

**SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PEACEBUILDING FUND
PROJECT DOCUMENT TEMPLATE**
(Official version of the project proposal)



United Nations
Peacebuilding

PBF PROJECT DOCUMENT

Country (ies): Montenegro	
Project Title: Fostering dialogue and social cohesion in and between Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Montenegro and Serbia (Dialogue for the Future) ¹	
Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway (if existing project):	
PBF project modality: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IRF <input type="checkbox"/> PRF	If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund: <input type="checkbox"/> Country Trust Fund <input type="checkbox"/> Regional Trust Fund Name of Recipient Fund:
List all direct project recipient organizations (starting with Convening Agency), followed type of organization (UN, CSO etc.): UNDP, UNICEF and UNESCO	
List additional implementing partners, Governmental and non-Governmental:	
Expected project commencement date²: 1 November 2018	
Project duration in months:³ 18 months	
Geographic zones for project implementation: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia	
Does the project fall under one of the specific PBF priority windows below: <input type="checkbox"/> Gender promotion initiative <input type="checkbox"/> Youth promotion initiative <input type="checkbox"/> Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cross-border or regional project	
Total PBF approved project budget* (by recipient organization): UNDP: \$ 375,019.47 UNICEF: \$283,550.00 UNESCO: \$287,765.80 Total: \$ 946,335.27	

¹ While Croatia is not officially part of the project, cooperation with relevant national counterparts in Croatia remains a project priority and will continue to be sought throughout the implementation inception. The joint activities envisaged in this project document remain relevant, however they will be revised accordingly to reflect direct implementation participation by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia; along with the corresponding budgets should it be necessary, in January 2019.

² Note: actual commencement date will be the date of first funds transfer.

³ Maximum project duration for IRF projects is 18 months, for PRF projects – 36 months.

**The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSO's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account*

Any other existing funding for the project (amount and source):

Project total budget:

PBF 1st tranche:	PBF 2nd tranche*:	PBF 3rd tranche*:	_____ tranche
UNDP: \$262,513.63	UNDP: \$112,505.84	XXXX: \$ XXXXXX	XXXX: \$ XXXXXX
UNICEF: \$198,485.00	UNICEF: \$ 85,065.00	XXXX: \$ XXXXXX	XXXX: \$ XXXXXX
UNESCO: \$ 201,436.06	UNESCO: \$86,329.74	XXXX: \$ XXXXXX	XXXX: \$ XXXXXX
Total: \$662,434.69	Total: \$ 283,900.59	Total:	Total:

Two-three sentences with a brief project description and succinct explanation of how the project is time sensitive, catalytic and risk-tolerant/ innovative:

This multi-country programme aims to address diminishing trust among different peoples in and between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia by providing structured opportunities for dialogue, action and policy recommendations on common social cohesion priorities, all the while promoting cross-cultural understanding and stronger civic engagement. Engagement with relevant counterparts in Croatia will be sought during the implementation with the aim of the expanding the cooperation within the initiative to Croatia as well.

Summarize the in-country project consultation and endorsement process prior to submission to PBSO, including through any PBF Steering Committee where it exists:

Following their leadership and successful implementation of the joint Dialogue for the Future initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the BiH Presidency initiated discussions to foster regional dialogue on its basis. The Presidency briefed on the initiative during the "Brdo-Brijuni" summit in 2015, and subsequently started developing a common framework with the UN HQ and BiH UNCT. Following up, the RUNOs in four partner countries held numerous online consultations and two consultative meetings in Sarajevo, in May (facilitated by PeaceNexus) and July 2018, respectively, to agree on various elements of the multi-country programme. Additionally, representatives of youth organizations from four partner countries were gathered for a dedicated meeting in July 2018 to offer their views on the planned intervention and activities of the programme. Offices of the Presidency in each partner country were briefed by the BiH Presidency Advisers, and by the UN on the content of the programme and received an electronic draft for comments in August.

Project Gender Marker score: 2 ⁴

Specify % and \$ of total project budget allocated to activities in direct pursuit of gender equality and women's empowerment.

Project Risk Marker score: 1 ⁵

⁴ **Score 3** for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective

Score 2 for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective

Score 1 for projects that contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly (less than 15% of budget)

⁵ **Risk marker 0** = low risk to achieving outcomes

Risk marker 1 = medium risk to achieving outcomes

Risk marker 2 = high risk to achieving outcomes

Select PBF Focus Areas which best summarizes the focus of the project (select ONLY one): 2.1⁶

If applicable, UNDAF outcome(s) to which the project contributes:

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Outcome 2: By 2019, BiH consolidates and strengthens mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflicts, reconciliation, respect for diversity and community security⁷.

Montenegro: Outcome 1: By 2021, a people-centered accountable, transparent and effective judiciary, Parliament, public administration and independent institutions ensure security, equal access to justice and quality services for all people

Serbia: Outcome 1: By 2020, people in Serbia, especially vulnerable groups, have their human rights protected and have improved access to justice and security and

Outcome 5: By 2020, an efficient education system is established that enables relevant, quality, inclusive and equitable education to all, particularly the most vulnerable, and increases learning and social outcomes.

Outcome 9: By 2020, Serbia has inclusive policies ensuring an enhanced cultural industries sector, promoting cultural diversity and managing cultural and natural heritage as a vehicle for sustainable development

If applicable, Sustainable Development Goal to which the project contributes: SDGs 4, 5, 11, 16, 17

Type of submission:

- New project
 Project amendment

If it is a project amendment, select all changes that apply and provide a brief justification:

Extension of duration: Additional duration in months:

Change of project outcome/ scope:

Change of budget allocation between outcomes or budget categories of more than 15%:

Additional PBF budget: Additional amount by recipient organization: USD XXXXX

Brief justification for amendment:

⁶ PBF Focus Areas are:


(1.1) SSR, (1.2) Rule of Law; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;
(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management;
(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services
(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3) Governance of peacebuilding resources (including PBF Secretariats)

⁷ The UNDAF has been officially extended until 2020.


PROJECT SIGNATURES:

Representatives of United Nations


Ms. Sezin Simanoglu
United Nations Resident Coordinator
in Bosnia and Herzegovina




Ms. Fiona McCluney
United Nations Resident Coordinator
in Montenegro



Ms. Karla Robin Hershey
United Nations Resident Coordinator
in Serbia




 ilding Support Office (PBSO)

 *Mr. Oscar Fernandez-Turanco*
Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support
Date & Seal


POTPISI NA PROJEKTU:

Predstavnici Ujedinjenih nacija


Gđa. Sezin Sinanoglu
Rezidentna koordinatorica Ujedinjenih nacija u
Bosni i Hercegovini



Gđa. Fiona McCluney
Rezidentna koordinatorica Ujedinjenih nacija u
Crnoj Gori



Gđa. Karla Robin Hershey
Rezidentna koordinatorica Ujedinjenih nacija u
Srbiji



podršku izgradnji mira (PBSO)

jes 
Pomoćnik generalnog sekretara za podršku izgradnji mira
Datum i pečat

Recipient UN Organizations

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Mr. Sukhrob Khoshmukhamedov
UNDP Resident Representative ad interim

Ms. Geeta Narayan
UNICEF Representative

Mr. Siniša Šešum
Head of Antenna Office in Sarajevo
UNESCO Regional Office of Science and Culture in Europe

Date & Seal

Montenegro

Mr. Ozurba Mikhajlovi Khogali
UNICEF Representative

Mr. Siniša Šešum

Mr. Siniša Šešum
Head of Antenna Office in Sarajevo
UNESCO Regional Office of Science and Culture
in Europe

Date & Seal

Republic of Serbia




Ms. Regina de Dominicis
UNICEF Representative

Ms. Steliana Nclera
UNDP Resident Representative ad interim

Mr. Siniša Šešum
Head of Antenna Office in Sarajevo
UNESCO Regional Office of Science and Culture in Europe

Date & Seal

Organizacije UN-a koje primaju sredstva

Bosna i Hercegovina	
<p>G. Sukhrob Khoshmukhamedov Ad interim rezidentni predstavnik UNDP-a</p> <p>Gđa. Geeta Narayan Predstavica UNICEF-a</p> <p>G. Siniša Šešum Šef Antena ureda u Sarajevu Regionalni ured za nauku i kulturu u Evropi UNESCO-a</p> <p>Datum i pečat</p>	  
Crna Gora	Republika Srbija
<p>G. Oskara Marković Khogali Predstavnik UNICEF-a</p> <p>G. Miodrag Dragišić Pomoćnik rezidentnog predstavnika UNDP-a</p> <p>G. Siniša Šešum II Šef Antena ureda u Sarajevu Regionalni ured za nauku i kulturu u Evropi UNESCO-a</p> <p>Datum i pečat</p>	<p>Gđa. Regina de Dominicis Predstavica UNICEF-a</p> <p>Gđa. Steliana Nedera Ad interim rezidentna predstavica UNDP-a</p> <p>G. Siniša Šešum Šef Antena ureda u Sarajevu Regionalni ured za nauku i kulturu u Evropi UNESCO-a</p> <p>Datum i pečat</p>

I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support (4 pages max)

- a) A brief summary of **context analysis findings** as they relate to this project, focusing on the driving factors of tensions/conflict that the project aims to address and an analysis of the main actors/ stakeholders that have an impact on or are impacted by the driving factors, which the project will aim to engage. This analysis must be gender- and age- sensitive.

Although they are independent, sovereign countries following their own policies and perspectives, the stability, security and overall status of the different communities living in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) remains closely intertwined with that of the Republic of Croatia, Montenegro and Republic of Serbia. Current relations between political leaders and their citizens; between political leaders themselves; and between citizens and communities of these countries directly contributes to the regional⁸ mood -- be they constructive and forward-looking, or regressive and negative. The latter impeding the efforts of countries in making a clean break from the conflicts of the 1990s.

Due to BiH's geographic position in the Western Balkans; its complex demographic structure and (in recent history) challenging political dynamics, inter-communal tensions and trends echo the loudest across this particular country, especially so when they are imported from the outside. They also often yield the strongest reactions, which in turn loop back to affect the region. In short, BiH is a central element in the peace and security equation in the Western Balkans which directly impacts the state of regional cohesion, its stability and progressive development.

The current reality is that – due to a broad array of its own internal, but also regional, dynamics and factors – relations between BiH and its neighbors remain fluid and can easily and quickly turn toward the negative. The social fabric within and between communities and countries remains fragile, not allowing for a durable peace and reconciliation, to settle across the region. An on-going narrative and rhetoric of division, mistrust and fear perpetuated by various public and dominantly male elected figures and media organizations contributes to low levels of inter-group trust; weak people-to-people cooperation and interrupted, fractured or even negative dialogue. The region lacks sufficient, structurally embedded, opportunities for cooperation, especially among the youth; there is an overall lack of skills and attitudes that allow for the appreciation of diversity and understanding of others; there is a wide-spread lack of trust toward official structures, institutions and leaders. Trust-building and regional cooperation narratives are seldomly used in any official political platforms, even at the highest levels.

This environment particularly affects the sentiments of young people who (unlike their parents) lack the experience of living in a period of peace progression, stability and tolerance. They have little exposure to positive interaction, dialogue and collaboration with people of different backgrounds. Increasingly, young people opt to migrate out of the region rather than remain and work to build a better future within their countries and communities.

⁸ In the context of this programme, the word regional implies the four participating countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia.

Many experts agree that without something deeper than mere coexistence 23 years after the end of hostilities, peace *within* BiH, and *between* BiH and its neighboring states will remain fragile: A “negative peace” characterized simply by the absence of direct violence, embed across all segments of said society(es). Today’s dynamics impacting these four countries underscore that this is an inadequate environment for consolidating and building trust, mutual understanding, stability and constructive opportunities.

