

Building Accountable and Sustainable Security in Somali Federal Member States (BASIS)

Addition to Project Document for No Cost Extension

The Building Accountable and Sustainable Security in Somali Federal Member States (BASIS) project was launched on 01 March 2024 with a planned duration of 12 months. At the conclusion of the project on 28 February 2025, a proposal for a costed extension was communicated to the Somalia Joint Fund (SJF) to build on the results of the initial project phase and to ensure continuity of security sector programming.

Government partners, including the Office of National Security (ONS), the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIED), and the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and UN members, including UNDP and UNTMIS, collectively endorsed the importance of the programme and the need for a costed extension. An external evaluation of the project was commissioned by the SJF and returned a broadly positive assessment of progress, particularly in developing inclusive, climate-informed security strategies and strengthening coordination between federal and state actors while improving the trust between local communities and state security institutions. The evaluation also provided a series of recommendations for enhancing project effectiveness, which where relevant will be incorporated into programming during the extension period.

The proposed costed extension was approved by the SJF until a new project end date of until 28 February 2026. Subsequently, the national implementing partners, SJF, UNDP and UNTMIS agreed to a no-cost extension for the period from 1 March 2026 to 30 June 2026 to allow completion of the remaining activities and planning for future programming. This project document serves as an addition to the original Project Document, and the cost extension framework for BASIS, with reference to the new 4-month no-cost extension period, until 30 June 2026.


Project description

The BASIS project supports people-centered security sector development in Somalia's Federal Member States (FMS). It works with FMS Ministries of Internal Security and State Security Offices, while also engaging federal-level institutions like the Office of National Security and Ministry of Internal Security to enhance coordination under the National Security Architecture (NSArch). The project aligns with the National Transformation Plan and the Somalia Security Development Plan in the context of the UNTMIS and ATMIS-AUSSOM transition.

The project addresses critical challenges in Somalia's security sector, which remains fragile despite progress in force generation. While the Somali National Army (SNA) and Police have expanded, limited manpower, inadequate funding, weak coordination, and gaps in the legal framework hinder effective security provision. Many areas in the FMS remain under Al-Shabaab control or rely on informal, clan-based security mechanisms. Additionally, affordability is a major concern, with 70% of the sector externally funded, raising sustainability questions.

BASIS aims to strengthen security resilience by supporting the development of state security policies and strategies, informed by comprehensive threat assessments and community needs. It fosters inclusive participation, engaging communities, including IDPs, women, youth, and marginalized groups, to address issues hampering security development. The project has facilitated the formation of local security committees and is currently assisting FMS in developing state security strategies as well as MOIS institutional strategies. These strategies will integrate affordability, climate risks, and community needs, feeding into national strategies with the support and coordination of the Office of National Security and the FGS Ministry of Internal Security.

A key focus is enhancing women’s participation in the security sector, where representation remains low at around 5%. BASIS also highlights the growing threat of climate change, which has displaced 2.9 million people due to conflict and droughts yet remains underexplored in security policy discussions. By adopting a bottom-up approach, BASIS seeks to address marginalization, improve coordination, and build sustainable, community-informed security frameworks, contributing to long-term stability in Somalia.

SJF Funding Window: Rule of Law	
<p>UNCF Strategic Priority: Security and Rule of Law</p> <p>NDP Pillar: Improved Security and the Rule of Law</p>	<p>UNCF Outcome(s): 2.2: Accessibility and responsiveness of institutions in empowering communities to address underlying causes of insecurity and conflict as well as endemic violations of human rights and marginalization will be ensured by efficient civilian oversight of security and rule of law institutions</p> <p>2.3: Rights and needs of Somali communities command the strengthening of security and rule of law institutions. Anti-corruption efforts, mitigation of duplication and stakeholders’ comparative advantages maximised</p>
Project location(s): Mogadishu, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, Southwest State	Anticipated end date: 30/06/2026
Recipient UN Organizations: UNDP	Implementing partners: UNTMIS, MOIS FGS, ONS and MOIS and SSOs in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, Southwest State. One CSO to be contracted.
<p>Original budget: US\$ 1,814,239</p> <p>Costed Extension Budget: US\$ 1,065,000</p> <p>Total Budget: US\$ 2,879,239</p>	Sources of funded budget and amount: SJF: US\$ 2,879,239
Project gender marker score: GEN2	Project risk marker score: Average 14.5 (Medium high)
Related UN projects within/outside the SJF portfolio: Joint Police Programme Phase II, Joint Justice & Corrections Programme, Women Peace & Protection programme.	<p>SDG:</p> 



