


## IRF – PROJECT DOCUMENT



### United Nations Peace building Support Office (PBSO) / Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)

<b>Project Title:</b> Support to JMC Support Platform	<b>Recipient UN Organization:</b> UNDP
<b>Project Contact:</b> Peter Barwick, Peace and Development Advisor Address: Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator – Myanmar, No. 6, Natmauk Road, P.O. Box 650 Yangon 11211, MYANMAR Telephone: +95 1 542910 to 542919 E-mail: peter.barwick@one.un.org	<b>Implementing Partners:</b> JMC and its Technical Secretariat Centre (TSC)
	<b>Project Location:</b> Myanmar; Yangon with Nay Pyi Taw, and six States/Regions
<b>Project Description:</b> The Project contributes to the JMC Support Platform, a mechanism set-up by the UN to respond to the requests from national stakeholders for a UN-led conduit for channelling institutional and technical assistance to the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC), set-up by the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), and mandated to uphold the ceasefire and monitor compliance of the parties to its principles and procedures. The Project enables the UN to put the Support Platform in place, thereby supporting the JMC, to be informed by international standards, and to undertake its core functions in accordance with the NCA.	<b>Approved Peacebuilding Fund:</b> 2,363,641 <b>Fully Allocated</b> 1 <sup>st</sup> tranche: \$1,654,548 Conditional 2 <sup>nd</sup> tranche: \$709,093  <b>Government Contribution: in kind contribution (e.g. office space for field offices)</b> <b>Other:</b> <sup>1</sup> The overall approved budget and the release of the second tranche is subject to PBSO's evaluation and decision process, and subject to funds being available in the PBF account.
	<b>Proposed Project Start Date:</b> 1 January 2017 <b>Proposed Project End Date:</b> 31 December 2017 <b>Total duration (in months)<sup>2</sup>:</b> 12-months

<sup>2</sup> The maximum duration of an IRF project is 18 months.

**Gender Marker Score<sup>3</sup>: 2**

*Score 3 for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective.*

*Score 2 for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective.*

*Score 1 for projects that will contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly.*

*Score 0 for projects that are not expected to contribute noticeably to gender equality.*

**Project Outcomes:**

- **Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC) engages effectively in ceasefire monitoring in accordance with the NCA**

**PBF Focus Areas<sup>4</sup>:**

Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1)(1.3) DDR

<sup>3</sup> PBSO monitors the inclusion of gender equality and women's empowerment all PBF projects, in line with SC Resolutions 1325, 1888, 1889, 1960 and 2122, and as mandated by the Secretary-General in his Seven-Point Action Plan on Gender Responsive Peacebuilding.

<sup>4</sup> PBF Focus Areas are:

1: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1):

(1.1) SSR; (1.2) RoL; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;

2: Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Priority Area 2):

(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management;

3: Revitalise the economy and generate immediate peace dividends (Priority Area 3);

(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services

4) (Re)-establish essential administrative services (Priority Area 4)

(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3)

Governance of peacebuilding resources (including JSC/PBF Secretariats)

# IRF PROJECT DOCUMENT

(for IRF-funded projects)

**Recipient UN Organization(s)<sup>4</sup>**


United Nations Development Programme

*[Signature]*

Signature

Peter Batchelor  
Country Director for UNDP in Myanmar  
Date & Seal

2016-12-05



**Representative of National Authorities**

National Reconciliation and Peace Commission

*[Signature]*

Signature

Dr Tin Myo Win  
Chairman of Peace Commission  
Date & Seal

2016-12-05

**Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)**

Name of Representative

Signature

Peacebuilding Support Office, NY  
Date & Seal

9.12.2016

*[Signature]*

**Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC)**

*[Signature]*

Signature

Renata Lok-Dessallien  
UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator  
Myanmar  
Date & Seal

2016-12-05



<sup>4</sup> Please include signature block for each RUNO receiving funds under this IRF.