One manner of addressing this challenge is to strengthen the social cohesion between different communities and groups. For social cohesion – with its emphasis on trust between people and institutions, acceptance and respect of cultural and gender diversity, civic participation and common good – defines the quality of coexistence in a given area. In turn, social cohesion affects reconciliation efforts such that higher levels of social cohesion will lead to a higher propensity for reconciliation.⁹ That is, unless today’s persisting social divides are bridged and communities are able to interact constructively, the region’s citizens will continue to live side by side, often governed by mistrust and fear, BUT continue to face same or similar issues and concerns, and diminished prospects of an overall positive, forward-leaning and stable future for BiH and its neighbors.

In sum, this state-of-affairs is driven by a reconciliation “deficit” which perpetuates lack of trust among citizens, communities and leaders; which, in turn, exacerbates social divides.

Reconciliation deficit. The dynamics playing out in BiH and the region over the past years underscore the threat which is posed by an incomplete process of, or insufficient attention dedicated to, reconciliation. 23 years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), rather than jointly working to heal the wounds of communities divided by the 1990s conflicts, the rhetoric and actions of many influential public figures and media organizations are still grounded in generating fear of, or hatred toward, other groups and peddling their “own” or “exclusive” version of the past, present and future. Ironically, as the region moves toward the EU, the mistrust and instability that has been generated for two decades, in essence, becomes the perpetual norm. Stereotypes continue to be reinforced; the notion of tolerance is continuously struck down; respect for others is greatly diminished; mutual understanding becomes much more difficult; and cultural diversity is more often portrayed as an anomaly of society, rather than enriching value to be safeguarded. The transitional justice process – largely defined by the verdicts of the ICTY in this region – was superimposed on communities of citizens who had not yet been given the support and space to come to terms with the events of the still recent past, and it’s still far from being completed. Meanwhile the international community spent two decades emphasizing the need for democratic processes (i.e. constitutional reform, elections, technical progress in the development and governance sectors), with insufficient attention to efforts supporting “stitching back” of the social fabric in BiH and in the region.

Thus, what has been significantly absent is the vital “restorative” forms of post-conflict efforts that contribute to healing, trust-building, increased collaboration, communication and stability. In this regard, BiH, Republic of Croatia, Republic of Serbia and, to a slightly less vocal extent, Montenegro, suffer from a “reconciliation deficit.” This deficit impacts

⁹ Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index UNDP;
http://www.cy.undp.org/content/cyprus/en/home/operations/projects/action_for_cooperation_and_trust/social-cohesion-and-reconciliation--score--index-.html

political, social and cultural dynamics in the entire region: When relations deteriorate between Croatia and Serbia, they negatively affect and divide the respective communities in BiH. When relations between the latter two communities deteriorate in BiH, they place the former in challenging, unhelpful policy-making and diplomatic situations. Building up some common understanding of the past, the present and the future can diminish the ability of spoilers to sustain narratives of grievance, humiliation and nationalist chauvinism (which, taken together, feed into the broader sweep of populism). In addition, as many regional experts argue, a genuine reconciliation process – as complex and difficult as it may be – can serve as a safeguard against the radicalization of young people (of all ethnic backgrounds).

Lack of trust. Overwhelming empirical evidence, expert analysis and independent media reporting make it abundantly clear that country-specific and region-specific contested narratives and distortion of facts continue to strike at the heart of all reconciliation efforts aiming to rebuild security, stability and an overall more positive future inside BiH and within the region will continue to remain elusive. The rhetoric of mistrust, often employed by dominantly male select public figures and/or officials, continues to be a significant amplifier of division by generating content and/or policies that exacerbate communal grievances and perpetuate tensions. Often attempts to address grievances are blocked by the same stakeholders that cite them in the first place.

New generations of citizens of BiH, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia are growing up in largely homogenous communities that are often polarized because of long-term exposure to negative rhetoric. They now have little trust toward, or knowledge and understanding of, those groups with different backgrounds. They are less comfortable with the notion of social diversity. They also reflect very low levels of participation in activities involving other groups and other countries.¹⁰ Critically, they are impacted by stereotypes passed from the negative rhetoric of one generation to another.¹¹ Of great concern is the fact that they remain highly susceptible to the negative/divisive narratives so that fear of other communities can be generated with relatively little effort.

Division and mistrust continue to be reinforced by carefully orchestrated media campaigns.¹² Conflict-affected citizens, in many instances forcibly separated into homogenous groups, continue to be exposed to the coverage of nationalist-driven media, highly influenced and dependent on political elites. These media organizations are one of the main vehicles that propagate the afore-mentioned narratives of mistrust in the midst of the peacebuilding efforts in BiH and the region.

Education systems contribute to this dynamic extensively as well. Twenty-three years of current practices demonstrates that the state of education in the region has done little to advance stability, inter-group trust and increased dialogue among and within BiH and its neighboring countries. Thus, addressing its deficiencies is not a choice but a necessity. The quality of education will be one of the determinants regarding how constructively the region

¹⁰ EU-UNDP Research on Socio-Economic Perceptions of Youth in BiH (2016) shows that “A quite high percentage of 88.7% of young people stated that, in the last 12 months, they had not taken part in any activities and projects aimed at fostering cooperation with young people from other countries, 3.3% state that they participated in activities with young people from other countries in the region.”

¹¹ Learning from Reconciliation Initiatives in the Western Balkans; UNDP/DPA/CEDEM; July 2015.

¹² Mark Thompson, *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina* (UK: University of Luton Press, 1999).

will learn to deal with the past and focus on a positive future; and how to combat the stereotypes and tensions generated by the conflicts and over 20 years of negative political and media rhetoric and narratives. In post-conflict BiH, for example, the roofs, walls and windows of the country's schools have been repaired but the content of textbooks and academic curriculums remain supremely politicized. Thus, BiH's citizens are essentially being pulled apart from the most formative years of their lives as they are subjected to identity wars via various curricula. In the process, negative stereotypes are reinforced and space for interaction across divides is not encouraged. A thoroughly nationalized and politicized educational system, in effect, delegitimizes the notion of a shared feeling of being 'a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina' together with other children of other nationalities." Thus, in the broadest terms, education is a vital reference point when it comes to bolstering the overall development of trust and tolerance in the region.

Social polarization/divisions. Following the 1990s conflicts, BiH's citizens typically invoke the word "suživot" (coexistence): i.e. there are no deep-seated problems; the fighting is over, but relationships have changed. This sentiment echoes across the neighboring countries as well: The once multi-national and multi-ethnic fabric of the region is now represented by a growing number of mono-national communities that increasingly look inward, that perpetuate stereotypes and diminish the notion for mutual understanding.

Even though the cessation of hostilities marked a decisive step in transforming the 1990s conflicts, sustaining the subsequent peace depended on the continuous addressing of other dynamics that threaten security, stability and that undermine efforts to diminish polarization and division between formerly warring communities. Analysts report that education has become the space of influence for political agendas... separating students according to ethnicity [nationality] as well as developing teaching strategies insisting on themes of collective guilt and blaming the other..."¹³ Furthermore, the appropriation of culture to exacerbate division and polarization was one of the most critical components of the conflict in the region. Lack of awareness and respect for diversity and richness of culture in the Western Balkans is a threat that knows no borders, highlighting the vulnerability of all societies today to the challenges of intolerance, hatred, fear and division. Broadly speaking, culture served as a tool for identity-building projects that often-stressed differences in oppositional/conflict context terms and were based on "us vs. them" narratives. To this day it remains an insufficiently addressed social cohesion issue. This peacebuilding initiative strives to respond with opportunities for civic engagement and for strengthening skills for tolerant intercultural dialogue.

For years following the cessation of hostilities, independent media organizations were slow to make positive, impactful changes because they could not place themselves to effectively compete with the old, nationalist media sources. Many peacebuilding stakeholders conclude (based on a broad body of research) that when presented with options, citizens would choose objective media coverage and positive narratives over biased coverage and negative narratives. The success of the nationalist-based media – both traditional and now, social – in generating negative dynamics that continue to define the post-conflict landscape challenges the above-mentioned assumption.¹⁴ Thus, in 2018, propaganda-based media organizations and

¹³ Learning from Reconciliation Initiatives in the Western Balkans.

¹⁴ Education about media and information is considered a fundamental skill for citizens in the twenty-first century by UNESCO ("New generations have to learn to be "explorers, analysts and creators (NB of the media content, in particular digital)" all at the same time", says Divina Frau-Meigs) UNESCO Courier September

systems with vitriolic and inciteful text or language continue to contribute to the polarization of communities in BiH and the region across political, religious and/or nationality lines. Today, it is clear that this dynamic is not being sufficiently counterbalanced by the plurality of other voices including objective-based content or peace/positive-promoting stories.

At the institutional level, social divides are perhaps best visible with the citizens' perceptions of the lack of inclusiveness in decision-making and lack of trust toward their governance institutions. Their own apathy stems from disillusionment and the overall sense that their voices don't make any difference. This is an extremely revealing dynamic which reflects the divide between citizens and their leaders. The latest regional data (RCC Barometer 2017¹⁵) shows that 45% of the population do not even discuss government decisions amongst themselves; only 3% participate in public debates, 5% comment on government decisions on the social media; and 8% protest. When asked why they aren't actively involved in these processes, 23% said they do not care about it at all, while 47% state an overwhelming sensation that an individual cannot influence decisions made by government(s). There is a worrying lack of trust in the institutions across the board (with e.g. parliaments being perceived as the least trusted institution regionally). However, positive inclination is that regional cooperation enjoys support with 73% of people agreeing that it can contribute to political, economic or security situation in their society.

Taken together, the aforementioned reconciliation, trust and social divide challenges largely serve to amplify radicalization, chauvinism, intolerance, disrespect towards diversity and negative rhetoric (the latter most vividly exhibited on social media and online spaces).

Three groups of critical stakeholders greatly impacted by the above described dynamics are: (i) youth; (ii) their highest-elected decision makers; and (iii) "opinion makers." All of them possess the potential to positively or negatively influence peace in the region, with women in particular - across all of the groups- holding a pivotal role which still needs to be embed in all levels of interventions addressing described impediments.

Youth. The heretofore described context affects the sentiments of young people in particular¹⁶. They have little exposure to positive interaction, dialogue and collaboration with people of different backgrounds. A study conducted among youth in BiH showed very low levels of participation in activities involving other groups and other countries.¹⁷ Critically, they are impacted by stereotypes passed from the negative rhetoric of one generation to another.¹⁸ The 'Western Balkans Labor Market Trends Report 2017', produced by the World Bank and the WIIW research institute highlights that youth, women and the low-educated are among the worst affected labor market participants and have high inactivity rates. According to the World Bank's SEE Regular Economic Report, nearly 25% of the

2017: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002523/252318e.pdf>

¹⁵ Regional Cooperation Council Balkan Barometer 2017:

https://www.rcc.int/seeds/files/RCC_BalkanBarometer_PublicOpinion_2017.pdf

¹⁶ Defined for the purposes of this intervention within the scope of adolescents (14-18 y/a) and youth (18-30 y/a), in accordance with UNICEF standards and official youth strategies of the participating countries.

¹⁷ EU-UNDP Research on Socio-Economic Perceptions of Youth in BiH (2016) shows that "A quite high percentage of 88.7% of young people stated that, in the last 12 months, they had not taken part in any activities and projects aimed at fostering cooperation with young people from other countries. 3.3% state that they participated in activities with young people from other countries in the region."

¹⁸ Learning from Reconciliation Initiatives in the Western Balkans: UNDP/DPA/CEDEM; July 2015.

region's young people are inactive, meaning they are not in employment, education, or training. High youth unemployment varies across the region: Montenegro having among the lowest rates and BiH among the highest.¹⁹ A comparative overview of youth studies in the Western Balkans²⁰ shows that youth (ages 15-29) have the highest trust in family and friends, while they generally do not trust those from neighboring countries, or persons of different ethnic background living in the country. Similarly, people of different religious or political beliefs earn very low trust in all countries included in the overview.

Furthermore, there has been a steady trend of diminishing rates of political participation among citizens in general and youth in particular through voting in elections and political party memberships. This is particularly worrying for youth, because their disengagement can endanger the future of political systems, especially in SEE countries, which are characterized by unfinished democratic consolidation. The most common reason stated for the lack of active involvement – especially by youth – in government decision-making in BiH, Montenegro, Serbia is an overwhelming sentiment that an individual cannot influence decisions made by government (reason stated by 47% of those who are actively involved). On average, only 28.6 per cent of youth have voted in elections in which they were eligible to vote²¹.