Project signatures

UN lead organization

Ms. Jelena Raketic, Resident Representative,
OIC, UNDP
Date & Seal



National Authorities


Aweys Haji Yusuf, Office of National Security
Date & Seal:



31-03-2026

National Authorities

Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail, Minister of Internal
Security - FGS
Date & Seal:



31-03-2026

DSRSG/RC/HC

George Conway
DSRSG/RC/HC
Date & Seal:



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Annex I: Project Results Framework

NDP PRIORITY: Pillar 2 Rule or Law (Security institutions serve the expectations of its citizens by respecting, protecting, and promoting their fundamental rights, thus ensuring security and stability)

UNCF STRATEGIC OUTCOME 2.2: Accessibility and responsiveness of institutions in empowering communities to address underlying causes of insecurity and conflict as well as endemic violations of human rights and marginalization will be ensured by efficient civilian oversight of security and rule of law institutions
2.3: Rights and needs of Somali communities command the strengthening of security and rule of law institutions. Anti-corruption efforts, mitigation of duplication and stakeholders' comparative advantages maximised

PROJECT OUTPUT 1: Somalia's security oversight institutions at FMS level have improved capacity and knowledge to develop comprehensive security policies that are sustainable and affordable

Output indicator, baseline, target	Sub-Outputs	Sub-output indicators, baselines and targets	Partner contributions	Indicative resources
Indicator: Status of implementation of state security policies Baseline: 4 strategies developed but implementation is	Sub-output 1.1: Legislative reforms, strategies and improved governance frameworks support the implementation of the NSArch	Indicator: # of state security policy implementation plans developed Baseline:0 Target: Plans developed in each state for implementation of state security policies	UNDP support to the ONS/SSOs for implementation	Desk review of implementation plans from SSOs/ONS



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minimal/not started Target: Implementation of 4 policies fully underway	Sub-output 1.2 The SSOs in coordination with ONS will implement people centred state security strategies that are affordable and sustainable	Indicator: # of affordability plans developed Baseline: 0 Target: 4	SSOs develop affordability plans	Desk review of affordability plans
	Sub-output 1.3: Security institutions integrate climate change threats into security policies	Indicator: # of Climate Change and Security Strategies developed Baseline: 4 security policies integrate climate change Target: 1 in Galmudug	UNDP support to ONS and Galmudug State for strategic development	Desk review of the security strategy by UNDP and UNEP

PROJECT OUTPUT 2: Democratic oversight of the security sector is strengthened in the Federal Member States (no salaries)

Output indicator, baseline, target	Sub-Outputs	Sub-output indicators, baselines and targets	Partner contributions	Indicative resources
Indicator: % changes in perceptions of security linked to State community outreach Baseline: 46% of respondents in target locations reported they	2.1 Inclusive dialogue platforms are established and maintained to support state security planning	Indicator: # people reached through local perceptions surveys snapshots Baseline: 4,472 people (F:1725, M:2747) reached by threat assessment consultations Target: Additional 1,500 reached through follow-up survey snapshots	MOIS FMS teams will conduct the surveys using previously designed questionnaires.	Means of Verification: Questionnaires. The sample group is meant to be an inclusive gender and age desegregated snapshot of community perception of the state of security. Clear criteria will be set on the participations in the questionnaires to be as inclusive as possible with a focus on marginalized groups.



