# SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PEACEBUILDING FUND PROJECT DOCUMENT TEMPLATE



#### PBF REVISED PROJECT DOCUMENT

Country(ies): Sudan

Project Title: Support to the Sudanese Peace Process. 3rd Amendment – April 2024; 4th Amendment – July 2025

**Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway (if existing project):** 00125403

PBF project modality:

IRF

⊠ PRF

If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund (instead of into individual recipient agency accounts):

Country Trust Fund Regional Trust Fund Name of Recipient Fund:

The color coding for project amendment is as follows:

- Black: Represents the original text in the project proposal.
- Black strike through: Indicates deletions made in the original text during the first round of reprogramming in December 2022.
- Red: Denotes new text that was inserted into the document during the first round of reprogramming in December 2022.
- Red strike through: Signifies text from the first reprogramming that was deleted during the second reprogramming in September 2023.
- Blue: Marks new text that was inserted during the second round of reprogramming in September 2023.
- Green: Marks new text for the third round of reprogramming in April 2024
- Purple: Marks new text for the fourth round of reprogramming in July 2025
- The new result framework has been developed with black font in the first round of reprogramming in December 2022, thus any black strikethrough from this point onwards in the result farmwork pertains to deletions made in the second round of reprogramming September 2023. The blue text represents updates made during this same round.

This system allows you to easily track changes and updates made to the project proposal over time.

List all direct project recipient organizations (starting with Convening Agency), followed by type of organization (UN, CSO etc.):

UNDP, UNHCR (already completed its activities)

List additional implementing partners, specify the type of organization (Government, INGO, local CSO): Local CSOs and Academic Institutions: Peace Research Institute, University of Khartoum and Peace and Development Centers in the 5 Darfur states, Two Areas and in the Eastern states of Sudan.

INGO: Norwegian Refugee Council, Zenab for Women Development, SAHARI Organization, Sudanese Org for Relief and Recovery (SORR)

Project duration in months<sup>1</sup>: 24 Months 39 Months (New End Date: 5 April 2024), 57 months (New end date: October 5, 2025)

Original timeframe 24 months –Dates: 5 January 2021 – 5 January 2023

1st Project amendment (no-cost extension and amendment), additional 15 months – Dates: 5 January – 5 April 2024

2<sup>nd</sup> Project amendment (only amendment due to the war). Dates remained the same: 5 January – 5 April 2024

3<sup>rd</sup> Project amendment (no-cost extension and amendment), additional 18 months – Dates: 5 April 2024 – 5 October 2025

4<sup>th</sup> Project amendment (no-cost extension and amendment) additional 4 months - Dates: 6 October 2025 – 29 January 2026

Geographic zones (within the country) for project implementation: National, with state-level intervention for North Darfur and Gedaref State. National

Does the project fall under one or more of the specific PBF priority windows below:

Gender promotion initiative<sup>2</sup>

Youth promotion initiative<sup>3</sup>

☐ Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions

Cross-border or regional project

## Total PBF approved project budget\* (by recipient organization):

**UNDP:** \$ 2,893,620

**UNHCR**: \$ 1,106,380 (UNHCR completed its activities)

Total: \$4,000,000

\*The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSO's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account. For payment of second and subsequent tranches the Coordinating agency needs to demonstrate expenditure/commitment of at least 75% of the previous tranche and provision of any PBF reports due in the period elapsed.

Any other existing funding for the project (amount and source): N/A

 PBF 1st tranche (70%):
 PBF 2nd tranche\* (30%):
 PBF 3rd tranche\* (\_%):

 UNDP: \$2,025,534
 UNDP: \$868,086
 UNHCR: \$331,914

 Total: \$2,800,000
 Total: \$1,200,000
 Total:

#### Provide a brief project description (describe the main project goal; do not list outcomes and outputs):

The purpose of the project is to channel support to the peace process in Sudan, including implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) alliance on 3rd October 2020. Three areas of intervention are foreseen:

- 1. Support to National Peace Architecture, including design and establishment of the Peace Commission, which still does not have an agreed organisational structure nor terms of reference, and other entities at national and sub-national levels, mobilisation of civil society, and development of a National Strategy for Peace, with accompanying financing framework;
- 2. Immediate support to the ongoing peace process, as well as to pre-implementation of the JPA, including a communications, outreach and advocacy campaign at community level to popularise the agreement, technical and financial assistance to organisation of events and processes envisaged in the JPA, and data collection and analysis to establish baselines to inform programming of international assistance;
  - 3. Support to Government to ensure that effective coordination and establishment of reporting, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are in place to promote accountability of peace agreement implementation, in line with binding international and regional legal instruments.

The project is an innovative attempt, built on the integrated nature of the UN mission and nexus working of the UN Agencies, to facilitate and support an unfolding national peace process. Implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement, and the development and implementation of a national Peace Strategy, will be both transformative and catalytic in establishing a new social contract, in preventing future conflict, and in all efforts toward SDG attainment.

While the purpose of the project remains to channel support to the peace process in Sudan, including implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) if and when possible, to do so, and to support an emerging peace infrastructure, the priorities for peacebuilding activities have been adjusted to take account of the limitations imposed by the 25 October 2021 coup. The Framework Agreement signed on 5 December 2022 was an encouraging sign of progress towards a civilian led government, but the recent armed conflict that broke out on the 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has undermined the prospects of lasting peace, prosperity and democracy in Sudan. Efforts to resolve the political crisis in Sudan continue at the beginning of 2023 with the signing of a Framework Agreement on 5 December 2022 widely recognized as an encouraging first step. Should a political deal be reached swiftly, and a civilian led government installed, transitional priorities, especially the support to transitional institutions and JPA commissions, can be strengthened as part of the projects current Outcomes and in close cooperation with UNITAMS. The conflict has since engulfed the metropolitan area of the capital, Khartoum, the Darfur States and the Kordofan States in an active armed confrontation and violence between the belligerents with dire implications on the civilian population that suffers from the violence and from a multifaceted socio-economic and humanitarian crisis. The civilian population is exposed to serious threats, as they are being mobilized, divided, including through hate speech and affected by human rights violations. The conflict has also damaged the country's critical infrastructure, services, and social cohesion, affecting millions of people who are already vulnerable and in need of humanitarian assistance. This has increased the risk of ethnic polarization and fragmentation of the country, with regional implications.

However, while the current status quo continues, the project will focus on support to credible local level and grass roots peacebuilding initiatives and community based conflict resolution and prevention mechanisms as part of a bottom-up approach to infrastructures for peace/peace architecture. Activities will be prioritized that stabilize conflict affected and vulnerable communities, build the capacity of local peacebuilding actors, promote social peace, inter-communal dialogue and awareness raising, build resilience and promote good offices to help communities mitigate and manage the threats to human security in the months ahead, for example, by easing tensions and competition over natural resources (land, water and gold), access to services and livelihoods, as well as progressing durable solutions for IDPs and host communities.

Previous and new activities and outputs have been re-organized with a stronger focus on local-level structures and actors, to contribute to the two Outcomes of the PBF MPTF joint Strategic Results Framework for Sudan:

• Support to peace processes and agreements, here comprising support to the mechanisms and processes of the JPA where these are understood as urgent and immediate priorities of the Government, which have the support of UNITAMS, and which can be delivered in the remaining Twelve month timeframe of the project; advocacy and communications work to promote public awareness of the JPA; and on demand facilitation of the ongoing Juba peace process between the Government and armed groups not party to the JPA.

- Support to Sudanese 'infrastructure for peace, primarily at national and the local level, including the development of the evidence base for peacebuilding and peacemaking, including the search for durable solutions for IDPs and refugees, mobilization and capacitation of civil society groups, and coherence and integration with regional platforms and programmes for peace.
- A subnational level stabilization intervention to provide infrastructures and support effective local and state based structures, mechanisms and procedures to prevent reoccurrence of violence between farmers and pastoralist in North Darfur through, inter alia, improved demarcation and management of migratory corridors, strengthening of the rule of law, and social cohesion activities as part of an emerging local level architecture for prevention and peacebuilding in the state, enhance social cohesion and peaceful co existence among internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities in Gedaref State, East Sudan, through improved access to services, livelihood opportunities, and social cohesion activities. Furthermore, the project will also provide additional support to the winter agricultural season of 2023–24 and to nomads in North Darfur to respond to the growing needs of both farmers and pastoralist, enhance their resilience and livelihoods through various interventions and activities. This proposed intervention in North Darfur will build synergies with the ongoing and reprogrammed PBF supported Youth Promotion Initiative which aims to provide support to farmers in North Darfur for the winter agricultural season of 2023. While the reprogrammed YPI offers seeds and related training on agricultural practice, the SSPP project will complement the seed distribution through the provision of agricultural tools to the same selected beneficiaries. Furthermore, the SSPP project will also provide assistance to nomads, through provision of solar items, in order to be inclusive and conflict sensitive with a view to historical tensions between farmers and nomadic pastoralists and to prevent perceptions of a one-sided intervention favoring one group over the other.
- The project aimed at facilitating the Sudanese peace process initially achieved significant milestones, including assisting in the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) and ensuring active participation from women and civil society. Post-signing, it focused on implementing the JPA through capacity-building initiatives for key institutions and conducting Darfur-wide consultations to garner public support for the agreement. However, implementation faced severe setbacks due to a lack of political will, culminating in an October 2021 military coup that restricted engagement with government counterparts and necessitated a one-year no-cost extension approved in April 2023. The outbreak of war shortly after required reprogramming activities to focus on social cohesion among internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities in Gedaref and North Darfur amid Sudan's growing internal displacement crisis. December 2023 marked another critical juncture when al-Jazeera state was overtaken by RSF forces, followed by escalating violence that destabilized Eastern regions such as Gedaref and heightened conflict in North Darfur throughout early 2024. With both areas classified as high-risk by the UN and facing coordination challenges due to an internet blackout, timely implementation of remaining project funds has become increasingly difficult. Compounding these difficulties, UNITAMS' mandate termination left critical gaps in peacebuilding efforts.
- To that end, given the urgent need for a peace and then political process to unfold with the meaningful participation of Sudanese women, the proposed new phase of the project aims to advance the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda in Sudan, promoting women's participation and empowerment in peacebuilding processes. This includes enhancement of the UN Country Team's capacity to address gender-specific challenges and promote women's participation in peace processes, strengthening the national implementation of the WPS agenda by engaging with Sudanese stakeholders and providing technical assistance to government institutions and civil society organizations, through the establishment of a WPS Advisor position within the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator's office in Sudan. The WPS advisor will provide specialized guidance, coordinate and partner with key WPS actors, and support community-level peacebuilding initiatives led by women's groups to promote the WPS Agenda and amplify the voices and advocacy efforts of women in peace processes through media platforms. This project has the potential to significantly enhance peacebuilding efforts in Sudan and serve as a catalyst for advancing gender equality and women's empowerment in the region.
- While the purpose of the project remains focused on strengthening the implementation of the Women Peace and Security agenda, the activities and outputs have been revised to accommodate the limitation of resources and delay in the recruitment of the Women Peace and Security Advisor. In this regard, the project will continue to support the Women Peace and Security Advisor at the office of the Resident Coordinator to continue advancing the WPS Agenda in Sudan for the period of the extension, with a focus on strengthening the UN Country Team's capacity to address gender-specific challenges and support women-led community-level peacebuilding initiatives.

Summarize the in-country project consultation process prior to submission to PBSO, including with the PBF Steering Committee, civil society (including any women and youth organizations) and stakeholder communities (including women, youth and marginalized groups):

- The original project has been prepared at the request of the Transitional Government of Sudan (TGoS) expressed at the September 2020 meeting of the PBF Joint Steering Committee for Sudan. It responds directly to needs expressed by the Peace Commissioner, following consultations with armed groups, UNAMID, UNITAMS, and UNCT Agencies. The project was approved by a meeting of the Technical Level Working Group of the PBF Joint Steering Committee held 7th December 2020.
- UNDP has organized extensive consultations in October and November 2022 to respond to the re-programming request by PBF for the project. Consultations have been organized with the UNITAMS Peacebuilding Unit in Khartoum, UNITAMS Regional Office in the Two Areas, UNHCR, UNDP Regional Office in North Darfur, and FAO.
- Activity components to support farmers during the winter agricultural season of 2023-24 and nomads were designed in consultations with and in line with needs expressed by the North Darfur Governor, Farmers and Nomads Associations, the Sahari Organization, and the El Fasher Agricultural Research Station in September 2023.
- The project interventions in Gedaref state are furthermore based on the assessment recommendation of the Joint Multi-Sectoral Sites Assessment of the Proposed Locations for the Relocation of the IDPs in Gedaref State. The assessment was done by state government institutions, NGOs, UN agencies, and state ministries on August 15, 2023.
- This new phase of the project was developed based on crucial needs identified in workshops on how to support the transition from UNITAMS to UNCT. These workshops were conducted in a format of consultations with the UN Country Team and stakeholder communities, which captured the views of women, youth, and marginalized groups. Thus the WPS Advisor post was identified as one of critical capacity gaps in the Transition in Sudan document.

### Project Gender Marker score<sup>4</sup>: \_2\_

Specify % and \$ of total project budget allocated to activities in pursuit of gender equality and women's empowerment:

30% of the total project budget (\$1,234,245) has been programmed for activities in support of gender equality and women's empowerment.

100% of the remaining funds in the new phase will be allocated to WPS work in Sudan.

## *Briefly* explain through which major intervention(s) the project will contribute to gender equality and women's empowerment<sup>5</sup>:

The transformative role of women in Sudan's revolution is widely recognised and the goal of gender equality and women's empowerment is inscribed in the Constitutional Declaration of August 2019 and the Juba Peace Agreement of October 2020. The Peace Commission will be supported to undertake communications and advocacy work in favour of the JPA that acknowledges the lead role played by women in the revolution and speaks directly to their aspirations and concerns, through dedicated programming and targeting of resources.

The project will promote a gender responsive approach to peacebuilding at all levels and actively support all signatory parties to meet gender commitments of the JPA, including 40% representation of women in all implementation mechanisms and processes of the peace agreement and national and local peace architecture for conflict prevention and resolution. The project will ensure that both the National Peace Strategy is gender responsive and accompanied by a gender disaggregated Results Framework and support to the Ministry of Finance for gender budgeting. All data and assessments to be supplied to the Government in support of durable solutions in communities of origin will be similarly gender responsive and disaggregated.

The project aims to empower women by offering them training packages and by supporting their access to basic services, and economic opportunities in the current crisis. The project will conduct needs assessments, identify different livelihood activities for women and men, and prioritize women's livelihood activities. Women will also participate in identifying community infrastructure that support their needs. The project will ensure that at least 40% of the beneficiaries across all activities are women and young women. All activities will be designed with a gender perspective and will address women's specific needs and challenges. The project will also contribute to measures aimed at preventing GBV e.g. by installing streetlights, particularly in communities hosting large numbers of IDPs.

A Monitoring and Evaluation mechanism to support implementation of the JPA will ensure monitoring and reporting on gender issues and all gender commitments made by Government and parties.

Planned Women Peace and Security interventions encompass areas of analysis and identification of WPS trends, joint interventions with key actors including partnerships between UNDP, UN Women, IGAD, AU and Personal Envoy of SG to Sudan, strengthening women led peace movement, women's participation in peace processes by amplifying the voices and advocacy peace efforts of women through various media platforms and providing coordination support. Additionally, there will be interventions aimed at addressing gender-based violence and sexual exploitation, empowering women economically, promoting their education and health, and fostering inclusive decision-making. These involve capacity building, women representation, supporting women-led initiatives, preventing and responding to violence, providing access to finance and skills development, ensuring equal access to education and healthcare, and implementing gender-sensitive policies. By prioritizing women's rights and empowerment, this project will contribute to building a more just and equitable society where women play a crucial role in peacebuilding and development.

## Project Risk Marker score<sup>6</sup> \_\_2\_\_

**Select PBF Focus Areas** which best summarizes the focus of the project (select ONLY one<sup>7</sup>:

PBF Focus Area 2.3, Conflict prevention/management.

If applicable, SDCF/UNDAF outcome(s) to which the project contributes:

## **UNDAF Outcome 5:**

By 2021 community, security and stabilization of people affected by conflict will be improved through the utilization of effective conflict management mechanisms, peace dividends and support to peace infrastructures and durable solutions that augment peaceful coexistence and social cohesion.

Sustainable Development Goal(s) and Target(s) to which the project contributes:

SDG 16: "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels".

#### **Type of submission:**

## New project Project amendment

If it is a project amendment, select all changes that apply and provide a brief justification:

Extension of duration: Additional duration in months (number of months and new end date): 15 months formal project amendment (no cost extension) for implementation by 5 April 2024.

Change of project outcome/scope: Reconfiguration of outcomes, outputs and activities against new PBF Strategic Results Framework. Reconfiguration of Outcome 3 and selected activities in Outcomes 1 and 2 considering the situation in the country post 15 April 2023.

Change of budget allocation between outcomes or budget categories of more than 15%: The remaining budget under Outcome 1 and 2 will be transferred to Activity 2.2.1, 2.3.3 and to the newly proposed Outcome 3 (a detailed budget annex will be attached)

Additional PBF budget: Additional amount by recipient organization: 0

This is the 3<sup>rd</sup> Project amendment and no-cost extension for an additional 18 months from 5 April 2024 to 5 October 2025.

This is the 4<sup>th</sup> project amendment and no- cost extension for an additional 4 months from 6 October 2025 to 29 January 2026.

#### Brief justification for amendment:

The project activities planned by UNDP and UNHCR were disrupted by the political turmoil and violence that followed the military takeover on 25th October 2021. The national peace process and the Juba Peace Agreement were put on hold, affecting the prospects of stability and reconciliation in the country. In order to mitigate the impact of the military takeover on the project, a revision and no cost extension were approved in early April 2023. However, drastic changes to the operational context occurred following the outbreak of war between the RSF and SAF on 15 April 2023.

The context of North Darfur, where the project intended to shift the efforts for the implementation of a pilot sub-national level stabilization intervention (Outcome 3), has changed dramatically by the eruption of active fighting between the SAF and RSF in El Fasher and in Tawila, Kutum, and Kabkabiya localities. The UN has, over the past months, repeatedly warned that the conflict in Darfur is taking on ethnic dimensions. The use of targeted violence and killings based on ethnic grounds have been frequently reported across different parts of Darfur. The conflict has severely affected humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding activities, safety and security, and access. Therefore, the implementation of the initially proposed Outcome 3 activities is now not viable. However, the project team will aim to retain some support in line with a request of the North Darfur Governor to support farmers and nomads during the upcoming winter agricultural season in 2023–24 with a limited amount of funding.

The Eastern region of Sudan has mostly been spared by the fighting between SAF and RSF. However, tensions remain high. The region experienced a significant influx of IDPs from Khartoum which has resulted in additional pressures on the already scarce and fragile access to basic services, livelihoods, and critical infrastructure with the potential to further increase inter-communal tensions. While there are three PBF projects in the region covering some localities in all three Eastern states, new needs are emerging—including from a preventive point of view—as a result of the war in Sudan. Additional peacebuilding interventions in Gedaref, as proposed in Outcome 3, are aimed at easing pressures on (host) communities in order to prevent an increase in (pre-existing) intercommunal tensions and conflict over access to scarce resources and services.

The UN Country Team in Sudan has moved teams to Port Sudan, which now also serves as a hub for support to other states in the Eastern region. The current security situation in Gedaref allows the UN and international organizations to operate—although with obstacles and challenges. In this context, Outcome 3 will be reprogrammed to specific localities in Gedaref—while retaining some targeted interventions in North Darfur—to take up newly emerging needs that come on top on longstanding conflict drivers while taking into consideration options for the implementation of programs along the HDP nexus.

At the same time, and in response to the current crisis, all UN peacebuilding efforts in Sudan are currently circumscribed by the scope and method ology of the UN Common Approach, while a new joint PBF MPTF Strategic Results Framework has been developed to bring coherence and a common intervention logic to joint UNITAMS UNCT programming (see updated Section 1b, Strategic Frameworks and National Ownership).

The proposed project revision herein builds on ongoing and completed activities to date while adapting or dropping activities constrained by the current conflict and political crisis and thus considered unrealistic in the timeframe for implementation remaining, and proposing new ones that respond to the updated context and conflict analysis. Activities are re-organised according to the three Outcome areas of the PBF MPTF Strategic Results Framework.

While most of the Outcome 1 and 2 activities are completed, the project intends to deliver an additional light peacebuilding assessment in Gedaref State (Activity 1.2.2) and to continue the work on the conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding capacity building materials development (Activity 2.3.3) and supporting data and crisis analytics through Activity 2.2.2 which is not affected by the current in country dynamics and the activity is nearing completion. The remaining funds under Outcome 1 and 2 which cannot be utilized in the current context will be re-directed to Outcome 3. Regarding the existing Outcome 1, support to a broad-based, inclusive, and participatory peace architecture in Sudan, progress has been limited. While the Peace Commission has been established in law, the Peace Commissioner remains its only representative, with neither adequate staff nor terms of reference in place to take forward its mandate or act as the coordinating institution for other mechanisms of JPA implementation as originally envisaged. While the project has

delivered on priority requests from the Peace Commissioner—e.g., for the development of a website and outreach strategy, provision of IT equipment, and support to public awareness of the JPA—it is unlikely that a more strategic approach can be taken in the absence of renewed momentum in the political transition and national peace process. While continuing to meet legitimate requests agreed as priorities between the Government and UNITAMS and in support of Sudan's peace processes, eg, for support to the Permanent Ceasefire Commission in Darfur (JPA Darfur Track), Outcome 1 has been revised to move beyond its original focus on the Peace Commission as an institution to provide qualified support to JPA architecture more generally, as the political situation allows, as well as support to negotiation and implementation of peace agreements at sub national level..

Although the mobilisation and articulation of civil society to the implementation of peace agreements must remain a priority, this too should be adapted to needs and inclusion/equitable participation at the local level and in support of local agreements, advancement of prevention and peaceful co-existence rather than aspects of JPA implementation/monitoring evaluation thereof, or the development of a National Strategy for Peace considered unrealistic in the remaining 6 month duration of the project and under the current circumstances.

Project achievements under Outcome 1 to date include a national Forum on Countering Hate Speech, attended by a Transitional Sovereignty Council Member, Minister of Cabinet Affairs, National Peace Commissioner, and Governor of Darfur Region along with 150 key stakeholders; Peace Dialogue had been conducted with youth from the 18 states in the International Peace Day, in coordination with UNITAMS and UNFPA; a workshop for peace centers on developing road map for academic institutions to contribute to social cohesion; a national dialogue with CSOs representatives on expanding peacebuilding space in Sudan. While ongoing work will be continued, new work for the final six months of project implementation will focus on mobilising 'infrastructure for peace' at the local level, expanding Output 1.2 to become a broader Outcome 2, concerned with building capacities of civil society actors for engagement in specific conflict resolution efforts in 'hotspot' areas to be stabilised.

Outcome 2, pre-implementation support to peace agreements, comprised three outputs for advocacy and communications work around the JPA, support to dialogue forums and processes, and data and assessments to inform durable solutions planning for IDPs and refugees. Under the first output, a high-level mission of the signatories of JPA and senior government conducted consultation and dissemination workshops in four states (Ed Daein, Zalengei, Nyala, El Geneina) for more than 1,100 participants, including key government officials, community leaders, CSOs, youth and women groups, IDPs, nomads, and other key actors. Under the second, support was also provided to the on-going Juba Peace Talks Secretariat and to facilitate Women's Delegation to participate in the Peace talks as observers and experts. The project organized a series of confidence building forums, townhalls, and advocacy for peace that are led by peace and development centres to mobilize local peace infrastructure, including but not limited to community based conflict resolution mechanisms, local administrative leaders, state institutions, civil society, and youth and women networks to build confidence, promote a culture of dialogue and strengthening social cohesion. The project provided complementary support to the efforts of the RC/HC and the Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) by contributing to the finalization and updating of Sudan's national durable solutions strategy and providing input into the regional IGAD durable solution strategy and plan of action.

UNHCR in coordination with its partner Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), will deliver capacity building, methodologies, and data exercises for a comprehensive identification of issues enabling returns, including HLP, legal identity and civil documentation, research on Women's HLP rights and other criteria for achieving durable solutions. This will have strong linkage and complementarity with the PBF project on Refugee and IDP Profiling Towards Sustainable Peace and Durable Solutions in Darfur (West, Central and North Darfur) as well as for Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad.

Given uncertainty over the immediate future of the political transition and implementation of the JPA, the proposed revision re-articulates Outputs and activities, completed, ongoing and planned, to the three Outcomes of the new Strategic Results Framework—support to the Juba peace process, and JPA advocacy and communications, now related to Outcome 1, support to peace processes and agreements, while work on data and assessments, for durable solutions as for broader knowledge management purposes, now falls under Outcome 2, development of infrastructure for peace at national and sub-national level.

Similarly, outputs of existing Outcome 3 have also been re-articulated to the new SRF Outcomes. Output 3.1, responsibility and accountability promoted, envisaged support to establishment of the critical JPA Monitoring & Evaluation mechanism. It appears unlikely that the political context will allow such support to be provided in the remaining duration of the project, and activities have been deleted. Activities under Output 3.2, for coherence with AU and IGAD, have yet to be delivered, although progress has been made on development of the UNDP Crisis Risk Dashboard for early warning. Both sets of activities are now represented as key elements contributing to Outcome 2, development of national 'infrastructure for peace'.

While completed and ongoing activities largely fall Most activities under new Outcomes 1 and 2 will be deleted and the budget will be relocated to a new Outcome 3, which has been created with the intention to pilot a joint UNITAMS-UNCT approach to the stabilization of conflict-affected hotspots, in line with the intervention logic of the Strategic Results Framework and in line with the overall aim of building and strengthening peace infrastructures. The pilot integrated effort aims to reduce tension and enhance social cohesion and peaceful co-existence among internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities in Gedaref State, East Sudan. This intervention will be aligned with the PBF supported project in Gedaref implemented by IOM and FAO, called: 'Strengthening the Climate Security Nexus in Gedaref' and the PBF-supported project, led by UNDP and UNICEF, called: 'Strengthening Capacities for Peace and Social Cohesion in Kassala and Red Sea States'. The aim of the intervention is to establish a solid social cohesion programme and coherent interventions that would further support a joint structure for peace in the Eastern region. The project will use various approaches and activities to foster dialogue, trust, and collaboration among the different groups, as well as support improved access to services and livelihood opportunities to ease tension between IDPs and host communities. Geographic targeting will take into consideration activities already ongoing as part of the mentioned PBF projects.

The activity components targeted at North Darfur build upon previous work undertaken by UNHCR and FAO and also synergies with the PBF supported Youth Promotion Initiative called Darfuri Youth Empowerment in Civic Spaces to Advance Peacebuilding. The SSPP project will complement the YPI project by providing agricultural tools to YPI beneficiaries and solar mobile chargers to nomads in North Darfur. In line with a conflict sensitive approach, farmers as well as (agro)pastoralists will be among the beneficiaries of the North Darfur component. The activities aim at averting the cyclical violence between farming and pastoralist communities that have repeatedly marked previous agricultural seasons.

Successful implementation of the pilot should not only contribute to reducing incidence of violence between IDPs and host communities, over winter/spring 2023 but also help establish effective structures, mechanisms, and procedures for application in future years and generate lessons learned for UNITAMS and the UNCT as to how to strengthen such structures in support of delivering on stabilization and prevention in other conflict hotspots to be identified during the upcoming phase of SRF operationalization.