Given all the above, young people opt to migrate out of these countries rather than remain and work to build a better future within their communities and the region.

Nevertheless, an important cadre of youth leaders is still present here and they are organized and often connected with similar circles of likeminded people. They represent a key partner in this intervention, one which could act as a vehicle to reach the inactive, disillusioned, unorganized and “un-networked” young people;²² to especially reach those who are susceptible to negative influences and who feel disengaged. Moreover, this peacebuilding initiative aims to especially reach and connect young people (with a strong focus on young women) who are NOT politically affiliated, in order to establish a broad-based, inclusive regional platform. One of the tools available in the region to engage with a wider cross-section of youth is u-Report, an online polling tool for young people, already operational in Montenegro, Albania, and Kosovo²³ and to be launched in BiH in October 2018. U-Report provides real-time data on the views/opinions of young people, which can be disaggregated by age, location, and sex, and used to inform advocacy and decision-making.

This multi-country programme is designed at a moment when the UN Member States are reaffirming and recognizing²⁴ the young people’s leadership role around the world as innovators and agents of change; as insider mediators, as “society shapers.” There is now

¹⁹ Youth challenges and opportunities in the Western Balkans, European Parliament, Briefing Note, 2017

²⁰ The Excluded Generation: Youth in Southeast Europe, a comparative overview of youth survey findings between conducted by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung between 2011 and 2015. The full report is available at: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sarajevo/13780.pdf>

²¹ The Excluded Generation: Youth in Southeast Europe; available at: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sarajevo/13780.pdf>

²² This was confirmed during the Regional youth consultations, organized in July 2018 in Sarajevo, for the purpose of developing this particular project proposal; youth participants were representatives of national youth councils from all four countries.

²³ All references to Kosovo are made in the context of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)

²⁴ This recognition has been cemented in the ground-breaking UN Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security, as well as re-affirmed in the UN RES 2282 on the Review of UN Peacebuilding Architecture, as well as the September 2018 launch of the new UN Youth Strategy and Generation Unlimited.

strong momentum to ensure that their contributions be actively solicited, supported and regarded as part of building peaceful communities and healthy democratic governance and transition: “young people’s participation promotes civic engagement and active citizenship”²⁵

Decision-makers. As described above, all the critical stakeholders have been identified as those with potential for more ‘negative’ or more ‘positive’ influence. While most of the analysis focus on rather negative connotations, there is a positive force at hand, which this initiative builds upon. In 2012 the BiH Presidency initiated discussions with the UN Secretary General, resulting in the Dialogue for the Future BiH initiative. In 2015, the leaders of the region agreed to a set of conclusions stemming from the Brdo-Bijuni Summit²⁶ held in Budva, Montenegro which, among other points, recognized “the Dialogue for the Future project and encourage the expanding it to the South East Europe.” In essence, they recognized the intertwined needs that the BiH Presidency initiative was aiming to address and supported elevating this peacebuilding effort up to the regional level. The core aspirational goal of the initiative’s Dialogue Platform Declaration is “to increase the focus on regional cooperation and reconciliation...” and to have “neighboring countries accept a proactive approach to reconciliation and confidence building.” In this regard, this multi-country phase of the *Dialogue for the Future* (DFF) peacebuilding project proffers the Offices of the Presidency a concrete realization of the aforementioned 2015 leadership conclusion. It also provides the Presidents of BiH, Republic of Croatia, Montenegro and Republic of Serbia the platform to be able to put forth many of the official statements and moves that they have recently made e.g. In January 2018 as the Croatian President visited the Ahmici memorial in BiH, she stressed that “We need to think about the past, but also about the future of good relations...I wish to build peace and friendship with neighboring states. There is no country with which this is more necessary than with BiH.” At the 8 May UN Security Council session on BiH, Croatia’s official statement underscored that “a stable, peaceful and united Bosnia-Herzegovina... is a generator of stability of South-Eastern Europe and beyond... Croatia bears special responsibility toward the well-being of Bosnia-Herzegovina... It is our partner whom we wholeheartedly support in building a better future for its citizens.”

Likewise, the recent visits of the President of Serbia to Sarajevo and Zagreb twinned with the statements about the need for more dialogue between peoples have been injecting much-needed positive dynamics in a region fighting the growing tide of the rhetoric of division and fear. In September 2017, he noted that “it is very important that we [Serbia and BiH] speak; it is important for our states and for our people... that which divides us at the moment are questions from the past... but it’s the future that connects us.” At the May 2018 UN Security Council session on BiH, Serbia’s official statement stressed that it is “convinced that political dialogue at all levels with Bosnia-Herzegovina is of particular importance for the

²⁵ UN’s Guiding Principles on Young People’s Participation in Peacebuilding: <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/guiding-principles-on-young-peoples-participation-in-peacebuildi.html>

²⁶ The Brdo-Brijuni Process was held for the first time in 2013 at the initiative of the Presidents of the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia. The initiative was named “Brdo-Brijuni Process” because of the shared idea of both Presidents for its organization: Brdo deriving from Brdo pri Kranju, where the first meeting of regional leaders was held; and Brijuni, in honor of the co-organizer and partner in the making of this initiative, the Republic of Croatia. The main aim of the initiators of the Brdo-Brijuni Process, the Presidents of the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia, is European integration of the countries in the region and stabilization of the situation in the Western Balkans through strengthening regional cooperation and overcoming outstanding issues.

development of all around relations... We are aware of the need to strengthen regional efforts in order to bring people together... We are joined in our common endeavors with Bosnia-Herzegovina also by our common aspiration to join the EU... By common will and joint efforts, we can make our relations catalytic to the process of regional rapprochement and good neighborliness.”

In November 2017, the then Bosnian Croat Chairman of the tripartite BiH Presidency declared that the task of reconciliation is the responsibility of the politicians and the political institutions to carry out. The Bosniak member of the BiH Presidency and current Chairman has previously noted that "We have only one path ... this is the path of integration, unification, reconciliation, cooperation and dialogue." In March 2018, the Bosnian Serb member of the BiH Presidency mentioned the Dialogue for the Future project as a particularly successful example of constructive cooperation between BiH and the UN and which has yielded important contributions toward reconciliation. In this regard, the March 2018 trilateral meeting between BiH, Croatia and Serbia's Presidents in Mostar – the first such meeting of the Presidents in six years – is a very positive development given the current climate.

During his March 2017 visit to BiH, the President of Montenegro touched on the need for stronger social cohesion in the region by noting that relations “toward the future” would have to be “built up” and with “joint engagement we better those relations.”

Such gestures, statements and moves are much needed belated steps toward a genuine and durable peace, trust and stability in BiH and the Western Balkans. In essence, they evoke the very spirit of the proactive approach to reconciliation and confidence building described in the DFF's dialogue declaration as well as the intent of the leaders who supported DFF at the 2015 Brdo-Brijuni Summit. The main thrust of the multi-country peacebuilding initiative directly speaks to these actions and statements.

For if divisions between communities and states continue to grow in this region, the responsibilities for the Offices of the Presidency to concretely address the concerns of their citizens by fostering an environment which enables security, stability and greater opportunities will become exponentially difficult. The highest-elected political leaders in the region are the most influential in ensuring commitment to meaningfully positive relations between their people, in-country and across the region. They are also best placed to advocate that this commitment is fostered and aligned across all levels of society.

Furthermore, research shows that as the number of women in parliament increases by 5%, a state is five times less likely to use violence when confronted with an international crisis (Caprioli, 2000). In this sense, the Offices of the Presidencies and fellow female politicians are a crucial partner in DFF. Their support will be crucial in engaging relevant ministries and institutions (e.g. those dealing with education, culture, youth, human rights, gender and sports affairs) vis-à-vis the dialogue platform recommendations.

Opinion-makers: Stemming from the previously described analysis of the core issues and their implications on social cohesion and a durable peace in the region, “opinion makers” are the third critical category within this initiative. This is due to their role and influence as media representatives, societal role models, teachers and pedagogical staff in schools and members of CSOs that work on reconciliation, peacebuilding, governance, civic participation, engagement of youth, women, and vulnerable groups.

Findings from the Worlds of Journalism (WJS) study²⁷ reveal that journalists and editors in the Western Balkans perceive their roles to be broader than those in traditionally western societies. They subscribe to traditional journalism values but also argue that the media has a broad responsibility to contribute to enhance transitions of societies after longer periods of conflict. At the same time, their role and the environment on which they are reporting is becoming more complex: they report little trust in the institutions of society entrusted with the task of leading the countries through many issues of transitional justice, while at the same time the majority of leading media outlets contributes to generating negative dynamics; furthermore, the need for enabling space for independent and quality journalism is outlined at the same time as journalism studies across the region are turning towards more general communication studies. This is coupled with the overall lack of critical thinking about what is reported and with what quality. A recent regional report on media literacy and education needs²⁸ outlines the overall low levels of media literacy - as part of the education and knowledge of the general public – “which are not approached in a systematic and structured manner in any of the countries in the region.”²⁹ Hence, along with the media literacy capacity building for the core target group (youth), this initiative aims to catalyze the discussions with the media (including with the journalism students) on their accountability when reporting, and their overall role in ruling narratives.

Media editors and news anchors/presenters are seen especially as influencers, along with prominent individuals with substantive social media followings.³⁰ Their views reach significant numbers of people, often across all four countries; and they hold great influence around either promoting positive or negative messages related to the three identified core challenges. At the community-level, teachers and parents have a crucial influence on the knowledge, attitudes, practices of young people. The above-described dynamics in the education systems greatly affect their scope of work, framework and perceptions, which in turn spills over to the young people they are educating and raising. Finally, the grass-roots outreach and role of the CSOs working in the field (i.e. identified focus areas) cannot be understated. Despite the general perception that the civil sector in the region has become overly professionalized, their expertise in skill-building, their networks and influence need to be considered and built upon where appropriate. Some of the recent analysis³¹ provide a breakdown indicating that the significant financial attention to the NGO sector in the past two decades led to a so-called “post-conflict NGO colonization”, an environment characterized by multiple layers of smaller initiatives, unsustainable funding-driven efforts “mainly concentrated in the main cities, frequent doubling of efforts, a lot of copy-paste and a great lack of cooperation”, even more so- competition.³² However, the same analysis notes that

²⁷ Andresen et. al, *New roles for the media in the Western Balkans*, 2017

²⁸ *Media Literacy and Education Needs of Journalists and the Public in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia: Regional Report (March 2017)*; Centre for Independent Journalism

²⁹ 2018 Media Literacy Index found that countries on the first positions of the Media Literacy Index ranking tend to have higher levels of trust among people and studies have asserted the correlation of these indicators with democracy and well-being. The region is characterized by low levels of media literacy as indicated by the following rankings: Croatia: 44, Serbia 31, Montenegro 28 and BiH 25 (scoring from 0-100).

³⁰ Most recent concrete examples could be seen with the media coverage of Croatia's success at the FIFA World Cup; and subsequent prominent reactions at individual levels.

³¹ Including the *Learning from Reconciliation Initiatives in the Western Balkans*; UNDP/DPA/CEDEM; July 2015. Study which was heavily focused on CSO initiatives.

³² “Civil society in the region mostly is recognized as NGO sector. This sector, in its current form, did not exist before the conflict. They became one of the main carriers of the process of democratization in the respective

these organizations “are much more flexible and much closer to reality when compared to other structures; while dealing with many issues on different levels, and meeting different actors in doing so, CSOs are the most valuable connective tissue in this regard”.

For these reasons, these particular groups of influencers are seen more as partners to the initiative, thus, a combination of partnerships/engagement and dialogue with them would be sought throughout the proposed activities.