<p>consider the area to be 'very safe' Target: 10% improvement compared to baseline</p>	<p>Sub-output 2.2: Security Actors' accountability frameworks are strengthened</p>	<p>Indicator: Status of agreement on a path forward to increase security oversight and accountability. Baseline: No agreement Target: Agreement reached</p>		<p>Meeting/workshop minutes/field visit</p>
	<p>Sub-output 2.3: Women's priorities and participation in security sector development is increased</p>	<p>Indicator: # women consulted on the status of their security and needs Baseline: 0 Target: at least 100 women in each FMS.</p>	<p>The contracted CSO will monitor all activities. Implementation will be monitored by UNDP national staff.</p>	<p>UNDP will work with the CSO and exercise oversight over the implementation of women consultation.</p>



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Annex II: Project risk management matrix



RISK ASSESSMENT						MONITORING PLAN			TREATMENT OPTIONS	
Risk	Risk drivers	Risk outcome	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level & Trajectory	Responsibility	Regularity	Sources	Mitigation	Adaptation
Potential for a defined adverse event or outcome to occur	Factors that influence the realization of a risk	Effects the risk would have on fund objectives and operations	Estimated chance of a risk occurring	Estimated severity of the risk outcome	Risk level = Likelihood x Impact Trajectory = Direction of risk level since last assessment	The party responsible for monitoring the risk (individual or team)	The frequency at which a risk should be monitored (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly)	The sources of information used for monitoring	Measures taken to reduce the impact and/or probability of a risk before it is realized	Identified contingency measures to reduce the impact of a risk after it is realized
Terrorism (unchanged)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Al-Shabaab still has capability to attack cities with explosives, attack Forward Operating Basis of ATMIS, and SNA positions. Captured land is hard to hold and some recovered areas may slip back under AS control 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Violence against communities Major setback in peacebuilding and implementation of security platforms Reversed progress that entails doing harm Any media coverage can expose national counterparts and 	4	4	16	UNDP	Weekly	Engagement with national, subnational and local authorities to determine the risk for each operating area before launching consultations. Security incidents reporting.	-Interventions have been carefully planned in NRAs and areas vulnerable to Al-Shabaab. - UNDSS information on incidents is monitored in areas of implementation to identify risks. - Coordination with humanitarian and	- Team has limited media exposure to some key events until after they have taken place. - Some documents remain confidential (not published) due to sensitive information.



	<p>making the people there exceptionally vulnerable.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNDP as an international organization is a target. 	<p>UNDP staff and consultants to risk.</p>						<p>Work with UNDP Security and UNDSS to mitigate and analyse threats.</p>	<p>development agencies and donors</p>	
<p>Increase in inter-communal violence in target areas (Unchanged)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lack of effective measures to reconcile the opposing groups across ethnic, cultural and provincial lines ▪ Insufficient and inadequate efforts to improve livelihood options ▪ Increased interventions of national actors in subnational and localized violence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Human and material loss, violence and security threats ▪ Major delays in or suspension of implementation of Fund interventions ▪ Reversed progress achieved 	4	4	16	UNDP	Weekly	<p>UNDSS reporting, coordination with humanitarian and development agencies and donors</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interventions in the project have been designed to help lessen intercommunal violence. ▪ The project facilitates trust building with targeted communities and increases the understanding of the authorities about grievances and threats in communities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Engagement with federal and FMS authorities to co-design interventions to ensure that they do not fuel local conflict but instead work towards state-building and building trust.
<p>Natural disasters & hazards (No change)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Insufficient and inadequate capacities and measures to contain and prevent the disease spread 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Communities are overwhelmed with crisis and survival making the project badly timed or irrelevant ▪ Limited to no 	4	4	16	UNDP	Weekly	<p>State authorities, district authorities, UNTMIS, UNEP</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The project is already enhancing coordination platforms that will indirectly facilitate improved security coordination for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ It became apparent during the implementation that there was no proper coordination



