.* was there follow through on partnership activities initiated by the Facility)?
- Did the project ensure adequate and appropriate plans for sustainability and/or exit strategies in its initiatives (including promoting national/local ownership)?

Coherence:

- To what extent does the Facility have a clear comparative advantage relative to other funding mechanisms?
- Does the project effectively complement (and avoid duplication of) the work of different entities, especially other UN actors the World Bank's Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF)?

PBF comparative advantage:

- Was the project's operational structure adequate to ensure an ongoing conflict-sensitive approach? Was it responsible for any unintended negative impacts?
- Did the project adopt an appropriate level of risk appetite? Were risks adequately monitored and mitigated?
- Did the project incentivize novel or innovative approaches? Were lessons learned sufficiently captured and disseminated?

A3. Case studies

Case 1: Somalia

Grant description

The Partnership Facility provided co-financing for the Joint UN-WB Liaison Officer post in Somalia in 2021 (USD 204,000) and again in 2024 (USD 271,059). Since its establishment in 2017, the position has been continuously co-financed by the UN and World Bank. Contracted through UNDP, the position is co-located in the UN Integrated Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC and the WB Country Management Unit (CMU), with dual reporting lines to the head of the UN Integrated Office and the Senior Operations Officer in the CMU.

Originally focused on strategic alignment, the position has evolved to play a significant role in supporting operational effectiveness. The objective of the 2021 grant was to strengthen UN-WB partnership in Somalia across the HDP nexus in support of Somalia's transition out of fragility. Interviewees highlighted the relevance of the role in a context where there was "an extreme amount of work at the intersection of the UN and WB mandates" and where peacebuilding and prevention work is an integral part of all development activities. The objective of the 2024 costed extension specified strengthening both strategic and operational UN-WB partnership, reflecting the increased focus on operational partnership, which had dramatically expanded, notably through an increased reliance on indirect third-party implementation (TPI) whereby the government would contract UN agencies to deliver specific components of World Bank financed projects. The costed extension also included an enhanced focus on generating and sharing lessons from Somalia to inform the global UN-WB partnership.

Given the operational modalities of the World Bank, the role has necessarily entailed close collaboration with government. This has only intensified with the increased focus on operational effectiveness, requiring greater engagement with government at multiple levels. Whereas issues of strategic alignment were largely co-ordinated with federal counterparts, operational effectiveness has required greater engagement with sub-national government counterparts.

Results

UN-WB strategic alignment has been deepened since 2021. In addition to collaboration on foundational analytics and strategies (e.g. CCA, UNSDCF, RRA, CPF), there is evidence of increased sharing of analysis across institutions and increased dialogue on priorities and approaches to strategic challenges. The Liaison Officer:

- facilitated joint advocacy across Government-UN-World Bank, which enabled Somalia to receive an additional year of grant financing (before transitioning to concessional loans);
- worked closely with the World Bank's FCV Country Coordinator on the 2023 RRA and development of new milestones for the Turnaround Allocation (TAA) in 2024;
- developed a code cable for the SRSG, DSRSG/RC/HC on post-HIPC financing priorities, which was consulted with the World Bank to set the narrative and inform UN HQ leadership on future priorities;
- facilitated joint UN-WB-EU collaboration to conduct a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment following the recent historic floods to shape joint support to resilience building;
- provided input for the UNSOM political strategy on economic and fiscal matters;
- provided quarterly economic analysis and frequent briefs to UN Senior Management to enhance the UN's assessment and analysis of Federal-State relations, which are at the heart of peacebuilding efforts in Somalia;

- encouraged UNSOM's gender unit and UN WOMEN to facilitate a training with the Ministry of Finance on gender sensitive budgeting to inform the 2025 budget;
- facilitated dialogue on UN & WB support to local governance and stabilisation efforts and on 'state affordability' modelling (working towards a joint understanding and coherent support to government on the role and size of the state across sectors including security).

UN-WB **operational effectiveness** has been strengthened. The Liaison Officer has played a key role in supporting the expanding World Bank portfolio, which relies significantly on indirect TPI arrangements with UN agencies. This has included providing advice on contractual arrangements, risk management and monitoring of operational partnerships. Support has been especially critical in coordinating flood and drought response efforts. The Liaison Officer:

- practically supports six projects representing US\$510 million in contracts between the government and UN agencies to deliver components of WB-financed operations through indirect third-party implementation (TPI);
- supported UN agencies, government ministries and World Bank teams in the finalisation of new agreements for flood response (US\$80 million) and food security;
- compiled data on aid channelled through UN agencies to government “on budget” and “on treasury” and externally financed staffing embedded in government, supporting the agenda on consistent and coherent use of country systems.