Gender Equality. In recent years, all four participating countries have taken steps to advance women’s rights. They have adopted or amended relevant legislation (for instance, criminal and labor laws), elaborated national strategies and action plans, and established institutional mechanisms to carry out and monitor the policies in the area. The dominance of nationalist politics and the myriad of transitional and post-conflict challenges in the Western Balkan countries have pushed issues of gender equality, the human rights of women and implementation of related legislation to the margins. Despite more than a decade of powerful and dedicated activity in civil society and significant organization on national and international stages, women have occupied few positions of formal decision-making authority in the various post-conflict contexts throughout the Western Balkans³³. According to a recent survey³⁴, gender-based violence, political participation and decision-making, lack of gender mainstreaming, gender stereotyping, and discrimination in the labor market have been recognized as the most pressing challenges women face in those countries. Women still lag behind men in the political and decision-making structures. Despite introducing affirmative measures (quota systems) in the parliaments around the region, women are still underrepresented. Political parties remain under the dominance of men, whereas in the public administrations, even when women are a majority in the system, they remain a minority in senior positions. This directly contributes to perpetuation of institutional social divides, even if they are nominally addressed (“on paper”). Lack of visible senior-level engagement of women, contributes to overall notion of lack of trust in women leadership, and de-motivates young women and girls in their attempts for formal societal efforts (i.e. even when active, most turn to civil society structures). On the other side of the coin, women in the Western Balkans have a pivotal traditional role in their families, and undeniable influence which still needs to transpire across all levels of interventions which address impediments to social cohesion. For this reason, a particular role for women related and focus will be ensured throughout the proposed dialogues. Furthermore, the project will ensure the rate of at least 50% for women’s participation in the overall distribution of approved projects within the Small Grants Facility as well as the participation rate of at least 50% for girls and young women in the skill building trainings. Using tools such as u-Report, the UN will generate sex-disaggregated data on issues to be covered by this project, such as social cohesion, empowerment/agency of different groups of citizens, and participation. It will also assess how these project interventions will impact women and men differently.

countries. Research has noted that NGOs usually are fund-oriented, and they become professional and bureaucratic structures. With strong support from international community, they became detached over time from the local environment. Consequently, they respond less to local needs and more to their own, sometimes personal, ones and to international requests. There is no strong cooperation among the NGOs, nor do they cooperate sufficiently with state institutions and national/local actors. This lack of cooperation seriously diminishes the effectiveness of the reconciliation process.”; *ibid*.

³³ Gender and Conflict in the Western Balkans, University of Birmingham, 2017

³⁴ Gender Issues in the Western Balkans, CSF Policy Paper no. 4, April 2018

- a) *A brief description of how the project aligns with/ supports existing UN and Government strategic frameworks, how it ensures national ownership and how the project complements/ builds on any other relevant interventions in this sector/area, including any lessons from previous PBF support.*

During his briefing to the General Assembly on 16 January 2018, the SG Antonio Guterres laid out 12 key areas of concern as Member States defined the UN's priorities. The Western Balkans are included in that list. The **Sustaining Peace** agenda of the UNSG and Member States directly aligns with the DFF peacebuilding initiative in the region.

Importantly, the multi-country programme directly links back to one of Secretary-General (SG) Ban Ki Moon's key messages from his July 2012 visit to the Western Balkans: That the UN still has an important role to play in a number of critical areas, one of them being **reconciliation**. During his visit to the region in January-February 2018, the SG's Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide also expressed his concern at the persistence of a serious **trust deficit** which is contributing to limited space for expression of clear commitments to reconciliation, in particular, in BiH.

The **first Dialogue for the Future (DFF)** peacebuilding project (2014-2016), initiated by the BiH Presidency, implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina and funded through the Peacebuilding Fund, ensured that: over 54,000 citizens were directly engaged through three Dialogue Platforms, Youth Forums, training seminars and activities, 43 projects were funded in all three project components (youth, education, culture), over 1 million people were reached through communication and outreach materials.

Learning from lessons in the first phase, the **current BiH joint programme (DFF II)**, through mid-2019) has a more streamlined approach, recognizing that institutional support at the local level is essential. The programme focuses on a specific geographic region (30 local administrations) that share an inter-entity or state border, have a significant returnee population, active civil society or have established avenues of cross-entity cooperation. Additionally, the joint programme supports targeted skill building for young opinion makers to ensure that they can lead dialogue platforms and be recognized as a contributor to positive change in the community.

The impetus for the current multi-country programme recognizes that persistent social divisions and negative dynamics within BiH continue to generate tensions that hamper progress toward stronger social cohesion, stability and genuine reconciliation among all populations across the region. The participants of the **Brdo-Brijuni Process/Summit** recognized the DFF project and encouraged its expansion into Southeast Europe within the adopted conclusions in June 2015.

As in the previous phases of BiH-only programme, **the multi-country DFF programme** will engage offices of the Presidency for their crucial role in promoting dialogue for visioning of the peaceful and sustainable future of the region and ensuring mitigation of intra-regional tensions. Presidents of the neighboring countries will be invited to join BiH Presidency in endorsing the *Dialogue Platform Declaration*, recognizing the role dialogue plays in preventing conflict and the crucial role of youth in shaping peaceful communities.

This joint multi-country programme is complementary to the European Commission's strategy for the Western Balkans (WB), especially as the EU has recognized the long-running

structural challenges around reconciliation. The **EU Western Balkans Strategy: a credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans**³⁵, adopted in February 2018, represents an important cohesive framework for the region. Reconciliation, good neighborly relations and regional cooperation are in focus. Within this process, the six WB countries established a *Regional Youth Cooperation Office for Western Balkans*³⁶ (RYCO), with the aim to „promote the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation between the youth in the region” through exchange. The joint programme will examine ways to cooperate with RYCO.

The multi-country DFF framework also provides the space for the UN to help ensure the full implementation of the **2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development** in BiH and the region. The leaders of BiH, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia all signed on to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; they are now accountable to deliver these goals to their citizens. The SDGs complement the goals of DFF as their fulfilment indirectly addresses many of the drivers and root causes of instability, negative dynamics and conflict. The SDGs combined with DFF’s dialogue platforms present an opportunity to help shift the public discourse in the Western Balkans away from the rhetoric of division toward an on-going dialogue around the common needs and aspirations of all citizens, irrespective of their backgrounds and states of origin. DFF may help the citizens of the region play a more active part in determining what kind of society and what kind of future they want to see for themselves and their communities via their leaderships. This project contributes to SDG 4: Quality Education, SDG 5: Gender Equality, SDG 11: Sustainable cities and communities, SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong institutions, and SDG 17: Partnerships.

UNDP’s Regional Programme on Local Democracy in the Western Balkans (ReLOAD), which has the overall objective to strengthen participatory democracies and the EU integration process in the Western Balkans by empowering civil society to actively take part in decision making and by stimulating and enabling legal and financial environment for civil society, is a congruent programme to this multi-country effort. This programme will explore synergies with ReLOAD, to take advantage of their focus on stronger civil society participation in decision-making.

Since 2004, UNESCO has been providing contact support to the **Council of Ministers of Culture of South East Europe (CoMoCoSEE)** within the framework of enhancing culture for sustainable development. It is the main cooperation platform for culture in South-East Europe. Its main purpose is to strengthen regional cooperation in the field of culture and development, while at the same time promoting culture as a tool for strengthening intercultural dialogue and reconciliation in the region. This platform will be useful in sharing lessons from the joint programme further.

In several countries around the region, UNICEF has implemented various innovative approaches to meaningfully engage young people including adolescents. **Youth Innovation Labs** are spaces for engaging young people, technologists, private sector, and civil society in problem solving. UNICEF has been working on ethical reporting on child rights and media literacy in all four countries nationally and sub-regionally, with considerable expertise. Additionally, UNICEF has developed **uReport**, an online polling and social messaging tool

³⁵ The full text of the Strategy is available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/eu-western-balkans-strategy-credible-enlargement-perspective_en

³⁶ <http://www.rycowb.org/>

that enables young people to speak out on development issues. Both the Innovation Labs and uReport will be scaled up in this programme.

II. Project content, strategic justification and implementation strategy (4 pages max Plus Results Framework Annex)

- a) A brief **description of the project content** – in a nutshell, what results is the project trying to achieve, and how does it aim to address the conflict analysis factors outlined in Section I (must be gender- and age- sensitive).

The programme’s focus argues for human rights, dignity, tolerance, mutual understanding and solidarity to be promoted through the joint work and education of the region’s citizens and young people in particular. In order for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region to build stronger insulation and resilience against instability and insecurity, current and future generations of citizens should be supported in constructive communication and interaction and enabled to work together in a way that is beneficial for all groups and all neighboring countries.

The context analysis factors identified above are integral to the concept of social cohesion, built around trust in people and in institutions, connectedness, social relations and focus on the common good. From the viewpoint of this programme, the social cohesion dimensions illustrated below will be the overarching conceptual framework.




Figure 1 Dimensions of Social Cohesion, Bertelsmann Foundation, 2015

Studies have found that social cohesion breaks down under various combinations of pressures. The absence of social cohesion is often a condition for conflict and violence. At the same time, conflict and violence impact the dynamics of social cohesion and fragmentation.³⁷ This programme will seek to impact various elements that improve social

³⁷ Religion, Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion in Conflict-affected Countries, Research Report, University of Denver, 2014

cohesion, specifically those that relate to trust in people and trust in institutions, greater acceptance of diversity, solidarity and helpfulness, civic participation.

- b) **Project result framework**, outlining all project results, outputs, activities with indicators of progress, baselines and targets (must be gender- and age- sensitive). Use **Annex B**; no need to provide additional narrative here.
- c) Provide a **project-level ‘theory of change’** – i.e. how do you expect these interventions to lead to results and why have these interventions been selected. Specify if any of these interventions are particularly risky.

This Theory of Change is informed by the *Reflecting on the Practice of Peace (RPP)* methodology and falls within the “healthy relationships and connections” whereby “peace emerges out of a process of breaking down isolation, polarization, division, prejudice and stereotypes between/among groups. According to People to People peacebuilding approach³⁸ - there is an assumed progression across a scale of healthy relationships which reasons:

Understand » Appreciate » Collaborate » Prefer to Peacefully Resolve

Moreover, this Programme is designed 25 years following the end of armed conflicts in the region, and our approach is based on addressing the outlined drivers that pertain to diminishing trust among various ethnic groups.

This programme posits the hypothesis that *if* members from different (ethnic) groups in the region, and especially youth, are sufficiently capacitated to engage in constructive dialogue and provided structured opportunities to identify social cohesion priorities and communicate them to their elected leaders and relevant institutions through dialogue platforms, and address them through joint projects and activities, *then* this will ensure broad-based participation and create partnerships across the four countries in pursuit of commonly identified priorities *because* skill-building for constructive dialogue, identification of common social cohesion priorities and joint action to address them will help break down barriers among various groups and help build a sense of connectedness and understanding, which are requisite in resilience to conflict.

To ensure maximum impact possible, institutional partners (Presidency offices, Governments and ministries, government agencies) will be actively engaged throughout the programme so that ownership of project results is sustained. Support for policy recommendations, arising from in-country and regional dialogue platforms, will be achieved through political diplomacy by the participating UN agencies and advocacy campaigns by civil society organizations and youth groups. A well-coordinated public outreach campaign and targeted engagement with media professionals will focus on enhancing media literacy and promoting objective and positive reporting. Therefore, *if* public institutions and media outlets promote and embrace content that reinforces greater social cohesion, *then* this will improve connectedness and enhance trust among various (ethnic) groups, ensuring institutional sustainability for proposed measures and offsetting negative media rhetoric, *because* changing individual and group perceptions of the other through dialogue, skill-building and joint problem solving, and removing institutional barriers to social cohesion through political

³⁸ Designing for Results. Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programmes

endorsement and policy change recommendations can contribute to durable peace and stability in the region.

- d) **Project implementation strategy** – explain how the project will undertake the activities to ensure most effective and efficient achievement of results, including justification for geographic zones, criteria for beneficiary selection, timing among various activities, coherence between results and any other information on implementation approach (must be gender- and age-sensitive). No need to repeat all outputs and activities from the Result Framework.