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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lack of early warning and early response mechanisms. ▪ Seasonal humanitarian emergencies ▪ Competing priorities for donors and implementing partners 	access to target communities							improved disaster management.	between security institutions and Ministry of Environment and the Somalia Disaster Management Agency. The project has encouraged improved coordination.
Operational obstacles (border closures, etc.) and security deterioration for staff. Risk of Internal State/non-state armed conflict.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ International dynamics (trade and travel restrictions) ▪ Social unrest and high unemployment related issues ▪ Internal and regional security deterioration/conflict ▪ Threat to the existence of the state, and the security of its people and infrastructure. ▪ Existence of several militant 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Major delays in or suspension of implementation of Fund interventions ▪ Limited to no access to target communities 	3	4	12	UNDP	Weekly	UNDSS, FGS and FMS authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Engagement with national and local authorities ▪ Coordination with humanitarian and development agencies and donors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BASIS is supporting national governments to improve internal security • Presence of ATMIS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Active communication with partners. ▪ Coordination with UNTMIS on political analysis and dialogue to unblock obstacles to programme implementation ▪ UNDP Security Risk/threat Analysis determines project implementation on the ground.



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	groups, most notably Al-Shabaab targeting staff									
Political conflict (new risk)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Social unrest ▪ Internal and regional security deterioration/conflict ▪ Threat to the existence of the state, and the security of its people and infrastructure. ▪ Negative impact on state-building and progress on the federalization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Major delays in or suspension of implementation of interventions ▪ Trust eroded between Federal Government and States 	5	4	20	UNDP	Monthly	UNDSS, FGS and FMS authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Robust engagement with national and FGS and State authorities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work closely with technical experts in government to try and reduce tensions and find innovative ways forward for continued implementation where possible. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Coordination with UNTMIS on political analysis and dialogue to unblock obstacles to programme implementation ▪ Bilateral engagement with Jubaland authorities for the continuation of implementation in an agreement with Office of National Security
Fund allocations not evenly distributed project thematic areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Geographical and sector bias in fund allocation and interventions ▪ Disbursement pressure (to intervene 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lack of or limited impact of fund interventions against the set objectives ▪ Funds spread too thinly to be able to 	2	4	8	UNDP	Monthly	FGS and FMS authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Active and transparent communication on pillar objectives. ▪ Funding is distributed equally to FMS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Analysis of best performing value for money investments that determine future support in case of



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(no change)	somewhere specific, to undertake specific action, to target certain people) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weaknesses in project review and selection 	take interventions to scale <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reputational damage to the pillar and donor concerns Fund interventions exacerbate political tensions and/or raise conflict risk Imbalanced sector progress 							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regular portfolio analysis – quarterly/prior to new call. Annual review of Fund strategic direction and priorities Independent review/evaluation on the overall performance of beneficiaries. 	reduced funding. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inclusion of lessons learned section in project proposals and reports
Inability to deliver expected results (unchanged)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of data and insufficient knowledge as to what works to inform effective programming Low risk tolerance preventing innovation Lack of political support / engagement Political pressures to work with certain partner(s) Lack of coordinated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of or limited impact of fund interventions against the set objectives Reputational damage 	4	5	20	UNDP	Weekly	FGS and FMS counterparts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Independent review/evaluation on the overall performance of projects Dedicated best practices and analysis responsibilities Inclusion of lessons learned section in project proposals and reports Develop coalitions to embed programmes into larger 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review of strategic direction and priorities Reassignment of staff / use of consultants Political support – as needed/when political pressure occurs



	<p>approaches between project and other interventions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contextual risks as described above 								peacebuilding and development plans	
Funding Gap (likelihood increased)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economic recessions in donor countries Donor fatigue Poor fund visibility Donor perceptions that stem from legacy of poor management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Smaller number of initiatives supported Underfunded project team Unable to progress with activities due to lack of funding Expectations from national counterparts for support not met 	4	5	20	UNDP	Monthly	SJF, RCO, UNDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work closely with national counterparts to manage expectations Advocate for importance of security oversight and accountable security sector Mutually reinforcing projects in UNDP ROL to share resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Investment in some carefully thought through initiatives that are 'low hanging fruit' showing real results in FMS. Partnership outreach strategy Advocacy for additional donors. UNDP's own commitment and investment to bridge gaps where possible.
Weak capacity of implementing partners (no change)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of capacity building efforts/opportunities for staff and organizational development for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited or lack of delivery on the set results Lower than expected quality results 	2	4	8	UNDP	Quarterly	FGS and FMS governments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use of HACT and partner due diligence Audit provisions in the standard MOU and SAA in line with 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ongoing performance reports. Third Party Monitoring of national