The project was initially designed to assist the Sudanese peace process by facilitating peace talks with armed movements towards the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), ensuring the meaningful participation of women and civil society at large. After the successful signing of the JPA, the project supported its implementation – including through critical capacity building for key institutions mandated to realize the JPA and, most significantly, Darfur-wide whole of society consultations to increase public awareness on and buyin for the JPA.

Delays in the JPA implementation due to absence of political will, however, significantly slowed down the project activities, culminating in the October 2021 military coup and subsequent limitations to engage with government counterparts. Thus, the project had to request a one-year no-cost extension, approved on April 10, 2023. Five days later, war erupted, forcing the project to go through a reprogramming of its activities in the face of armed violence spreading rapidly across large parts of the country.

This peacebuilding project and its dedicated team have faced exceptional circumstance in Sudan, responding to political crisis and conflict, including with necessary adjustments to a highly fragile context. Since the outbreak of the 2023 war, re-programmed activities focused on social cohesion and peaceful coexistence of IDPs and host communities in Gedaref and North Darfur – as Sudan faces the world's largest internal displacement crisis.

In December 2023 the crisis took yet another turn to the worse when al-Jazeera state, Sudan's food basket region, was taken over by the RSF, followed by intense fighting that destabilized the Eastern regions of Sudan – including Gedaref. Equally, violence intensified in North Darfur throughout January and February 2024. Access to both project locations became a challenge and as such no implementation was achieved. The UN has classified both locations as high-risk, restricted to only live-saving programme criticality level one activities. Many local implementing partners are reducing their footprint. A country-wide internet and communications blackout limited coordination. These developments entirely prevented the implementation of a remaining 800,000 USD project funds under the re-programmed Outcome 3 by April 2024.

At the same time, the Sudanese Government terminated the mandate of UNITAMS, leaving the UN Country Team in Sudan with critical gaps in the area of peacebuilding. A transition roadmap has been agreed-upon, calling upon the UN-AFPs to fill critical peacebuilding gaps at the community level. The exceptional approval of a reprogramming of the remaining funds under this project would present us with the unique opportunity to tailor support strategically towards filling these transition gaps. The project is thus proposing to refocus on establishing a Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Advisor position within the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator's office and support community-level peacebuilding initiatives focused on promoting Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

The advisor will provide specialized guidance on gender-sensitive approaches to peacebuilding initiatives, bridging a crucial gap identified during workshops supporting the transition from UNITAMS to UNCT. The post of a WPS Advisor directly contributes to advancing the WPS agenda by enhancing the UN Country Team's capacity to address gender-specific challenges, promote women's meaningful participation in peace building processes, and strengthen the national implementation of the WPS agenda. The advisor will provide system wide coordination and advisory services on monitoring and reporting on Conflict Related Sexual Violence. The post will support the implementation of the Framework of Cooperation on prevention and response to CRSV, and include a strong liaison function between the Office of Personal Envoy of Secretary General and the UNCT around the monitoring and reporting of CRSV. As such, this project has the potential to significantly enhance peacebuilding efforts in Sudan and serve as a catalyst for advancing gender equality and women's empowerment in the region.

While significant progress has been made in implementing the reprogrammed activities under output 4.1 and 4.3, implementation of activities under output 4.2 was slowed down by the absence of a peace process in Sudan, to which the implementation of most activities in this output were tied.

The proposed project revisions will build on completed activities while suspending those remaining (activities 4.1.8; 4.19; 4.2.2; 4.2.3; 4.2.4; 4.3.4) that are not yet implemented as of 31st July 2025. Funds from the suspended activities will be reallocated to continue supporting the position of the Women Peace and Security Advisor until 9 January 2026, as well as the management cost (Direct Project Costs) for operating the project until its closure in January 2026.

The WPS Advisor was hired for a period of 12 months from 10 January 2025 to 9 January 2026. In the extension period, the WPS advisor will continue offering technical support and guidance to the UNCT, national authorities and civil society on advancing the Women Peace and Security Agenda. UNDP is also undertaking resource mobilization efforts to support the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, recognizing a clear funding gap. These efforts also aim to sustain the position of the WPS Advisor beyond the current funding period.

### PROJECT SIGNATURES:

Recipient Organization (s): UNDP	Recipient Organization (s): UNHCR
Name of Representative: Mr. Luca Renda	Name of Representative: Ms. Kristine Hambrouck
Resident Representative, Sudan	Representative, Sudan
Docušigned by: 08981287E8BA478	
Signature	Signature
Date & Seal 15-Sep-2025	Date & Seal 17/09/28
Head of UN Country Team	Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)
Ms. Denise Brown	for Elizabeth Spehar
UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator	Assistant Secretary-General, Peacebuilding Support Office
Signature &	Signature 16 Oct 2025
Date & Seal 17 September 2025	Date & Seal

#### I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support (4 pages max)

#### a) Conflict Analysis Findings

The last two years have brought profound changes to Sudan and created a new potential pathway to comprehensive and sustainable peace. In December 2018, a deteriorating situation led to an uprising under the leadership of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) with the instrumental participation of women and youth. A state of emergency was declared in February 2019, and a new transitional federal government was formed with military officers appointed as governors of the 18 States. As protests continued, the military withdrew its support for President Omar al-Bashir and replaced him with a Transitional Military Council (TMC) in April 2019.

Following negotiations, the TMC and the FFC signed a Political Declaration establishing a 39-month timeframe for a transitional period on 17 July 2019. The Constitutional Declaration, signed on 17<sup>th</sup> August 2019, annulled the Interim National Constitution of 2005, and articulated the principles of sovereignty and rule of law as well as governance arrangements within the executive and the legislative. A Sovereign Council (comprising five members from the military and six from the FFC), and a transitional technocratic government was established to address the country's immediate challenges, including reforming state institutions, making peace with armed groups, and addressing the dire economic situation. The transitional period, which was to be governed by a government with ministers selected by the FFC, is expected to culminate with elections by the end of 2022, following the adoption of a new Constitution.

The Constitutional Declaration, which governs the Transitional Period, envisaged the completion of a fair, inclusive, and comprehensive peace in Sudan no later than six months from its signing, which would address both the causes and effects of conflict in the country.

The Juba Declaration for Confidence-building Procedures and the Preparation for Negotiation between the transitional authorities and a coalition of 10 armed groups and alliances, under the auspices of the President of South Sudan, was signed on 11th September 2019. After nearly a year of direct negotiations between the parties, an interim peace agreement with five armed groups comprising the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) was initialed on 30th August and signed on 3rd October 2020.

The signed peace deal does not include the faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N), loyal to leader Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, which has been participating in talks but has been negotiating separately with the government. Nor does it include the Sudan Liberation Army loyal to Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) which had rejected the peace process calling for a range of preconditions including establishment of a secure environment in Darfur and the return of IDPs. At the time of writing, however, formal negotiations with both groups appear imminent.

The Juba Peace Agreement is therefore effectively the first in a larger set of peace agreement, that will need to be signed for there to be a comprehensive and sustainable peace in Sudan. This is also the first set what the transitional government hoped would be a longer series of negotiations. It includes seven protocols across a range of areas including security, power sharing, revenue sharing, land ownership and return of displaced populations and a range of measures and, more importantly, sees those armed group signatories that sign become partners in the transitional government<sup>1</sup> and sets back the 39-months of its transition to the date of its signature.

The agreement provides for multiple Commissions, Councils, Courts and Conferences and other processes to address all outstanding issues between the parties. Percentage representation of parties on key mechanisms is defined in many instances, and specific deadlines given for implementation. Fundamentally, the peace deal sees agreement on an asymmetric federal system based on 6 regions (pre-1989 arrangement), with the addition of two devolved regions for South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. It does not define the powers and competencies for each region, which are slated for agreement at a Governance Conference to be held within 6 months of signing. Meanwhile, the Two Areas will have their own legislative and executive powers and a single Darfur region will be created, with a Joint Task of 12,000 troops to ensure protection of civilians. On the development side, the Juba Peace Agreement creates a central fund with sub-funds for the Two Areas, East Sudan and Darfur, with government subsequently pledging a USD 750 million contribution over 10 years. The agreement foresees a new secular Constitution and offers a generational opportunity to establish a new social contract while addressing the complex root causes and drivers of conflict in Sudan.

The JPA deploys gender sensitive language and confirm the equality principles established in the 2019 Constitutional Charter<sup>2</sup>, though to varying degrees in the different component agreements. Various provisions in many of the agreements provide for greater gender equality. Article 1.20 of the ANI provides that the signatories recognize the "importance of women's representation in all levels of authority and decision-making centers in a just and effective way and no less than 40% of representation". The Blue Nile, Kordofan, Eastern Path Agreements provide for 40% women participation at the national parliament. The Truth and Reconciliation Committee to be established under the Darfur Agreement will consist of 11 members altogether; five members will be appointed by each of the signatories, the chair will be appointed jointly by the two signatories, and both sides are required to appoint at least one woman each.

At the heart of conflict in Sudan are questions around governance, economic management, rule of law, the social legacy of decades of conflict and environmental mismanagement. Structural issues include displacement due to conflict, uncertain land tenure, the role of security institutions, and gender inequality. All of these issues have contributed to violent or latent conflict within Sudan and manifested themselves in different ways across the country under the previous regime, fostering armed opposition in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan and fomenting discontent in Sudan's East. Inter-communal conflicts over scarce natural resources, land or contested tribal leadership continue to be widespread and, if unresolved, could easily flare into violence once again. Multiple recurring conflicts need to be resolved, inter-communal tensions managed peacefully, and consensus built around contested priorities before violence escalates.

Displacement due to conflict in Sudan is an enormous problem. The 2018 UN Humanitarian Needs Overview cites government figures of 2 million IDPs in Sudan, including 1.8 million in Darfur and nearly 200,000 in South and West Kordofan. There are also significant numbers of refugees from Sudan in Chad and South Sudan, and lower numbers in Ethiopia, Kenya and the Central African Republic. Approximately 1.2 million refugees and asylum seekers from other countries, primarily South Sudan, live within Sudan.

IDPs face ongoing issues in terms of security, uncertainty, and lack of economic opportunities. Tensions exist with host communities in urban areas, where the presence of IDPs has affected the communal makeup of towns and put strain on local resources. A significant proportion of violence in Darfur is directed at or occurs around IDPs and IDP camps. Women in IDP camps are still subject to sexual and gender-based violence while performing activities of daily living such as collecting water, fuel or animal fodder, or on their way to seek daily work in the hosting towns. Women continue to survive without access to needed reproductive health services, as well as limited access to justice and basic social and humanitarian services.

The return of displaced communities to their places of origin is limited by insecurity and lack of infrastructure. In many areas, new communities have reportedly established themselves in areas that have seen displacement, leading to conflict when displaced communities attempt to return.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Power sharing, armed groups get: 3 seats on Sov. Council; 25% of TLC and 25% of Cabinet.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> According to the Constitutional Declaration, one of the aims for the three-year transitional period is to "Repeal laws and provisions that restrict freedoms or that discriminate between citizens on the basis of gender" para. 7(2)). The declaration also promises women 40% representation in Sudan's legislative assembly.

Within this context of peace implementation, it is a Government of Sudan responsibility to provide protection to all its citizens, as per the National Protection of Civilians Strategy. However, there are significant challenges, and the number of protection incidents remains significant.

The fact that the vulnerabilities of women substantially increase during conflict and continue to escalate due to displacement and the resultant humanitarian situation, together with the under-representation of women in peace processes and the lack of commitments and accountability framework towards gender issues, gives weight to the need for women's protection and security to be considered as a priority and to be translated into action by decision-makers.

In the absence of trust in government institutions at the state-level and taking into consideration abuses committed in the past, there is need for a strengthened and enhanced protection monitoring through field presence by UNCT, NGO and civil society protection and human rights agencies. This work, which is intrinsically linked to the monitoring and evaluation commission, would be needed in those areas where the protection risks are highest, particularly parts of Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

As called for in the Constitutional Declaration of August 2019, a Peace Commission was originally established on 17<sup>th</sup> October 2019 as an independent body, and a Peace Commissioner appointed shortly thereafter. In addition to acting as rapporteur to the peace talks, the Peace Commission was entrusted with the execution of all aspects of the peace agreements reached. The Peace Commissioner is entrusted with all a) political processes directly linked to the implementation of peace agreements; as well as b) building up a consensus of a new system of values, norms and institutions that regulate the peaceful management of conflict; and c) enhancing the legitimacy of the state through improved capacity to deliver on human security, welfare, human rights and the rule of law.

While the Peace Commission is intended to operate at the apex of national peace architecture in Sudan, its basis in legislation is still to be established, its relationship to other JPA-agreed entities, as well as its structure, approach and operations, are all still to be defined as part of the peace process<sup>3</sup>. Article 20.1 of the Juba Peace Agreement states that: "The Parties agree to form a Peace Commission tasked with implementing the comprehensive peace agreement with the participation of signatory parties in preparing the commission law and structure".

Cognizant of the importance of the Peace Commissions role in peace implementation, Government representatives - including from the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Federal Governance, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning as well as the Peace Commissioner - requested PBF support to peace implementation and/or ongoing negotiations at the inaugural meeting of the PBF Joint Steering Committee on 13<sup>th</sup> September 2020 (see Section 1c below).

Preparation of a support project was endorsed by the PBF Joint Steering Committee and approved by the UN PBSO. In respect of conflict sensitivity considerations, as well as adherence to the "do no harm" principle, a decision has also been made to include support to ongoing negotiations.

#### **Context Update, October 2022**

While efforts of the transitional government started to bear fruit with regard to resolving long-standing internal conflicts, economic recovery and garnering international support, Sudan's political equilibrium remained fragile. In October 2021, the democratic transition was derailed by the military takeover; including the dissolution of Prime Minister Hamdok's civilian government; the arrest of many of Sudan's leading civilian politicians, including Prime Minister Hamdok, and activists and the suspension of six articles in the Constitutional Charter. On 21 November, Prime Minister Hamdok and President of the Sovereign Council General Burhan signed an agreement to resume the military-civilian partnership until the end of the transition period leading to elections. The agreement was rejected by the majority of political actors, including the (opposition) Forces for Freedom and Change, the Resistance Committees (neighbourhood community organizers) and many civil society groups sparking youth led protests in several states in the country. Prime Minister Hamdok resigned in January 2022 and there has been no replacement as of August 2022. On 5 December 2022, a Political Framework Agreement between civilian political forces and the military institution in Sudan has been signed. The Agreement is considered a critical first step towards the restoration of a sustainable transitional period and the formation of a credible civil, democratic, and accountable government. On 8 January 2023, the signatories to the Framework Agreement with the facilitation of the Trilateral Mechanism (African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and United Nations) had launched the final phase of the political process aimed at reaching a final and just political agreement.

Two years in, the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement remains much delayed – beyond the power sharing arrangements, appointments, and the Permanent Ceasefire Committee (PCC) (which is not yet fully operational), there has not been much progress. Moreover, the JPA does not include the Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW), a key group that has yet to join the peace process, nor the SPLM-N led by Abdelaziz al Hilu, which is negotiating in Juba on its own separate track based on a Declaration of Principles signed with General Burhan in March 2021. In addition, the JPA's Eastern Track was suspended on 16th Dec 2021 and remains contested by groups in the East who feel unrepresented.

While political efforts to solve Sudan's national crisis are still underway, many of Sudan's states have experienced renewed cycles of violence increasing the need to support stability and peace structures at the local level. UNITAMS and the UN Country Team have jointly engaged in and agreed upon priorities to be addressed while the current crisis persists. The priority baskets and critical gaps identified in the UN Common Approach as well as the priority Outcomes and programmatic approaches identified in the Strategic Results frameworks for the alignment and entry points for the implementation of the project's activities (as elaborated below).

## **Context Update September 2023**

Following the military takeover in October 2021 that derailed the democratic transition in Sudan, the then-allied Generals Al Burhan (SAF) and Hamedti (RSF) had a fallout during the last stages of negotiation to reestablish a transition process. The armed conflict erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum on 15 April 2023. It rapidly spread to strategic urban centers across the country, including Merowe, El Obeid, and El Geneina. Soon, most of Darfur, except East Darfur, and the Kordofan States were engulfed by armed violence. In Darfur, the conflict has become increasingly ethicized, which risks further escalation and a descent into a civil war. While some armed struggle movements have maintained neutrality, some are becoming parties to the conflict, either by joining forces with the SAF or RSF, such as the Darfur-based SLM-A Mustafa Tambor movement allied with the RSF, or by opening additional battlefronts, as SPLM-N Al-Hilu did in South Kordofan in July 2023, while civilians may also take up arms to defend themselves. Tribal militias also joined the fighting, such as Arab and Erenga militias in West Darfur, and tribal leaders of Rezeigat, Salamat, Falata tribes pledged allegiance in Central

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The 3<sup>rd</sup> October Agreement on National Issues calls for participation of signatory parties in preparing the Peace Commission law and structure.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Sudan Tribune, 'SLM faction joins Sudanese army against RSF in Darfur,' 31 July 2023 https://sudantribune.com/article275601/

and South Darfur to RSF and the Beja and the Hadandawa in the East to the SAF.<sup>5 6 7</sup> Calls for mobilization of the civilian population are being accompanied by increased polarization and hate speech, particularly in the East of Sudan, where the instigation of hate speech is a long-standing issue that has turned tribes against each other.

The conflict has created a rule of law vacuum, with reports of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law mounting. These include a stark increase in reports of conflict related to sexual violence. Civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, religious and cultural sites, are being used and targeted by the conflicting parties. The conflict in Sudan is taking a massive toll on human lives, public infrastructure, and availability of basic services, separating, and displacing families and placing immense pressure on host communities in addition to hindering the peace process and prospects of the JPA implementation and support in Sudan. As of 7 October 2023, OCHA reported about 5.5 million people have fled their homes and sought refuge within Sudan or in neighboring countries, and according to the Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH) as of 8 September 1,265 people have been killed and 8,396 others have been injured. Across the country, the disruption of trade routes and the active fighting are reducing food stocks, causing spikes in the prices of basic commodities, and limiting household mobility, negatively affecting household access to basic services and their ability to engage in income-generating activities such as small business activities in markets, sale of livestock, seasonal labor migration and crop cultivation. Looting and destruction of markets, infrastructure, and basic service facilities have been widely reported. The fighting also impacted the agricultural activities prior to and during the rainy season, which will most likely lead to a failure of harvest in the most affected areas, which will have dire consequences on food security at the national level. In June, most of the country was in Integrated Food Security Phase Classification - IPC Phase 3 status and, by August, more and more conflict-affected localities and bigger urban centers slipped into IPC Phase 4 acute food insecurity, especially in Darfur and the Kordofan States. <sup>10</sup> In many parts of the country, increasing pressures on communities come on top of poverty, violent competition for access to land, services, and livelihoods, and inter-communal strive based on long-standing conflict causes, as also identified in the PBF supported UN Sudan Peacebuilding Assessments (March 2023).

#### **Conflict Analysis to support the Outcome 3 interventions in Gedaref:**

Prior to the outbreak of the armed conflict in April 2023, the most frequently observed type of conflicts in Gedaref were localized disputes over natural resources, notably in relation to access to, and ownership of land, conflicts between herders and farmers due to livestock migration, and grazing practices, and conflict over water resources. Gedaref has also experienced border tensions with Ethiopia which has been gradually escalating since 2020. Further drivers of conflict reportedly include continuous economic deterioration and marginalization of the population of Gedaref and the broader Eastern region of Sudan. Hate speech against different groups of society, utilized by individuals with diverse political or economic interests to achieve their agenda, is creating instability, weakening the social fabric of society and causing a distortion of social cohesion. Furthermore, natural hazards such as floods and the refugee influx are also posing additional pressures to local communities and stresses to the equal access and availability of the already scarce basic services, livelihoods and infrastructure which is further fueling perceptions of marginalization, discrimination, and inter-tribal conflicts.

Following the outbreak of the armed conflict in April 2023, in Khartoum, the situation in Gedaref has been largely calm but the overall environment remains tense. Multiple RSF infiltrations have been reported to the Eastern region but so far Gedaref has not been affected by direct clashes between SAF and RSF. Crime rates in the state have reportedly increased including theft, robbery, burglary and other small and petty crimes. Since the beginning of the armed conflict, 15 incidents have been recorded against humanitarian workers in Gedaref. These incidents vary from bureaucratic impediments to violence against personnel, assets and facilities, attacks against public facilities, hostilities against relief operations and operational interference. A state of emergency was first declared on the 29 April 2023. An emergency decree issued on the 9 August stipulated the closure of the border crossing points with Ethiopia due to the renewed tensions and fighting in the neighboring Amhara region. The renewed fighting in the North-Western territories of Ethiopia also bears the risk of a spillover of the conflict across the border, especially in the contested Al Fashaga locality in Gedaref State.

While only one fatality has been registered as a direct consequence of the fighting in Gedaref, a humanitarian crisis is taking a significant toll as a result of the deteriorating conditions. The population in Gedaref is exposed to increasingly wide-spread poverty, food shortage and lack of access to medical care. The most dire consequences are manifesting themselves in the form of malnutrition. The Gedaref Children Hospital recorded since April, 365 cases of malnutrition and 132 deaths of children from severe malnutrition and related diseases. Most of the cases are from the Al Mafaza, Gala'a Al Nahal, Al Galabat Al Gharbiyah-Kassab, Galabat Ash-Sharagiah localities and typically from refugee shelter and camp settings (106 of the total case load). <sup>13</sup> Gedaref has experienced a significant influx of IDPs fleeing the armed conflict from Khartoum, becoming an important transit point of IDPs toward Port Sudan and to Ethiopia but also a destination for people to seek safety. Prior to the conflict, the state hosted 6,000 IDPs spread across host communities in 2 camps, 3 neighbourhoods and 12 villages and 61,000 refugees in in the Um Rakuba and Um Gargour refugee camps and in the Tunaydbah and Babikri refugee settlements. As of the 31 September, IOM-DTM reported a total 252,824 displaced individuals who are now residing in 205 locations across Gedaref mostly concentrated in Gedaref town, Wasat Al Gedaref, Ar Rahad and Galabat Ash-Shargiah. 71% of displaced sought refuge at relatives in the host community, 23% in rented accommodations, 3% in camp-like settlements and 3% in public buildings. The most important priority needs of IDPs are food, non-food items, and health. <sup>14</sup> IDPs reported travel to Gedaref to search of safety closer to members of their own tribe, or to search for income opportunities in the various agricultural projects which are active in Gedaref during the Rainy Season. Additionally, both Sudanese and non-Sudanese nationals (notably Ethiopian nationals), travel through Gedaref in order to cross the b

The influx of IDPs to Gedaref places a significant burden on host communities and stresses on the availability of already scarce resources, such as food, potable water, medicine, fuel and on the accessibility of basic services, such as housing, health services, water supplies and electricity. The urban areas of Gedaref have been struggling with food and potable water shortage, lack of medical supplies and medicine, periodical electricity outages and breakdowns of telecommunication (including phone and internet services). The state of Gedaref's hospitals

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Radio Dabanga, 'Tragic stories from Sirba as violence in West Darfur spreads,' 1 August 2023 <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/tragic-stories-from-sirba-as-violence-west-darfur-spreads">https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/tragic-stories-from-sirba-as-violence-west-darfur-spreads</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The New Arab, 'Sudan: Darfur tribes 'pledge allegiance' to RSF in move that could tip scales in war-torn Sudan,' 6 July 2023 <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/sudan-several-darfur-arab-tribes-pledge-allegiance-rsf">https://www.newarab.com/news/sudan-several-darfur-arab-tribes-pledge-allegiance-rsf</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Human Right Watch, 'Sudan: New Attacks in Darfur,' 4 August 2023 <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/04/sudan-new-attacks-darfur">https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/04/sudan-new-attacks-darfur</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> OCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Update, 7 October 2023, <u>Sudan - Sudan Humanitarian Update (7 October 2023) | Digital Situation Reports (unocha.org)</u>
<sup>9</sup> FEWS NET. Sudan Food Security Outlook June 2023 to January 2024: Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3), across the country amid heavy fighting, 2023. https://fews.net/east-africa/sudan/food-security-outlook/june-2023#national-overview

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation June 2023 and Projections for July - September 2023 and October 2023 - February 2024: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/fi/c/1156504/?iso3=SDN

<sup>11</sup> Sudan Humanitarian AccessSituation Report (April-May 2023) OCHA, 7 July 2023: https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-access-situation-report-april-may-

<sup>2023?</sup>\_gl=1\*zs5okf\*\_ga\*MjEzNTQ0NzIxOC4xNjkxNzg1MDI3\*\_ga\_E60ZNX2F68\*MTY5MTgwODk2My4yLjEuMTY5MTgxMDYwMy42MC4wLjA. 
<sup>12</sup> Ethiopia declares state of emergency following clashes in Amhara, Al Jazeera, 4 August 2023: <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/4/ethiopia-declares-state-of-emergency-following-clashes-in-amhara">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/4/ethiopia-declares-state-of-emergency-following-clashes-in-amhara</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>An interview with GM of Pediatrician in Al Qadarif, Dr.Nisreen Abugedari – (info. Confirmed with the Pediatric Hospital Statistical Department) https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story\_fbid=pfbid02DSrubHYVsvWiM8F8819Tap3terKvhFywETGUbpwmYPmLWmtuvmE4vaJS9MgF6uyGl&id=1000 64150959569

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> International Organization for Migration (IOM), Sep 05 2023. DTM DTM Sudan - Weekly Displacement Snapshot (02). IOM, Sudan <a href="https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudan-weekly-displacement-snapshot-02?close=true">https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudan-weekly-displacement-snapshot-02?close=true</a>

and healthcare service is dire. Hospitals are reportedly overrun by patients; medical personnel are lacking as well as supplies of medicine and medical equipment. The state is facing a severe malnourishment crisis and hospitals are struggling to provide adequate treatment and to mitigate the related diseases. With the incoming rainy season, water-borne diseases are also expected to appear, further aggravating the health crisis in Gedaref.

The armed conflict also resulted in a significant spike in the price of basic commodities, which have reportedly increased by between 5 and 10 times compared to pre-crisis levels, as well as transportation costs (increase by 100%) and rent (can go up to 2,000 USD/month) and other accommodation prices (can go up to 150 USD/night). Prices have increased dramatically for staple goods, and there are shortages of imported goods, such as wheat, flour, and oil. According to FAO, the prices of basic commodities, including bottled water, food, and fuel have increased by 40-60% in conflict-affected areas. 15 Once local stocks are exhausted, resupply will be a challenge because of the disruption to transport networks, the closure of factories, and the inability to pay for new stocks. Transporting agricultural products to markets has become exceedingly difficult because of closed access routes, the security risks involved, and the high transportation costs as fuel prices skyrocket. As poverty widens and deepens, unemployment increases, and food insecurity looms over the state, WFP estimates that an additional 2 - 2.5 million people in Sudan are expected to slip into hunger in the coming months, which would take acute food insecurity in Sudan to record levels, with more than 19 million people affected. Gedaref is among the worst affected and most susceptible states in the country. Such obstacles will likely drive food prices even higher in the coming months. According to WFP, the price of a local food basket - which in March 2023 was already 28% higher than in March 2022 - is expected to increase by a further 25% in the next three to six months should the conflict continue. 16 During the rainy season, heavy rainfall could lead to river flooding, potentially affecting humanitarian access to IDP populations and refugee camps in Gedaref. The heavy rains and flooding can also lead to damage or loss of property and livelihood, and damage to cultivated land and agricultural production. The most recent seasonal forecast indicates the possibility of heavier than normal rainfall during summer, in parts of the country, including Gedaref.<sup>17</sup> It could further gravely compromise food security by disrupting agricultural cycles, as well as transport and supplies to markets.