The multi-country proposal is derived from the second phase of the BiH-level *Dialogue for the Future* project and has the following overall goal: *Strengthened cross-country dialogue and reconciliation between different groups in and across BiH, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia.*

The following outcome and outputs have been identified:

Outcome: *Stability and trust in the region, and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are enhanced.*

Output 1.1. *Different groups in the region, and youth in particular, acquire and practice skills to help break stereotypes and constructively interact across divides.*

Output 1.2: *Citizens from different groups jointly identify and implement actions that can promote social cohesion in the region, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina.*

Output 1.3: *Policy recommendations to improve social cohesion in the region are effectively advocated for and endorsed by authorities and relevant stakeholders.*

Geographic scope. The programme will be implemented on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Republic of Serbia. Priority areas in the four participating countries may include BiH bordering communities.

Output 1.1. *Different groups in the countries of the region, and youth in particular, acquire and practice skills to help break stereotypes and constructively interact across divides.*

Activities under this Output aim to equip the relevant target groups with skills needed to engage constructively in the dialogue process and empower them to continue positive work in their communities.

Proposed activities:

- 1.1.1 Establish methodological framework to enhance capacity of each stakeholder group (adolescents, youth, women, teachers, media)

A team of experts (ensuring balanced representation of both sexes) will be engaged from the four participating countries to propose a methodological framework for capacitation activities planned under this joint programme. Participating UN agencies in the four countries will exchange information and content on available guidebooks and teaching material that can be

used to enhance capacities of both students and teachers in media and information literacy, culture of dialogue, critical thinking, advocacy and leadership, and prevention of discrimination and violence.

1.1.2 Enhance peacebuilding capacities of youth and adolescents

It is recognized that adolescence (10-18 years) represents a crucial developmental phase for any individual and that is why emphasis under this activity is placed on introducing streamlined modules that prevent threats driven by distorted interpretations of culture, hatred and ignorance; to disarm the process of radicalization (via focus on human rights and the rule of law). Adolescents (10-18) and youth (18-30) will receive targeted skill building to enable them to partake constructively in dialogue and decision-making processes, be active contributors to positive transformation in their communities, fight stereotypes and nourish acceptance of diversity. Skills-based training will facilitate gender responsiveness and will contribute to gender equality and fighting gender stereotyping in both teaching and learning. Particular emphasis will be placed on reaching out to unorganized and marginalized adolescents and youth through various channels, including youth networks and student council organizations in each country.

The selection criteria, when reaching out to adolescence representation, will depend on the selection of localities, for each country presumably, a different methodology, depending on the Joint Programme Board decision. Criteria for schools, regardless of the modality of selection of the localities, will aim at having the Call for Proposals for schools to participate, ensuring a good clustering of schools with the specified, country-specific criteria including diversity, gender-equality, geographical spread, and urban-rural ratio. The schools (primary and secondary) shall be encouraged, as public institutions, to engage actively in selection of their beneficiaries with the proposed criteria of providing evidence in prior participation on projects related to social cohesions, social inclusion, peacebuilding and youth empowerment. Alternatively, the schools and/or clusters of schools will be selected with the same criteria through the relevant Ministries of Education (the approach may vary from country to country). The pro-active approach to involvement of schools builds on the hypothesis and evidence from the field, that public institutions need a stronger engagement and ownership of the participation in the selection process aiming at the enhanced sustainability and replication of the capacity building activities in area of peacebuilding competencies. The selection process will also build on the existing Associated School Networks (ASPnet)³⁹ ensuring a certain percentage of schools across the region which already participate in this initiative. This process will be coordinated with the RYCO activities to maximise synergies.

1.1.3 Enhance peacebuilding capacities of women's groups

Particular focus will be placed on young women, who will be targeted with leadership and advocacy skills training, to empower them to be the leaders of change in their communities. The project activities will be shaped in line with the Secretary-General's Seven Point Action Plan on Gender Responsive Peacebuilding.⁴⁰ The aim is two-fold: (i) to increase the visibility

³⁹ The UNESCO Associated Schools Network (ASPnet) links educational institutions across the world around a common goal: to build the defences of peace in the minds of children and young people. The over 11,500 ASPnet member schools in 182 countries work in support of international understanding, peace, intercultural dialogue, sustainable development and quality education in practice.

⁴⁰ The Secretary-General's Seven Point Action Plan on Gender Responsive Peacebuilding is available here:

and recognition of women from marginalized communities as stakeholders in trust-building activities and as actors ('facilitators') who work toward peace and security; and, (ii) to raise awareness about strategies and practices to enhance the participation of women.

1.1.4 Enhancing capacities of teachers/trainers for promotion of cultural diversity, inter-cultural dialogue and tolerance

Across the four countries, primary and secondary school teachers will participate in learning seminars to enhance their skills in teaching media literacy, inter-modular civic education and Learning to Live Together concept. Additionally, primary and secondary schools will be provided with *World Heritage in Young Hands* kit, a teaching guide to sensitize young people to the importance of preserving their local, national and world heritage. Balanced representation of both sexes will be ensured.

1.1.5 Enhance capacities of media to promote media literacy and amplify positive storytelling

Narratives that may affect peace and stability in the region are being created in all countries targeted by the joint programme. The joint programme's area of geographic coverage can be considered a single communication space in which media, cultural and social media influence almost organically spills across borders. As negative narratives seem to attract cross-border attention more frequently than positive ones, participating UN agencies will work with journalists and editors in various media outlets in the region to promote media literacy and amplify positive storytelling, fighting biased and prejudicial reporting. Specific efforts will be made to promote media reporting that highlights the contributions of men and women to social cohesion and positive regional dynamics, ensuring balanced representation of both sexes among the beneficiaries.

Output 1.2: *Citizens from different groups jointly identify and implement actions that can promote social cohesion in the region, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina.*

Activities under this Output will ensure broad-based dialogue among various stakeholder groups, and especially youth, on social cohesion priorities in the region. Identified priorities will be translated into action through a Joint Call for Proposals (Small Grants Facility) to support cross-country partnerships and joint action on solutions. Additionally, dedicated grants will be available to mixed country youth teams who will seek innovative solutions to social cohesion challenges.

1.2.1 Organize in-country youth dialogues on social cohesion

Youth, as the central stakeholder group in the programme, will be provided opportunities to discuss various factors that impact social cohesion in their country and the region, identify their role in overcoming challenges and propose actionable solutions. Youth dialogues will pay particular attention on including unorganized and marginalized youth in the consultative process. The joint programme will seek to ensure equal participation of adolescent boys and

girls as well as young women and men (at least 50% of participating youth will be adolescent boys and girls). Youth dialogues will include dedicated sessions on social norms and stereotypes surrounding gender equality in their environments, and elicit actionable recommendations from engaged youth.

1.2.2 Organize in-country dialogue platforms on regional social divides and priorities

This programme recognizes that providing citizens with the proper space to voice their concerns is fundamental to the creation of a sustainable, socially cohesive society. In that, harnessing of civic participation and political feedback mechanisms are essential for positive and continuous growth. The 2018 UN/World Bank report *Pathways for Peace*⁴¹ recognizes inclusive dialogue platforms as one of conflict prevention strategies.

Dialogue platforms⁴², as unique form of consultation in this joint programme, represent the main instrument of intervention for this programme. They are a multi-stakeholder forum within a structured environment which maximizes participation and cooperation among various stakeholders (political leaders, public institutions, youth, civil society, academia, media, private sector, international community representatives) focusing on two pillars: people to people and people to political leaders.

In this programme, dialogue platforms⁴³ will comprise a wide range of public, civic and private stakeholders engaged together in structured dialogue identifying and discussing regional factors which hamper social inclusion, as well as generating meaningful solutions and recommendations to address the social divides within and among Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia. The joint programme will ensure that platform meetings gather at least 50 per cent women (of which adolescents will make up 20 per cent).

1.2.3 Organize first regional platform on common social cohesion priorities

The first regional dialogue platform will be organized in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to validate priorities identified at in-country platforms, affirm and prioritize implementable solutions and short- to mid-term recommendations that address the regional social divides and nurture trust among people. The first regional dialogue platform will include representatives of each stakeholder group included in in-country dialogues, with political participation at the Presidency level. Young women and girls will make up at least 50 per cent of overall participants, while a thematic session will feature youth sharing their experiences and lessons in addressing gender inequality and stereotypes in participating countries.

1.2.4 Enable joint action on identified social cohesion common priorities

Action on common priorities, identified and agreed at regional dialogue platforms and regional thematic meetings, will be supported through a type of Small Grants Facility inviting civil society organizations, public institutions, media, local governments and schools to collaborate across borders in implementing solutions to commonly identified priorities. All aspects (priorities, themes, eligibility criteria, grant thresholds, evaluation criteria, appraisal

⁴¹ The full text of the report can be found at: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337>

⁴² Platforms have been tested within the first and second phase of the BiH DFF joint programme.

⁴³ Detailed guidelines on main criteria for convening participants in dialogue platforms will be agreed among participating UN agencies at the onset of programme implementation.

procedure, forms, promotional activities and contracting procedures) of the Joint Call for Proposals will be agreed among participating agencies, with a view to publishing one call across all four countries, but administering grants at country level, whereby country of successful lead applicant will determine contractual arrangements (subject to coordination among agencies). Furthermore, the BiH focus will be dutifully acknowledged in evaluation criteria. The priority of gender equality and women's empowerment will be specifically prioritized by designating at least 30% of available funding towards grantees that are women led and/or projects that have gender equality and women's empowerment as a significant objective.

Innovation Labs composed of cross-country teams of young boys and girls identified at in-country and regional platforms, will provide dedicated space to youth to fashion solutions that address their particular concerns under the social cohesion umbrella.

1.2.5 Organize regional thematic dialogues

Regional thematic dialogues, hosted by each participating country, will enable focused discussion by target group (adolescents and youth, media, civil society organizations, women's groups, teachers) on social cohesion priorities from their specific perspective. They will reinforce the establishment of thematic partnerships in the region to support joint action on common priorities and recommendations on institutional sustainability of capacity building programs and policy advocacy efforts promoted through this joint programme. All dialogue meetings will ensure balanced representation of both sexes, including among participating youth and adolescents.

Output 1.3: *Policy recommendations to improve social cohesion in the region are effectively advocated for with, and endorsed by, authorities and relevant stakeholders.*

Under this Output, the programme aims to sustain momentum created by a broad-based consultations process in the region and set solid foundations for social cohesion policy recommendations to be embraced and endorsed by relevant stakeholders.

1.3.1 Meetings with decision-makers on policy recommendations

To ensure success and endorsement of identified policy recommendations, participating UN agencies will invest political diplomacy efforts, relying on established partnerships with numerous government bodies in all four countries, to promote the identified policy recommendations and find suitable ways for their endorsement, together with decision-makers. The meetings with government partners will aim at having at least 30% participation of women. The uReport partners (those who mobilised most uReporters in their communities) of which 50% girls and young women, will be engaged in the joint effort of UN agencies, aiming at strengthening the evidence-based arguments collected through the uReport mechanism.

1.3.2. Support to policy advocacy campaigns

Civil society organizations, and youth groups in particular, will be provided grants to conduct targeted public information and advocacy campaigns on a set of proposed policy measures.

commonly agreed at in-country and regional level, taking place in tandem with institutionalization efforts by the UN agencies. CSOs will engage 50% of women and girls through advocacy campaigns. This will be ensured through a monitoring system, prepared by the project.

1.3.3. Organize final regional dialogue platform

The final regional dialogue platform is proposed to take place in Mostar⁴⁴, serving to secure political commitment by decision-makers to sustainability of proposed policy recommendations, present the examples of joint work and partnerships across the four countries and shape the contours of a follow-up joint programme. The project will ensure balanced representation of both sexes, including among adolescents and youth.

Project approach:

Process-based: The programme is built around a broad consultative process taking place through dialogue platform events. Therefore, identification of social cohesion priorities and solutions how to overcome them at a regional level are not pre-determined; they will be discussed at open fora, i.e. in-country and regional dialogue platforms that will reflect the discussions of various groups in the region.