	<p>partners</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Limited funds for recruiting qualified personnel and restrictive HR policies preventing timely recruitment of personnel ▪ High staff turnover among the implementing partners/ in national counterparts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reduced sustainability of activities and results ▪ More resources diverted to capacity building activities for counterparts 							<p>the framework for joint audit</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Systematic monitoring and coordination support 	<p>beneficiary performance and compliance.</p>
<p>Limited and inadequate coordination among PUNOs and fund stakeholders (no change)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lack of effective coordination mechanism among the partners and lack of engagement fund stakeholders ▪ Different programme interests, approaches and principles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Duplication of activities, i.e., ineffective use of funds ▪ Loss of opportunities to achieve results 	4	4	16	UNDP	Quarterly	, UNTMIS, UNDP, FGS government	<p>Implement joint programmes based on comparative advantage</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strengthen Global Focal Point Arrangement at Strategic management level and technical levels in Somalia. Project benefits from strong cooperation with UNTMIS, in particular ROLSIG, PAMG, HRO and RCO.



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<p>Slow delivery and inability to implement within timeframe (no change)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Recruitment requirements and delays ▪ Inefficient programming/operational procedures ▪ Contextual risks as described above (particularly natural hazards, political volatility, and operational challenges) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Loss of opportunities, failure to achieve the set programme and Fund objectives ▪ Reputational damage 	<p>5</p>	<p>3</p>	<p>15</p>	<p>UNDP</p>	<p>Monthly</p>	<p>UNDP</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Use of HACT and partner due diligence ▪ Systematic monitoring and coordination support by the lead agencies. ▪joint audit to be undertaken in joint programmes ▪ Rapid risk assessments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Adaptable programming and managing expectations through regular communication with partners has kept the project delivery on track.
<p>Diversion of resources (no change)</p>	<p>Lack of effective due diligence policies and mechanisms</p>	<p>Loss of opportunities, failure to achieve the set programme and Fund objectives. Reputational damage</p>	<p>3</p>	<p>4</p>	<p>12</p>	<p>UNDP</p>	<p>Quarterly</p>	<p>FGS and FMS governments</p>	<p>UN Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Framework and UN staff mandatory integrity training programmes NGO projects audited in compliance with financial regulations, rules and directives applicable to UNDP. Information sharing between agencies on partners (ex. shared database on</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Taking corrective action to either cancel Letters of Agreement or refusal of payments.



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									partner due diligence information)	
Unsustainable results (no change)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited duration Limitations to the extent capacity of national counterparts can be built and sustained Ineffective exit strategies of the projects Externalities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exacerbated aid dependency Limited impact of the Fund activities Reputational damage 	4	5	20	UNDP	Quarterly	UNDP, FGS and FMS governments	The Fund extension enables the strategic planning that look specifically at affordability and sustainability of institutions. Exit strategies of the projects are clear whereby the project is leaving behind policies and products that will help ensure sustainability. Strengthened focus on capacity building of local actors rather than direct service provision.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Discussions with national authorities on how the project outputs can contribute to sustainability, in particular the state security strategies and focus on affordability and legislative reforms.
Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) committed by PUNOs and imple-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Presence/residence of implementation partner staff within target communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Damages the UN's and the Fund's reputation and ability to deliver on its mandate 	2	4	8	UNDP	On need to have basis	HRO, UNDP, FGS and FMS governments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse Application of conflict sensitivity principles Active 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Engagement with RCO to address the issue comprehensively.