#### Conflict Analysis to support the Outcome 3 interventions in North Darfur:

The ongoing conflict in Sudan has devastating implications for peace processes at the Darfur regional level. The underlying conflict drivers and unresolved grievances from two decades of conflict that persist in Darfur have allowed for the instrumentalization of the nationwide conflict for the resumption of local conflicts. Armed violence has increased sharply in all the Darfur States except for East Darfur. Reportedly, both conflict parties have reportedly been recruiting and training fighters in Darfur with the RSF mostly targeting youths from Arab communities of Rizeigat and Taaisha tribes. The increase in armed violence raises concerns about the wider ethnicization of the conflict and a potential descent into civil war. Since the beginning of the conflict and until the time of writing, violence has occurred in El Fasher, Tawila, Kabkabiya and Kutum of North Darfur, in Nyala and Kass of South Darfur, in Zalingei and the Jebel Marra area of Central Darfur but the epicenter of the conflict has been West Darfur. In El Geneina, Kerenik and Sirba, the RSF and its allied Arab militias clashed with SAF and the Sudanese Alliance Movement (SAM), and also directly targeted civilians on an ethnic/tribal basis resulting in hundreds of fatalities and tens of thousands of displaced persons.

As of the 31 August, IOM-DTM reported 1,578,519 IDPs across Darfur with continued numbers of border crossings to Chad, where 464,824 refugee arrivals have been counted as of the 3 September.<sup>19</sup> Across the Darfur States, the disruption of trade routes and the active fighting are reducing food stocks, causing spikes in the prices of basic commodities, and limiting household mobility, negatively affecting household access to basic services and livelihoods and their ability to engage in income generating activities such as small business activities in markets, sale of livestock, seasonal labor migration and crop cultivation. Widespread looting and destruction of markets, infrastructure, and basic service facilities have been widely reported from all states except for East Darfur. The fighting also impacted the agricultural activities prior and during the rainy season that will most likely lead to a failure of harvest, which will have dire consequences on the food security of the region.<sup>20</sup> In June, the greater Darfur area was in IPC Phase 3 status and by August more and more conflict affected localities and bigger urban centers slipped into IPC Phase 4 acute food insecurity.<sup>21</sup>

## Context update April 2024

The armed conflict in Sudan, which started on April 15, 2023 reached a critical juncture in December 2023 when the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) took over Al-Jazeera State, propelling the nation into even more unprecedented turmoil. This event not only escalated conflicts to neighboring states of Sinnar and Gedaref but also instilled widespread fear among civilians as threats started looming large. The RSF's aggressive advances have had profound repercussions on food security; agricultural production, value chains, and humanitarian interventions have been significantly disrupted, exacerbating an already dire situation for many citizens. In Gedaref State, particularly in Fao city which has suffered multiple RSF attacks, tensions are mounting, threatening to destabilize the entire eastern region of Sudan. Concurrently, North Darfur's El Fasher stands as the final bastion for the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) within Darfur amidst severe ongoing conflicts and encirclement by RSF forces. Should the RSF succeed in capturing El Fasher, it would signify complete control over Darfur, marking a substantial shift in power dynamics that could have far-reaching implications for national stability and security across all the states. This scenario demands urgent international attention and intervention to mitigate further human suffering and restore peace and order within Sudan.

<sup>15</sup> UNFPA Sudan Emergency: Situation report no 2 (22 May 2023) https://sudan.unfpa.org/en/publications/sudan-emergency-situation-report-no2-22-may-2023

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> OCHA Sudan Flash Update No. 14 | 28 May 2023 OCHA: <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-clashes-between-saf-and-rsf-flash-update-no-14-28-may-2023-enar">https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-clashes-between-saf-and-rsf-flash-update-no-14-28-may-2023-enar</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Sudan Crisis: Probability of above normal rainfall, river flood risk, and concentrations of IDPs (19 May 2023) REACH, Published: Reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/map/sudan/sudan-crisis- probability-above-normal-rainfall-river-flood-risk-and-concentrations-idps-19-may-2023

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> The Mustafa Tambor led faction of the SLM-A pledged allegiance to the SAF and joined the fighting against the RSF. Many tribal Native Administrations have also pledged their allegiance to the RSF in Central and South Darfur, including the Rizeigat, Salamat, and al-Falata tribes. In West Darfur, the Masalit tribe and the Sudanese Alliance Movement (SAM) have aligned with SAF following attacks in West Darfur and the killing of the leader of SAM, who was also the Wali of West Darfur. In North Darfur, JPA signatories such as the Minnawi-led faction of Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM/MM), SLM/A Transitional Council, the Justice and Equality Movement, the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces and SAM deployed their soldiers but have attempted to remain officially neutral in the conflict (with the exception of the SAM, given their involvement in the West Darfur conflict). Similarly, Sudan Liberation Movement – Abdel Wahid (SLA-AW), a JPA non-signatory have so far also taken a neutral stance, but have recalled fighters from Libya to ensure the protection of civilians in their area of control. Tamazuj (Third Front), another signatory group have announced their alignment with RSF.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> International Organization for Migration (IOM), Sep 05 2023. DTM DTM Sudan - Weekly Displacement Snapshot (02). IOM, Sudan. <a href="https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudan-weekly-displacement-snapshot-02?close=true">https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudan-weekly-displacement-snapshot-02?close=true</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> FEWS NET. Sudan Food Security Outlook June 2023 to January 2024: Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3), across the country amid heavy fighting, 2023. https://fews.net/east-africa/sudan/food-security-outlook/june-2023#national-overview

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation June 2023 and Projections for July - September 2023 and October 2023 - February 2024: <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/fi/c/1156504/?iso3=SDN">https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/fi/c/1156504/?iso3=SDN</a>

In the aftermath of RSF's aggressive takeover of al-Jazeera in December 2023, the resulting escalation in violence and territorial destabilization has profoundly affected Sudan's socio-political landscape, hampering access to key project locations and rendering the implementation of the remaining funds exceedingly challenging. This turmoil was exacerbated by heightened hostilities in North Darfur through early 2024 and a subsequent country-wide internet and communications blackout, which further stymied coordination efforts. The United Nations has categorized both al-Jazeera and Gedaref as high-risk zones, restricting activities solely to life-saving interventions with critical priority level one.

While the national ceasefire mediation process is stalled, a series of locally brokered ceasefire agreements have unfolded amidst the war. Local ceasefire agreements are temporary agreements between combatants to suspend hostilities within a limited section of the larger battlefield. Compared to national-level negotiations facilitated through external actors, these localized ceasefire agreements between SAF and RSF are brokered by community actors. Civilian actors are critical in transforming the current conflict with their unique knowledge of local conflict drivers and their ability to apply community-level conflict prevention and peacemaking processes. Since fighting erupted in April 2023, such locally brokered ceasefires have emerged at different locations across Sudan including in Khartoum, the Darfurs, the Kordofans and Al-Gazira.

While much attention focuses on externally facilitated, national-level mediation processes and outcomes, paying attention to local level ceasefire initiatives – their conditions and impacts – is critical. They can be used by parties for strategic reasons to free up troops to attack elsewhere or to consolidate capabilities ahead of intensified fighting. They can but also serve as gradual measures for de-escalation and confidence building between parties that generate trust, foster cooperative behavior, lower the intensity of armed violence and diffuse tensions in neighboring areas. They constitute critical entry points for pathway to de-escalation and conflict transformation. Local ceasefire agreements can also serve as critical entry points to mitigate humanitarian consequences of war. Understanding their dynamics is thus of both political and humanitarian interest. Further analysis of local peacebuilding initiatives amidst Sudan's war will allow for strategic considerations on how such processes and facilitating actors can be supported.

Concurrently, the cessation of UNITAMS' mandate by the Sudanese Government left a void in peacebuilding efforts at a national level, prompting the UN Country Team to strategize on filling these gaps. UNITAMS activities have been transitioned to the UNCT but also to the Personal Envoy of the SG (PESG) in the areas of his mandate. Anything that is operational in Sudan remained with the UN Country Team, with the overall parameter between the mandate of the Country Team and the Special Envoy. The UN transition in Sudan was mandated by the UNSC Resolution 2715 that requested immediate cessation of UNITAMS activities from 4 Dec 2023, transfer of tasks, where applicable and appropriate, to UN APFs by 29 Feb 2024. In this process, the SG's Directives outlined the requirements for the transition (joint UNCT/UNITAMS transition calendar, roadmap, resource mobilization strategy). The focus of the transition is not only on the closure of UNITAMS but safeguarding the achievements and work done jointly as an integrated UN in Sudan over the period of two years in the areas of human rights, protection of civilians, Women, Peace and Security, peacebuilding and other programmatic activities. As such, this is a transition of the UN in Sudan into a new configuration post-UNITAMS, rather than a drawdown and transition of UNITAMS only. The transition planning discussions were held within the parameters of three priority areas that were endorsed by the Head of Agencies of the UNCT and the Senior Management Team in UNITAMS: 1. Conflict prevention, peace-making and peacebuilding, 2. Protection of civilians, human rights and rule of law, and 3. Women, peace and security and youth. These priority areas align with the United Nations Common Approach and Priorities in Sudan (2024) document that was endorsed by the UNCT as the planning document in December 2023. As such, the outcomes of the transition planning fit within the existing planning framework of the United Nations country team with a view to facilitate implementation and ensure continuity and sustainability.

The workshop on Women, Peace and Security resulted in the following conclusions: there is a significant amount of engagement of UN AFPs on WPS; UNCT must continue consolidating this work; there are clear mandate holders who can convene the UNCT discussion to reinvigorate integrated work as a country team on the WPS topic; there is a joint understanding of priorities; and RC/HC's Office can support some of these areas with the lead agencies to ensure coordination across WPS including liaising with the PESG.

Sudan's current conflict is having a devastating impact on the people of Sudan, particularly women and girls. The conflict has reversed the gains made toward democracy and stability, leaving the country in suffering and insecurity, while facing a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. Sudanese women and girls are paying a heavy price for this violence, bearing the brunt of a humanitarian crisis. Sudan is among the largest internal displacement crises in the world. 53 per cent of internally displaced are women and girls, and there is a growing risk that the violence will soon create the world's largest hunger crisis. More than 7,000 new mothers could die in the coming months if their nutritional and health needs remain unmet. Over 6.7 million people are at risk of gender-based violence and reports of intimate partner violence, sexual exploitation and abuse, and trafficking in persons are widespread and increasing. Survivors report rarely able to access services or report to authorities. The economic impact of the conflict has further marginalized women, stripping them of livelihood opportunities and pushing many towards severe measures and the risk of sexual exploitation and abuse as they seek to support their families.

Ongoing attempts at peace have so far faltered, with SAF and RSF lacking genuine commitment to peace in the absence of a mutually hurting battlefield stalemate. The ceasefire-aimed US and Saudi-brokered Jeddah talks include only the two main belligerents. They run in parallel to a forum-shopping-plagued political track that attempts to bring a wide variety of stakeholders, including civilian actors with diverging positions, together. At this process design stage, the aim of the political track is to map out actors, topics and options for the post-ceasefire phase when renewed transition negotiations can meaningfully materialize. This presents a pivotal opportunity for amplifying the voices of civilians, particularly women, who are disproportionately affected by conflict. Women and youth have historically been marginalized in peace processes despite their critical roles in fostering community cohesion and rebuilding post-war societies. As indicated by numerous studies on women's and youth participation in peace negotiations, inclusive dialogues that integrate these demographics result in more comprehensive and sustainable peace agreements.

Women and girls, often the first responders in crises, are not only victims of this violence but also pivotal to the survival and resilience of their communities. Sudanese women and women's rights organizations continue to advocate for peace and a return to democratic governance at different fora. Their participation in peace processes and humanitarian responses is not just beneficial but necessary for creating lasting peace and security.

## b) Strategic Frameworks & National Ownership

UN Security Council resolution 2524 (2020) reiterates the principle of national ownership of the peace process, supports the creation and expansion of national peace infrastructure and an inclusive, community-based approach to peacebuilding, extends the UNAMID mission until end 2020, and establishes the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) to assist the country in its transition towards democratic governance. The four strategic objectives of UNITAMS under SCR 2524 (2020) are:

- i. Assist the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace.
- ii. Support peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements.
- iii. Assist peacebuilding, civilian protection and rule of law, in particular in Darfur and the Two Areas.

iv. Support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance. The end result on the UNITAMS peacebuilding objective is that peace implementation progresses sufficiently to **sustain peace** through legitimate and functioning State institutions throughout Sudan that provide basic security, protection and services to the population with full respect of the rule of law and human rights.

**Sustaining peace** is a comprehensive UN agenda for preventing the onset, outbreak and recurrence of conflict by addressing its root causes and drivers<sup>22</sup>. It applies across contexts including where there is no open conflict. It is ongoing and iterative and calls for reducing the risks of fragility (conflict drivers) and strengthening the infrastructures for peace and social cohesion.

Sustaining peace demands more effective coordinated responses among the key pillars of the UN—peace and security, development, and human rights, as well as humanitarian action— and overcoming institutional and sectoral silos to develop collaborative and complementary solutions across the conflict cycle. This is reinforced by the 2030 Agenda, particularly SDG 16 at the nexus of security and development. The sustaining peace resolutions and the 2030 Agenda are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and together are shaping a common global vision of a sustainable peaceful future, including the values of national ownership, inclusivity, people-centred and transformative approaches, and long-term perspectives. Sustaining Peace and the SDGs represent system-wide frameworks that recalibrate towards long-term approaches that focus on root causes and building societal resilience.

The sustaining peace framework allows the UN to better support Sudan to achieve the SDGs, by stepping back from sectoral and projectized interventions and instead propose more integrated solutions; by taking a more deliberate approach to tackling group-based vulnerabilities; and by incrementally offering a broader framing of peace and development to national stakeholders.

UN Security Council Resolution 2254 underlines the importance of the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union in Sudan, and supports the African Union Peace and Security Council's call for the Government of Sudan to urgently identify areas in which the African Union could provide additional assistance and encourages UNITAMS, UNAMID and the African Union to ensure coherence, coordination and complementarity of their support Sudan, including through a United Nations-African Union senior level coordination mechanism.

As per Chapter 15 of the Constitutional Declaration, the TGoS has committed to "Apply UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the relevant African Union resolutions regarding participation of women at all levels in the peace process, and to apply regional and international charters regarding women's rights", "Conduct legal reforms that guarantee women's rights, by repealing all laws that discriminate against women, and protect the rights granted to them by this Constitutional Charter," and under Chapter 7, ensure that, "The participation of women is not be less than 40% of the membership of the Transitional Legislative Council."

In keeping with the above commitments, in March 2020, the TGoS endorsed the National Action Plan for UNSCR1325 (NAP1325). The NAP1325 objectives are to:

- Actively involve women in peacebuilding, peacekeeping, peace negotiations, and decision-making processes at all levels and in relief, reconstruction, and development.
- Promote the recognition of women's rights before, during, and post-armed conflict.
- Ensure the protection of women against any form of gender-based violence, such as rape and sexual slavery, and put an end to impunity.

The *UN in Sudan – Common Approach and Priorities* was agreed in March 2022 to guide planning and prioritization of UN system efforts until the end of 2023. It was derived from the detailed *Sudan Peace-making*, *Peace building and Stabilization Program (SPPSP)* developed in July 2021 to establish a joint programmatic framework for UNITAMS and the UNCT. The Common Approach reflects limitations placed upon UN engagement with the new de facto government following the 25<sup>th</sup> October coup and prioritises work of the SPPSP according to three "baskets": (1) basic services, community stabilization and resilience; (2) protection of civilians, rule of law and human rights; and (3) democratic transition, peace building and conflict prevention.

A joint Strategic Results Framework was approved in October 2022 for the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) for Peace and Stabilisation – established as a pooled funding mechanism to channel donor contributions towards SPPSP implementation -and the work of the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) in Sudan to convert agreed activities of the UN Common Approach into a structure and strategy for programming. The SRF establishes collective outcomes to be achieved, with disaggregated targets and indicators against which to monitor progress, comprising (1) stabilization of conflict-affected hotspot areas; (2) development of infrastructure for peace at national and local levels; and (3) support to peace processes and peace agreements.

The reprogrammed project furthermore aligns with the priorities, in particular priority 2, as outlined by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) following the outbreak of the war: (1) achieving a stable ceasefire with a monitoring mechanism; (2) preventing the escalation or ethnicization of the conflict; (3) protection of civilians and provision of humanitarian relief; and (4) preparing, for when the time is ripe, a fresh political process with the participation of a broad array of civil and political actors, including women (see SRSG Perthes' remarks to the Security Council 22 May 2023).

This project aligns with the UN priorities in Sudan. For national level political negotiations to succeed the involvement of voices of civilian actors within Sudan is crucial at the moment many civilian actors and movements are diaspora led there is a need to bridge this gap and ensure involvement of civilian actors who remained within Sudan despite the shrinking of civil space at the same time the civilian actors are equally plagued by elite capture, risking a lack of attention towards the victims and survivors of the war ensuring the meaningful participation of community based peacebuilders, including women and youth will provide greater legitimacy to efforts in consolidating civilian viewpoints it will also ensure local level ownership on ongoing mediation process design efforts. Thus, the project will support the meaningful participation of local level peace actors track 3, 2, and 1 medication processes.

In Sudan, the engagement of women and youth in peace processes and community dialogues has emerged as a transformative approach to achieving sustainable peace. Historically marginalized in political arenas, these groups have increasingly become critical actors in mediating conflicts and fostering reconciliation at both national and local levels. Their involvement ensures that diverse perspectives are represented, which is essential for comprehensive conflict resolution strategies. Women bring unique insights into peacebuilding due to their roles within families and communities, enabling them to mediate disputes with empathy and a focus on social cohesion. Likewise, youth bring innovation, energy, and a vested interest in ensuring long-term stability for their futures. Their active participation has proven to dismantle traditional hierarchies that often perpetuate cycles of violence by including those who are directly impacted by conflict yet frequently excluded from decision-making processes. Community dialogues spearheaded by these groups encourage inclusivity and grassroots mobilization, empowering locals to take ownership of peace initiatives. This holistic approach not only addresses immediate tensions but also establishes enduring frameworks for societal harmony (Sudan). By championing the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> The twin 2016 General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions 70/262 and 2282 on "Sustaining Peace" are the UN's strongest commitment to 'positive peace' to-date, disconnecting the link between peace and violent conflict and the linear relationship between war, peace and development. Sustaining peace encompasses an array of interventions, including strengthening the rule of law, promoting sustainable economic growth, poverty eradication, social development, sustainable development and national reconciliation. Some of the means and principles by which these interventions are pursued are inclusive dialogue and mediation, access to justice and transitional justice, accountability, good governance, democracy, accountable institutions, respect for human rights and gender equality.

voices of women and youth in peace negotiations, Sudan can pave the way for resilient governance structures rooted in equity and sustained through broad-based communal support.

#### c) Strategic Needs Assessment & Existing Interventions

The Peace Commissioner outlined broad thematic priorities in his speech to the *Friends of Sudan* donor group in Dubai on 8th August and has since made separate specific requests for assistance to UNITAMS and the PBF Steering Committee for consideration. In summary, the support requested from PBF falls into three categories:

- 1. Establishment and capacitation of national peace architecture, with initial focus on the Peace Commission itself and the process for preparation of a National Strategy for Peace;
- 2. Support to the phase of pre-implementation of peace agreements, including i) strategic communications and advocacy; ii) dialogue processes and events; iii) data and assessments for durable solutions and transition to the longer-term peace and development processes of Agenda 2030.
- 3. Facilitation of international support to the implementation of peace agreements.

Project name (duration)	Donor and budget	Project focus	Difference from/ complementarity to current proposal
Support Peace and Development Centers in Sudan on dissemination of Juba Peace Agreement	UNDP Core TRAC Resources	Dissemination of the Juba Peace Agreement among local communities	Complementarity
Dissemination of Juba Peace Agreement in Darfur	UNAMID	Dissemination of the Juba Peace Agreement in Darfur	Complementarity
Support Peace Talks and Secretariat in Juba	UNAMID	Juba Peace Secretariat	Complementarity
PBF Secretariat Project	UNDP	Support to core PBF programming and functions in Sudan	Complementarity
Darfuri Youth Empowerment in Civic Spaces to advance peacebuilding	UNDP and UNHCR funded by PBF	Countering hate speech	Complementarity
Support to the agricultural season	FAO / WFP funded by CERF (protection activities complemented by UNHCR, funded by UNHCR)	Providing technical support to crop protection committees so that they mitigate carry out awareness raising and mitigate disputes on the ground.	Complementarity
Refugee and IDP Profiling Towards Sustainable Peace and Durable Solutions in Darfur in West, Central and North Darfur as well as for Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad	UNHCR/IOM	Profilling and Data collections	Complementarity
Strengthening Capacities for Peace and Social Cohesion in Kassala and Red Sea	UNDP - UNICEF funded by the PBF	Reducing violent conflict, enhancing peace and social cohesion in Kassala and Red Sea	Complementarity
Strengthening the Climate - Security Nexus in Gadaref	IOM and FAO funded by the PBF	Addressing land and natural resource triggered conflicts to mitigate the impact of climate change on local conflict dynamics	Complementarity
Youth Volunteers Supporting Peace and Recovery in Darfur (YOVORED - PHASE V) – Re- programmed	UNDP	To develop the capacity of the youth to support peace and recovery processes in their own communities while enhancing their skills and skills competencies for their social and career development	Complementarity

Darfuri Youth Empowerment in Civic Spaces to Advance Peacebuilding		The reprogrammed project will focus on providing support to young sedentary farmers by seed distribution and training on agricultural practices	Complementarity
--	--	---	-----------------

### II. Project content, strategic justification and implementation strategy (4 pages max Plus Results Framework Annex)

#### a) Project Overview

The purpose of the project is to channel support to the peace process in Sudan, including implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) alliance on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2020. Three areas of intervention are foreseen:

- 1. Support to National Peace Architecture, including design and establishment of the Peace Commission, which still does not have an agreed organisational structure nor terms of reference, and other entities at national and sub-national levels, mobilisation of civil society, and development of a National Strategy for Peace, with accompanying financing framework.
- 2. Immediate support to pre-implementation of the JPA, including a communications, outreach and advocacy campaign at community level to popularise the agreement, technical and financial assistance to organisation of events and processes envisaged in the JPA, and data collection and analysis to establish baselines to inform programming of international assistance;
  - a. In order to ensure conflict sensitivity, the project would provide support to ongoing discussions and mediation of additional tracks as required. This might include negotiations between the Transitional Government of Sudan (TGoS) and the SPLM-N/Al Hilu and, in the future, SLA Abdel Wahed.
- 3. Support to Government to ensure that effective coordination and establishment of reporting, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are in place to promote accountability of peace agreement implementation, in line with binding international and regional legal instruments.

The project seeks to build partnerships wherever possible to promote coherence, coordination and complementarity of both policy and programming. It will facilitate the integrated mission, UNITAMS, African Union and IGAD engagement as appropriate and support Sudan's cross border relations and regional integration; it will serve as a platform to support relevant inter-Agency working of the UNCT, as part of the integrated UNITAMS mission; it will establish a monitoring and evaluation mechanism by which parties, guarantors and witnesses can jointly assess progress toward implementation of the peace agreement; it will work with the donor community to promote joint analysis, common methodology, and consensual agreement to baselines, targets and indicators to support implementation of both the Juba Peace Agreement and the proposed National Strategy for Peace.

While the purpose of the project remains to channel support to the peace process in Sudan, including implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) if and when possible, to do so, and to support an emerging peace infrastructure, the priorities for peacebuilding activities have been adjusted to take account of the limitations imposed by the 25 October 2021 coup. The Framework Agreement signed on 5 December 2022 was an encouraging sign of progress towards a civilian led government, but the recent armed conflict that broke out on the 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has undermined the prospects of lasting peace, prosperity and democracy in Sudan. Efforts to resolve the political crisis in Sudan continue at the beginning of 2023 with the signing of a Framework Agreement on 5 December 2022 widely recognized as an encouraging first step. Should a political deal be reached swiftly, and a civilian led government installed, transitional priorities, especially the support to transitional institutions and JPA commissions, can be strengthened as part of the projects current Outcomes and in close cooperation with UNITAMS. The conflict has since engulfed the metropolitan area of the capital, Khartoum, the Darfur States and the Kordofan States in an active armed confrontation and violence between the belligerents with dire implications on the civilian population that suffers from the violence and from a multi-faceted socio-economic and humanitarian crisis. The civilian population is exposed to serious threats, as they are being mobilized, divided, including through hate speech and affected by human rights violations. The conflict has also damaged the country's critical infrastructure, services, and social cohesion, affecting millions of people who are already vulnerable and in need of humanitarian assistance. This has increased the risk of ethnic polarization and fragmentation of the country, with regional implications.

However, while the current status quo continues, the project will focus on support to credible local level and grass-roots peacebuilding initiatives and community-based conflict resolution and prevention mechanisms as part of a bottom-up approach to infrastructures for peace/peace architecture. Activities will be prioritized that stabilize conflict affected and vulnerable communities, build the capacity of local peacebuilding actors, promote social peace, inter-communal dialogue and awareness-raising, build resilience and promote good offices to help communities mitigate and manage the threats to human security in the months ahead, for example, by easing tensions and competition over natural resources (land, water and gold), access to services and livelihoods, as well as progressing durable solutions for IDPs and host communities.

Previous and new activities and outputs have been re-organized with a stronger focus on local-level structures and actors, to contribute to the two Outcomes of the PBF MPTF joint Strategic Results Framework for Sudan:

• Support to peace processes and agreements, here comprising support to the mechanisms and processes of the JPA where these are understood as urgent and immediate priorities of the Government, which have the support of UNITAMS, and which can be delivered in the remaining Twelve month timeframe of the project; advocacy and communications work to promote public awareness of the JPA; and on demand facilitation of the ongoing Juba peace process between the Government and armed groups not party to the JPA.

- Support to Sudanese 'infrastructure for peace, primarily at national and the local level, including the development of the evidence-base for peacebuilding and peacemaking, including the search for durable solutions for IDPs and refugees, mobilization and capacitation of civil society groups, and coherence and integration with regional platforms and programmes for peace.
- A subnational level stabilization intervention to enhance social cohesion and peaceful co existence among internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities in Gedaref State, East Sudan, through improved access to services, livelihood opportunities, and social cohesion activities. Furthermore, the project will also provide additional support to the winter agricultural season of 2023-24 and to nomads in North Darfur to respond to the growing needs of both farmers and pastoralist, enhance their resilience and livelihoods through various interventions and activities. This proposed intervention in North Darfur will build synergies with the ongoing and reprogrammed PBF supported Youth Promotion Initiative which aims to provide support to farmers in North Darfur for the winter agricultural season of 2023. While the reprogrammed YPI offers seeds and related training on agricultural practice, the SSPP project will complement the seed distribution through the provision of agricultural tools to the same selected beneficiaries. Furthermore, the SSPP project will also provide assistance to nomads, through provision of solar items, in order to be inclusive and conflict sensitive with a view to historical tensions between farmers and nomadic pastoralists and to prevent perceptions of a one sided intervention favoring one group over the other.