Partnership and sustainability: The BiH *Dialogue for the Future* was initiated by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The offices of the Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia will be the main partners of the project, aiming at greater cooperation and positioning BiH as the host and the convener of the regional peacebuilding platform. At the onset of the project, participating UN agencies will explore opportunities for viable and sustainable partnerships, with national and/or regional mechanisms, to ensure financial and institutional sustainability of the regional peacebuilding initiative. This particularly relates to the dialogue platforms, especially vis-à-vis implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and contribution to the EU Strategy for the Western Balkans.

III. Project management and coordination (4 pages max)

- a) **Recipient organizations and implementing partners** – list direct recipient organizations and their implementing partners (international and local), specifying the Convening Organization, which will coordinate the project, and providing a brief justification for the choices, based on mandate, experience, local know-how and existing capacity.

The management and coordination arrangements will follow the guidelines in the UNCT Guidance Note on Joint Programmes, based on *Delivering as One* approach.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ The reconstructed Old Bridge and Old City of Mostar is a symbol of reconciliation, international co-operation and of the coexistence of diverse cultural, ethnic and religious communities. 2020 will mark 15 years since its reconstruction

⁴⁵ Updated in June 2017 for BiH UNCT.

The agencies participating in the Joint Programme will include UNDP, UNESCO and UNICEF. Under the overall leadership of the **Joint Programme Board**, the participating UN agencies will have the ultimate responsibilities for achievement of results of the UN activities conducted through Programme. UNDP Bosnia and Herzegovina will act as the Convening Agency of the Joint Programme responsible for the strategic and programmatic leadership of the Joint UN Programme and ensuring coherent and coordinated approach of the participating UN agencies. The Convening Agency, in partnership with other participating UN Agencies, will be responsible and accountable to the Joint Programme Board for facilitation of the achievement of agreed delivery and results of the Joint UN Programme in a manner consistent with the One Programme (UNDAF) 2015-2020 for BiH.

Overall oversight and strategic guidance of the Programme will be provided through Joint Programme Board. The Board will include the UN Resident Coordinators from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, and dedicated representatives of the Presidencies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia, as well as Heads/Representatives of UNICEF, UNDP and UNESCO for the four countries. The Joint Programme Board will meet for the first time after one month of the Programme's inception to adopt Terms of Reference and agree on the composition of the Board, and how often the Board will be meeting. New members to the Board may be added, subject to approval by the Board approval.⁴⁶ The Board will be the main decision-making authority of the joint programme and will be responsible for the strategic oversight of the overall implementation and interagency coordination. The Board gives guidance to the Joint (Regional) Programme Coordinator and will be responsible for the resolution of the implementation issues, if required. The Board also reviews and endorses the annual work plans, reviews implementation progress and annual reports. The Board approves any substantial changes in the budgets or activities.

Each of the participating UN agencies will be substantively and financially accountable for the activities designated to it in the joint programme. The participating agencies will be individually responsible for: ensuring the timely implementation of the activities and delivery of the reports and other outputs identified in this project document; contracting and supervising qualified local and international experts, financial administration, monitoring, reporting and procurement for the activities they are responsible for; and carrying out all the necessary tasks and responsibilities to assist the Board.

The **Joint (Regional) Programme Coordinator (JPC)**, hosted by the Convening Agency, will act as secretariat during Board meetings. The incumbent will be tasked to coordinate the overall implementation of the programme, ensuring implementation of activities as approved in the work plans endorsed by the JPB and, in cooperation with Recipient UN Organizations (RUNOs), coordinating activities with the **Joint Implementation Team**, composed of the four joint (national) programme coordinators from each participating country. S/he will be responsible for coordination and implementation of all common activities, such as joint communications strategy, regional baseline/end line public perception study, independent

⁴⁶ In order to strengthen institutional ownership of the project, inclusion of other relevant representatives of authorities in all participating countries in the work of Project Board, can be discussed and agreed during the Board meetings, taking into account specific mandates of Institutions which might be invited to take the part in the work of Joint Programme. Similar approach will be taken to inviting civil society representatives from all four participating countries.

final evaluation of the Joint Programme, organization of regional dialogue platforms. The Coordinator will also be responsible for consolidation of the inputs of all agencies for narrative reporting to the donor. The position of Joint Programme Coordinator will be administratively managed by UNDP Bosnia and Herzegovina (Convening Agency) who will be issuing the contract. The Joint Programme Coordinator will consult with the agencies on the financial plans and expenditures related to activities defined within the work plans. The Coordinator reports to the Joint Programme Board and is required to abide by Board decisions, and not to be affected only by steering or guidance by one agency, including the Convening Agency. The Coordinator will inform the Board on any substantial revisions to budgets and activities that go beyond the minimal threshold prescribed in the donor agreement. Such changes have to be endorsed by the Board. The RUNOs are also encouraged to share with the JPC any budgetary changes or revisions which vary from the originally approved budget, even for those that are below minimal threshold so that all agencies are aware of any changes in the programme implementation.

The Joint (**National**) Programme Coordinator, hosted by the Convening Agency of each participating country, will be responsible for the overall coordination and lead the effective implementation of the programme activities in the respective participating country, ensuring alignment with the joint annual work plan. S/he will also monitor and analyse risks, monitor programme implementation at country level, coordinate inputs to the joint narrative and financial reports and contribute to the development of the overall Communications Strategy and various communication tools.

The Joint (Regional) Programme Coordinator is responsible to escalate issues concerning coherence in implementation and approach among participating country teams to **the Strategic Advisory Board** composed of Resident Coordinators of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, as well as Heads of participating UN agencies from each participating country.

The Joint Programme Coordinator will work closely with the **UN Peace and Development Unit (PDU)**, sharing information regularly on programme implementation, and to ensure proper coordination with the Presidency offices as main partners. The UN Peace and Development Unit (PDU) within RCO BiH, led by the Political and Development Advisor (PDA), will provide overall strategic and technical advice, from a political and peacebuilding perspective, to the Board, the RUNOs and the Joint Programme Coordinator, given the sensitive nature of this peacebuilding/conflict prevention project. In collaboration with the RUNOs and JPC, the PDU will, on-going basis, liaise with (i) the BiH Presidency; (ii) PBSO/PBF, DPA and EOSG (when necessary); and (iii) relevant counterparts in participating countries to ensure coherence from a political and peacebuilding perspective and (iv) to ensure political sensitivities are monitored and addressed in timely manner.

- b) **Project management and coordination** – present the project implementation team, including positions and roles and explanation of which positions are to be funded by the project (to which percentage). Explain project coordination and oversight arrangements. Fill out project implementation readiness checklist in **Annex C**.


UNCTs in participating countries are to define their own internal setup based on their existing structures and participating agencies. At country level, in Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNDP will take on convening agent capacity, while UNICEF and UNESCO will fulfil that role for Serbia and Croatia, respectively.

To ease overall coordination efforts, it is proposed that at least a national programme coordinator and a project assistant are appointed by convening agency at each country. Due to the nature of the project, and the fact that other offices do not have a PDU, appointed RCO focal points (Coordination Specialists/ Heads of Offices) will act as primary technical-level point of contact with the offices of respective Presidencies in their countries.

To allow for greater clarity in programme management, detailed Terms of Reference would be developed in the programme inception period for each of the proposed structures/ units outlined in the Organigram; with accompanying SOPs. Additionally, the inception period will serve to develop and agree on the Terms of Reference for communications component, base-line and end-line survey methodology and implementation, as well as for recruitments of staff required for the effective programme implementation.

Joint **communication efforts** will be ensured through a coordination role executed by the UNDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A dedicated communications staff would be hired, complemented by outsourcing of specific PR and communication services to an agency/ service provider(s) with presence in four countries targeted by the programme. Special care will be taken to ensure coordination of targeted skill-building for media professionals vis-à-vis a set of activities that will be outsourced to a service provider, based on an agreed Communications Strategy of the programme.

A schema of the proposed set-up can be found below:



- c) **Risk management** – assess the level of risk for project success (low, medium and high) and provide a list of major project specific risks and how they will be managed, including the approach to updating risks and making project adjustments. Include any Do No Harm issues and project mitigation.

Risks to the achievement of PBF outcomes	Likelihood of occurrence (high, medium, low)	Severity of risk impact (high, medium, low)	Mitigating Strategy (and Person/Unit responsible)
Busy political agenda of the key political stakeholders.	High	High	RCs and PDU will remain in constant liaison with the Presidency advisors to ensure uninterrupted engagement.
Change in representation at the highest political level	High	Medium	It is expected that at least one BiH Presidency member will change following October 2018. Elections will be held in Croatia in 2019. RCs and PDU will remain in constant liaison to ensure uninterrupted engagement.
Complicated coordination/management structure and agency administrative procedures are delaying implementation.	Medium	Medium	Joint Implementation Team, coordinated by the Joint Programme Coordinator, will develop ToR and SoPs concerning various functions in the joint programme. To be done during the inception period. Additionally, issues regarding delayed implementation may be escalated if needed to Strategic Advisory Body for review and guidance.
Media amplify negative rhetoric supporting divisions	Medium	Medium	The Programme foresees specific skill-building and engagement with the media on media literacy, understanding and support for the objectives of the project; maintaining various channels of communication/outreach to the public including social media outlets and influencers; and engagement of the Presidency and its networks to ensure accurate portrayal of the project by the media.
Unfavourable dollar exchange rate fluctuations.	Low	High	Pro-active financial planning and management system.
Overlap with other donor funded reconciliation initiatives (e.g. RYCO)	Low	High	Continuous coordination with other donors active in the peacebuilding/ reconciliation area.
Inter-cultural dialogue activities supported through the project touch on potentially sensitive topics and disestablish the participation of targeted groups.	Medium	Medium	Throughout the project, emphasize the support of inter-cultural dialogue as a process whilst maintaining a clear neutral stance with regards to the content; ensure Presidency support to open dialogue (if/when needed).
Force Majeure (e.g. act of nature) impacts Project activities.	Low	High	The Project will have a flexible approach, including reprogramming of activities to respond to the emerging needs.

- d) **Monitoring and evaluation** – What will be the M&E approach for the project, including M&E expertise in the project team and main means and timing of collecting data? Include a break-down of M&E budget that the project is putting aside, including for collection of baseline and end line data for indicators and independent evaluation, and an approximate M&E timeline. Ensure at least 5-7% of the project budget is set aside for M&E activities.

The programme will undertake a baseline and end-line perception study at the beginning and near the end of the Programme, relying on a mixed-method approach, and ensuring coherence with a BiH-based perception survey. The survey methodology will be designed during the inception period. Results will inform the implementation and contribute to the assessment of the results and impact of the programme. A company/institution will be contracted to undertake the relevant study through a competitive procurement process. Given the complementarity of interventions in participating countries, the joint regional DFF programme and UNCT Albania/Ryco programme will coordinate on baseline/end line studies. In addition, a final independent evaluation of the programme will be undertaken at the end of programme, outsourced through a competitive process.

A Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Plan will be prepared at the outset of the programme. Monitoring activities would include site visits; meetings with partners and beneficiaries to assess progress and obstacles; continued assessments of the efficiency of the local-level mechanisms and financial assurance of granted activities such as spot checks (in line with the agency-specific standards). Additionally, entry and exit surveys are planned for capacity building events for specific target groups, as well as for dialogue platform events.

RUNOs will develop monitoring and evaluation guidelines for projects funded under the Grants Facility, based on the lessons learned within BiH-based projects.

Furthermore, monitoring will be devised to ensure that every output/outcome is implemented in a gender-informed way (e.g. with sex-disaggregated indicators wherever possible, with 50-50 breakdown of male/female participation in project events, etc.)

As outlined in the above section, the PDU team based in the Resident Coordinator's Office will also provide substantive monitoring of the programme vis-à-vis its intended peacebuilding objectives, guiding the RUNOs on the political developments having a possible impact on the programme, on issues related to conflict sensitivity of the programme implementation, and ensuring that the programme is contributing to peacebuilding and social cohesion in the society.