The Liaison Officer has also supported **system-level learning** by capturing and disseminating lessons learned related to UN-WB partnership in Somalia. In the context of the WB Fragility Forum, the Liaison Officer co-authored [a blog post](#) with the FCV Country Coordinator dedicated to the UN-WB partnership in Somalia. The Somalia Integrated Office has participated in a variety of events, showcasing the successes of the project.

Enablers

Co-financing ensures shared skin in the game: As one interviewee explained, “it’s not just about having more boots on the ground, but having shared skin in the game to at least try to translate the priorities from our perspective to like-minded and similarly oriented partners across the HDP nexus.” Co-financing by both the World Bank and UN was seen as critical to ensure a shared stake in the role. Anchoring the position between the RCO and CMU, with dual reporting lines, was also key for ensuring a shared stake in ensuring the success of the function.

Positioning of role as joint asset enables more meaningful partnership: Seen as a core team member by both the WB CMU and the UN RCO, the Liaison Officer supports partnership as a “two-way street,” as opposed to one institution trying to influence the other. By facilitating interinstitutional translation (e.g. unpacking each institution’s terminology and shortcuts), the Liaison Officer enables more meaningful engagement and dialogue. Interinstitutional translation is viewed as a necessary process of mutual adjustment needed to bridge two organizational cultures.

Providing full-time support enables early action: Interviewees emphasized the full-time nature of the role, requiring an individual that can proactively adapt to evolving needs. “It’s a full-time job. When we have a function acting as liaison officer, things get picked up and addressed straight away. When we don’t have it, things reach a boiling point and we have to deal with it as firefighting rather than anticipating a problem.” The importance of relationship building was seen as key to this function: “Whether you can resolve [an issue] in a productive way depends on the people involved and how much they know about each other.”

Genuine commitment to partnership from leadership: Interviewees highlighted the importance of genuine interest and commitment to partnership (not just lip service), which required UN and WB colleagues sitting down and hashing out how to do business together. It wasn't "just about a document that we do together and then it sits in a drawer for 2 years while we pat each other on the back," but rather about "finding real issues" to tackle collectively.

Constraints and challenges

- While UN and WB teams see the Liaison officer as a core team member, the institutions themselves struggle to recognize the jointness of the role, which inhibits access to internal systems and creates bureaucratic challenges (e.g. for mission planning, duty of care). This is further complicated by the fact that the RCO is unable to hire the Liaison Officer directly, requiring an agency (in this case UNDP) to handle the contractual arrangements.
- The need for the Liaison Officer in Somalia as a core function is broadly recognized, but the funding arrangements are determined on a short-term basis. More discussion is needed on the sustainability of the arrangements, if the function is to be maintained.

Case 2: The Gambia

Grant description

The 2022 Partnership Facility regular track grant of USD 400,000 was designed to enhance UN-WB collaboration in The Gambia in relation to the Government's Turn Around Strategy and joint analysis. The timing of the grant was strategic. The WB had approved a 3-year Turn Around Allocation (TAA) of US\$ 225 million to support the Government's implementation of its Turn Around Strategy centred on 5 strategic objectives: (1) security & political stability, (2) governance & transitional justice, (3) land management, environment & climate change, (4) human capital development and (5) inclusive growth and economic stability. The UN was in the process of updating its Common Country Analysis (CCA) and developing its first UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF).

The grant's first objective was to support the design and implementation of a joint UN-World Bank mechanism to (1) facilitate UN support to the government's implementation of its Turn Around Strategy and (2) facilitate the sharing of information and data between the UN and the Bank on the government's annual performance on achieving key milestones under the first 3 strategic objectives of the Strategy.

The grant's second objective was to "undertake a series of joint UN-World Bank analyses that would serve to (1) align the two organisations' thinking and strategic objectives as they relate to root causes of fragility and conflict, as well as to sources of resilience / peace engines and (2) propose parameters for a more structured UN-World Bank collaboration going forward, including in the areas of cross-fertilisation of analyses (e.g., the UN's Common Country Analysis with the Bank's Risk & Resilience Assessment) and enhanced collaboration between the two organisations. The grant was to finance three joint UN-WB studies and an update of the UN's 2019 Conflict and Development Analysis with inputs from the WB.

The delivery modalities for supporting either objective are not elaborated in detail in the grant proposal. The budget indicates that the support would be delivered primarily through consultant services evenly split across the two objectives. UNDP served as the implementing partner in support of the Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO).