The goal of the project is to advance the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda in Sudan, promoting women's meaningful participation and empowerment in peacebuilding processes. This goal will be achieved through the following:

- Assess the roles and opportunities for women to act as local-level peacebuilders and change makers within their communities
- Build women's agency in peacebuilding by enhancing their capacities as insider mediators
- Support community-level peacebuilding initiatives led by women's groups are supported to advance local-level ceasefire agreements
- Enable the meaningful participation of women in peace processes at all levels
- Enhance the UN Country Team's capacity to address gender-specific challenges and promote women's participation in peace processes. Establish a WPS Advisor position within the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator's office in Sudan, who will provide specialized guidance on gender-sensitive approaches to peacebuilding and coordinate and partner with key WPS actors. Conduct workshops and training to strengthen the knowledge and skills of UN staff on gender issues.

### b) Project Theory of Change

The central premise of the project is that while political will and good faith remain prerequisites, Sudan will only be able to achieve a lasting and just peace settlement if it has the capacities, processes and external support to make and sustain the peacebuilding momentum(s).

The project assumes political goodwill of all parties, and their genuine commitment to the peace process; it also assumes interest of the international community in supporting Sudanese efforts to bring about lasting and just peace in the country.

The project also assumes that all stakeholders recognise the need to address the legacy of the conflict in multiple dimensions, including accountability for gross human rights violations and durable solutions for protracted displacement of Sudanese within the country and in the neighbouring countries.

Going forward, an all inclusive and participatory approach is understood as the best guarantor that the peacebuilding effort will be perceived and accepted as demonstrably for the public good, undertaken in the interests of all and in accordance with the rule of law, fairly applied.

The rationale and pathways to achieving desired outcomes in these areas are outlined below, along with the key outputs and indicative activities that will be required.

If women are capacitated as local-level peacebuilders, women's agency is strengthened to initiate and advance local-level ceasefire agreements, and women peacebuilders are empowered to participate in peace talks at all levels, *then* a diverse group of women will be empowered to participate in local and national political and peacebuilding processes, contributing to lasting peace in Sudan and advancing the WPS agenda.

## c) Key Project Components

Outcome 1: Sudan has broad-based, inclusive, participatory and gender-responsive peace architecture in place, at national, regional and local levels, for ongoing dispute resolution and the transparent, accountable, multi-stakeholder implementation of an overarching National Strategy for Peace.

Inclusive decision making is fundamental to sustaining peace at all levels, as are long term policies to address economic, social and political aspirations, and to achieve the SDGs. Fostering the participation of young people as well as of the organisations, movements, and networks that represent them is crucial. Women's meaningful participation in all aspects of peace and security is critical to effectiveness, including in peace processes, where it has been shown to have a direct impact on the sustainability of agreements reached.

## Output 1.1: Peace Commission established in law and functioning at national and sub-national levels.

The project will support institutional planning for Terms of Reference and governance structure of the national and sub-national Peace Commission Offices, and as regards the definition of the vertical and horizontal institutional relationships and inter linkages with between the Peace Commission and other Commissions and entities of the peace agreement, as well as existing national and sub-national governance structures. This will include relationships between the implementing mechanisms and commissions and the TGoS oversight bodies, including the Monitoring and Evaluation Commission.

Establishment and development of the operational methodology of the Peace Commission, commensurate with the guiding principles and global good practices for building inclusive approaches to conflict prevention identified in the recommendations of the UN-World Bank study,

Pathways for Peace

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>-https://www.pathwaysforpeace.org

Technical assistance may also be provided to the establishment and operational methodology of other permanent or peace agreement specific institutions, Commissions or entities to be established under the purview of the Peace Commission, including, *inter alia*, the IDPRC, Lands and Hawakeer Commission, Transitional Justice, Herders, Nomads, and Farmers Commission, etc. of the JPA, or those that may be envisaged under potential future peace agreements. In regard to ensuring focus on the need for durable solutions for IDPs and refugees, the Peace Commission's capacity will be strengthened in the following areas, in support of the forcibly displaced:<sup>24</sup>

- Planning and assessments, as to facilitate realistic nationally owned durable solutions planning, which takes all solutions into account, including return and local integration.
- Engagement of IDP (and returnee) communities in peace and durable solutions planning that takes in consideration underlying rights and protection challenges and risks.
- Returnee and protection monitoring, analysis of the findings and referrals to relevant Government entities.
- Legal aid for returnees and IDPs.

International assistance to peace agreements must be subject to Government coordination at both national and sub-regional level. New mechanisms will need to be agreed and established in support of implementation of the peace agreement. The project will work with the Peace Commission and signatories to develop governance options and provide secretariat support on behalf of Government and international partners.

# Output 1.2: Civil society mobilised and articulated to implementation of peace agreements and development of a National Strategy for Peace.

The project will support the Peace Commission to identify and map all infrastructure for peace including academic institutions and civil society organisations and clarify their role and possible linkages with the Peace Commission to support peacebuilding and reconciliation processes at national, sub-national and community levels. In line with the findings of 'Pathways to Peace', the long term guarantor of sustainable peace in Sudan is likely to be the strong engagement of civil society and local communities<sup>25</sup>, properly capacitated and coordinated, as partner to the implementation of activities, as advocates for policy reform and budget provision, and as monitors of the overall transparency, accountability and efficacy of the national effort.

Given the particularly strong role played by women in the revolution, and in line with commitments made in the Constitution and the JPA, it is considered of particular importance that women's CSOs and CSOs working on gender issues are identified and articulated to the work of the Peace Commission at all levels.

Insider mediation draws upon the ability of institutions, groups or individuals that are seen as insiders or internal to the conflict within a given context who are able to broker differences, build consensus and resolve conflict.<sup>26</sup> The project will support establishment of common spaces for free and open discussions and dialogue among political parties, women and youth groups, civil society and academia on peacebuilding issues and peaceful settlement of differences. This will be facilitated by insider mediators using their credibility and influence.

In key areas affected by forced displacement, in Darfur and elsewhere, the project will organise inclusive and participatory consultations at community level to develop and guide interventions in favour of durable solutions for IDPs and refugees, informed by good practice and lessons learned, as well as data and analysis available to UNHCR and UNDP from ongoing and new collaborative projects<sup>27</sup>. Wherever possible, the consultative process should build on robust initiatives, mechanisms and alliances (including women networks) already established in the context of durable solutions multis stakeholder processes (for instance, for the Durable Solutions Action Plans in eighteen localities across the five states of Darfur)

## Output 1.3: National Strategy for Peace prepared and adopted.

UN Security Council Resolution 2524 requests the Secretary General, in partnership with all relevant actors, including International Financial Institutions, to support the Government of Sudan in conducting a comprehensive assessment to define the country's longer term conflict prevention, recovery and peacebuilding needs and in developing relevant strategies to address these needs. The various accords and respective peace agreements on regional issues should be moulded into a single, coherent framework, as highlighted in the recent Security Council debate on the situation in Sudan just days before the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement.<sup>28</sup>

The project will support the Peace Commission to lead the preparation of a National Strategy for Peace, as well as constituent sub-national strategies, ensuring coherence and alignment between the Strategy and the five tracks of the Juba Peace agreement. Stakeholders to the process will include the FFC, PMO, Sovereign Council, Higher Council for Peace, signatories to the JPA, civil society, women and youth groups, IDPs and refugees, nomads and international partners.

The process by which the Strategy is prepared will itself need to be agreed through consultation and consensus to achieve legitimacy, transparency and accountability. The methodology to be utilised should be inclusive and participatory in design and in implementation; transparent, accountable and rights based; appropriately targeted, suitably informed and collaborative, as well as subject to ongoing processes of coordination, monitoring and evaluation, and programmatic adjustment. The Strategy will need to be accompanied by a robust M&E framework, to ensure that every intervention can demonstrate its value as an effective investment with positive impact for affected communities.

The National Strategy should articulate specific paths to achieve peace dividends, including for the many forcibly displaced, internally and across the borders with neighbouring countries. The project will ensure substantive alignment of the Strategy with the National Strategy for Durable Solutions separately under preparation.

The project will provide technical assistance to ensure that conflict sensitivity and gender are mainstreamed within the Strategy. All consultative processes for Strategy development will target 40% representation of women, in line with provisions of the Juba agreement and relevant articles of UNSCR 2254<sup>29</sup>. It will also build capacities of the Ministry of Finance for public finance management, to ensure that it is able to prepare, manage and monitor a transparent financing framework to accompany the National Peace Strategy. This will include support to gender

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Reference is made to the activities specified in the Darfur Peace Agreement Implementation Matrix, including (a)4/13/15/16/21/22, among other workstreams outlined for other regions.

<sup>&</sup>quot;Conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile and other parts of the country have fragmented social cohesion and institutions, especially on a local level, including through forced displacement and repeated cycles of rebellion and repression." Cf. WBG, Country Engagement Note for the Republic of Sudan for the period FY21-FY22, September 10, 2020, p.4, available here.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> UNDP Guidance Note, April 2020 https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/conflict-prevention/engaging-with-insider-mediators-sustaining-peace in an age of .htmlError! Hyperlink reference not valid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Including from UNCT work already underway with support from PBF and CERF.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> See UN Doc. S/PV.8761, 25 September 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> UNSCR 2254 calls upon the Government of Sudan to ensure women's full, equal and meaningful participation in peace processes, implementation of future peace agreements, conflict prevention and decision making- and reform processes related to peace and security.

budgeting, with a view to promoting accountability and transparency in fiscal planning, increasing gender responsive participation in the budget process by involving women and men equally in budget preparation, advancing gender equality and women's rights.

Outcome 1 Peacebuilding, peacemaking and implementation of peace agreements advance progress toward a peaceful and democratic transition.

Dialogue, negotiation, and agreement between parties remains the only viable pathway to making and sustaining peace in Sudan. Only the Sudanese people and their representatives can make and sustain peace in Sudan through a successful political transition and through peace agreements at national, sub-national and local level that address the root causes of violence. External actors such as the UN can assist<sup>30</sup>, but not substitute for, Sudanese peacemaking, through the timely provision of appropriate technical and financial resources to strengthen and support accountable and inclusive JPA implementation and support to peacemaking processes at the community level (see Outcome 3).

#### Output 1.1 Mechanisms and processes of JPA architecture supported

Despite the constitutive act of the Peace Commission having been put in place in April 2021, government has not yet fully operationalized the Commission, nor established other JPA commissions and mechanisms except for the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee. The project will provide further technical and advisory support to the Peace Commission to be able implement its mandate, subject to agreement and remaining resources. Should a political deal be reached, and a civilian led government installed, transitional priorities, especially the support to transitional institutions and JPA commissions, can be strengthened as part of the projects current Outcomes and in close cooperation with UNITAMS.

In response to a request for support from UNITAMS, the project will provide support to the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee established in September 2021. The Permanent Ceasefire Committee for Darfur is provided for in the Juba Peace Agreement chapter 8, with a mandate to monitor the permanent ceasefire; receive and verify unsettled violations and complaints; monitor demining activities and defuse unexploded military ordnance and facilitate humanitarian access.

Decrees 243, 244 and 245 of 30 June 2021 designate UNITAMS to serve as the Chair of the PCC and related five sectoral committees. The project will provide technical support to the PCC including capacity development to PCC team members and key stakeholders, data and assessment through the Crisis Risk Dashboard (see Activity 2.2.2), equipment and information, education, and communication materials (IEC) to create awareness to the public in Darfur on the mission and mandate of the PCC.

- Activity 1.1.1 Provision of IT equipment to the National Peace Commission (NPC). Completed.
- Activity 1.1.2 NPC website designed and operational to improve community outreach and communication with the wider public and civil society engagement on the peace process. Completed
- Activity 1.1.3 Recruitment of communication specialist to support NPC visibility and implementation of the JPA advocacy plan developed with support of UN agencies. Completed
- Activity 1.1.4 Visual identity/branding for Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee and provision of vehicle stickers, vest, t-shirts, caps, armbands. Completed
- Activity 1.1.5 Capacity development and knowledge management support to the National Peace Commission and Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee (PCC) and critical mechanisms and structure under JPA that might be established in consultations with UNITAMS. Off Track Full budget to be reprogrammed to Activity 2.2.1

## Output 1.2 Advocacy and communications campaign conducted.

The local and inter-communal nature of conflict in Sudan requires a strong advocacy and communications campaign to be conducted at grassroots level in support of each peace agreement, to promote understanding and buy-in, and to prepare the ground for the inclusive local dialogue and planning processes that are envisaged. It is particularly important that the campaign is specifically designed to speak to women and reflects adequately their concerns and interests; it should also explicitly raise awareness of gender provisions in the JPA, the UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan and the Constitution.

The project will support implementation of a Communications and Visibility Strategy/Action Plan for the Peace Commission, prepared with separate support of PBF.<sup>31</sup>

- Activity 1.2.1 10,000 copies of JPA printed and widely distributed within government line ministries and departments, as well as to the civil society and summarized, track specific versions drafted by a committee of JPA signatories and the government. Completed
- Activity 1.2.2 High level mission from the signatories of JPA and senior government to conduct consultation and dissemination workshops in four states (Ed Daein, Zalengei, Nyala, El Geneina) for more than 1,100 from key government officials, community leaders, CSOs, youth and women groups, IDPs, nomads, and other key actors. Completed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> UNSCR 2579 (2021) mandates UNITAMS and the UNCT to support peace processes and implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and future peace agreements.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> To be included in the unearmarked \$300,000 allocation for DPPA assistance under the existing PBF Secretariat Project.

Activity 1.2.3. At the request of the Peace Commissioner, installation of a medium-wave peace radio station in Ed Damazin, Blue Nile state and distribution of solar radio devices for remote communities with no access to public information. Off Track Full budget to be reprogrammed to the new Outcome 3

Activity 1.2.4 Support to the NPC and PCC with communications and community engagement support. Off Track Full budget to be reprogrammed to the new Outcome 3

### Output 1.3 Support provided to peace talks with non-signatory armed groups

In complex multilevel mediation efforts that span various stages of political negotiation toward a comprehensive settlement, development actors can help to identify and frame technical issues, assess the developmental and fiscal impacts of negotiated settlements, and provide advisory assistance on options<sup>32</sup>. The project will channel expertise of the integrated mission to negotiations in Juba in this regard and provide technical support and assistance to all parties in the negotiations including but not limited to support to SPLM-N Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu and the TgoS on issues around security arrangements, constitution issues and federalist options.

The project will support UNITAMS to service the Juba Peace Talks Secretariat, paying specific attention to ensuring the voices of women in the mediation effort. Women's meaningful participation in all aspects of peace and security is critical to effectiveness, including in peace processes, where it has been shown to have a direct impact on the sustainability of agreements reached.

Activity 1.3.1 Support provided to the on-going Juba Peace Talks Secretariat Completed

Activity 1.3.2 Support provided to Women's Delegation to participate in the Juba Peace Talks as observers and experts. Completed

Outcome 2: Pre-implementation support to peace agreements has mobilized popular goodwill and participation, established agreed machinery and processes of the peace process, and improved the evidence base upon which agreements are finalized and implemented.

While it is anticipated that the Government of Sudan will move imminently to establish the Peace Commission in law and furnish it with the necessary resources to fulfil its mandate, institutional set up of sub-regional offices, selection and training of staff, and effective roll out of the mechanisms and processes of peacebuilding is likely to be a process that can realistically be achieved only over the medium term.

In the meantime, the Peace Commission should be fully staffed and operational in 2021 to develop and implement its strategy. There is an urgent need for the Peace Commission to provide pre-implementation support to the peace agreement already signed, and to have resources available as and when other agreements are reached.

## Output 2.1 Advocacy and Communications Campaign conducted.

The local and inter-communal nature of conflict in Sudan requires a strong advocacy and communications campaign to be conducted at grassroots level in support of each peace agreement, to promote understanding and buy in, and to prepare the ground for the inclusive local dialogue and planning processes that are envisaged. It is particularly important that the campaign is specifically designed to speak to women and reflects adequately their concerns and interests; it should also explicitly raise awareness of gender provisions in the JPA, the newly-endorsed UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan and the Constitution.

The project will support implementation of a Communications and Visibility Strategy/Action Plan for the Peace Commission, currently under preparation with separate support of PBF.

Output 2.2 Dialogue forums and processes supported

In complex multilevel mediation efforts that span various stages of political negotiation toward a comprehensive settlement, development actors can help to identify and frame technical issues, assess the developmental and fiscal impacts of negotiated settlements, and provide advisory assistance on options<sup>34</sup>. The project will channel expertise of the integrated mission to negotiations in Juba in this regard and provide technical support and assistance to both parties in the negotiations including but not limited to support to SPLM-N Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu and the TgoS on issues around security arrangements, constitution issues and federalist options. It may also entail, together with UNDP, a series of forums to discuss practicalities of peace agreement implementation: lessons learned from Sudanese experience, including best practices from around the world.

The partial peace agreement signed on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October includes a significant number of events and processes to be 21tabiliza and undertaken to agreed deadlines. Further peace agreements may add to these mechanisms or may modulate plans for implementation or sequencing of those already agreed. While responsibility for the 21stabilization and financing of these remains with the Government of Sudan, the project will retain unearmarked resources to provide technical assistance to the design and facilitation of events and processes, to be unlocked at the request of the Peace Commissioner and upon approval of the Technical working Group of the PBF Joint Steering Committee. Technical advisory support will be provided to the Peace Commission, and potentially to other commissions as requested by the Peace Commission, to ensure that standing operations and bespoke event, mechanisms and processes for supporting peace agreements conform to international standards and model global good practice.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Pathways to Peace, Chapter 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> To be included in the unearmarked \$300,000 allocation for DPPA assistance under the existing PBF Secretariat Project.

<sup>34-</sup>Pathways to Peace, Chapter 8.

#### Output 2.3 Data and assessments inform durable solutions for IDPs and refugees.

Lasting and just peace in Sudan requires durable solutions for refugees and IDPs. Subject to safe and unhindered access to target areas in question, intentions and impediments to return must be surveyed to the extent and depth possible through profiling exercises of individuals and area based assessments of current conditions that identify what will be required to ensure security and rule of law, access to basic services and livelihoods opportunities to the standard necessary to support safe and dignified returns, and to sustain the choices of returnees over the long-term.

The credibility of data and analysis will be essential to ensure an evidence base for the conversation with the development and peacebuilding stakeholders backing durable solutions for the forcibly displaced in and *from* Sudan. Existing tools for planning, programming and analysis, agreed upon and piloted by UN agencies and the Government of Sudan, and in some cases by the World Bank,<sup>35</sup> should be used and streamlined, to ensure a holistic approach to protection, durable solutions and sustaining peace, as cross cutting dimensions underpinning the overarching peace process in Sudan. A common data grammar and interoperable methodologies are prerequisites for strategic and operational coherence of the Peace Commission.

The project will support relevant Agencies of the UNCT Durable Solutions Working Group to prepare data, undertake assessments and formulate inter-agency programmes in response to specific requests from the Peace Commissioner approved by the technical committee of PBF Joint Steering Committee. Wherever possible, area based assessments should be planned and conducted with other actors, eg, World Bank and other IFIs, African Union, IGAD, European Union etc., with a view to working toward shared conflict analysis, baseline data and target indicators, with agreed collective outcomes aligned to fulfilment of the peace agreement and a common monitoring framework to assess and evaluate progress (see Output 3.3).

Outcome 2 Sudan has an infrastructure for peace 'established and engaged in peacemaking and peacebuilding at national and subnational levels.

In 2010, governments, political parties, civil society and UNCTs from 14 African countries in Kenya agreed upon a working definition of infrastructures for peace (I4P) as a 'dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in a society'. The concept of infrastructure for peace is built upon the premise that conflict prevention efforts require sustained collaboration across a broad spectrum of stakeholders. UNSCR 2524 emphasizes "the importance of national ownership, inclusivity, and the role that civil society can play to advance national peacebuilding processes and objectives in order to ensure that the needs of all stakeholders are taken into account" 36.

Also central to the concept is that peace infrastructure should be linked at national and sub-national levels. In addition to national activities, the project will pay specific attention to the development and engagement of peace infrastructure in hotspot areas of Gedaref and North Darfur, in support of implementation of Outcome 3. At local level, and subject to detailed conflict sensitivity analysis in regard to all actors<sup>37</sup>, State-level Committees, local protection committees, native administrations and traditional courts, civil society groups representing specific constituent communities, women's groups, youth groups and University peace centres all comprise potential assets for peace that can, in principle, contribute to peacemaking and peacebuilding, through advocacy for their inclusion in key processes, capacity development support to their operations, and resources to act.

## Output 2.1 Civil society mobilized and capacitated

As per UNSCR 2524, and in line with the findings of 'Pathways to Peace', the long-term guarantor of sustainable peace in Sudan is likely to be the strong engagement of civil society and local communities<sup>38</sup>, properly capacitated and coordinated, as partner to the implementation of activities, as advocates for policy reform and budget provision, and as monitors of the overall transparency, accountability and efficacy of the national effort.

The project will support the establishment of common spaces for free and open discussions and dialogue among political parties, women and youth groups, civil society and academia on peacebuilding issues and peaceful settlement of differences. This will be facilitated by academic institutions using their credibility and influence and build upon Community Reconciliation Mechanisms (CBRMs) and Community Management Committees (CMCs) already established in many places.

Given the particularly strong role played by women in the revolution, and in line with commitments made in the Constitution and the JPA, it is considered of particular importance that women's CSOs and CSOs working on gender issues are identified and articulated to peacebuilding and peacemaking work at all levels.

Activity 2.1.1 National dialogue with CSO representative on expanding peacebuilding space in Sudan to support the implementation of JPA. Completed

Activity 2.1.2 Building the capacities of academic institutions to design and facilitate gender responsive and conflict sensitive community dialogue to strengthening social cohesion. Completed

<sup>37</sup> Locality-level analysis has already been undertaken for many hotspot areas in a series of State-level UNITAMS assessments. Prospective community perception studies can be utilized to add necessary granularity to ensure that proposed interventions are appropriate and fully conform with the principle of "do no harm". It is vital to avoid exacerbating any existing tensions, or – wherever possible – being seen to work through, or otherwise favour, those who have previously abused power.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> In late 2017, the UN Country Team and Government of Sudan jointly agreed to pilot durable solutions profiling exercises in rural Um Dukhun and urban El Fasher in North Darfur, respectively. See "Measuring progress towards durable solutions in Darfur", which includes an evaluation of the intervention in El Fasher and a "lite"" durable solutions toolkit for Sudan. Karen Jacobsen and Therese Bjorn Mason, May 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> This assumption is reiterated in UNSCR 2636 (2022).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> "Conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile and other parts of the country have fragmented social cohesion and institutions, especially on a local level, including through forced displacement and repeated cycles of rebellion and repression." Cf. WBG, Country Engagement Note for the Republic of Sudan for the period FY21-FY22, September 10, 2020, p.4, available here.

- Activity 2.1.3 National forum on countering hate speech. Completed
- Activity 2.1.4 Peace Dialogue with youth for International Peace Day. Completed
- Activity 2.1.5 Capacity development training for CSOs on conflict sensitive programming peacebuilding, conflict mitigation and management as part of ongoing joint initiative between UNDP, PBF, and UNSSC. Completed, remaining budget to be reprogrammed to activity 2.3.3
- Activity 2.1.6 Peace dialogue and confidence building exercise to build trust, promote consensus around national peace issues especially for youth and women groups, in coordination with Peace Research Institute (PRI) and Peace and Development Centers (PDCs) in the five Darfur states, South and West Kordofan, Kassala, EL Gadaref, and Red Sea states. Partially completed, remaining budget to be reprogrammed to Outcome 3
- Activity 2.1.7 Establish a network of digital mediators and develop hate speech and behavioral insight module that is context oriented. Partially completed, remaining budget to be reallocated to Outcome 3

#### Output 2.2 Key elements of the evidence-base for peacebuilding in place.

While there is a general dearth of statistics in Sudan, data collection and knowledge management are understood as fundamental to the twin processes of peacemaking and peacebuilding.

The established and neutral network of peace centres operating within public universities in Sudan is understood as a key asset of national peace infrastructure in this regard. UNDP will mobilise the peace centres to contribute to a series of State-specific peacebuilding assessments and articulate them to planning and implementation of social cohesion activities envisaged under Outcome 3.

The project will also support the UNDP Crisis Risk Dashboard as an early warning platform. The CRD facilitates information gathering, management, analysis and stabilization of crisis risk data, both in terms of immediate risks (e.g. violence, population displacement, political instability) as well as longer-term risks (e.g. macroeconomic instability, weak institutions, poor access to basic services).

-To date, access to the CRD has been provided to the UN Peacebuilding Working Group and UNITAMS and the information is used by OCHA, OHCR, IOM, UNICEF, and the World Bank. The CRD political violence prediction has been used in UNITAMS 'monthly trend analysis and has guided several discussions with CSOs platform (including Conflict Sensitivity Facility and Data for Change platforms). The first narrative report will be shared with UN agencies by the end of March 2023.

In parallel, UNHCR in collaboration with its partner NRC will organize a comprehensive mapping and gap analysis of data and evidence for durable solutions, return and reintegration and protection as needed for the implementation of the JPA. UNHCR in coordination with its partner Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), will deliver capacity building, methodologies and data exercises for a comprehensive identification of issues enabling returns, including HLP, legal identity and civil documentations, research on Women's HLP rights and other criteria for achieving durable solutions. This will have strong linkage and complementarity with the PBF project on Refugee and IDP Profiling Towards Sustainable Peace and Durable Solutions in Darfur (West, Central and North Darfur) as well as for Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad.

UNHCR and its partner NRC have already completed a number of important activities: ongoing recruitment of staff for Kutum and Kereneik, procurement of project items – tablets, IEC materials etc; partnership agreement signed with Darfur Development Reconstruction Agency (DDRA); ongoing discussions with civil registry and Judiciary to sign an MOU for the issuance of documents; identification of host communities; provision of information on HLP rights; provision of case-specific counselling on HLP rights; provision of information on legal identity and civil documentation; provision of counselling on civil documentation; provision of information on legal identity; provision of counselling on Legal identity; research on women's HLP righ–s - TOR developed and advertised, consultant has been selected – ongoing onboarding process, the consultant is expected to be in Sudan in November 2022.

The credibility of data and analysis through the research on women's HLP rights as well as complementary project on Refugee and IDP Profiling Towards Sustainable Peace and Durable Solutions in Darfur will be particularly important to ensure an evidence base for the conversation with the development and peacebuilding stakeholders backing durable solutions for the forcibly displaced in and *from* Sudan. Existing tools for planning, programming and analysis, agreed upon and piloted by UN agencies and the Government of Sudan, and in some cases by the World Bank,<sup>39</sup> should be used and streamlined, to ensure a holistic approach to protection, durable solutions and sustaining peace, as cross-cutting dimensions underpinning the overarching peace process in Sudan. A common data interoperable and methodologies are prerequisites for strategic and operational coherence of the work of both the UN system and the mechanisms and processes of potential JPA implementation.

The project provided complementary support to the efforts of the RC/HC and the Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) with a high-level advisory capacity to strengthen and progress on Durable Solutions. The special advisor has contributed to the finalization and updating of the national durable solutions strategy and input into the regional IGAD strategy and plan of action, and developed a set of recommendations on normative, institutional, and programmatic levels on the way forward and helped further build and maintain commitment and support in navigating the political landscape including with donors. The project organized as well a workshop on the 5th of December 2022 with State Government, line ministries, UN and (I)NGO representatives in North Darfur to discuss and validate North Darfur Durable Solutions Strategy, drafted an Action Plan / framework to guide government planning for priority interventions in the short, medium and long-term against each objective, and identified relevant existing/planned programmes implemented by UN and (I)NGOs in North Darfur and define further support required from UN agencies, INGOs and NGO partners.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> In late 2017, the UN Country Team and Government of Sudan jointly agreed to pilot durable solutions profiling exercises in rural Um Dukhun and urban El Fasher in North Darfur, respectively. See "Measuring progress towards durable solutions in Darfur", which includes an evaluation of the intervention in El-Fasher and a "lite"" durable solutions toolkit for Sudan. Karen Jacobsen and Therese Bjorn Mason, May 2020.