- e) **Project exit strategy/ sustainability** – Briefly explain the project's exit strategy to ensure that the project can be wrapped up at the end of the project duration, either through sustainability measures, agreements with other donors for follow-up funding or end of activities which do not need further support. If support from other donors is expected, explain what the project will do to try to ensure this support from the start.

As outlined above, the participating UN agencies will explore ways to ensure sustainability of the programme results, following the initial 18-month duration. Throughout the programme, but especially for the Grants Facility, national and local governments will be solicited to co-fund joint projects by various stakeholder groups. Moreover, relevant line-ministries of youth, education and culture affairs will be the focus of dedicated efforts by

RUNOs to include social cohesion priorities and regional cooperation projects among the eligible criteria for funding of CSO applications.

Participating UN agencies will consider organization of crowdfunding capacity building events to sustain locally-led peacebuilding projects. Additionally, as representatives of bilateral donors and IFIs will be invited to in-country and regional dialogue platforms with Presidencies and elected leaders, this will provide another opportunity to secure additional funding.

Finally, as this programme was initiated by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Presidency Advisers/ officers of participating countries will be regularly informed of all aspects of programme implementation, including support for agreed fund-raising approach.

IV. Project budget

Please provide a brief justification for the proposed budget, highlighting any specific choices that have underpinned the budget preparation, especially for personnel, travel or other indirect project support, to demonstrate value for money for the project. Proposed budget for all projects must include funds for independent evaluation. Proposed budget for projects involving non-UN direct recipients must include funds for independent audit.

Fill out two tables in the Excel budget **Annex D**.

Annex A.1: Project Administrative arrangements for UN Recipient Organizations

(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS based on the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

AA Functions

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved “Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds” (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate the financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF annual consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is completed by the RUNO. A project will be considered as operationally closed upon submission of a joint final narrative report. In order for the MPTF Office to financially close a project, each RUNO must refund unspent balance of over 250 USD, indirect cost (GMS) should not exceed 7% and submission of a certified final financial statement by the recipient organizations’ headquarters.);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any costs extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Semi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by

		PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

Financial reporting and timeline

Timeline	Event
30 April	Annual reporting – Report Q4 expenses (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
<i>Certified final financial report to be provided by 30 June of the calendar year after project closure</i>	

UNEX also opens for voluntary financial reporting for UN recipient organizations the following dates

31 July	Voluntary Q2 expenses (January to June)
31 October	Voluntary Q3 expenses (January to September)

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250, at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent's website (<http://mptf.undp.org>).

Annex A.2: Project Administrative arrangements for Non-UN Recipient Organizations

(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient Non-United Nations Organization:

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each recipient in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will have full responsibility for ensuring that the Activity is implemented in accordance with the signed Project Document;

In the event of a financial review, audit or evaluation recommended by PBSO, the cost of such activity should be included in the project budget;

Ensure professional management of the Activity, including performance monitoring and reporting activities in accordance with PBSO guidelines.

Ensure compliance with the Financing Agreement and relevant applicable clauses in the Fund MOU.

Reporting:

Each Receipt will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Bi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

Financial reports and timeline

Timeline	Event
28 February	Annual reporting – Report Q4 expenses (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
30 April	Report Q1 expenses (January to March)
31 July	Report Q2 expenses (January to June)
31 October	Report Q3 expenses (January to September)
<i>Certified final financial report to be provided at the quarter following the project financial closure</i>	

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250 at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the Administrative Agent, no later than three months (31 March) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the Recipient Non-UN Recipient Organization will be determined in accordance with applicable policies and procedures defined by the PBSO.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent website (<http://www.mptf.undp.org>)

Final Project Audit for non-UN recipient organization projects

An independent project audit will be requested by the end of the project. The audit report needs to be attached to the final narrative project report. The cost of such activity must be included in the project budget.

Special Provisions regarding Financing of Terrorism

Consistent with UN Security Council Resolutions relating to terrorism, including UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and 1267 (1999) and related resolutions, the Participants are firmly committed to the international fight against terrorism, and in particular, against the financing of terrorism. Similarly, all Recipient Organizations recognize their obligation to comply with any applicable sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Each of the Recipient Organizations will use all reasonable efforts to ensure that the funds transferred to it in accordance with this agreement are not used to provide support or assistance to individuals or entities associated with terrorism as designated by any UN Security Council sanctions regime. If, during the term of this agreement, a Recipient Organization determines that there are credible allegations that funds transferred to it in accordance with this agreement have been used to provide support or assistance to individuals or entities associated with terrorism as designated by any UN Security Council sanctions regime it will as soon as it becomes aware of it inform the head of PBSO, the Administrative Agent and the donor(s) and, in consultation with the donors as appropriate, determine an appropriate response.

Non-UN recipient organization (NUNO) eligibility:

In order to be declared eligible to receive PBF funds directly, NUNOs must be assessed as technically, financially and legally sound by the PBF and its agent, the Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO). Prior to submitting a finalized project document, it is the responsibility of each NUNO to liaise with PBSO and MPTFO and provide all the necessary documents (see below) to demonstrate that all the criteria have been fulfilled and to be declared as eligible for direct PBF funds.

The NUNO must provide (in a timely fashion, ensuring PBSO and MPTFO have sufficient time to review the package) the documentation demonstrating that the NUNO:

- Has previously received funding from the UN, the PBF, or any of the contributors to the PBF, in the country of project implementation
- Has a current valid registration as a non-profit, tax exempt organization with a social based mission in both the country where headquarter is located and in country of project implementation for the duration of the proposed grant. (**NOTE:** If registration is done on an annual basis in the country, the organization must have the current registration and obtain renewals for the duration of the project, in order to receive subsequent funding tranches)
- Produces an annual report that includes the proposed country for the grant
- Commissions audited financial statements, available for the last two years, including the auditor opinion letter. The financial statements should include the legal organization that will sign the agreement (and oversee the country of implementation, if applicable) as well as the activities of the country of implementation. (**NOTE:** If these are not available for the country of proposed project implementation, the CSO will also need to provide the latest two audit reports for a program or project based audit in country.) The letter from the auditor should also state whether the auditor firm is part of the nationally qualified audit firms.
- Demonstrates an annual budget in the country of proposed project implementation for the previous two calendar years, which is at least twice the annualized budget sought from PBF for the project⁴⁷
- Demonstrates at least 3 years of experience in the country where grant is sought
- Provides a clear explanation of the CSO's legal structure, including the specific entity which will enter into the legal agreement with the MPTF-O for the PBF grant.

⁴⁷ Annualized PBF project budget is obtained by dividing the PBF project budget by the number of project duration months and multiplying by 12.

Annex B: Project Results Framework (MUST include sex- and age disaggregated data)

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification/ frequency of collection	Indicator milestones
<p>Outcome 1: Stability and trust in the region, and especially in BiH, are enhanced.</p>		<p><i>Outcome indicator 1 a:</i> Rank of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 2018 Global Peace Index.</p> <p><i>Baseline (2018):</i> 89 out of 163 countries.</p> <p><i>Target (2020):</i> Improved ranking.</p>	<p>Global Peace Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace.</p>	<p>The rankings are published annually.</p>
		<p><i>Outcome Indicator 1 b:</i> Percentage of youth indicating higher levels of trust towards other ethnic groups in the region.</p> <p><i>Baseline (2017):</i> low overall level of trust between youth of different ethnicities⁴⁸.</p> <p><i>Target (2020):</i> 50% of surveyed youth, particularly in BiH (including youth who are direct project beneficiaries) report increased trust toward members of other ethnicities.</p>	<p>Findings of the perception survey commissioned by the programme.</p> <p>uReport data (UNICEF-led).</p> <p>Entry- and exit surveys for youth grantees and dialogue platform participants.</p> <p>Final Programme Evaluation Report.</p>	<p>Baseline perception survey with representative sample from all participating countries conducted by the 5th month of the programme implementation.</p> <p>Entry- and exit surveys conducted with grant beneficiaries (upon signing and closing of grant contracts, 9th and 16th months of the programme implementation respectively).</p>
		<p><i>Outcome Indicator 1 c:</i> Level of collaboration to address mistrust and social divides between citizens from different groups in the participating countries, with their peers in Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p>	<p>Perception study commissioned by the programme.</p> <p>Entry- and exit surveys for grantees and dialogue platform participants.</p>	<p>Entry- and exit surveys conducted with all dialogue platform participants (political leaders and stakeholder groups) at the first and last gatherings</p>

⁴⁸ 2017 RCC Balkan Barometer results.

		<p><i>Baseline (2017):</i> low overall levels of cross-country collaboration addressing mistrust and social divides (BiH vis-a-vis neighboring countries).</p> <p><i>Target (2020):</i> Increased level of cross-country collaboration to address mistrust and social divides between citizens, manifested through at least 20 sustainable social cohesion partnerships generated as a result of the programme.</p>	<p>Final Programme Evaluation Report.</p>	<p>respectively.</p> <p>End-line perception survey conducted in the last 2 months of the programme implementation.</p> <p>Final Evaluation of the programme will be conducted in the last 2 months of the programme implementation.</p>
		<p><i>Outcome Indicator 1 d:</i> Level of media literacy of participating countries in the Media Literacy Index.</p> <p><i>Baseline (2018):</i> Bosnia and Herzegovina ranking 25th; Croatia ranking 44th place, Montenegro ranking 28th place and Serbia ranking 31st place⁴⁹.</p> <p><i>Target (2020):</i> Increased ranking of participating countries.</p>	<p>Media Literacy Index, Open Society Institute – Sofia.</p>	<p>The Media Literacy Index is conducted annually.</p>
		<p><i>Outcome Indicator 1 e:</i> % of young people who believe that reconciliation in the region is enhanced and the region is a safe and peaceful place.</p> <p><i>Baseline (2018):</i> to be defined upon project commencement</p> <p><i>Target (2020):</i> 10 % increase by the end of project</p>	<p>Perception Study commission by the programme.</p> <p>RYCO Monitoring and Evaluation Tool.</p> <p>Entry and exit surveys for grantees and dialogue</p>	

⁴⁹ The index uses standardized score ranging from 100 to 0 score, highest to lowest.

		platform participants.	
<p>Output 1.1: Different groups in the countries of the region, and youth in particular, acquire and practice skills to help break stereotypes and constructively interact across divides.</p> <p>List of activities under this Output:</p> <p>1.1.1 Establish methodological framework to enhance capacity of each stakeholder group (adolescents, youth, women, teachers, media).</p> <p>1.1.2 Enhance peacebuilding capacities of youth and adolescents.</p> <p>1.1.3 Enhance peacebuilding capacities for women's groups.</p> <p>1.1.4 Enhance capacities of teachers/trainers for promotion of cultural diversity, inter-cultural dialogue and tolerance.</p> <p>1.1.5. Enhance capacities of media to promote media literacy and amplify positive story-telling.</p>	<p><i>Output indicator 1.1 a:</i> Number of people (teachers, youth, women, journalists and editors, sex- and gender-disaggregated) from participating 4 countries with increased knowledge and skills to bridge social divides.</p> <p><i>Baseline (2018):</i> Insufficient number of people (particularly teachers, youth and women) capacitated to support social cohesion in the region.</p> <p><i>Target (2020):</i> At least 1900, as follows: (i) 800 adolescents (10 – 18 years old); (ii) 800 young people (18 – 30 years old) among whom 50% women; (iii) 200 teachers, among whom 50% women and (iv) 120 journalists and editors.</p> <p><i>Output indicator 1.1 b:</i> Number of stakeholders who apply the acquired skills and knowledge in their follow-up work as a result of the programme support.</p> <p><i>Baseline (2018):</i> n/a.</p> <p><i>Target (2020):</i> At least 50% of all stakeholders (in various target groups) apply the skills and knowledge acquired through the programme in their follow-up work.</p>	<p>Entry- and exit capacity development surveys filled in by trainees.</p> <p>Lists of participants in training activities.</p> <p>Programme progress/final report.</p>	<p>Capacity development support for all programme target groups is completed by the 7th month of the programme implementation.</p>
<p>Output 1.2: Citizens from different groups</p>	<p><i>Output Indicator 2.1 a:</i> Total number of people (particularly youth) from participating countries who</p>	<p>Lists of participants from the dialogue events.</p>	<p>In terms of dialogue platform sequencing, the approach is as follows: in-</p>