<p>engaging partners (no change)</p>	<p>Disenfranchised and vulnerable population due to extreme poverty and low educational level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence against women in the society resulting in a societal tolerance 								<p>communication with partners</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strong safeguarding procedures. 	
<p>Doing harm by introducing culturally inappropriate and conflict-insensitive activities (no change)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Culturally or conflict-insensitive project implementation designs, e.g., unequal distribution of project benefits to stakeholder communities ▪ Conflict: community/group resentment over selection of recipients 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inadvertently caused harm to beneficiaries in family and community settings ▪ Disruption in projects implementation and reduction of their impact ▪ Negative impact on gender relations in beneficiary communities 	<p>3</p>	<p>5</p>	<p>15</p>	<p>UNDP</p>	<p>Monthly</p>	<p>FGS, FMS governments, TPMs, Community Assessments</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Application of DO NO HARM and conflict sensitivity principles ▪ Active communication with partners ▪ Dedicated M&E data/best practices/lessons learnt analysis ▪ Application of HRDDP while working with Somali authorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Community - Beneficiary feedback in assessments. ▪ Ensuring that women were involved in the assessment exercises to specially engage with women. ▪ Relying on national partners to guide implementation.



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<p>Gender barriers (no change)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participation of women in programme activities may be perceived by some community members as culturally inappropriate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contextual risks as described above Reduced project impact since women are central in many of the programmes' activities. 	5	4	20	UNDP	Monthly	UNDP, UNTMIS, FGS and FMs governments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gender-sensitive programming Work on patriarchal gender norms with communities in a fair and respectful manner 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensuring the involvement of women in all activities Empowering women funded by the project to be included in activities and having influence on programme outputs and focus.
<p>Security threats impacting implementation (no change)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National counterparts and consultants may experience issues that will impact on their ability to carry out activities in areas where there are considerable security threats in the context of the campaign against Al-Shabaab. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contextual risks as described above Reduced project impact since national counterparts will not be able to reach the targeted communities 	3	5	15	UNDP	Continuous	UNTMIS, UNDP, FGS and FMS Governments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regular security updates received from both local information, UNDP Security team and UNDSS Ensure that movements are not advertised and think carefully through the impact of media exposure Adaptative management to switch areas and interventions into different areas if areas become too tense or are 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate with State Security Office and MOIS FMS on implementation in volatile areas. During the first year of implementation there were no security threats that jeopardized implementation. Political rifts between FGS and FMS may in



									considered too risky for access.	the long term undermine united attempts to formulate a nation-wide security policy.
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Annex III: Project budget



Output 1: Somalia's security oversight institutions at FMS level have improved capacity and knowledge to develop comprehensive security policies that are sustainable and affordable

Sub-outputs	Location	Activities	Inputs	Responsible Party	Budget year 2
					Including direct project costs and bank charges
Sub-output 1.1: Legislative reforms, strategies and improved governance frameworks support the implementation of the NSArch	Nationwide but with a focus on national level	1.1.1 Coordination and technical leads on legislative drafting and support to the FMS security strategy development. The legal advisor will work on the FMS acts that implements the SSO as part of the NSArch framework. The CT/Security Advisor continues to support the FMS in producing implementation plans based on the state security strategies. BASIS facilitates technical support including from UNTMIS and Inclusive Politics Portfolio in UNDP to legislative drafting on key critical pieces of legislation that will facilitate the implementation of the NSArch and the SSDP in the context of a federated model.	Senior FMS legal advisor in the ONS 4,000 x 9 months = 36,000 Senior CT/Security Advisor 4,000 x 9 months = 36,000 Director of FMS and BRA unit = 4,000 x 9 = 36,000 FMS legal coordinator = 1,500 x 9 = 13,500	ONS	171,500
			Consultation meetings and capacity building workshops/travel (substantively supported by UNTMIS) \$ 50,000	ONS	
Sub-output 1.2 The SSOs in coordination with ONS will implement people centred state security strategies	Nationwide but concentrating on FMS security	1.2.1 SSO directors develop affordable plans to the implementation of the state security strategies with a <u>comprehensive M&E</u> platform that facilitate the implementation of the SSDP and the NTP. BRA administration engages in threat	SSO Directors 5 x 4000 for 9 months = 180,000 SSO WPS coordinators 5 x 1500 9 months = 67,500 (important for the gender marker)	ONS	247,500