Results

For the first time anywhere in the world, the UN was fully integrated in TAA monitoring structures in The Gambia— Steering Committee, Technical Committee and Technical Working Groups. The participation of UN Agencies in the TWGs in particular helps the inform a collective assessment of the government's progress towards TAA milestones and enables fine-tuning of indicators for monitoring progress. This enables the UN and World Bank support to the government to be more aligned, coherent, and consistent. Furthermore, the project opened up space for collaboration and trust beyond the activities listed in the original project document.

UN-WB strategic alignment could have been further strengthened had the Partnership Facility grant been used to support the TAA monitoring mechanisms as originally intended. While joint mechanisms for monitoring have been successfully designed and implemented, grant resources were not utilized to support this process. Collaboration on the joint mechanisms was carried out by existing UN and WB staff, including the PF team; no consultants were contracted to support the process, as envisaged in the original proposal. A Steering Committee, Technical Committee and working groups have been established, providing a space for dialogue between the Government, the UN and the World Bank on progress against TAA milestones. The Facility –through its advisory services (if not its project grant)– was successful in fully integrating the UN into these Bank structures, the first time this has ever been achieved globally.

- The Steering Committee has met twice (January 2023 and March 2024) to conduct an annual joint review of the implementation of the Turn Around Strategy and achievement of TAA milestones. The meetings were used to discuss progress at a political level and to set the strategic direction for the work of the five TAA technical working groups. It is chaired by the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA) and co-chaired by the World Bank Resident Representative and the UN Resident Coordinator. The process of writing the project proposal –and the related dialogue between the UN and World Bank– contributed to the addition of the RC to the Steering Committee. Members include senior government officials and development partners.
- The Technical Committee has not maintained regular sectoral progress consultations and reporting has been inconsistent against some key milestones. While joint UN-WB analytical work delivered under the second objective have proven to be useful sources of analysis for discussions, more could have been done to support the government with the operationalization, maintenance and reporting of the Technical Committee and its working groups. Close collaboration between the Facility (through its advisory services), the RCO and the World Bank was responsible for enabling the inclusion of UN Agencies in all 5 Technical Working Groups, not just the 3 envisaged in the ProDoc. UN Agency contributions to these WGs were significant and greatly aided the Bank to monitor the government's progress towards the milestones.

In addition to supporting monitoring mechanisms, the grant proposal aimed to “facilitate UN support to the government's *implementation* of its Turn Around Strategy.” It is unclear what exactly this support would have entailed, and slow progress against TAA milestones indicates that additional support to help focus attention on lagging areas would still be beneficial.

The project has been more successful at supporting **UN-WB strategic alignment** through analytics, although the timeliness of deliverables could have been enhanced. The key deliverable financed by the grant –the updated CDA– was finalized in May 2024, after the CCA and UNSDCF were already completed due to institutional misunderstanding on technical and managerial roles and responsibilities as well as personality dynamics. The CDA was a key input used for the application to renew The Gambia's eligibility to access the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The CDA has been very useful for the World Bank

given that the context has changed significantly in the three years since it conducted an RRA. In addition to providing more updated information, it also goes into more depth and granularity on issues related to security sector reform and justice than a typical RRA.

Enablers

Clear links to the TAA process, with strong potential for replication in other contexts, provided a strategic entry point for strengthening UN-WB partnership at both strategic and technical levels. While the grant ultimately was not used for the establishment of joint mechanisms (and relied instead directly on existing staff and personnel), the experience is informing discussions around replicating the model in other contexts. The evaluators were not provided with information on how unused funds were re-allocated.

Established habits for partnership: The World Bank and the IMF both participate regularly in the UNCT in The Gambia, which remains rare in most countries. There is a track record of collaboration in recent years that has been maintained despite staff turnover.

Constraints and challenges

- A lack of clarity on who would be responsible within the RCO for implementation of the grant has been a key hindrance resulting in low ownership and accountability. For example, there has been no reporting by the RCO on grant progress since October 2022. Recruitment and procurement procedures facilitated by UNDP have been slow, contributing to delays. The grant proposal also had a lack of clarity in how support would be provided to deliver the first objective related to designing and operationalizing joint mechanisms related to the TAA.
- Although the TAA monitoring mechanisms are innovative in the way they create space for inclusive dialogue between the government, the UN and the WB, there is still a mismatch in the expectations of how they are meant to operate and what they are intended to deliver.