	<p>jointly identify and implement actions that promote social cohesion in the region, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p> <p>List of activities under this Output:</p> <p>1.2.1. Organize in-country youth dialogues on social cohesion.</p> <p>1.2.2. Organize in-country dialogue platforms on regional social divides and priorities.</p> <p>1.2.3 Organize first regional dialogue platform on common social cohesion priorities.</p> <p>1.2.4 Enable joint action on identified social cohesion common priorities.</p> <p>1.2.5 Organize regional thematic dialogues.</p>	<p>meaningfully engage in and contribute to identification of social cohesion barriers and priorities for the 4 countries.</p> <p><i>Baseline (2016):</i> 600 people in the national platform events in Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p> <p><i>Target: (2020):</i> At least 1,600 people (among whom at least 800 youth and women) from participating countries engage in and contribute to identification of regional social cohesion barriers and priorities.</p> <p><i>Output Indicator 2.1 b:</i> Total number of dialogue platforms (gender balanced) bringing together political leaders and various stakeholders from the 4 participating countries in joint discussions on how to strengthen social cohesion in the region.</p> <p><i>Baseline (2016):</i> 0.</p> <p><i>Target: (2020):</i> At least 20 broad-based social cohesion dialogue platform events (gender balanced) bringing together political leaders and various stakeholders from the 4 participating countries.</p> <p><i>Output Indicator 2.1 c:</i> Total number of people (particularly youth) from participating countries who benefited directly from social cohesion actions identified through the dialogue</p>	<p>Programme reports.</p> <p>Media monitoring/press clipping.</p> <p>Recommendations from the dialogue platforms.</p> <p>Calls for Proposals and Reports from implementation of the grants.</p> <p>Feedback from grant facility beneficiaries (indirect and direct).</p> <p>Photos and videos from the implementation of social cohesion initiatives in the region.</p>	<p>country youth dialogues precede the national level dialogue platforms, which feed into the regional dialogue platform, while thematic (target-group-based) dialogues take place continuously throughout the entire programme.</p>
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	platforms and implemented with the programme support. <i>Baseline (2017):</i> n/a. <i>Target: (2020):</i> At least 10,000 people (whereby 50% are female, and among whom at least 5,000 adolescents and youth) from participating countries directly benefit from social cohesion actions. <i>Output Indicator 2.1 d:</i> % of the dialogue platforms' recommendations for social cohesion in the region implemented with the joint programme's support. <i>Baseline (2017):</i> n/a. <i>Target: (2020):</i> At least 20% of the dialogue platforms recommendations for social cohesion in the region implemented with the programme support.		<p>Media coverage, photos, videos capturing advocacy and formal endorsement of social cohesion recommendations.</p> <p>Programme reports.</p> <p>Materials from advocacy events.</p>	<p>Emerging social cohesion recommendations from the dialogue platforms are in place by the 12th month of the programme implementation, so there is sufficient time for advocacy efforts.</p> <p>Social cohesion recommendations are formally endorsed by</p>
<p>Output 1.3: Policy recommendations to improve social cohesion in the region are effectively advocated for, and endorsed by, authorities and relevant stakeholders.</p> <p>List of activities under this Output:</p> <p>1.3.1. Meetings with decision-makers on policy recommendations.</p>	<p><i>Output indicator 1.3 a:</i> Number of effective advocacy channels (engaging equal numbers of both sexes) leveraging political and public support within participating countries for endorsement of social cohesion policy recommendations.</p> <p><i>Baseline (2018):</i> UN agencies in the participating countries have deployed successful advocacy efforts to promote social cohesion.</p>			

	<p>1.3.2. Support to policy advocacy campaigns.</p> <p>1.3.3. Organize final regional dialogue platform.</p>	<p><i>Target (2020):</i> At least 4 interconnected and mutually-reinforcing advocacy channels help leverage political and public support for endorsement of social cohesion policy recommendations, including: (i) UN-led discussions with political leaders and policy-makers; (ii) regional dialogue platform; (iii) civil society/youth networks campaigns inspired through the programme; (iv) media.</p> <p><i>Output indicator 1.3 b:</i> Number of social cohesion policy recommendations voiced through the regional dialogue platform that are endorsed by authorities and international community and contribute to their effective follow-up implementation.</p> <p><i>Baseline (2018): n/a.</i></p> <p><i>Target (2020):</i> At least 5 policy recommendations formally endorsed by authorities and the international community.</p>	<p>Formal decisions and documents of authorities or the international community evidencing endorsement of the social cohesion recommendations.</p>	<p>relevant authorities / international community by the last month of the programme implementation, with strong indications for these during the second regional dialogue platform.</p>
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1. Bosnia and Herzegovina

CATEGORIES	UNDP		UNICEF		UNESCO		Total tranche 1	Total tranche 2	PROJECT TOTAL
	Tranche 1 (70%)	Tranche 2 (30%)	Tranche 1 (70%)	Tranche 2 (30%)	Tranche 1 (70%)	Tranche 2 (30%)			
1. Staff and other personnel	53,085.97	22,751.13	49,700.00	21,300.00	62,230.00	26,670.00	165,015.97	70,721.13	235,737.10
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4. Contractual services	486,044.43	208,304.75	91,000.00	39,000.00	196,350.00	84,150.00	773,394.43	331,454.75	1,104,849.18
5. Travel	24,850.00	10,650.00	9,100.00	3,900.00	4,200.00	1,800.00	38,150.00	16,350.00	54,500.00
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	105,000.00	45,000.00	126,700.00	54,300.00	-	-	231,700.00	99,300.00	331,000.00
7. General Operating and other Direct Costs	27,811.00	11,919.00	7,700.00	3,300.00	21,000.00	9,000.00	56,511.00	24,219.00	80,730.00
Sub-Total Project Costs	696,791.40	298,624.88	284,200.00	121,800.00	283,780.00	121,620.00	1,264,771.40	542,044.88	1,806,816.28
8. Indirect Support Costs (must be 7%)	48,775.40	20,903.74	19,894.00	8,526.00	19,864.60	8,513.40	88,534.00	37,943.14	126,477.14
TOTAL	745,566.80	319,528.63	304,094.00	130,326.00	303,644.60	130,133.40	1,353,305.40	579,988.03	1,933,293.42

3. Montenegro

CATEGORIES	UNDP		UNICEF		UNESCO		Total tranche 1	Total tranche 2	PROJECT TOTAL
	Tranche 1 (70%)	Tranche 2 (30%)	Tranche 1 (70%)	Tranche 2 (30%)	Tranche 1 (70%)	Tranche 2 (30%)			
1. Staff and other personnel	76,018.24	32,579.25	9,100.00	3,900.00	35,728.00	15,312.00	120,846.24	51,791.25	172,637.49
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	4,345.25	1,862.25	4,550.00	1,950.00	-	-	8,895.25	3,812.25	12,707.50
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	700.00	300.00	-	-	-	-	700.00	300.00	1,000.00
4. Contractual services	72,731.47	31,170.63	155,050.00	66,450.00	136,500.00	58,500.00	364,281.47	156,120.63	520,402.10
5. Travel	25,746.00	11,034.00	4,900.00	2,100.00	3,500.00	1,500.00	34,146.00	14,634.00	48,780.00
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	55,930.00	23,970.00	7,000.00	3,000.00	-	-	62,930.00	26,970.00	89,900.00
7. General Operating and other Direct Costs	9,868.88	4,229.52	4,900.00	2,100.00	12,530.00	5,370.00	27,298.88	11,699.52	38,998.40
Sub-Total Project Costs	245,339.84	105,145.65	185,500.00	79,500.00	188,258.00	80,682.00	619,097.84	265,327.65	884,425.49
8. Indirect Support Costs (must be 7%)	17,173.79	7,360.20	12,985.00	5,565.00	13,178.06	5,647.74	43,336.85	18,572.94	61,909.78
TOTAL	262,513.63	112,505.84	198,485.00	85,065.00	201,436.06	86,329.74	662,434.69	283,900.59	946,335.27

4. Serbia

CATEGORIES	UNDP		UNICEF		UNESCO		Total tranche 1	Total tranche 2	PROJECT TOTAL
	Tranche 1 (70%)	Tranche 2 (30%)	Tranche 1 (70%)	Tranche 2 (30%)	Tranche 1 (70%)	Tranche 2 (30%)			
1. Staff and other personnel	14,350.00	6,150.00	95,900.00	41,100.00	54,880.00	23,520.00	165,130.00	70,770.00	235,900.00
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4. Contractual services	73,640.00	31,560.00	69,300.00	29,700.00	192,150.00	82,350.00	335,090.00	143,610.00	478,700.00
5. Travel	24,227.00	10,383.00	2,450.00	1,050.00	3,500.00	1,500.00	30,177.00	12,933.00	43,110.00
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	-	-	211,750.00	90,750.00	-	-	211,750.00	90,750.00	302,500.00
7. General Operating and other Direct Costs	92,975.12	39,846.48	-	-	18,200.00	7,800.00	111,175.12	47,646.48	158,821.60
Sub-Total Project Costs	205,192.12	87,939.48	379,400.00	162,600.00	268,730.00	115,170.00	853,322.12	365,709.48	1,219,031.60
8. Indirect Support Costs (must be 7%)	14,363.45	6,155.76	26,558.00	11,382.00	18,811.10	8,061.90	59,732.55	25,599.66	85,332.21
TOTAL	219,555.57	94,095.24	405,958.00	173,982.00	287,541.10	123,231.90	913,054.67	391,309.14	1,304,363.81

Activities/Output Categories		UNEP	UNICEF	UNESCO	Total (USD)
5. Women's Empowerment					
Output 1: Different groups in the countries of the region, and youth, to articulate, acquire and practice skills to help break stereotypes and constructively interact across divides.					
Activity 1.1: Establish technological framework to enhance capacities of each stakeholder group (adolescents, pregnant and lactating youth, women, opinion-makers, teachers, media)		155,115.93	115,000.00	149,840.00	419,955.93
Activity 1.2: Enhance inter-building capacities of youth and adolescents		32,828.00	30,000.00	83,000.00	145,828.00
Activity 1.3: Enhance capacities of teachers/trainers 3, for promotion of cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and tolerance		40,829.99	83,000.00	-	123,829.99
Activity 1.4: Enhance capacities of parents to promote literacy and employ practices that reduce gender inequality		80,715.00	-	-	80,715.00
Output 2: Citizens from different groups identify and implement actions that can promote social cohesion in the region especially in BiH.					
Activity 2.1: Organize inter-city youth dialogues or workshops on social cohesion		134,674.10	140,000.00	100,000.00	374,674.10
Activity 2.2: Organize inter-city youth dialogues or workshops on social cohesion		55,082.00	70,000.00	10,000.00	135,082.00
Activity 2.3: Organize regional forums/dialogues		70,000.00	85,000.00	90,000.00	245,000.00
Activity 2.4: Establish inter-city youth dialogues or workshops on social cohesion		29,192.10	-	-	29,192.10
Output 3: Policy recommendations to improve social cohesion in the region are actively advocated for, with, and endorsed by, authorities and relevant stakeholders.					
Activity 3.1: Meetings with decision-makers on policy recommendations		40,696.00	10,000.00	25,000.00	75,696.00
Activity 3.2: Support to policy advocacy campaigns		26,370.00	-	10,000.00	36,370.00
Activity 3.3: Organize local regional dialogue platform		14,276.00	10,000.00	20,000.00	44,276.00
3. Humanitarian Crises					
B. Indirect Support Costs (only FY)					
		350,485.59	745,000.00	249,940.00	1,345,425.59
		24,539.98	16,450.00	10,805.00	51,795.98
		375,025.57	861,450.00	260,745.00	1,497,220.57