that are affordable and sustainable	development.	assessments and strategic planning for Banadir.			
		The SSOs are responsible for security coordination, policy and act as secretariat for the (yet to be established) the State Security Councils. BRA administration is responsible for Mogadishu security.	FGS-FMS coordination platform enables mutual meeting and consultation between FGS and FMS in kind from UNTMIS (this would be covered also by left over funds from BASIS year 1 – to be determined).		In-kind
		1.2.2 Continued work on affordability. Future police deployment, in particular in NRAs and the composition of security in the FMS is drafted and planned for short- and mid-term aligned with the NSArch.	Affordability (DCAF) = 55,000\$ Could be mobilised from different source than SJF	UNDP	55,000
1.3 Security institutions integrate climate change threats into security planning and response	ONS and SSOs	1.3.1 Climate Change and Security Strategy formulated including response mechanisms for security forces (a joint endeavour with UNTMIS climate advisor and UNDP Resilience and Climate Change). The framework is developed first in Galmudug state, using adaptation for conflict prevention through local dialogue.	Climate Change and Security Advisor 4,000 x 9 = 36,000	ONS	106,000
			Annual Climate Change and Security Conference and capacity building workshops in the FGS and FMS 30,000		
			EIP who have a track record in Galmudug and in this work, support to ONS and Galmudug State for strategic development and support to climate security and adaption modelling (40,000).	UNDP	
Total budget output 1					565,000



Output 2: Democratic oversight of the security sector is strengthened in the Federal Member States (no salaries)					
2.1 Inclusive dialogue platforms are established and maintained support state security planning	FMS	2.1.1 The MOIS plays a crucial role in Federal and FMS Institutional Development for improved police deployment. MOIS FGS continues to support the FMS ministries to plan longer term for improve security across the FMS (joint effort with UNTMIS Police section and JPP)	MOIS FGS Institutional and capacity building advisor supporting implementation of MOIS strategic plans 3,800 x 9 = 34,200 Travel and MOIS/FGS conference 15,000\$	MOIS FGS	49,200
		2.1.2 MOIS at FMS levels in collaboration with SSOs are able to reach 'hot-spot' communities to plan for improved security, in particular through improved police deployment and community security.	MOIS FMS teams revisit communities to do security snapshots. Four teams in the FMS for 3 months (or part time 6 months) = 35,000 Travel 30,000 (for light snapshots in previously visited communities).		65,000
2.2 Security Actors accountability frameworks are strengthened	Nationwide	2.2.1 Preparations to produce an accountability framework for armed actors and enhancing community oversight over the security forces.	Capacity building, consultations, workshops leading to agreements on a path forward to increase security oversight and accountability. 30,000\$ (plus in-kind from UNTMIS)	ONS UNTMIS SSR/DDR	15,000



2.3 Women's priorities and participation in security sector development is increased	Nationwide	2.3.1 Recruitment strategies enhanced, and policies enacted for improved conditions for women in the security sector. Assessment on number of women in the security sector from 2021 is updated.	Consultation workshops, awareness and outreach 15,000\$	ONS with UNDP/ UNTMIS	15,000
Total budget output 2					144,200
Total programmable budget Output 1- 2 (without GMS and banking fees)					709,200
Project Implementation					
Sub-outputs	Location	Activities	Responsible Party	Total USD Including direct project costs and bank charges	
Project Management	Country-wide	Project Manager ¹	UNDP	30,000	
	Country-wide	Administrative Officer NPSA 8	UNDP	28,272	
	Country wide	SSR Advisor	UNDP	40,000	
	Int. /country wide	Travel budget of project team	UNDP	7,710	
MEL	Country wide	Monitoring and Evaluation and Learning budget (knowledge products)	UNDP	5,000	
	Countrywide	Evaluation and recommendations (future programming)	UNDP	30,000	

¹ Note: An interim caretaker within the UNDP team will handle this, and these are token contributions to the efforts.



Oversight	Countrywide	HACT, Audit, financial spot checks, TPM (only for ONS as the MOISs can be done via JPP)	UNDP	5,000
	Countrywide	Common Services (mandatory)	UNDP	15,000
DPC				114,507
Bank Charges				10,638
UNDP General Management Services GMS 7%				69,673
Total Project Implementation				355,800
Total Project Budget				1,065,000