- Activity 2.2.1 Provide complementary support to the interagency comprehensive peacebuilding assessments in Darfur, East and the two areas in collaboration with PRI and PDCs led by UNITAMS. On Track, Additional funds will be allocated from Activity 2.2.2 and Activity 1.1.5 to conduct a light data collection exercise/assessment for Gedaref State
- Activity 2.2.2 Support to Crisis Risk Dashboard (CRD) On Track
- Activity 2.2.3 Technical support to gap analysis of data and evidence for durable solutions (e)integration and protection and further research on women's HLP rights for a comprehensive identification of issues enabling return, HLP, legal identity, civil documentation, and other criteria for achieving peace and durable solutions Completed
- -Activity 2.2.4 Mapping of conflict resolution structures. CRD mapping to document how cases are adjudicated in practice, to identify strengths and weaknesses and inform programmes designed to increase the robustness of these systems, and capacity building to stakeholders on Collaborative Dispute Resolution (CDR) and implications of HLP on durable solutions. Completed
- Activity 2.2.5 Support to women's HLP rights: Assessment on women's access to HLP rights. The survey would assess displaced women's actual access to land, their perceptions of the likelihood of accessing it in the future and the perceived obstacles that restrict their access to land and property. Individual experiences of attempts or access to land and their outcomes could also be recorded.

  Completed
- Activity 2.2.6 Based on data and evidence collected, conduct public awareness campaigns and targeted information through counselling and legal assistance among IDPs and refugees on HLP rights, collaborative dispute resolution, legal identity and civil documentation to support access to durable solutions. Completed
- Activity 2.2.7 Area-based assessments for durable solutions for IDPs and refugees with common methodology in main areas of potential return or (re)integration. Completed

### Output 2.3 Relevant regional and international capacities for peace enhanced

Not all drivers of conflict respect national bo ders—IGAD has a number of important regional platforms, including, *inter alia*, early warning systems for drought (IDRISSI), and pastoralist famer conflict (CEWARN)<sup>40</sup>, and mechanisms or centres dedicated to refugee displacement, water management and governance (IWU), food security and nutrition (FSNWG), pastoral area and livestock development (ICPALD), that should be seen as integral and supportive of Sudan's putative infrastructure for peace. The project will facilitate cooperation with IGAD in regard to sharing of lessons, good practices, and methodologies as they relate to analyses and operations related to prevention and will work with IGAD and the Peace Commission to identify opportunities for integrating CEWARN and other relevant IGAD cooperation and support platforms into Sudanese infrastructure for early warning of conflict. Data to be gathered will feed into the Crisis Risk Dashboard (see activity 2.2.2).

The project will also support the second phase of an on ongoing initiative in partnership with the PBF Sudan and United Nations System Staff College with the aim of enhancing the knowledge and skills of humanitarian, development and peace practitioners in Sudan to apply Conflict Sensitive approaches through different thematic and geographical areas. The programme will design comprehensive capacity building in conflict sensitive programming will be supported, based on Sudanese contextual reality and guided by global and regional experiences with in-depth understanding on thematic priorities such as Community Engagement, Durable Solutions and Systems thinking to peacebuilding practitioners in the UN System and national NGO/CSOs in Sudan.

- Activity 2.3.1 Joint UN/AU/IGAD workshop to ensure coherence, coordination and complementarity of programming and to identify concrete synergies and opportunities for enhancing early warning capacities in Sudan. Off Track—Full budget to be reprogrammed to the new Outcome 3
- Activity 2.3.2 Facilitation of IGAD workshop/consultations at sub-national level in North Darfur with regard to early warning and prevention mechanisms in relation to conflict between farmers and pastoralists in North Darfur. Off Track-Full budget to be reprogrammed to the new Outcome 3
- Activity 2.3.3 Develop thematic conflict sensitivity materials in partnership with PBF and United Nations System Staff College. On Track, additional fund has been added from Activity 2.1.6 and 2.3.4 to this activity to cover the cost of translation from English to Arabic
- Activity 2.3.4 Organize a ToT workshop to establish local and national experts on conflict sensitivity to lead face to face workshops on conflict sensitivity. Full budget to be reprogrammed to activity 2.3.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> The African Union has developed a Continental Early Warning System to advise the Peace and Security Council on "potential conflict and threats to peace and security" and "recommend best courses of action." The IGAD CEWARN platform forms part of the AU framework, with a focus on pastoralist-related conflicts. Through field monitors in different areas, CEWARN observes cross-border and internal pastoral conflicts and provides information related to potentially violent conflicts, their outbreak and escalation, also liaising with local administrations and communities within and across borders to avert crises.

## Outcome 3: Peace agreements in Sudan implemented in a transparent and accountable manner, in line with relevant international norms and standards, and Sudan better integrated in sub-regional peace architecture

In line with its global remit, PBF in Sudan aims to be 'catalytic', and to actively facilitate international support to peace in Sudan. For all external partners, as well as for the parties to the agreement itself, it is vital that the process of implementation of the peace agreement meets the highest possible standards in regard to inclusion, transparency, and accountability, as well as for the protection of civilians and respect for human rights.

#### Output 3.1 Responsibility and accountability promoted.

Article 21.1 of the Agreement on National Issues signed on 3<sup>rd</sup> October calls for the establishment of a mechanism to monitor and evaluate the final peace agreement. The mechanism is to be composed of "representatives of the signatory parties, the mediator, the guarantors and any other components agreed to by the Parties". Guarantors to the JPA include South Sudan, Chad and the UAE; witnesses to date<sup>41</sup> include the UN, African Union, European Union, League of Arab States, Qatar and Egypt. References in the Agreement to the UN Peace mission are to the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission for Sudan (UNITAMS).

The project will underwrite UN support to establish the resu mechanism, facilitating the members to fulfil their roles and responsibilities, including in specific issues relevant to humanitarian, development and peace/security dimensions of the Agreement, as well as on cross-cutting areas eg, gender equality, human rights, protection and durable solutions. Technical assistance is likely to include development of a results framework, establishment of a monitoring and evaluation tools and regime, planning for any operational presence required, and agreement to reporting and communications modalities and protocols.

### Output 3.2: Coherence with international policy and programmes enhanced.

The project will provide technical and legal assistance to the Peace Commission to ensure coherence of activities with international and regional instruments binding Sudan, as well as to assist the Commission in advocating for, and contribute (as applicable) to the accession, domestication, reform or implementation of relevant laws, policies and other legally binding commitments.

The project will also contribute to the engagement of the Peace Commission, and other entities created pursuant to the Juba Peace Agreement, in current initiatives of the African Union<sup>45</sup> or IGAD<sup>46</sup>, to which Sudan has been party and a leading proponent.<sup>47</sup>

The project will facilitate IGAD in regard to sharing of lessons, good practices, and methodologies as they relate to analyses and operations related to prevention. Sudan already participates in the IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) for addressing conflicts in the region<sup>48</sup>. The project will work with IGAD and the Peace Commission to integrate CEWARN and other relevant IGAD cooperation and support platforms into Sudanese infrastructure for early warning of conflict, to be developed as a network of academic Peace and Development Centers (PDCs), active in all current 18 states of Sudan, and embedded in local communities at grass roots level. Data to be gathered will feed into the Crisis Risk Dashboard (CRD) which the UN is currently establishing on UNDP's CRD methodology. The CRD facilitates information gathering, management, analysi25tabilizationsation of crisis risk data, both in terms of immediate risks (e.g. violence, population displacement, political instability) as well as longer term risks (e.g. macroeconomic instability, weak institutions, poor access to basic services).

## Outcome 3 Coexistence between farmers and pastoralist in North Darfur is increasingly improving, with stable relations between them, underwritten by strengthened application of the rule of law and mechanisms/structures in place to maintain achievements.

In line with stabilizationsation Outcome of the October 2022 PBF-MPTF Strategic Results Framework, the project will pilot an integrated UNITAMS UNCT effort in North Darfur to promote peaceful passage of the agricultural season, previously marked by cyclical violence between farmers and pastoralists over migratory routes and access to key natural resources including water and land.<sup>49</sup>

Stabilisation of 'hotspots' must proceed according to a context specific, area based approach as per the methodology outlined in the UN Common Approach. There are several migratory routes going through North Darfur (*Table 1*), some of which are currently closed or blocked, as they encompass hotspot areas including in rural El Fasher, Korma, Tawila, Dar Es Salam and Kelemando<sup>51</sup>. While migratory routes should customarily be reviewed and rehabilitated every year in May, this does no longer occur, reportedly due to financial shortages. In absence of demarcation, some farmers had taken the opportunity to expand their farming areas into migratory routes and livestock grazing pastures, while pastoralists routinely encroach on farming land, often in search of water for livestock. Along with resulting destruction of crops, the North Darfur peacebuilding assessment corroborates earlier findings<sup>52</sup> that for many, access to water is a key trigger of conflict.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Other countries are expected to witness the agreement once an official English language translation is available.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Sudan is not a party to any of the two statelessness conventions, however it is a party to a number of other conventions that include some safeguards against statelessness at birth, for instance. Sudan is signatory of the Declaration of International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Member States on the Eradication of Statelessness (2017), and the Brazzaville Action Plan, which entails reforms of national laws and regulations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> For instance, the terms of the Peace Agreement in relation to transitional justice and forced displacement, among other topics under the national issues chapter, will likely warrant a debate on the existing national policy on the protection of IDPs, and the need to bring its provisions closer to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Equally, Sudan's commitment to the Brazzaville Action Plan.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup>e.g., Tripartite agreements on returns have been signed between the Sudanese, Chadian government and UNHCR

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> One example is Sudan's engagement on the process behind the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Specific Aspects on the Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> IGAD and UNHCR in collaboration with the core-group members of the IGAD Support Platform are in the process of initiating a regional discussion on durable solutions for protracted displacement in Sudan and South Sudan.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> That is notably the case with the Nairobi Declaration, an agreement by IGAD countries to have a comprehensive regional approach to deliver durable solutions for refugees while also maintaining protection and promoting self-reliance in the countries of asylum. The IGAD Support Platform for the implementation of the Nairobi Action Plan, launched in December 2019 at the occasion of the first Global Refugee Forum in Geneva, consists of humanitarian and development organizations, private sector partners, and donors committing to show solidarity by providing concrete financial and development support to refugees in the East and Horn of Africa. The core group members of the Nairobi Process include EU, Germany, UNDP and the World Bank.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> The African Union has developed a Continental Early Warning System to advise the Peace and Security Council on "potential conflict and threats to peace and security" and "recommend best courses of action." The IGAD CEWARN platform forms part of the AU framework, with a focus on pastoralist related conflicts. Through field monitors in different areas, CEWARN observes cross border and internal pastoral conflicts and provides information related to potentially violent conflicts, their outbreak and escalation, also liaising with local administrations and communities within and across borders to avert crises.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> According to the PBF-funded peacebuilding assessment for North Darfur (see activity 2.2.1), now in final stages of preparation, 65% of respondents surveyed pointed to conflicts between farmers and pastoralists as the primary cause of conflict in North Darfur.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> The Nomadic Commissioner explained that these include nomadic routes inside El Fasher town, including El Fasher Airport, as well as routes passing through the El Fasher University Areas and the Zamzam IDP camp.

FGD participants in Tawila claim that all the routes were actually open, but that conflict happened away from the routes themselves because of the deliberate aggression of Arab tribes supported by government.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> United Nations Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund Sudan and Joint Internally Displaced Profiling Service, *Thematic Brief: Strengthening the rule of law and conflict resolution mechanisms*, October 2021

Table 1: Livestock migratory routes demarcated and those need rehabilitation in North Darfur						
Name of livestock migratory routes	Locality	<del>Demarcated</del>	Hotspot areas			
Kulkul Dar EL Rezagat	EL Fasher and Dar EL Salam	Kulkul – Jabal Shalla 80 km	Jabal Shalla Z mzam Umm derasayia in Dar El Salam locality About 65 km needs to be demarcated.			
Sub LMR from Kulkul Dar EL Rezagat routs /east side of EL Fasher	EL Fasher and Dar EL Salam	Demarcated from Kulkul until Hamra in Dar EL Salam locality	Kulkul Azagarfa Umm maraheek Gogo Gogo until Abu Hamra in Dar EL Salam locality about 95 km needs rehabilitation.			
Umm Seyalla Dar EL Taaisha	Kutum EL FaFasher and Tawilla	Demarcated from Umm Seyalla /Kutum locality until Dobo Al omda Tawilla locality	From Jabel Kossa Jabel N ssir – Dobo Al omda about 45 km needs rehabilitation (East Tawilla).			
Sub LMR Umm Seyalla Dar EL Taaisha	Kutum EL Fasher and Tawilla		1			

In the past, to address issues related to migratory routes and land tenure issues, the Ministry of Agriculture had formulated a five year strategy. A state level law was passed in 2013 regulating relations between farmers and herders. The law included regulations on farming, and defined movements and routes. Specific zones, including for land/farming, watering and animal movements were established. When promulgated, it was intended that the law would be revisited and reviewed every five years, but this process has rarely been conducted. However, in July 2022, the North Darfur authorities revised key articles of the law including penalties which would be incurred by farmers and herders who violate the law.

In preparation for the agriculture season in North Darfur, the governor (Wali) established a Higher Committee and an Executive Committee to Protect Farms and Migratory Routes, overseeing the work of Locality committees:

• The Higher Committee supervises the work of the Executive Committee; forms an "emergency operations room" to deal with incidents between farmers and herders, and to take necessary measures; registers migratory routes and grazing pasturelands with the Ministry of Infrastructure and Urban Development.

The Executive Committee puts in place a workplan to protect farms and migratory routes until the harvest; puts in place a workplan to avoid tensions over the date of animal release onto the farms; puts in place a workplan to welcome nomads coming from the south and guide them towards the migratory routes / set up agreed early warning systems to inform farmers on the arrival of the nomads and livestock and to escort them as they approach each locality and points of friction; identifies places which need additional water resources; identifies migratory routes that are closed due to cultivation and committing relevant land sheikhs to compensate agricultural land in other areas; send cases to the Higher Committee.

Locality committees have been established in several localities already. These committees are intended to comprise membership of all affected communities, civilian experts, women, and youth representatives, and to have clear terms of reference. Members of the locality committees need to ensure coordination with all local communities.

In June 2022, UN agencies and Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources conducted a capacity building workshop in ElFasher for the newly established Executive Committee and Higher Committee for the Protection of Farms and Migratory Routes in North Darfur. Follow-up meetings were held with North Darfur Governor (Wali) who endorsed the recommendations of the workshop including the need for the deployment of trusted and capable joint security forces, the reopening of migratory routes and the accessing of farms, the reissuing of laws regarding the agricultural season, the empowerment of locality committees to resolve disputes, the construction of water yards and other services, as well as social cohesion, and reconciliation activities. A follow up workshop with the Wali and UNCT in North Darfur conducted on January 2023 had reinforced the importance of addressing the root causes of the violence between the farmers and pastoralists through the proposed stream of support.

The government of North Darfur is now seeking UN agency technical support to capacitate the committees to enable them to promptly respond to farmer / herder disputes, to mitigate tensions, to raise awareness among local communities, and to promote confidence building and rule of law.

The appointment of the Nomads and Farmers Commissioner as well as the establishment of both committees offer entry points in the case of North Darfur for strengthening and developing subnational peace infrastructure to engage in prevention and address conflicts between farmers and pastoralists.

Further to the workshop, periodic meetings have been held between the Nomads and Farms Commissioner, Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources and UN agencies and NGO partners to plan and update on implementation of activities, and exchange of information, including on locations in need of assistance. At the same time, with CERF resources, FAO has been implementing its immediate package of support measures

for the agricultural season, including distribution of seeds and basic agricultural tools, support to locality committees to protect farms and migratory routes, and other nutrition and WASH measures.

The project will work in close coordination with UNITAMS, FAO and other relevant Agencies of the UNCT in collaboration with the relevant state government entities to provide complementary support to existing interventions aimed at delivering on workshop recommendations for achievement of a well-managed and peaceful agriculture season in North Darfur.

#### Output 3.1 Conflict management capacities are strengthened around migratory routes

Building on a workplan for management of the agriculture seasons cleared by the government, the government of North Darfur has requested support to the mapping of migratory routes, updating of laws/procedures regulating their use and establishing penalties for their violation, and to the deployment of joint security forces to underwrite law enforcement as necessary.

The North Darfur judicial authorities have now updated the 2013 law governing the protection of farms and migratory routes during the agriculture season. This law needs to be disseminated to ensure that it is received, understood, and respected by all communities, and that it is enforced by the relevant security authorities. Furthermore, the authorities have suggested that there would need to be a wholescale redrafting of the law before the 2023 agriculture season. The authorities would look to relevant UN entities to assist both in the updated law's dissemination and in the redrafting for 2023.

- Activity 3.1.1 Support the establishment/ strengthening of representative and participatory agriculture season protection Committees and the development of locality workplans/SOPs for safe implementation of the agriculture season.
- Activity 3.1.2 Facilitate detailed mapping of migratory routes & grazing pasturelands in each locality and support demarcation.
- Activity 3.1.3 Provide support to Farmers and pastoralist commission to organize and coordinate agriculture season committees for more peaceful utilization of migratory routs during agriculture season.
- Activity 3.1.4 Provide technical support for updating and strengthening of relevant Laws/procedures at state and locality levels to protect farms, migratory routes and relevant lands and facilities guaranteeing success of agriculture season.
- Activity 3.1.5 Ensure dissemination of the updated Laws/procedures to relevant civilian & security officials, develop and implement media campaigns to raise public awareness and compliance.
- Activity 3.1.6 Workshops on conflict resolution, peaceful coexistence, & capacity building for Ministry of Agriculture, police, native administration civil and CSOs in hotspot locations, in coordination with University of El Fasher Centre for Peace Studies.
- Activity 3.1.7 As required and in coordination with UNITAMS provide support to local authorities to develop operational plans/SOPs for coordination of Higher, Executive and Locality level Security Committees, security providers and civil society actors with capacity to provide mediation/conflict resolution services.
- Activity 3.1.8 Support training of joint security forces on protection of civilians, human rights and international humanitarian law in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) and peaceful co-existence.
- Output 3.2 Social cohesion promoted between farmers and pastoralist's communities through peacebuilding and stabilisation interventions.

Past history of conflict over migratory routes, coupled with long standing grievances of different communities in regard to weak governance, poor access to basic services, marginalization and lack of political representation, has left a legacy of distrust between groups that must be overcome to ensure sustainable peace. Support to authorities to strengthen rule of law regarding management of the agriculture season should be accompanied by inclusive and participatory activities to promote social cohesion.

- Activity 3.2.1 Awareness campaigns to promote social cohesion that utilize innovative tools like street theatre, community radio, arts and sports in community around farms and migratory routs
- Activity 3.2.2 Veterinary services organized across the corridors and in certain grazing pasturelands to encourage herders to remain within the determined migratory routes while involving the farmers in the campaigns to encourage peaceful co-existence.
- Activity 3.2.3 In consultations with authorities; rehabilitate & construct water services, including boreholes & water yards in areas within or next to migratory routes & pasturelands to ensure equitable access between farmer and pastoralist communities

# Outcome 3: Social Cohesion and Peaceful coexistence among internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the host communities improved in Gedaref State, and farmers and nomads are supported during the winter agricultural season of 2023-24

Gedaref is amongst the poorest States in the country, characterized by low levels of rainfall and environmental degradation, chronic food insecurity, poor development indicators, and limited support from the central government. There has been intermittent tribal violence and clashes over the past two decades.<sup>53</sup> The deteriorating economic and socio-political conditions in Sudan have impacted the already volatile situation and threaten the fragile peace in the region. Furthermore, many Eritrean, Ethiopian, and Somalian refugees have continued to arrive to the State over the years, including the most recent Tigray influx in 2022. Prior to the armed conflict, Gedaref state hosted 57,582 refugees and asylum seekers, consisting of both protracted caseload and new arrivals. Simultaneously, Sudan has undergone several political changes that resulted in an institutional crisis and an economic downturn.

With the current conflict between SAF and RSF, Sudan has entered yet another phase of a political crisis that has profound implications for the country's prospects. As of 28 Sep 2023, IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Sudan estimates that 4,295,092 Individuals (856,578 Households) have been recently internally displaced, and 1,190,633 mixed cross-border movements have been made into neighbouring countries. Gedaref has experienced a significant influx of IDPs fleeing the armed conflict from Khartoum. According to the DTM, over 252,824individuals are currently displaced in the Gedaref State. Gedaref became an important transit point for IDPs toward Port Sudan and Ethiopia but also a destination for people to seek safety. Prior to the conflict, the state hosted 6,000 IDPs spread across host communities in 2 camps, 3 neighbourhoods, and 12 villages and 61,000 refugees in the Um Rakuba and Um Gargour refugee camps and in the Tunaydbah and Babikri refugee settlements.<sup>54</sup>

The influx of IDPs into the State is putting strain on the already limited resources and access to services, particularly in localities hosting the displaced populations. The convergence of different tribes, and the competition of scarce resources is creating new tensions such as ethnic tensions, increased marginalization, and insecurity. These challenges pose a threat to the stability and development of the State, as well as the humanitarian situation of the affected people. This has necessitated the expansion of services and the creation of livelihood opportunities to alleviate the suffering of the IDPs and to strengthen the capacity of host communities and foster social cohesion and peaceful co-existence among the different groups. Thus, this Project aims at enhancing resilience, social cohesion, and peaceful co-existence among internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities through improved access to services, livelihood opportunities, and the use of social cohesion tools.

The additionally proposed activities on supporting the farmers and nomads during the winter agricultural season will follow the successful completion of the UNCT's recent support to the summer agricultural season in North Darfur, which happened despite the current security climate where FAO and UNDP, in collaboration with a local partner SAHARI and El fasher Agriculture research station, have distributed over 4Metric ronnes to accessible localities in North Darfur. This was done under the supervision of the Wali and in coordination with the farming and nomads commission in North Darfur. This support was essential to mitigate the negative impacts of the disruption of agricultural activities during the rainy season, which was heavily impacted by the armed conflict. The conflict has generated a severe food insecurity and malnutrition crisis which by interacting with pre-existing inter-communal tensions and conflict dynamics, generates further pressures and fragmentation of local communities as well as it creates additional tensions between newly displaced people and host communities. Most of North Darfur is currently in IPC phase 4 and is one of the worst affected areas by the food insecurity within Darfur. El Fasher and Dar Es-Salaam localities are the most populous urban areas that also host the bulk of new displacement in North Darfur. In North Darfur, these are one of the worst affected localities by the food insecurity, displacement prior to and due to the current armed conflict and also these additional pressures come on top of long-standing conflict causes in North Darfur as highlighted in the PBF supported Peacebuilding Assessment on North Darfur. Tensions over access to services and livelihoods, including between communities following different livelihood systems, are likely to increase with additional pressures. The support to the winter farming season is designed on this basis in line with broader efforts by the state government to diffuse tensions between farmers and herder communities, not least by of

Furthermore, this project will be implemented in synergy with the PBF-supported Darfuri Youth Empowerment in Civic Spaces to Advance Peacebuilding (upon approval of reprogramming) to provide support by distributing seeds and providing training on agricultural practices with a similar amount in order to be conflict-sensitive and avoid generating any further tensions between sedentary farmers and nomadic herders by a one-sided intervention.

## Output 3.1: Affected IDP and host community households have access to critical services.

Expanding essential services to help accommodate the massive influx of displaced populations into host communities to lessen tensions between displaced and host communities. Provision of water and lighting for vulnerable/displaced populations at night to ensure protection for civilians in terms of minimizing the risks of robbery, reducing the incidence of SGBV, etc.).

- Activity 3.1.1: Establish or rehabilitate two (2) water yards benefiting 4000 people (60% female).
- Activity 3.1.2 Establish two Water User Associations and a Cost Recovery System for the maintenance and sustenance of the water yards.
- Activity 3.1.3 Provide and install 13 Solar Street lights in IDP Gathering Areas to enhance safety and security, especially for girls and women at night: benefiting over 20,000 (60% female).

## Output 3.2: The food and livelihood security of affected households (including IDPs, refugees, and host communities) improved.

Gedaref state has been affected by the armed conflict that has increased and worsened poverty, as well as caused a significant rise in the cost of basic goods that is impacting IDPs and host communities and creating a potential risk of violence. The conflict also triggered a severe food security issue in the state, with associated malnutrition and famine (Gedaref is in IPC Phase 3, with majority of the population expected to rapidly slip into IPC 4).<sup>55</sup> The project will aim to advance sustainable and climate resilience livelihoods and income sources that will promote peace and social cohesion, providing concrete economic advantages and encouraging positive relations between IDPs and host communities in Gedaref State.

Activity 3.2.1 Provide agriculture inputs for gardening and winter crops (including seeds, tools, solar water pumps, and fertilizers) to 2000 households (at least 40% female).

<sup>53</sup> ACLED Data Dashboard: https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> DTM Sudan - Situation Report (16) Displacement Tracking Matrix, IOM 8 August 2023: <a href="https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudan-situation-report-16?close=true">https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudan-situation-report-16?close=true</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation June 2023 and Projections for July - September 2023 and October 2023 - February 2024: <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/fi/c/1156504/?iso3=SDN">https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/fi/c/1156504/?iso3=SDN</a>

Activity 3.2.2. Provide ten (10) micro-grants to vulnerable groups and associations (including IDPs and host community members) to initiate joint activities such as bakeries, community kitchens, grain mills, small businesses, petty trading, and food processing.

# Output 3.3 Platforms and avenues for dialogue and inclusive engagement among different tribes and groups established and strengthened that reinforce a culture of peace and social cohesion.

Gedaref State is facing a serious threat of hate speech, which fans ethnic divisions and could heighten the risk of escalation into a wider conflict. Pre-existing conflict drivers have included land and natural resource ownership and access issues that were exasperated by the use of hate speech as a tool to turn community members against each other. Today, the ongoing armed conflict nation-wide interacts with these pre-existing conflict drivers by creating tensions between IDPs and host communities on the utilization of and access to land and natural resources. To build local capacity for prevention and mitigation, the project aims to strengthen the peacebuilding capacities of local actors, especially youth and women, who can play a key role in fostering dialogue, trust and social cohesion among IDPs and host communities. The project will use innovative tools and methods to facilitate inclusive and participatory processes that promote mutual understanding and respect among different groups in Gedaref.

- Activity 3.3.1 Provide customized civic education training to youth and women groups in peacebuilding and social cohesion.
- Activity 3.3.2 Support (through grants and in-kind support) youth and women's networks to develop and implement localized peacebuilding and safe advocacy initiatives.
- Activity 3.3.3 Organize cross-tribal culture activities and events including arts, drama and music with key peace messaging utilizing mass media platforms.