Case 3: Chad

Grant description

The 2022 Partnership Facility (PF) regular track grant of US\$ 400,000 for Chad was designed to support the Government and partners in the implementation of a nexus approach, to enhance the impact of investments in development, humanitarian response and peacebuilding. More specifically, the grant was to be used to:

- (i) Establish a nationally-led system for mapping operational activities across the HDP nexus that would be updated on a quarterly basis;
- (ii) Support the development of a Government HDP roadmap, including strategic priorities and concrete entry points for collaboration;
- (iii) Establish a shared data collection/sharing mechanism to support evidence-based policy making and national planning; and
- (iv) Integrate costed HDP priorities in key national planning and budgeting frameworks, strategies, sector plans and programming frameworks with partners.

The proposal built on existing strong collaboration between the UN and WB on various analytical pieces including the World Bank's Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA), the UN's Common Country Analysis (CCA), consultations on the Prevention and Resilience Allocation (PRA), and a Political Economy Analysis produced with a Fast Track grant from the PF.

The financing was to be used to hire a dedicated HDP advisor in the office of the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator to strengthen collaboration with the World Bank, support the Government's leadership role, and support HDP actors to work better together more generally. Administered by UNDP, the position was to be co-located between the RCO Chad and the Ministry of Planning. Systems established over the 18-months of support were to be handed over to government counterparts at the end of the grant period.

Results

While the Chadian context more broadly provides many examples of strong and innovative UN-WB partnership, to which the PF has clearly contributed, the regular track grant made minimal contributions this partnership on HDP nexus convergence due to numerous challenges. After multiple delays and a request by government to cancel the HDP advisory position, funds were reallocated to contract local personnel and short-term consultants to support the establishment of nationally-led coordination structures for HDP convergence zones, including the complex response in eastern Chad. The closing date was extended from June 2023 to December 2024.

Interview for the evaluation were conducted in mid-2024, more than a year after the project was originally slated to end. At this point, deliverables under the project included a mapping of HDP activities that focused almost exclusively on humanitarian actors and activities. For example, the stakeholder analysis section only includes humanitarian actors as per the 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan. There is no mention of the World Bank or other actors working on the development or peace pillars of the nexus. It should be noted that the project is still ongoing and contacts with the World Bank are regular at a technical level.

The activities contracted have yielded results that were of benefit to the government, and helped the UN, WB, and other partners align under a government vision. Lessons have been learned from this experience which focuses on higher-level processes as opposed to also supporting operational delivery (where support was also crucially needed) , and the Partnership Facility is in discussion with the UN

RCO and World Bank CMU in Chad on directing future support towards a liaison position similar to those in Somalia and DRC, but with an even greater focus on operational coordination.

Enablers, constraints and challenges

There were many enablers in Chad, notably the strong track record of partnership between the UN and WB. However, they were unable to overcome the constraints and challenges. Lack of oversight of the activities delivered given complex three-way arrangement with UNDP and confusion over managerial roles/responsibilities also seems to have been a challenge, given the deficiencies highlighted above.

Acronyms

ASG	Assistant Secretary-General
CCA	Common Country Analysis
CDA	Conflict and Development Analysis
CMU	Country Management Unit
CPF	Country Partnership Framework
DCO	Development Coordination Office (of the UN Secretariat)
DPO	Department of Peace Operations (of the UN Secretariat)
DPPA.	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (of the UN Secretariat)
DSRSG/RC/HC	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General / Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator
EC/DC	Executive Committee / Deputies Committee (of the UN)
FCV Group	Fragility, Conflict and Violence Group (of the WBG)
HDP(N)	Humanitarian, Development and Peace (Nexus)
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (Initiative)
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee (of the UN humanitarian system)
IDA19/20/21	Replenishment process for the International Development Association (19 th , 20 th , 21 st)
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
OECD DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBAR	Peacebuilding Architecture Review (of the UN system)
PBSO.	Peacebuilding Support Office (of the UN Secretariat)
PDA	Peace and Development Advisor
PF	Partnership Facility
PSPB	Peacebuilding Strategy and Partnerships Branch (of PBSO)
PRA	Prevention and Resilience Allocation
RC	Resident Coordinator
RCO	Resident Coordinator's Office
RECA	Remaining Engaged during Conflict Allocation
RMR	Regional Monthly Review
RRA	Risk and Resilience Assessment
SRSR	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TAA	Turn Around Allocation
TPI	Third-Party Implementation
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSDCF	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
UNSDG	United Nations Sustainable Development Group
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
WBG	World Bank Group

References

For readability we have linked policy and working documents within the text wherever possible. These references connect to the broader research literature and are not essential to follow the thread of argument.

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