## Output 3.4 Peaceful coexistence promoted between farmer and pastoralist communities through peacebuilding and stabilisation interventions in North Darfur

The output is aiming to mitigate the food insecurity crisis and prevent the escalation of pre-existing inter-tribal tensions between farmers and pastoralists into violence. The proposed activities aim to foster peaceful coexistence of farmers and nomads by minimizing the risk for competition for resources. Therefore, locally procured agricultural tools will be distributed to 630 selected young beneficiaries (50% young female-led households and 50% young male beneficiaries), 500 in rural El Fasher and 130 in Dar Es-Salaam. These beneficiaries will be the same as the ones benefiting from the seed distribution and agricultural practices training under the YPI project. In addition to this, the project will also provide support to 387 nomads (aiming for targeting 40% of nomadic women) by distributing solar mobile chargers by a local implementing partner and overseen by UNDP remotely. A support equally extended to nomads is necessary to be conflict sensitive and minimize the risk of perceiving the project as one-sided toward farmers and to ease some of the inter-communal tensions between the sedentary farmers and herder nomads which is a long-standing conflict dynamic which is at risk of being aggravated by the current armed conflict.

- Activity 3.4.1: Distribute agricultural tools ((local plows, pesticide sprayers, hoes,..) to sedentary farmers
- Activity 3.4.2: Distribute solar mobile chargers to nomadic communities
- Activity 3.4.3 Support (through grants and in-kind support) youth and women's beneficiaries from farmers and nomads communities to develop and implement localized social cohesion and peacebuilding initiatives.

## Outcome 4: Women's participation and empowerment in peacebuilding processes in Sudan are enhanced through the advancement of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

- Output 4.1: The UN Country Team's capacity to address gender-specific challenges and promote women's participation in peace processes is strengthened.
- Activity 4.1.1: Establish a WPS Advisor position within the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator's office in Sudan, who will provide specialized guidance on gender-sensitive approaches to peacebuilding and coordinate and partner with key WPS actors, including conflict-related sexual violence-Completed
- Activity 4.1.2: Conduct workshops and training to strengthen the knowledge and skills of UN staff on WPS issues Completed
- Activity 4.1.3: Establish a dedicated and revitalized coordination mechanism for WPS, led by the RCO, including agencies with relevant mandates. Create platforms for knowledge sharing and best practices related to WPS and Youth across UN agencies.- Completed
- Activity 4.1.4: Develop joint programs and initiatives focused on WPS, including support to women protection and survivors' networks, leveraging the expertise of different UN agencies.- In progress
- Activity 4.1.5: Provide substantive advisory support to the UNCT on the WPS agenda and ensure its integration into the strategic planning and decision-making processes of the UN in Sudan. Completed
- Activity 4.1.6: Establish and maintain partnership with the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General (PESG) and his office to ensure close collaboration and complementarity between the technical-level work of the UNCT and the Office of the PESG.- Completed
- Activity 4.1.7: Establish mechanism to monitor and evaluate the UNCT's gender mainstreaming efforts. Ongoing
- Activity 4.1.8: Systematically gather timely, accurate, reliable and objective information on conflict-related sexual violence in Sudan.
- Activity 4.1.9: Complement the reports and advocacy Office of the SRSG for the Sexual Violence in Conflict with the Security Council and other political and policy-making bodies conflict-related sexual violence
- *Output 4.2* Sudanese stakeholders including government institutions and civil society organizations are supported to identify and address gender-specific challenges in peacebuilding through technical assistance on implementing the WPS agenda.
- Activity 4.2.1: Develop and deliver training programs for women on negotiation skills, conflict resolution, and political advocacy relevant to the peace process. Completed

Activity 4.2.2: In partnership with the office of the PESG, provide expert assistance on key topics under discussion during political processes and peace talks, ensuring gender-responsive approaches to issues including constitution drafting, transitional justice, community security, etc.

Activity 4.2.3: Develop strategy and engage with political stakeholders to advocate for women's inclusion in political processes, peace talks and decision-making processes.

Activity 4.2.4: Facilitate the participation of women and youth peacebuilders in ongoing for a for mediation process design

Output 4.3 Community-level peacebuilding initiatives led by women's groups are supported to advance local-level ceasefire agreements

4.3.1: Conduct assessment on local-level ceasefire agreements between SAF and RSF brokered by civilian actors, with focus on the role of women and youth in local peace initiatives. – Completed

Activity 4.3.2: Develop a set of recommendations for strategic support of such local-level peace actors and peace pockets and provide strategic guidance on these inclusive initiatives.- Completed

Activity 4.3.3: Facilitate networking and experience sharing amongst community peacebuilders.- Completed

Activity 4.3.4: Support the amplification of the voices and advocacy efforts of women in peace processes through traditional and social media platforms.

#### d) Project Sequencing & Targeting

The project will be national in scope, with initial sub-national focus on Darfur and the Two Areas in respect of implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement. Project focus will be widened subject to other conclusion of other peace agreements. an pilot initiative for stabilisation in North Darfur Gedaref, East Sudan and support to farmers and nomads in North Darfur during the winter agricultural season (see Outcome 3). All activities at sub-national level will be subject to access and security arrangements to be defined and sequenced between parties as part of the peace implementation process itself.

Given the rapidly evolving context, and the need to remain flexible but timely in following the contingent sequencing of peace agreement implementation, the project will be implemented in two phases. The Results Framework in Annex B distinguishes between first phase activities of the project, which respond to foreseeable immediate priorities, and outline activities of a second phase of assistance, that will be subject to review and further elaboration following the envisaged Governance Conference and other imminent key milestones in peace agreement implementation.

The project will pay special attention to needs of vulnerable groups – women, youth, IDPs and refugees<sup>56</sup> – to support their efforts to participate equally and effectively in governance institutions and peacebuilding mechanisms, to build on the advocacy by women's groups inside the country and deliver on the revolution's key demands – Freedom, Justice and Peace. All activities to be conducted by this project are intended to actively promote, as well as conform to, this inclusive agenda.

Armed groups party to the Juba Peace Agreement jointed the TGoS on 15<sup>th</sup> November and have been consulted on the design of the project herein via the Peace Commissioner. Consultations with non-signatory groups – the Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) and the faction of the Sudan Liberation Army loyal to Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) – were conducted by UNITAMS on a mission to Juba, November 2020.

## III. Project management and coordination (4 pages max)

## a) Recipient organizations and implementing partners

The PBF project "Support to the Sudanese Peace Process" will engage UNDP and UNHCR as recipient organizations, under the convening authority of the RCO. UNDP was selected based on its mandate and thematic lead for peacebuilding, governance and rule of law within the UNCT; UNHCR as thematic lead and co-chair (with UNDP) of the UNCT Durable Solutions Working Group, and according to its global mandate to assist and protect refugees, persons internally displaced by conflict, and stateless people.

Both Agencies have significant operational capacity in Sudan, as per table below, and are already in receipt of PBF funds for five "sister projects" under implementation in Darfur. Moreover, the country-level collaboration in Sudan builds on the robust institutional partnership between the two agencies at the global level, through which standing technical capacity and expertise can be leveraged from teams (at headquarters and regional offices) in issues underpinning the PBF project.<sup>57</sup> UNDP acts as administrative agent for the PBF Secretariat in Sudan and will act as Convening Organisation for this project.

UNDP and UNHCR will work with and through local implementing partners (IPs) wherever it makes sense to do so. IPs will be selected based on a detailed technical assessment of their implementation capacity, presence, experience and local knowledge of the targeted localities and according to agency-specific procurement processes and procedures.

Agency	Total budget in previous calendar year	Key sources of budget (which donors etc.)	Location of incountry offices	No. of existing staff, of which in project zones	Highlight any existing expert staff of relevance to project
UNDP:	129,141,089	KOICA, MPTF, PBF, TRAC, UN,	1 HQ office in Khartoum and 9	180 staff	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> The exact number/scope of target populations will greatly depend on the conditions on the ground, in relation to access to new areas as the implementation of the JPA advances. In any case, in relation to IDPs, the primary target population of this project – considering the potential impact on returns and reintegration - will include: about 335,000 internally displaced in West Darfur; 377,200 IDPs in Central Darfur; and 503,200 IDPs in North Darfur. Depending on priorities from the Peace Commission, other entities newly created under the JPA, and the broader strategy for peacebuilding and durable solutions of the Government of Sudan, the project can also target at least 60% of the estimated 330,000 Sudanese refugees registered across the border in Chad (as of November 2019) who originate from West Darfur state.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Local governance and rule of law contributions to prevent, address and solve forced displacement and statelessness situations, UNHCR-UNDP Programmatic Framework 2020-2023.

Implementing partners: UNSSC, PRI, SUDIA, Adila Organization, SOS Sahel, RSD and DDRA		Sweden, Switzerland, UK, IT, etc.	projects offices with co-location presence in other states		Peace Building advisor, ER & Stabilisation officer, Peacebuilding associate,
UNHCR:  Implementing partners:	274,593,587.64	U.S.A and CERF; NL, EU, UK.	1 Branch Office in Khartoum, 4 Sub- Offices and 9 Field Offices.	285 Natl. staff 68 Intl. staff 109 AWF	Associate M&E Officer (P2), Protection Officer (P3), Protection Assistant (G6), Associate Protection Officer (P2); Durable Solutions Officer (P2)

#### b) Project management and coordination

#### Project Management

UNDP will recruit an International UNV (IUNV) as Peacebuilding Project Manager. The Project Manager will be supported by a Community Dialogue and Facilitation Expert (IUNV), an Institutional Capacity Development Officer (IUNV) and a national Peacebuilding Officer (SB4). All staff will be resident in Khartoum. In the remaining duration of the project, UNDP will engage an international Women Peace and Security advisor (P5), while the national peacebuilding project manager (NPSA8), community empowerment officer (NPSA9) and peacebuilding officer (NPSA9) will continue to lead on the project implementation. The project manager will be supported by peacebuilding officer (NPSA 9), project associate (G6), Youth Empowerment Officer (NPSA 9), Livelihood Officer—Value Chain (NPSA9), and M&E Analyst (FTA) while working closely with the Head UNDP Field Office (P2) and field staff in Gedaref and North Darfur for the implementation of Outcome 3.

UNHCR staff will implement the project largely through existing staff, including an Associate Peacebuilding and Durable Solutions Analyst (P3), a Protection Sector Coordinator (P4), a Senior Protection Cluster Coordinator (P4), a Durable Solutions Officer (P3), Protection Officer (P3), Associate Durable Solutions Officer (P2), Associate Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (P2), and an Information Management Officer (P3).

Some staff positions under this project might be co-located with the Peace Commission once reconstituted, subject to agreement with TGoS and without prejudice to mandate specificities of the RUNOs involved. Administrative and support staff may be based within Agency offices. The project team will benefit from the technical capacity of the PBF Secretariat in Sudan, including the ongoing support of a Gender Expert and M&E Expert.

## Coordination and Oversight Arrangements

Ultimate responsibility for coordination and oversight rests with the PBF Joint Steering Committee (JSC), which meets on a bi-annual basis, co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator and the Peace Commission of the Government of Sudan, and inclusive of senior-level representation of the Recipient Agencies as well as UNAMID and UNITAMS. A technical committee of the JSC will evaluate and approve quarterly workplans and provide ongoing guidance to Project Management between formal meetings of the full JSC.

Given the fluid and inherently uncertain nature of the peace process, the need to evaluate and respond to unforeseen events and requests, and to adjust activity implementation accordingly, a standing Contact Group of UN colleagues will be established by the DSRSG/RC/HC to ensure coordination of effort and to provide guidance to the Project Manager on an ongoing basis. The Contact Group will follow the project on an ongoing basis, meeting on an *ad hoc* basis as required, and will comprise the PBF Programme Coordinator in Sudan and representatives of the RCO, UNITAMS, and Recipient Organisations.

This project will be under the overall coordination of UNDP as lead agency. The project will seek close coordination with the PBF Secretariat and UNITAMS for technical and advisory support and to ensure linkages and complementarity with PBF projects as well as relevant agency programming in the region. In North Darfur, within one month from the project approval, a coordination mechanism will be established at locality and state levels, which will include all implementing partners, UNITAMS Regional Office, state level government, UNHCR and UNDP. These committees will be responsible for coordinating activities, encouraging national ownership, and ensuring integrated and strong coordination with relevant peacebuilding initiatives in the state. The locality level coordination will be organized bi-monthly, while the state level coordination will be conducted monthly. UNDP will invite the PBF team for quarterly state level meetings in North Darfur. In Khartoum Bi-monthly coordination meetings will be resumed as of February 2023 with PBF Secretariat, and the respective project focal points assigned by each agency, UNITAMS and chaired by UNDP. This platform will facilitate the review of project implementation planning for the upcoming steps of the implementation period. Even though each agency will be responsible for specific activities, coordination and information-sharing will be essential as all activities are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.

The project will be implemented as part of the overarching Priority Peacebuilding Programme of UNITAMS and the UNCT in Sudan. UNHCR will ensure coordination and collective effort of Agencies comprising the UNCT DSWG, as co-chair and thematic lead, integrating their work within the broader UNCT effort to model a *new way of working* to address the humanitarian-development-peace nexus through the lens of peacebuilding.<sup>58</sup> The DSWG's purpose is threefold: to inform and advise, develop policy and coordinate a variety of stakeholders. Its members and work plan fit neatly across the Humanitarian-Development Peacebuilding Nexus (HDPN).<sup>59</sup> The DSWG is at the initial stage of supporting the Government of Sudan with a Durable Solutions Strategy.

## c) Risk management

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> UNDP formally adhered to the OECD-DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus, of 22 February 2019, and UNHCR is currently conducting an internal reflection on how to operationalize the triple nexus. The engagement in Sudan, notably with support from the PBF, is an important piece on the learning process of both agencies about the nexus approach, and this value should not be overlooked.

<sup>59</sup> Durable Solutions Working Group members: IOM, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, OCHA, UN-Habitat and representatives from the INGO Steering Committee and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Durable Solutions Working Group members: IOM, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, OCHA, UN-Habitat and representatives from the INGO Steering Committee and donors.

The overall risk level of the project is considered to be high, on the basis of political uncertainty and the evolving nature of the peace process, as well as the consequent need for the project to remain flexible as to the design of activities to meet the Outputs.

An initial Risk Analysis appears in tabular form below. The Risk Analysis will be updated by the Project Manager on a quarterly basis, in consultation with the PBF Programme Coordinator, for presentation and discussion at the PBF Joint Steering Committee.

Project specific risk	Risk level	Mitigation strategy (including Do No Harm considerations)
Political Risk #1: Key political risks include loss of Government authority, delays to establishment of the Peace Commission, setbacks in the peace process, insufficient buy-in of key stakeholders, or attempts by parties to peace agreements to misuse assistance for political ends, or to side-line or isolate other parties or actors. Replacement of local or national government leaders, or the inability of local governments to function due to political transition, constitutes another political risk.	High Risk	The political risks identified can be mitigated by ongoing conflict analysis and project re-adjustment, and an inclusive and participatory, conflict-sensitive approach at the local level. The risk of local government turnover can be partially mitigated by identifying and aligning with key community members who can support and promote ongoing community participation in the implementation process.
Political Risk #2: Operational risk to the peace process relating to horizontal and vertical interoperability of overall architecture and individual components of the peace agreement.	High Risk	The success of the project (at least on relevance and effectiveness, and to some extent on its sustainability) rests on the ability to support the Peace Commission with coordinating policy and programmatic areas scattered across mandates, strategies and priorities from different agencies and stakeholders, while ensuring ownership and inclusivity of a political process defined by fragmentation of actors, interests and mechanisms.
Political Risk #3: Risk that key actors ignore or resist commitments made under the JPA and elsewhere in regard to gender equality and women's empowerment.	High Risk	Agencies will continue to advocate for Government and parties to respect GEWE commitments made, supported by the Gender Expert of the PBF Secretariat for Sudan.
Security Risk 1: The drawdown of UNAMID, unmet expectations of the change in Government, or spoilers in the peace process may all trigger increased insecurity or an upsurge in conflict that could threaten the wellbeing of staff, impede access to project sites, or derail implementation of project activities.	Medium Risk	Negotiations with formal and informal authorities and community leaders will be held to secure a safe environment for project staff and any implementing partners. All PBF projects will be implemented under the guidance of the UN Department for Safety and Security and the authority of the UN Designated Security Official for Sudan.
Operational Risk #1: Key risks related to those inherent to the peace process itself, including the scope, timing, and level of access to territories and local populations currently beyond Government control. The project must remain flexible and capable of programmatic adjustment if it is to support the evolving Sudanese peace process in an effective and timely way.	High Risk	While the PBF seeks to be innovative, and is in principle a risk-tolerant fund, this increases rather than decreases the need for detailed and ongoing risk management. The context, pathways and means of the project will need to remain under permanent review by the Project Management, by the PBF Secretariat, the project Contact Group and Technical Committee of the PBF Joint Steering Committee, and attendants risks reprofiled as part of the review process.
Operational Risk #2: UN system architecture in Sudan is in transition, with UNITAMS about to deploy as UNAMID continues to drawdown. New personnel, coordination arrangements and processes will take some time to settle and become effective and may delay efforts to achieve the desired coherence of whole-of-system response and/or DSWG customization of Durable Solutions planning to the peace process.	Low Risk	The project will be implemented in the framework of an RCO-led Peace Support Programme designed to ensure coherence of UN response and considered high priority by all relevant UN principals.

	1	
Operational Risk #3: Security incidents and violence escalate between RSF and SAF in Gedaref farmers and pastoralists during the farming season with a deteriorating security situation in Gedaref North Darfur affecting the project implementation cycle.	Medium Risk	In addition to regular update of UNDSS and UN conflict analysis, the project will use the Crisis Risk Dashboard data analysis capacities to regularly monitor incidents and triggers of conflict and develop appropriate mitigation measures
Operational Risk #4: Security incidents and violence escalate between RSF and SAF North Darfur with a potential of escalation of conflict to an ethnic level between farmers and pastoralists during the farming season	High Risk	In addition to regular update of UNDSS and UN conflict analysis, the project will use the Crisis Risk Dashboard data analysis capacities to regularly monitor incidents and triggers of conflict and develop appropriate mitigation measures
Reputational Risk: Reputational risks include associations (real or perceived) with parties of the conflict, political actors, or rights violators.	Medium Risk	Regularly updated local conflict analyses and conflict-sensitive approach, wide stakeholder engagement, communication, and coordination with human rights and political arms of the UN system. The UN RCO will ensure that the project is fully compliant with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP).  Transparent communication of project activities to all stakeholders by the PBF Secretariat as well as regular consultation with counterparts will help in mitigation. In addition to communicating intentions and achievements, controlling the narrative is also an essential component in the management of reputational risk.
The COVID-19, cholera and dengue fever and ongoing limits on movement	Low	Build in back up plans for flexibility should restrictions limit un person interactions and adhere to the health safety measures recommended by the authorities

The project will be implemented according to a conflict sensitive approach. The first aspect of conflict sensitivity requires that PBF and relevant partners analyse and understand the impact of national and local conflict dynamics on the ability of PBF and its recipient Agencies to deliver peacebuilding activities. The second aspect of conflict sensitivity considers the impact of PBF projects on the various national and local conflicts. This includes but goes beyond the *do-no-harm* approach by explicitly providing support to local actors to transform the conflicts.

All geographically targeted work, including advocacy and outreach activities, sub-national dialogue processes, area-based assessments and planning for durable solutions, will be subject to a local conflict sensitivity analysis prior to activity implementation, for review by the project Contact Group. The purpose of the conflict sensitivity analysis will guide design and implementation of proposed activities and ensure proper mitigation mechanisms to identified human rights related risks, ensuring, among others, that implementation does not in any way legitimise institutions or leaders that have been associated with egregious violations of human rights.

The project will follow do-no-harm approach to all gender aspects of risks during activity implementation.

## d) Monitoring and evaluation

In so far as success of the project is success of the peace process itself, project monitoring and evaluation will rely on the same methodology and tools to be developed under Output 3.1 to support monitoring and evaluation of peace agreement implementation. be aligned with the

detailed M&E regime that will accompany implementation of the PBF MPTF joint Strategic Results Framework. This will include prospective baseline and impact surveys, and ongoing feedback from Focus Groups, in different areas of the country.

Monitoring and evaluation of the project will be undertaken separately by UNDP and UNHCR with respect to the activities that each will implement, The M&E Expert will work with the Project Manager to ensure that activities proposed in all bi-annual work plans for PBF Joint Steering Committee approval conform and contribute to the overarching Results Framework.

The project acknowledges the challenges of evaluating most of the first and second project Outcomes and its related activities and outputs in the current context, where accessibility to beneficiaries, safety, and connectivity are compromised. Therefore, the project will rely on available tools and stakeholders that can provide feedback on the activities, such as the Peace Commissioner, PCC representatives, members of the peace centers, and CSOs that the project has engaged in reachable areas. The project will also evaluate some activities based on the products and reports produced and shared directly with UNCT and peace partners, such as the conflict sensitivity modules, peacebuilding assessments, HLP right assessments, and durable solutions strategy. The main limitation will be evaluating the communication and advocacy to JPA and wider communities, and HLP public awareness campaigns, especially in Darfur. Moreover, the situation may also affect the sustainability of these interventions. UNDP and UNHCR are seeking to work closely with the PBF on this and to learn from similar PBF experiences and lessons learned to design the final evaluation of the project.

Regarding the new Outcome 3, the Monitoring and Evaluation Expert will develop the monitoring system, tools, and guidelines to collect the right data to track the indicators and monitor the project implementation through frequent field visits. All other professional staff will also monitor implementation in their respective areas of responsibility. The Project will ensure close monitoring during the project implementation phase to:

- Ensure that the selection of beneficiary communities is transparent.
- Ensure that within communities, intended beneficiaries, including women and men from the most disadvantaged groups, participate in and benefit from the interventions.
- Ensure that delivery is according to the work plans.
- Assess immediate impacts and potential sustainability of the interventions; and
- Ensure that interventions foster peace and social cohesion throughout the process and do not create new tensions.

The Project will use a variety of methods to monitor and evaluate its progress and impact on peace and social cohesion in the target localities. The Project will organize workshops, bringing all the stakeholders, including the beneficiaries, to reflect on the achievements, adopt new innovative solutions, identify new challenges, and develop solutions to address them. When it is difficult to meet face to face, the project will also develop online and offline community feedback tools that will enable the beneficiaries and other stakeholders to share their views and suggestions on the project performance and results. Furthermore, the project will establish an M&E mechanism that will consist of project staff, implementing partners, beneficiaries and other relevant actors who will participate in regular meetings, reviews and learning events to assess the project progress and impact and use secondary data sources from existing projects and interventions in the states. The project will hold two assessments, an endline evaluation to collect accurate data for specific indicators, and a final evaluation to assess the outcomes of the project, and to identify the lessons learned and best practices for future replication and scaling up.

A closing evaluation will be carried out on behalf of the Joint Steering Committee in the final month of implementation. The evaluation will be carried out to assess overall impact of the intervention and lessons learnt for consideration in future programming.

M&E Breakdown Table			
Agency/Secretariat	Activity	Timeline	Cost (5-7% of budget)
UNDP	Prospective Studies/Focus Groups	Ongoing	90,000
UNDP	Project Assurance	2- <del>23</del> <del>39-</del> 57 month	20,000
UNHCR	Project Assurance	2- <del>23</del> 39 month	20,000
Consultant(s)	Evaluation	23-24 39-57 month	60,000
	190,000		

## e) Project exit strategy/ sustainability

The purpose of the project is to support the process of implementation of the peace agreement, which has a fixed timeframe of 39 + 1 months from signature. While the project has been designed for PBF funding over a two year duration, the project may be extended to align with the end date of the peace process subject to further PBF or donor support.

It is anticipated that a Multi Party Trust Fund will be established in support of the UNITAMS mandate and key aspects of peace agreement implementation. The PBF Coordinator in Sudan maintains permanent liaison with the donor community in the country, under the guidance of the DSRSG/RC/HC.

Project sustainability is understood to comprise three main pillars:

• *Community sustainability* refers to how well the project is rooted and embedded in the target community, to what extent the community feels ownership over the project, and how the community will continue with the project once funding has ended.

- Financial sustainability refers to the project's financial prospects after initial funding has ended, including any follow-on internal funding sources (ex. additional UN agency contributions, revenue generation) or external funding sources (ex. additional grants, government funding) that have been secured by the project team.
- Organizational sustainability refers to the project's structural ability to be sustained in the long run thanks to mechanisms and outputs established during the project.

Regarding the project herein, the concept of community sustainability most obviously relates to the integrated approach to stabilisation envisaged under Outcome 3. To build community ownership, which is considered vital to the overall success of the intervention, the project will ensure inclusive and participatory approaches to development of the legal framework for regulating migratory routes, as well as inclusive representation of civil society and local communities in all mechanisms and forums for early warning and response, and for selection and implementation of UNCT stabilisation measures. The project will establish Joint Management Committees at the community level to manage all the assets constructed/rehabilitated.

Financial sustainability of project interventions must be considered on an activity by activity basis, according to well established principles governing the work of the RUNOs concerned (UNDP and UNHCR). The impact of these activities will be monitored through close accompaniment through the implementing partners over time, and their support will be phased down progressively as beneficiaries show signs of ability to financially self-sustain themselves, their livelihood sources, and economic activities. The project will also train the Joint Management Committee members on cost recovery and bookkeeping.

In terms of organizational sustainability, the hard components of the project Outcome 3, such as the established and rehabilitated infrastructures and those established through the provision of micro grants, as well as distributed assets, will be handed over to relevant community groups and locality level authorities and they will be consulted at every step of the implementation to gauge ownership and to only provide those kinds of assets that they truly need and will be using according to purpose. In order to further ensure this aspect, the project team will establish a community oversight committee (JMC) and sign commitment letters with those who resume ownership of the assets to clearly determine the roles and responsibilities and create accountability.

the project aims both to pilot an integrated UN approach to stabilisation in North Darfur under Outcome 3, and to support sustainable governance structures already at least partially in place and functioning (eg, Higher, Executive and Locality Security Committees, Ministry of Agriculture, security providers etc.). Immediate stabilisation activities to be delivered by the project over the remaining Twelve months will be complemented by development of a suite of priority projects to act as 'peace dividends', to be delivered with parallel funding by relevant UN Agencies as follow up. Opportunities for complementarity will be assured with the draft Proposal for Supporting Community Stabilization and Co Existence in North Darfur, Tawila, Dares Salam and El Fasher Rural Localities by UNITAMS Regional Office of El Fasher and relevent PBF and MPTF call for interest for 2024.

In regard to broader work of the project to support the Sudanese peace process, implementation of the JPA, and mobilisation and capacitation of an 'infrastructure for peace 'at national and local level, these must be seen as long term UN commitments, which must be phased and delivered according to prevailing context and immediate needs. While the SSPP can make a significant contribution to the journey, further projects in this domain will undoubtedly be required before the proposed Outcomes are achieved across the country to the satisfaction of all stakeholders.

Advancing the WPS agenda in Sudan is a long-term process that will require targeted efforts beyond the year-long scope of this project. To this end, the Resident Coordinator, with support from the Joint Secretariat of the Sudan Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) and the PBF, will advocate for additional funding to support the post beyond the closing date of this project. Under the oversight of the Joint MPTF-PBF Secretariat, this project benefits from exposure to MPTF partners who may be willing to contribute additional funds to support future phases of the project. Given the UN Transition Plan's emphasis on enhanced WPS capacities following the UNITAMS drawdown, this project is well-positioned for targeted advocacy for continued funding.

## IV. Project budget

The project is primarily a capacity development initiative, with corresponding categories of expenditure – technical assistance and other forms of consultancy, costs of meetings and workshops, travel and per diem costs. International travel costs will be incurred in ensuring UNCT and UNITAMS inputs into the Juba mediation effort.

The project is divided into two phases. Detailed formulation of the second phase is contingent upon milestones in the peace process to be reached as a result of first phase assistance. At the end of the first phase, the implementing Agencies will revise activities in line with priorities agreed by the PBF Joint Steering Committee for Sudan, for review and approval by PBSO prior to second tranche disbursement.

## Annex A.1: Support to the Sudanese Peace Process - Checklist of project implementation readiness

Quest	tion	Ye s	No	Comment			
	Planning						
1.	Have all implementing partners been identified? If not, what steps remain and proposed timeline	x		IP identification underpins the feasibility analysis behind the RF and budget: each activity has a careful appraisal of how and with which partners it can be implemented successfully and efficiently.			
2.	Have TORs for key project staff been finalized and ready to advertise? Please attach to the submission	X					
3.	Have project sites been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline	X		This will happen during the inception phase, as it is highly dependent on developments in the peace process.			
4.	Have local communities and government offices been consulted/ sensitized on the existence of the project? Please state when this was done or when it will be done.	х		Extensive consultation through the Peace Commission took place with TGoS entities involved. Consultation with communities will take place during the inception phase.			
5.	Has any preliminary analysis/ identification of lessons learned/ existing activities been done? If not, what analysis remains to be done to enable implementation and proposed timeline?	X		Early findings from the data/evidence component of the PBF/Darfur were taken in consideration on the choice of activities for the new project (for relevance and sustainability).			
6.	Have beneficiary criteria been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline.	Х		Broadly, yes. Detailed definition will happen in the inception phase.			
7.	Have any agreements been made with the relevant Government counterparts relating to project implementation sites, approaches, Government contribution?	х		Through the Peace Commission			
8.	Have clear arrangements been made on project implementing approach between project recipient organizations?	X		A strategic and operational discussion is planned between UNHCR and UNDP once the project is signed, with a view to link the project with the broader landscape of engagement for both agencies, including leveraging existing partnerships and arrangements in issues relevant for peace in Sudan.			
9.	What other preparatory activities need to be undertaken before actual project implementation can begin and how long will this take?	N	I/A				
	Gender						
	d UN gender expertise inform the design of the project (e.g. has a gender adviser/expert/focal point or omen colleague provided input)?	X		The UNDP gender focal point has reviewed the project and gender scoring			
11. Dic	11. Did consultations with women and/or youth organizations inform the design of the project?			There were no direct consultations with women or youth organizations			
12. Are	e the indicators and targets in the results framework disaggregated by sex and age?	Х		As far as possible			
	pes the budget annex include allocations towards GEWE for all activities and clear justifications for allocations?	Х		Yes, except for activities considered gender blind			

## Annex A.2: Checklist for project value for money

Ques	etion	Yes	No	Project Comment
1.	Does the project have a budget narrative justification, which provides additional project specific information on any major budget choices or higher than usual staffing, operational or travel costs, so as to explain how the project ensures value for money?		X	With the exception of international travel costs relating to shuttle support to the mediation effort in Juba, South Sudan, there are no major budget choices or exceptional items to be justified.

2.	Are unit costs (e.g. for travel, consultancies, procurement of materials etc.) comparable with those used in similar interventions (either in similar country contexts, within regions, or in past interventions in the same country context)? If not, this needs to be explained in the budget narrative section.	x		Costing of specific budget items underpinning each activity are aligned with costs of similar items from other projects in Sudan, factoring also important differences related to geographic focus of implementation (urban/rural areas for instance)
3.	Is the proposed budget proportionate to the expected project outcomes and to the scope of the project (e.g. number, size and remoteness of geographic zones and number of proposed direct and indirect beneficiaries)? Provide any comments.	х		The budget balances geographic and institutional scope, with right allocations for support to central institutions, their state-level representation, and the need to include target populations, by reaching out to where they currently live.
4.	Is the percentage of staffing and operational costs by the Receiving UN Agency and by any implementing partners clearly visible and reasonable for the context (i.e. no more than 20% for staffing, reasonable operational costs, including travel and direct operational costs) unless well justified in narrative section?	x		
5.	Are staff costs proportionate to the amount of work required for the activity? And is the project using local rather than international staff/expertise wherever possible? What is the justification for use of international staff, if applicable?	х		
6.	Does the project propose purchase of materials, equipment and infrastructure for more than 15% of the budget? If yes, please state what measures are being taken to ensure value for money in the procurement process and their maintenance/ sustainable use for peacebuilding after the project end.		×	
•	Does the project propose purchase of a vehicle(s) for the project? If yes, please provide justification as to why existing vehicles/ hire vehicles cannot be used.		Х	
8.	Do the implementing agencies or the UN Mission bring any additional non-PBF source of funding/ in-kind support to the project? Please explain what is provided. And if not, why not.	Х		Where relevant, logistics and infrastructure in the field, including in remote areas, will be provided to the implementation of the project.

# Annex B.1: Support to the Sudanese Peace Process - Project Administrative arrangements for UN Recipient Organizations

(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

# **AA Functions**

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved "Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds" (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate the financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF annual consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is completed by the RUNO. A project will be considered as operationally closed upon submission of a joint final narrative report. In order for the MPTF Office to financially closed a project, each RUNO must refund unspent balance of over 250 USD, indirect cost (GMS) should not exceed 7% and submission of a certified final financial statement by the recipient organizations 'headquarters);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any cost extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

#### Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Semi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	operational project closure (it can be	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

#### Financial reporting and timeline

Timeline	Event
30 April	Annual reporting – Report <b>Q4 expenses</b> (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
Certified final after project cl	financial report to be provided by 30 June of the calendar year osure

UNEX also opens for voluntary financial reporting for UN recipient organizations the following dates

31 July	Voluntary Q2 expenses (January to June)
31 October	Voluntary Q3 expenses (January to September)

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250, at the closure of the project would have to been refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

# **Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property**

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

# **Public Disclosure**

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund) and the Administrative Agent's website (www.mptf.undp.org).

Annex C: Support to the Sudanese Peace Process - Project Results Framework (MUST include sex- and age disaggregated data)

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification/ frequency of collection	indicator milestones
Sudan has broad-based, inclusive and participatory peace architecture in place, at national, regional and local levels, for ongoing dispute resolution and the transparent, accountable,		Outcome Indicator 1 a  Baseline: Commitment of TGoS and the signatories to development of national peace architecture (2020) as currently articulated by the peace agreements in place  Target: Sudan has conflict early warning systems and conflict resolution mechanisms fully functioning at all levels (2022) to protect civilians and ensure accountability		
multi-stakeholder implementation of the Peace Agreements and an overarching National Strategy for Peace.		Outcome Indicator 1-b  Baseline: No National Strategy for Peace (2020)  Target: An inclusive National Strategy for Peace developed and adopted with operational plan and budgets included in MTEF (2022)		
SDG Target(s):  Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all.  Significantly reduce all forms of violence and		Outcome Indicator 1c  Baseline: The Constitutional Declaration and Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) commit to no less than 40% representation of women (2020)  Target: Staffing of Commissions and other structures, and		
related death rates everywhere.  UPR Recommendations:		participation in all mechanisms and processes of peace agreements, achieves 40% representation of women. (2020-2022)		
Both the Government and armed groups immediately take necessary steps to cease all forms of conflict and ensure humanitarian access for internally displaced persons.  The harmonization of national laws with international human rights principles has advanced at a slow pace. Parts of the legal framework, such as the National Security Act and the emergency laws in Darfur, continue to infringe on fundamental rights.  Adopt a holistic approach to development and	Output 1.1  Peace Commission established and functioning at national and sub-national levels  Phase I Activities:  1.1.1 Technical assistance to prepare TORs, structure and SOPs of Peace Commission	Output Indicator 1.1.1  Baseline: Peace Commission lacks legal basis, agreed TORs and governance structure, SOPs and budget (2020)  Target: Peace Commission established at national and subnational levels with primary and secondary legislation, operational plan and agreed multi-year budget (2021)	Legal Gazette; public and project records	Multi-stakeholder agreement to Peace Commission TORs, structure and operations (2021)
effectively implement the poverty reduction strategy to address the root causes of inequalities in the country.	1.1.2 Technical assistance to prepare ToRs, structure and SOPs of IDPRC.  1.1.3 Technical assistance to the ToRs, regulations and rules of procedures of Compensation and Reparations Fund in Darfur.  1.1.4 Organise broad based consultations with the signatories to JPA and other stakeholders and peace actors to develop a comprehensive roadmap and pre-implementation prerequisites	Output Indicator 1.1.2  Baseline: No Government coordination mechanisms exist to support implementation of the peace agreement  Target: # of Government coordination mechanisms established at national and subnational level for implementation of the peace agreement	Public records/site visits/project closing evaluation	
	Phase II Phase II Activities:  1.1.5 UNDP TA/capacity development training for establishment and operations of Peace Commission and other Commissions, institutions and CSOs comprising national peace architecture	Output Indicator 1.1.3  Baseline: Stakeholder commitment to gender equality and gender responsive institutions (2020)  Target: TORs, SOPs, and staffing of all Commissions and entities reflect gender aspirations and targets (2021)	Legal Gazette; public and project records—	Multi-stakeholder agreement to Peace Commission TORs, structure and operations (2021)

1.1.6 UNHCR TA/capacity development/CD training for establishment and operations of Peace & other Commissions and institutions foreseen  1.1.7 Delivery of capacity building workshops for TGoS officials at central and State level on development approaches to HLP issues as relevant for durable solutions.  1.1.8. HLP baseline assessments representative of main displaced populations and affected communities in Darfur and other areas emerging from conflict, as accessible.	Output indicator 1.1.4  Baseline: 0 entities agreed upon the JPA formed as Dec.2020.  Target: 3 entities constituted and having clear organic role and functions by Q3 2021.	Legal Gazette; public and project records—	
Output 1.2	Output Indicator 1.2.1		
Civil society mobilised and	Baseline:		
articulated to	Target:		
implementation of peace			
agreements and			
development of a National Strategy for Peace	Output Indicator 1.2.2		
Phase I Activities:	Baseline:		
	Targe		
1.2.1 Mapping of civil society "assets" at national and sub-national levels for articulation			
to Sudanese peace architecture and implementation of peace agreements			
Phase II Activities:			
1.2.2 Mobilisation workshops held at subnational level, bringing relevant civil society actors and affected groups, including IDPs and refugees, together to discusssupport to implementation of local peace agreements and preparation of National Strategy and constituent sub-national strands.	Baseline: Number and capacities of women's NGOs and CBOs in Sudan varies by geographic area (2020)  Target: Women's groups are able to reflect and channel gender issues and concerns of their members in all peacemaking and implementation processes (2021-2022)		
Output 1.3	Output Indicator 1.3.1		
	Baseline: No process for	Project and public	Inclusive public
National Strategy for Peace prepared and adopted	preparation of National Strategy defined (2020)	records; stakeholder interviews	process validation event (to be determined)
Phase I Activities:	Target: Inclusive and participatory process for development of		
1.3.1 TA to initiate discussion and consensus building with all peace actors and	National Peace Strategy and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding and		
stakeholders, and prepare a road map with action plan and timelines for the national and	Stabilization Programmatic Framework agreed between all		
sub-national consultation processes for the	relevant stakeholders (2021)		

	D 0			
	Peace Strategy and The Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Stabilization Strategies for Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan and East Sudan  Phase II Activities:  1.3.2 Inclusive and participatory Conferences and processes organized at national and subnational level to articulate civil society organisations to National Strategy preparation, inclusive of IDP and refugee communities, women, and youth groups  1.3.3 TA to organize inclusive and participatory multi-stakeholder consultation workshops to design and develop Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Stabilization Strategies for Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan and East Sudan  1.3.4 Drafting of National Strategy and inclusive development and validation workshops for all constituent area based strands  1.3.5 Mainstreaming cross-cutting approaches of conflict-sensitive programming, humanights approaches and gender equity in the strategy and mandate of the Commission  1.3.6 Ministry of Finance capacity development training for public finance management and gender budgeting  1.3.7 National Conference to validate National Peace Strategy and post-conflict Peacebuilding and Stabilisation Strategy for Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan and East Sudan  1.3.8 Communications and advocacy work with Parliamentarians to support adoption process	Baseline: No National Strategy for Peace or Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Stabilisation (2020)  Target: National Peace Strategy and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Stabilization Strategies (for Darfur, Blue Nile South Kordofan and East Sudan) developed and adopted, founded on peace agreements reached, with clear partnership and resource mobilization plan to make and maintain peace in Sudan for the long-term (2022)  Output Indicator 1.3.3  Baseline: No Strategy or process for preparing Strategy in place (2020)  Targets:  a) Process of Strategy preparation includes minimum 40% representation of women at all levels and in all consultations (2021)  b) Gender issues mainstreamed across the Strategy, and Strategy accompanied by gender-disaggregated Results Framework and Budget (2020)	Legal Gazette, project and public records; project closing evaluation  Public and project records, stakeholder interviews; closing project evaluation	Implementation of agreed process steps (Output Indicator 1.4.1)  Formal adoption of National Strategy, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Stabilisation Strategies and accompanying budget for implementation  Implementation of agreed process steps (Output Indicator 1.4.1)
Outcome 2:  Pre-implementation support to peace agreements has mobilized popular goodwill and participation, established agreed machinery and		Outcome Indicator 2 a  Baseline: Unknown levels of popular support for peace agreement and peace process (2020)  Target: Increasing levels of public support for implementation of peace agreement(s), gender disaggregated (2021-2022)	Prospective Studies/Project Focus Groups (in accessible target areas)	
processes of the peace process, and improved the evidence base upon which agreements are finalized and implemented.  SDG Target(s): Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere.  By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including		Outcome Indicator 2 b  Baseline: JPA requires successful implementation of multiple Conferences and sub-processes to determine key next steps toward sustainable peace and durable solutions for IDPs and refugees (2020)  Target: Implementation of peace agreements proceeds smoothly, and key events/processes reach consensus on pathways to peace (2021-2022)	Public records	
birth registration.  UPR Recommendations:  Root causes of the conflict, including discrimination and access to land and livelihoods, remain a major challenge for the long-term stability of Darfur.		Outcome Indicator 2 c  Baseline: Peace agreement and peace process require data and assessment (2020)  Target: Peace process and implementation of peace agreement has benefited from UNITAMS and its UNCT partners expertise and experience (2021-2022)	Feedback from parties to peace agreement and process; project closing evaluation	
	Output 2.1  Advocacy and Communications Campaign conducted  Phase I Activities:	Output Indicator 2.1.1  Baseline: Weak public understanding of provisions of Juba Peace Agreement (2020)  Target: 50% increase in public awareness of JPA and work of Peace Commission (2021)	Prospective Studies/Project Focus Groups (in accessible target areas)	

meetings 'roadshow'	Baseline: No public information campaign in place to communicate	Project records/ closing evaluation	Airing of first
2.1.2 Dissemination of the JPA among the local communities in key locations, cities, and IDPs/refugee camps	peace agreement(s) and accompany implementation process (2020)		Definition and approval of P
2.1.3 Two initial TV or radio talk shows (one mixed, one women-only panel), x 2 for Darfur and the two Areas and East Sudan (6 total)	Target: Public information campaign designed and implemented (2021)		communication strategy
2.1.4 Preparation of public awareness/communications	Output Indicator 2.1.3		
strategyawareness, advocacy, engagement, and participation by citizens, civil society, and peace actors	Baseline: Lead role of women in revolution acknowledged; consensus on need to deliver on gender equality and WPS agenda (2020)	Project records/ closing evaluation	
Phase II Activities:	Target: Gender-responsive Peace		
2.1.5 Implementation of Peace Commission public awareness/ communications strategy	Commission communications strategy implemented (2021)		
2.1.6 Public awareness campaign among IDPs and refugee to help them understand their rights, durable solutions options, and prevailing conditions in their original home areas as pursuant to JPA.			
	Output Indicator 2.1.4 - # of advocacy interventions made for creation of conducive conditions for durable solutions		
	Baseline		
Output 2.2	Output Indicator 2.2.1		
Output 2.2	Output Indicator 2.2.1  Baseline: SPI M-N Abdelaziz Al-		
Dialogue forums and processes supported	Baseline: SPLM-N Abdelaziz Al- Hilu has requested UNITAMS/UNCT inputs to mediation effort, to inform process		
Dialogue forums and	Baseline: SPLM-N Abdelaziz Al- Hilu has requested UNITAMS/UNCT inputs to		
Dialogue forums and processes supported  Phase I Activities:  2.2.1 Integrated mission inputs to mediation effort via informal workshops convened to assist the parties, and the GoS either	Baseline: SPLM-N Abdelaziz Al- Hilu has requested UNITAMS/UNCT inputs to mediation effort, to inform process		
Dialogue forums and processes supported  Phase I Activities:  2.2.1 Integrated mission inputs to mediation effort via informal workshops convened to	Baseline: SPLM-N Abdelaziz Al- Hilu has requested UNITAMS/UNCT inputs to mediation effort, to inform process and decision-making of parties Target: All parties express satisfaction with UNITAMS/UNCT		
Dialogue forums and processes supported  Phase I Activities:  2.2.1 Integrated mission inputs to mediation effort via informal workshops convened to assist the parties, and the GoS either separately or together, to come to a	Baseline: SPLM-N Abdelaziz Al- Hilu has requested UNITAMS/UNCT inputs to mediation effort, to inform process and decision-making of parties  Target: All parties express satisfaction with UNITAMS/UNCT facilitation  Output Indicator 2.2.2  Baseline: No existing local structures specifically mandated to receive and adjudicate compensation claims by refugees and IDPs.		
Dialogue forums and processes supported  Phase I Activities:  2.2.1 Integrated mission inputs to mediation effort via informal workshops convened to assist the parties, and the GoS either separately or together, to come to a negotiation position.  2.2.2 TA to support development of vision of both autonomy and decentralization in and around Governance Conference to define the responsibilities that would need to be undertaken at national, regional and subnational levels, and in the Two Areas, to design and options for discussion, on separation of state and religion and subsequent security arrangements	Baseline: SPLM-N Abdelaziz Al- Hilu has requested UNITAMS/UNCT inputs to mediation effort, to inform process and decision-making of parties  Target: All parties express satisfaction with UNITAMS/UNCT facilitation  Output Indicator 2.2.2  Baseline: No existing local structures specifically mandated to receive and adjudicate compensation claims by refugees		
Dialogue forums and processes supported  Phase I Activities:  2.2.1 Integrated mission inputs to mediation effort via informal workshops convened to assist the parties, and the GoS either separately or together, to come to a negotiation position.  2.2.2 TA to support development of vision of both autonomy and decentralization in and around Governance Conference to define the responsibilities that would need to be undertaken at national, regional and subnational levels, and in the Two Areas, to design and options for discussion, on separation of state and religion and subsequent security arrangements  2.2.3 Technical assistance to define the ToRs and regulations of the local committees for claims in Darfur as pursuant to the JPA and support to define the underlying consultative	Baseline: SPLM-N Abdelaziz Al- Hilu has requested UNITAMS/UNCT inputs to mediation effort, to inform process and decision-making of parties  Target: All parties express satisfaction with UNITAMS/UNCT facilitation  Output Indicator 2.2.2  Baseline: No existing local structures specifically mandated to receive and adjudicate compensation claims by refugees and IDPs:  Target: 10 local claims commissions established in Darfur by Q4 2021 (including five in target localities of PBF/Darfur and CERF)  Output Indicator 2.2.3  Baseline: No resettlement and		
Dialogue forums and processes supported  Phase I Activities:  2.2.1 Integrated mission inputs to mediation effort via informal workshops convened to assist the parties, and the GoS either separately or together, to come to a negotiation position.  2.2.2 TA to support development of vision of both autonomy and decentralization in and around Governance Conference to define the responsibilities that would need to be undertaken at national, regional and subnational levels, and in the Two Areas, to design and options for discussion, on separation of state and religion and subsequent security arrangements  2.2.3 Technical assistance to define the ToRs and regulations of the local committees for claims in Darfur as pursuant to the JPA and	Baseline: SPLM-N Abdelaziz Al- Hilu has requested UNITAMS/UNCT inputs to mediation effort, to inform process and decision-making of parties  Target: All parties express satisfaction with UNITAMS/UNCT facilitation  Output Indicator 2.2.2  Baseline: No existing local structures specifically mandated to receive and adjudicate compensation claims by refugees and IDPs.  Target: 10 local claims commissions established in Darfur by Q4 2021 (including five in target localities of PBF/Darfur and CERF)  Output Indicator 2.2.3		

Phase II Activities:	Output Indiantar 0.04	
	Output Indicator 2.2.4	
2.2.5 Ongoing provision of mission inputs to Juba mediation effort as required	Baseline:	
2.2.6 TA in response to specific requests for		
UNCT experience and expertise  2.2.7 Provide technical support in promoting		
and facilitating consensus building through		
dialogue and safe spaces for deepening relationships of trust and an increase		
participation of local communities, women and youth in peacebuilding and peace		
implementation		
Output 2.3	Output Indicator 2.3.1	
Data and assessments	Baseline: No comprehensive	
inform durable solutions for	mapping of data and evidence needed for the successful	
IDPs and refugees	implementation of the JPA provisions concerning IDPs and	
Phase I Activities:	refugees.	
2.3.1 Technical support to a comprehensive	Target: 1 comprehensive data mapping document available to	
mapping and gap analysis of data and evidence for durable solutions, r(e)integration	guide Peace Commission and other entities on coordinating durable	
and protection as needed for the implementation of the JPA.	solutions, reconciliation and transitional justice activities related	
2.3.2 Technical support to development of	to the forcibly displaced by conflict in Sudan.	
methodologies, tools and analysis for comprehensive assessments on protection	Output Indicator 2.3.2	
issues as relevant for planning returns and reintegration.	Baseline: No nationwide baseline	
2.3.3 Support the Peace Commission, and	data on HLP rights as relevant for refugees and returnees, or legal	
other relevant government entities with capacity building, in establishing a protection	identity/civil registry by IDPs and refugees.	
and peacebuilding network through existing mechanisms in the field, including—through	Target: 2 concept notes and	
relevant committees at the locality level (e.g Peaceful Coexistence and Agriculture	methodologies for broad baseline assessments of HLP issues as	
Protection Committees) and IDP Camp Coordination structures.,	relevant for returns, and of legal identity rights by forcibly displaced	
2.3.4. Support to the development of	populations.	
peacebuilding and conflict resolution plan for Peace Commission staff and implementing	Output Indicator 2.3.3	
partners in areas affected by conflict and displacement.	Baseline: No nationwide plan for entry points and reception centers.	
Phase II Activities:		
2.3.5 Assessment of issues enabling returns,	Target: Transit and reception plan available to the Peace Commission	
including HLP and other criteria for achieving durable solutions, in target IDPs and returnee	and IDPRC by Q2 2021 as a basis for predictable and peaceful returns	
communities.  2.3.6 Area-based assessments for durable	of persons displaced by conflict.	
solutions for IDPs and refugees with common methodology in main areas of potential return		
or (re)integration.		
2.3.7 Design and facilitate workshops/training on peacebuilding and conflict resolution for the		
Peace Commission staff and implementing partners.		
partitoro.		

Outcome 3:		Outcome Indicator 3 a		
Peace agreements in Sudan implemented in a transparent and accountable manner, in line with relevant international norms and standards, and Sudan better integrated in		Baseline: Accountability mechanism for peace agreement implementation agreed in JPA but not yet established (2020)  Target: Parties, Guarantors and Witnesses to the Juba Peace Agreement express high levels of satisfaction with the way in which it is implemented (2020)	Project and public records; project closing evaluation.	
sub-regional peace		Outcome Indicator 3 b		
architecture.		Baseline: Negative public perceptions of implementation of previous peace agreements	Prospective Studies/Project Focus Groups (in accessible target areas)	
SDG Target(s):		Target:70% public satisfaction with peace agreement implementation.	<del>arcas)</del>	
Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in		Outcome Indicator 3 c		
developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.  UPR Recommendations:		Baseline: Establishment of national peace architecture would benefit from further sub-regional integration (2020)	Project and public records; project closing evaluation.	
		Target: Sudan cooperates closely with its neighbors and participates fully in all sub-regional initiatives for conflict prevention and response (2022)		
	Output 3.1	Output Indicator 3.1.1		
	Responsibility and accountability promoted	Baseline: M&E Commission for peace agreement agreed but not established (2020)		
	Phase I Activities:	Target: M&E Commission for monitoring implementation of the		
	3.1.1 Agree and facilitate UN support to establishment and operations of mechanism to monitor and evaluate the JPA	peace agreement(s) established and functioning smoothly (2021- 2022)		
	Phase II Activities:	Output Indicator 3.1.2		
	3.1.2 Ongoing servicing of JPA monitoring and evaluation mechanism on behalf of parties, guarantors, and witnesses to the Agreement	Baseline: No methodology envisaged for implementation of M&E Commission mandate (2020)		
		Target: M&E regime for monitoring of implementation of the agreement is gender responsive and gender disaggregated (2021)		
		Output Indicator 1.1.3		
		Baseline: Lack of mechanism to measure and monitor public opinion toward peace agreement terms and implementation (2020).		
		Target: M&E regime utilizes prospective perception studies to monitor public opinion of peace agreement implementation and contribute to national early warning system (2022)		
	Output 3.2	Output Indicator 3.2.1	Legal Gazette,	
	Coherence with international policy and programmes enhanced	Baseline: # of international treaties and obligations outstanding for domestication	project and public records; project closing evaluation	
		Target: # legislative acts adopted		
	Phase I Activities: 3.2.1 Joint UN/AU/IGAD workshop to ensure	Output Indicator 3.2.2		
	coherence, coordination and complementarity of programming  Phase II Activities:	Baseline: Transitional Government of Sudan has yet to agree design of conflict early warnings system as part of national		
	3.2.2 TA for domestication of relevant international, continental, and regional policy frameworks	peace architecture (2020)  Target: Design of Sudanese conflict early warnings system integrates relevant IGAD platforms for prevention and resilience and Conflict Risk Dashboard (2021)		
		Oomiliet Filsk Dashboard (2021)		

wit	.2.3 Support to Peace Commission to engage vith relevant sub-regional events and rocesses (AU, IGAD, etc).	Output Indicator 3.2.3  Baseline:	Project and public	
3.2 we in a me 3.2 Da pla of with Ce	, , , ,	Target:	records; project closing evaluation	

# Annex C: Support to the Sudanese Peace Process - Project Results Framework (MUST include sex- and age disaggregated data)

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification/ frequency of collection	indicator milestones
Outcome 1:  Peacebuilding processes, peacemaking and implementation of peace agreements advance progress toward a peaceful and democratic transition.  (PBF Strategic Results Framework Outcome 3)		Outcome Indicator 1a  # of relevant commissions of Juba Peace Agreement are supported established and functional.  Baseline: No relevant commissions supported established  Target: 2	Project records, Legal Gazette, final project evaluation; JPA M&E mechanism if and when established  Note: Relevant and can be evaluated through direct engagement with National Peace Commissioner and Darfur Permanent Cease Committee	Year 1: 2 Year 2: 1
		Outcome Indicator 1b # of community members aware about JPA terms and provisions at different levels (sub national and national support)  Baseline: Unknown levels of popular support for peace agreement and peace process (2020)  Target: 30,000 –in Darfur Region (including 40% women) 25,000 local communities and IDPs 2,000 community leaders and native administration 2,000 CSOs (including women and youth groups) 1,000 Government officials	Project reports, news reports, menitoring and field visits, implementing partners report and UNITAMS reporting  Note: can't be evaluated under the current security climate	Year 1: 15,000 Year 2: 5000

		T	
Output 1.1 Mechanisms and processes of JPA architecture supported	Output Indicator 1.1.1		
	# of equipment and technical support provided to the NPC	Legal Gazette; public and project reports	Year 1: 80%
Activity 1.1.1 Provision of IT equipment to the National Peace Commission (NPC).	Baseline: None, to inadequate support provided	Note: Relevant and can	Year 2:
	Target: NPC equipped with necessary IT	be evaluated through the National Peace	20%
Activity 1.1.2 NPC website designed and operational to	equipment (laptops, printers,) and technical support and tool for communication	Commissioner	
improve community outreach and communication with the wider public and civil society engagement on the	(communication specialist and website)  Output Indicator 1.1.2		
peace process.	# of equipment communication materials and	Legal Gazette; public and project reports, UNITAMS	Year 1: 100%
Activity 1.1.3 Recruitment of communication specialist to	technical support provided to the PCC Baseline: Inadequate support to the 5 sectorial	reports	Year 2: 0
support NPC visibility and implementation of the JPA advocacy plan developed with support of UN agencies.	committee of PCC	Note: Relevant and can be evaluated through	
advocacy plan developed with support of the agentics.	Baseline: inadequate support provided	Darfur Permanent Cease Committee	
Activity 1.1.4 Visual identity/ branding for Darfur	Target: PCC equipped with necessary IT		
Permanent Ceasefire Committee and provision of vehicle stickers, vest, t-shirts, caps, armbands.	equipment (laptops, printers,) and tools for communication and community outreach		
Activity 1.1.5 Capacity development and knowledge management support to the National Peace			
Commissioner and Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee (PCC) and critical mechanisms and structure			
under JPA that might be established in consultations with UNIATMS.			
Output 1.2 Advocacy and Communications campaign conducted	Output Indicator 1.2.1	Project reports, news	Year 1: 15,000
Activity 1.2.1 10,000 copies of JPA printed and widely distributed within government line ministries and	# of community members reported understanding JPA terms and provisions	reports, monitoring and field visits, implementing partners report and	<del>Year 2: 0</del>
departments, as well as to the civil society and summarized, track specific versions drafted by a	Baseline: Weak public understanding of provisions of JPA (2020)	UNITAMS reporting	
committee of JPA signatories and the government.	Target: 15,000 –in Darfur Region (including	Note: the striked output indicator is not	
	40% women) 10,000 local communities and IDPs	measurable under the current security context in	
Activity 1.2.2 High level mission from the signatories of JPA and senior government to conduct	2,000 community leaders and native administration	Darfur. UNDP proposed a new measurable indicator	
consultation and dissemination workshops in four states (Ed Daein, Zalengei, Nyala, El Geneina) for more than	2,000 CSOs (including women and youth groups) 1.000 Government officials	in blue	
1,100 from key government officials, community leaders, CSOs, youth and women groups, IDPs, nomads, and	# of high-level workshops organized to raise		
other key actors.	awareness on JPA terms and provisions in Darfur		
Activity 1.2.3. At the request of the Peace	Baseline: 0		
Commissioner, installation of a medium-wave peace radio station in Ed Damazin, Blue Nile state and	Target: 4		
distribution of solar radio devices for remote communities with no access to public information.	Output Indicator 1.2.3	Project records, including	Year 1: 1 Year 2: 0
The second to person mornation.	Equipment and capacities established to raise awareness on JPA and peace process in Blue	procurement documents, key informants at state-	
Activity 1.2.4 Support to the National Peace	Nile	level, closing evaluation interviews with key	
Commission and Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee (PCC) with communications and outreach	Baseline: 0	stakeholders	
efforts.	Target: Installation of MW Peace radio station	Note: the activity related to this output indicator will not be implemented under	
		the current conditions	
	Output Indicator 1.2.4	Project records DCC	<del>Year 1:</del> 15,000
	# of community members in Darfur reported understanding of PCC mandate and role	Project records, PCC reports, closing evaluation	Year 2: 0
	Baseline:	Note: the activity related to this output indicator will	
	<del>Target:</del>	not be implemented under the current conditions	
	Target: 15,000 –in Darfur Region (including		
	40% women) 10,000 local communities and IDPs 2,000 community leaders and native		
	administration 2,000 CSOs (including women and youth		
	groups) 1,000 Government officials		
Output 1.3 Support provided to peace talks with non-	Output Indicator 1.3.1	Foodback from north-	Year 1:
signatory armed groups.  Activity 1.3.1 Support provided to the on-going Juba	# of parties express satisfaction with	Feedback from parties to peace agreement and process; project closing	80% Year 2: 0
Peace Talks Secretariat	Baseline: SPLM-N Abdelaziz Al-Hilu has	evaluation and SG reports	
	requested UNITAMS/UNCT inputs to mediation effort, to inform process and decision-making of	Note: Relevant and can be evaluated by	
Activity 1.3.2 Support provided to Women's Delegation to participate in the Juba Peace Talks as observers and $\frac{1}{2}$	parties	UNITAMS reports	
experts.	Target: 70% of surveyed individuals		

		Outcome Indicator 2 a		Year 1: 50
Outcome 2:  Sudan has an 'infrastructure for peace' established and engaged in peacemaking and peacebuilding at national and sub-national levels.  (PBF Strategic Results Framework Outcome 2)		# of CSOs, including women-led and youth-led groups, actively promoting social cohesion in target 'hotspots' participating in early warning systems and/or engaged regularly in conflict resolution dialogue and processes.  Baseline: Unknown number of CSOs currently supporting  Target: 50 40	Project M&E regime, UNITAMS reporting, public records, project final evaluation  Note: Relevant and can be evaluated with some limitations due to accessibility of beneficiaries	Year 1: 50 Year 2: 0
		Outcome Indicator 2 c  # of assessments and joint analysis supported by UNITAMS and UNCT to enhance joint understanding of conflict dynamics and drivers  Baseline: 0  Target: 7	Feedback from parties to peace agreement and process; project closing evaluation  Note: Relevant and can be evaluated through the peace assessment reports that will be shared to the UNCT	Year 1: 7 Year 2: 0
		Outcome Indicator 2 d  # of sub-regional initiatives for conflict prevention and responses, attended by Sudanese officials  Baseline: 0  Target: 4	Project and public records; project closing evaluation.  Note: the activity related to this output indicator will not be implemented under the current conditions	<del>Year 1: 4</del> <del>Year 2: 0</del>
	Output 2.1 Civil society mobilised and capacitated  Activity 2.1.1 National dialogue with CSO representative on expanding peacebuilding space in Sudan to support the implementation of JPA.	Output Indicator 2.1.1  # of forums and workshops organized for CSOs to contribute to peacemaking and peacebuilding processes  Baseline: TBD  Target: 80-40	Feedback from participants of forums and workshops, final evaluation interviews with key stakeholders  Note: Relevant and can be evaluated with some limitations due to accessibility of beneficiaries	Year 1: 40 Year 2: 0
institutions and conf strengther	Activity 2.1.2 Building the capacities of academic institutions to design and facilitate gender responsive and conflict sensitive community dialogue for to strengthening social cohesion  Activity 2.1.3 National forum on countering hate speech  Activity 2.1.4 Peace Dialogue with youth for International	Output Indicator 2.1.2  # of women groups capacitated to reflect the gender issues and concerns in peacemaking and implementation processes (2021-2023) Baseline: TBD  Target: 20	Project records, interviews with women's groups and other stakeholders in regard to women's participation Note: Relevant and can be evaluated with some limitations due to accessibility of beneficiaries	Year 1: 20 Year 2: 0
	Activity 2.1.4 Peace Dialogue with youth of international Peace Day  Activity 2.1.5 Capacity development training for CSOs on conflict sensitive programming peacebuilding, conflict mitigation and management as part of ongoing joint initiative between UNDP, PBF, and UNSSC.	Output Indicator 2.1.3  # of CSOs trained on, and mainstreaming conflict sensitivity in their programing and implementation  Baseline: 0  Target: 1500 participated in the conflict sensitivity online modules (English and Arabic versions)	Project records and reports, closing evaluation  Note: Relevant and can be evaluated through UNSSC online platform	Year 1: 1000 Year 2: 500
	Activity 2.1.6 Peace dialogue and confidence building exercise to build trust, promote consensus around national peace issues especially for youth and women groups, in coordination with Peace Research Institute (PRI) and Peace and Development Centers (PDCs) in the five Darfur states, South and West Kordofan, Kassala, EL Gadaref, and Red Sea states.  Activity 2.1.7 Establish a network of digital mediators and develop hate speech and behavioral insight module that is context oriented	Output Indicator 2.1.4	Project reports, feedback from trainings and final evaluation  Note: Relevant and can be evaluated through the products developed	Year 1: 50 Year 2: 0
	Output 2.2 Key elements of the evidence-base for peacebuilding in place.  Activity 2.2.1 Provide complementary support to the interagency comprehensive peacebuilding assessments in Darfur, East and the two areas in collaboration with PRI and PDCs led by UNITAMS and UNDP.	Output Indicator 2.2.1  # of interagency comprehensive peacebuilding assessments organized in Darfur, East and the two areas in collaboration with PRI and PDCs led by UNITAMS and UNDP  Baseline: 0  Target: 7	Project records, including 7 state-level peacebuilding assessments; feedback from UNITAMS/UNCT Note: Relevant and can be evaluated through the peace assessment reports that will be shared to the UNCT	Year 1: 7 Year 2: 0

	Output Indicator 2.2.2		
Activity 2.2.2 Support establishment of Crisis Risk Dashboard (CRD) as conflict early warning platform with Peace Research Institute (PRI) of the University of Khartoum in collaboration with Regional Peace and Development Canters.		Project records; UNDP Crisis Risk Dashboard Note: Relevant and can be evaluated through the online CRD platform and the CRD offline reports	
Activity 2.2.3 Technical support to a gap analysis of data and evidence for durable solutions, r(e)integration and protection and further research on women's HLP rights for a comprehensive identification of issues enabling return, HLP, legal identity, civil documentation, and other criteria for achieving peace and durable solutions	Output Indicator 2.2.3  # of gender sensitive research and thematic papers and/or advocacy strategies on the HLP rights of IDPs and refugees issued and disseminated  Baseline: 0	Thematic papers issued Mailing lists Roundtable records Project records  Note: Relevant and can be evaluated through the products developed	Year 1: 3 Year 2: 0
Activity 2.2.4 Mapping of conflict resolution structures. CRD mapping to document how cases are adjudicated in practice, to identify strengths and weaknesses and inform programmes designed to increase the robustness of these systems and capacity building to stakeholders on Collaborative Dispute Resolution (CDR) and implications of HLP on Durable solutions	Target: 3  Output Indicator 2.2.4  # of CDR structures mapping assessments conducted in North and West Darfur States  Baseline: 0  Target: 1 assessment	Assessment report issued Mailing lists Roundtable records Project records  Note: Relevant and can be evaluated through the products developed	Year 1: 0 Year 2: 1
Activity 2.2.5 Support to women's HLP rights: Assessment on women's access to HLP rights. The survey will assess displaced women's actual access to land, their perceptions of the likelihood of accessing it in the future and the perceived obstacles that restrict their access to land and property. Individual experiences of attempts or access to land and their outcomes could also be recorded.	Output Indicator 2.2.5  # of assessments conducted on women's access to HLP rights  Baseline: 0  Target: 1	Assessment report issued Mailing lists Roundtable records Project records  Note: Relevant and can be evaluated through the products developed	Year 1: 0 Year 2: 1
Activity 2.2.6 Based on data and evidence collected, conduct public awareness campaigns and targeted information through counselling and legal assistance among IDPs and Refugees on HLP rights, collaborative dispute resolution, legal identity and civil documentation to support access to durable solutions	Output Indicator 2.2.6  # of individuals (disaggregated by group, gender and age) who received support (information, counselling and legal assistance including collaborative disputes) on HLP, and legal and personal documentation.  Baseline: 0  Target: 10,000 (80% IDPs)	Monitoring data Project records/ Event report and attendance lists Legal counselling case files CRCs referrals/ records  Note: the activity related to this output is not measurable under the current security context, although it has been fully implemented	Year 1: 0 Year 2: 10000
Activity 2.3.7 Area-based assessments for durable solutions for IDPs and refugees with common methodology in main areas of potential return or (re)integration	Output Indicator 2.2.7 # of DS assessment and strategy supported  Baseline: 0  Target: 1 DS strategy assessments supported	Monitoring data Project records/ Event report and attendance lists Legal counselling case files Note: Relevant and can be evaluated through the activity products	Year 1: 1 Year 2: 0
Output 2.3 Relevant regional and international capacities for peace enhanced  Activity 2.3.1 Joint UN/AU/IGAD workshop to ensure coherence, coordination and complementarity of programming and to identify concrete synergies and opportunities for enhancing early warning capacities in Sudan.	Output Indicator 2.3.1  # of IGAD workshops/ consultations at sub national level and national organized  Baseline: 0  Target: 4	Project records including feedback surveys from workshop participants; project final evaluation interviews with key stakeholders Note: the activity related to this output indicator will not be implemented under the current conditions	Year 1: 4 Year 2: 0
Activity 2.3.2 Facilitation of IGAD workshop/consultations at sub-national level in North Darfur with regard to early warning and prevention mechanisms in relation to conflict between farmers and pastoralists in North Darfur.  Activity 2.3.3 Develop thematic conflict sensitivity materials in partnership with PBF and United Nations System Staff College	Output Indicator 2.3.2 # of conflict sensitivity materials developed Baseline: 0 Target: 3	Project records and training materials produced; feedback from participants of trainings  Note: Relevant and can be evaluated through the activity products	Year 1: 3 Year 2: 0
Activity 2.3.4 Organize a ToT workshop to establish local and national experts on conflict sensitivity to lead face to face workshops on conflict sensitivity	Output indicator 2.3.3  # of capacities developed to facilitate conflict sensitivity training  Baseline: 0  Target: 25 peace ambassadors are trained (	Project records and training materials produced; feedback from participants of trainings Note: the activity related to this output indicator will not be implemented under the current conditions	<del>Year 1: 25</del> <del>Year 2: 0</del>

Outcome 3:		Outcome Indicator 3	UNDP project reports,	
Coexistence between farmers and pastoralist in North Darfur is increasingly improving, with stable relations between		Increase of confidence of communities along migratory routs—in conflict prevention and management mechanisms.	Project evaluation and perception survey	
them, underwritten by strengthened application of the rule of law and mechanisms/ structures in place to		Baseline: TBC		
maintain achievements (PBF Strategic Results Framework		Target: Significant increase in community confidence		
Outcome 1)		Outcome indicator	UNDP project reports, perception survey, project	
		#of incidents between farmer and pastoralist as a result of competition over land and natural resources	final evaluation and CRD report	
		Baseline: TBD		
		Target: reduced/decreased number of violence incidents along migratory routs		
	Output 3.1 Conflict management capacities are strengthened around	Output Indicator 3.1.1	Progress reports, final	<del>Year 1: 5</del> <del>Year 2: 0</del>
	migratory routes	# of committees, mechanisms and structures supported and capacitated	evaluation	
	Activity 3.1.1 Support the establishment/ strengthening of representative and participatory agriculture season protection	Baseline: 0		
	Committees and the development of locality workplans/SOPs for safe	Target: 5-committees (one per locality),		V .
	implementation of the agricultural season  Activity 3.1.2 Facilitate detailed mapping	Output Indicator 3.1.2 # of kilometers mapped to support demarcation and conflict resolution,	Progress reports, final evaluation	Year 1: 300 Year 2: 0
	of migratory routes & grazing pasturelands in each locality and support demarcation,	Baseline: 0		
	conflict resolution and law enforcement  Activity 3.1.3 Provide support to Farmers	Target: 300 linear Kilometers of migratory routes demarcated.		
	and pastoralist commission to organize and coordinate agriculture season	Output Indicator 3.1.3 # of workshops on conflict resolution and	Project reports and final	Year 1: 10 Year 2: 0
	committees for more peaceful utilization of migratory routs during agricultural season	peaceful coexistence for state and nonstate actors held,	evaluation	
	A 11 11 0 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Baseline: .0		
	Activity 3.1.4 Provide technical support for updating and strengthening of relevant Laws/procedures at state and locality	Target: 10-workshops (2-per locality),		
	levels to protect farms, migratory routes and relevant lands and facilities guaranteeing success of agricultural season			
	Activity 3.1.5 Ensure dissemination of the			
	updated Laws/procedures to relevant civilian & security officials, develop and implement media campaigns to raise public awareness and compliance.			
	Activity 3.1.6 Workshops on conflict resolution, peaceful coexistence, &			
	capacity building for Ministry of Agriculture, police, native administration			
	civil and CSOs in hotspot locations, in coordination with University of El Fasher Centre for Peace Studies.			
	Activity 3.1.7 As required and in coordination with UNITAMS provide			
	support to local authorities to develop operational plans/SOPs for coordination of			
	Higher, Executive and Locality level Security Committees, security providers			
	and civil society actors with capacity to provide mediation/conflict resolution services.			
	Activity 3.1.8 Support training of security forces on protection of civilians, human rights, and international humanitarian law.			
	Output 3.2	Output Indicator 3.2.1	Davis de la constant	<del>Year 1: 15</del>
	Social cohesion promoted between farmer and pastoralist communities	# of social cohesion events/measures implemented in targeted locations	Project reports and evaluations	<del>Year 2: 5</del>
	through peacebuilding and stabilization interventions.	Baseline: 0		
	Activity 3.2.1 Awareness campaigns to	Target: 20		
	promote social cohesion that utilize innovative tools like street theatre, community radio, arts and sports in	Output Indicator 3.2.2	Project records, final	Year 1: 2 Year 2: 3
	community radio, arts and sports in community around farms and migratory routs.	# of infrastructure and services rehabilitated/constructed/provided in the targeted locations	evaluation	
		Baseline: 0		

Activity 3.2.2 Veterinary services organized across the corridors and in certain grazing pasturelands to encourage herders to remain within the determined migratory routes while involving the farmers in the campaigns to encourage peaceful co-existence.	Target: 5	
Activity 3.2.3 In consultations with authorities; rehabilitate & construct water services, including boreholes & water yards in areas within or next to migratory routes & pasturelands to ensure equitable access between farmer and pastoralist communities		

	communities			
Outcome 3:  Social Cohesion ar Peaceful coexisten among internally dipersons (IDPs) and host communities improved in El Gao State.	splaced the	Outcome Indicator 3 a % of community members reporting a decrease in tribal/communal conflicts by gender.  Baseline: TBD  Target: 75%	UNDP project reports, Project evaluation, and end line perception survey	
(PBF Strategic Res Framework Outcom		Outcome Indicator 3 b % of community members has access to basic services and livelihood opportunities Baseline: TBD  Target: 75% % change in frequency with which youth leaders use hate speech to inflame and instrumentalize inter-group conflicts  Baseline: TBD Target: 45%	UNDP project reports, perception survey, project final evaluation, and CRD report	
	Output 3.1: Affected IDP and host community households have access to critical services  Activity 3.1.1 Establish or rehabilitate two (2) water yards benefiting 4000 people (60% female).  Activity 3.1.2 Establish two water User Associations and a Cost Recovery System for the maintenance and sustenance of the water yards  Activity 3.1.3 Provide and install 13 Solar Street light in IDP Gathering Areas to enhance safety and security, especially for girls and women at night: benefiting over 20,000 (60% female).	Output Indicator 3.1.1  # of households benefiting from infrastructure rehabilitated/developed by age and gender.  Baseline  Target: 4,000 (60% women)  Output Indicator 3.1.2	Field Monitoring Reports, Progress Report  Field Monitoring Reports, Progress Report	
	Output 3.2: The food and livelihood security of affected househol (including IDPs, refugees, and host communities) improved.  Activity 3.2.1 Provide agriculture inputs for gardening and winter crops (including seeds, tools, solar water pumps, and fertilizers) to 2000 households (at least 40% female).  Activity 3.2.2 Provide ten (10) micro-grants to vulnerable groups and associations (including IDPs a host community members) to initiate joint activities su as bakeries, community kitchens, grain mills, small businesses, petty trading, and food processing.	# of vulnerable households supported with assets to start productive activities; disaggregated by gender  Baseline: TBD  Target: 2,000 (40% women)	Field Monitoring Reports, Progress Report	
	Output 3.3: Trust, confidence, and social cohesion among conflicting tribes and affected communities improved through sports activities.  Activity 3.3.1 Provide customized civic education training to youth and women groups in peacebuildin and social cohesion.  Activity 3.3.2 Support (grants and in-kind) youth a women's networks to develop and implement localized peacebuilding and safe advocacy initiative	# of youth and women groups supported with civic education training and grants – in kind support  Baseline: TBD  Target: 10	Field Monitoring Reports, Progress Report	
	Activity 3.3.3 Organize cross-tribal cultural activities and events, including arts, drama, and music, with key peace messaging utilizing mass media platform	High and the control of the control	Field Monitoring Reports, Progress Report	

	Output 3.4: Peaceful coexistence promoted between farmer and pastoralist communities through peacebuilding stabilization interventions in North Darfur  Activity 3.4.1: Distribute agricultural tools to sedentary farmers.  Activity 3.4.2: Distribute solar mobile chargers to nomads.	# of sedentary framers received agricultural tools (plows, hoes, pesticide sprayers)  Baseline: 0  Target: 630 (50% female, 50% male)	Field Monitoring Reports, Progress Report	
	Activity 3.4.3 Support (through grants and in-kind support) youth and women's beneficiaries from farmers and nomads to develop and implement localized social cohesion and peacebuilding initiatives.	Output indicator 3.4.2: # of nomads received solar mobile charger Baseline: 0 Target: 387 (40% female, 60% male)	Field Monitoring Reports, Progress Report	
		Output Indicator 3.4.3:  # of localized peacebuilding initiatives created by beneficiaries of stabilization grants and inkind support  Baseline: 0  Target: 4	Field Monitoring Reports, Progress Report	
Outcome 4  Women's empowered participation in peacebuilding processes in Sudan is enhanced through advancing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda		Outcome indicator 4a:  % increase of women participating in peace talks and political processes targeted by the project (disaggregated by age and community group).  Baseline: TBC  Target: TBC	Monitoring reports, progress report	
	Output 4.1: UN Country Team's capacity to address gender-specific challenges and promote women's participation in peace processes is strengthened  Activity 4.1.1: Establish a WPS Advisor position within the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator's office in Sudan, who will provide specialized guidance on gender-sensitive approaches to peacebuilding and coordinate and partner with key WPS actors, including conflict-related sexual violence  Activity 4.1.2: Conduct workshops and training to strengthen the knowledge and skills of UN staff on WPS issues  Activity 4.1.3: Establish a dedicated and revitalized coordination mechanism for WPS, led by the RCO, including agencies with relevant mandates. Create platforms for knowledge sharing and best practices related to WPS and Youth across UN agencies.  Activity 4.1.4: Support UN-AFPs in the development of joint programs and initiatives focused on WPS, including support to women protection and survivors' networks  Activity 4.1.5: Provide substantive advisory support to the UNCT on the WPS agenda and ensure its integration into the strategic planning and decision-making processes of the UN in Sudan.  Activity 4.1.6: Establish and maintain the partnership with the Personal Envoy and his office to ensure close collaboration, complementarity between the technical-level work of the UNCT and the Office of the PESG on WPS  Activity 4.1.7: Establish mechanism to monitor and evaluate the UNCT's gender mainstreaming efforts.  Activity 4.1.8: Systematically gather timely, accurate, reliable and objective information on conflict related sexual violence in Sudan.  Activity 4.1.9: Complement the reports and advocacy Office of the SRSG for Sexual Violence in Conflict with the Security Council and other political and policy-making bodies that address conflict-related sexual violence	Baseline: N/A Target: N/A  Output indicator 4.1.2: # of workshops conducted on WPS  Baseline: 0 Target: TBC  Output indicator 4.1.3: average # of participants attending WPS workshops (disaggregated by sex)  Baseline: 0 Target: TBC  Output indicator 4.1.4: WPS coordination mechanism established and meeting regularly  Baseline: N/A Target: frequency TBC  Output indicator 4.1.5: Number of UNCT planning documents that integrate WPS agenda  Baseline0: Target:1 (Interim Cooperation Framework)	Monitoring reports, meeting attendance logs, meeting minutes, progress reports  M&E plan, meeting minutes, recommendation reports	

Output 4.2: Enabling the meaningful, capacitated participation of women and civil society in peace processes at all levels  Activity 4.2.1: Develop and deliver training programs for women on negotiation skills, conflict resolution, and political advocacy relevant to the peace process.  Activity 4.2.2: In partnership with the office of the PESG, provide expert assistance on key topics under discussion during political processes and peace talks, ensuring gender-responsive approaches (e.g. constitution drafting, transitional justice, community security).  Activity 4.2.3: Develop strategy and engage with political stakeholders to advocate for women's inclusion in political processes and peace talks and decision-making processes.  Activity 4.2.4 Facilitate the participation of women and youth peacebuilders in engoing for a for mediation process design	Output indicator 4.3.1: # of women trained (disaggregated by community group)  Baseline: 0 Target: TBC  Output indicator 4.3.2: # of trained women actively applying negotiation, conflict resolution, and advocacy skills in political and peace processes  Baseline: TBC Target: TBC  Output indicator 4.3.3: % improvement in understanding of key topics after trainings  Baseline: TBC Target: TBC  Output indicator 4.3.4: # government institutions and CSOs receiving expert assistance (disaggregated by state)  Baseline: TBC Target: TBC  Output indicator 4.3.5: % positive feedback from stakeholders on the effectiveness and relevance of expert assistance  Baseline: TBC Target: TBC	Pre-and post-training assessments, meeting attendance logs, monitoring reports, progress reports, feedback forms	
Output 4.3 Community-level peacebuilding initiatives led by women's groups are supported to advance local-level ceasefire agreements  Activity 4.3.1: Conduct assessment on local-level ceasefire agreements between SAF and RSF brokered by civilian actors, with focus on the role of women and youth in local peace initiatives.  Activity 4.3.2: Develop a set of recommendations for strategic support of such local-level peace actors and peace pockets and provide strategic guidance on these inclusive initiatives.  Activity 4.3.3: Facilitate networking and experience sharing amongst community peacebuilders  Activity 4.3.4: Support the amplification of the voices and advocacy efforts of women in peace processes through traditional and social media platforms	Output indicator 4.4.1: # of assessments conducted on local-level ceasefire agreements across Sudan with a focus on women and youth  Baseline: TBC Target: TBC  Output indicator 4.4.2: # of strategic recommendations developed for supporting local-level peace actors and peace pockets.  Baseline: TBC Target: TBC  Output indicator 4.4.3: # of networking events established for community peacebuilders.  Baseline: TBC Target: TBC  Output indicator 4.4.4: # of collaboration initiatives formed among community peacebuilders as a result of the networking events, with a focus on local-level ceasefires  Baseline: TBC Target: TBC  Output indicator 4.4.5: # of traditional and social media campaigns conducted to amplify the voices of women in peace processes.  Baseline: TBC Target: TBC  Output indicator 4.4.6: Engagement with social media campaigns  Baseline: TBC Target: TBC  Output indicator 4.4.6: Engagement with social media campaigns  Baseline: TBC Target: TBC	Testimonies from event participants, event attendance logs, progress reports, field monitoring reports, social media logs,	