Length: Max. 15 pages

**I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support**

- a) Peacebuilding context
- b) Mapping of existing peacebuilding activities and gaps
- c) Rationale for this IRF

**II. Objectives of PBF support and proposed implementation**

- a) Project outcomes, theory of change, activities, targets and sequencing
- b) Budget
- c) Capacity of RUNO(s) and implementing partners

**III. Management and coordination**

- a) Project management
- b) Risk management
- c) Monitoring and evaluation
- d) Administrative arrangements (standard wording)

**Annex A:** Project Summary (to be submitted as a word document to MPTF-Office)

**Annex B:** Project Results Framework

## **PROJECT COMPONENTS:**

### **I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support**

#### **a) Peacebuilding context:**

The conflict context in Myanmar is complex. Myanmar is home to 135 constitutionally recognized national races (and many others that are not officially recognized) and a diverse configuration of ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural identities. The country's main interior boundaries overlay its ethnic groupings and ethnic nationalities have strong ties to the territories they inhabit. Myanmar is host to one of the longest internal conflicts in the world with multiple conflicts occurring in different parts of the country's territory. While each conflict has a different historical trajectory, the key contestations are between the Bamar-dominated state and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) over the degree and nature of self-determination, power-sharing, resource-sharing and the assertion and protection of ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural identities. Myanmar's civil wars and inter-communal violence have resulted in death and injury, damaged private and public property, disrupted livelihoods and social services, and fragmented family and social relations. The legacies of conflict and military rule have resulted in significant mistrust between conflict parties, between communities and decision-makers and between communities, and contributes to a significant erosion of trust in formal nation-building processes.

In Myanmar as elsewhere, conflict impacts men and women differently. Women make-up the larger part of civilian populations affected by conflict, and as such, pay higher tolls in situations of civilian casualties and displacement. The Gender Situation Analysis (2015) for Myanmar points to several challenges specific to or of greater concern to women including food insecurity, the loss of property and lands, the risk of human trafficking in conflict areas, the increased burdens placed on women taking up non-traditional roles in the absence of males (albeit conversely, the opportunities that come with it) and increased physical insecurity. While comprehensive data is unavailable, available information points to the use of sexual violence as a tool of war and the increased risk of sexual violence, trafficking, forced marriages and domestic violence in conflict areas. Women are traditionally more disadvantaged in recovering their socio-economic capacities post-war, given pre-existing vulnerabilities, new human security challenges in transition periods, relatively weaker access to socio-economic opportunities and relatively weaker representation in decision-making at the local level, including on security and protection matters.

On 15 October 2015, the Government of Myanmar (GoM) and eight EAOs signed a 'Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement' (NCA), marking a fresh effort to end the country's protracted civil war. While the NCA is incomplete – a further seven EAOs involved in the negotiations did not sign the document and three others have been excluded from signing the NCA by the previous government– it created the foundations for ceasefire monitoring and national political dialogue.

The NCA lays out the key principles, objectives and mechanisms that were agreed between conflict parties for securing an enduring peace. It sets-up the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC) to ensure compliance with the ceasefire agreement and the Union Peace

Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) for laying out the framework and roadmap for political dialogue.

Myanmar's peace process remains fragile. Fighting between Myanmar's military forces (Tatmadaw) and ethnic EAOs, and between EAOs, continues to flare up in Kachin, Shan, Rakhine and Kayin states.

On 30 March 2016, Myanmar's National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government was sworn in, following a historic landslide victory at the 8 November 2015 general election. While there was initial uncertainty as to whether the new Government would continue a peace process it did not start, its engagement to-date reflects an overall level of comfort with the process (and mechanisms set-up through it) to-date and no interest for complete overhaul of the progress made to-date. Since assuming the position of State Counsellor at the helm of government, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has repeatedly emphasized the importance her government places on making progress towards peace and her intention to take a direct role in leading it.

The international donor community is eager to support the new government's peace agenda. The UN, by virtue of its impartiality and technical expertise, is well-placed to contribute. The United Nations (UN) has already consistently assisted and invested in the country's peace process, in particular through the work of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General (SASG) on Myanmar. One of the unique features of the Myanmar peace process is that it has been largely nationally driven, without an explicit facilitation or mediation role from international actors. One implication is that some of the standard sequencing of international engagement in peace processes, including forums for aid coordination around peacebuilding have been absent to-date. The NCA and its mechanisms, while informed by international comparative experiences and technical support, are nationally established, owned and driven. Going forward, international partners, including the UN, will need to respect the principle of national ownership beyond its rhetorical value, and build on, support and strengthen these national structures to support the nation's journey towards lasting peace.

On 24 February 2016, the United Nations Resident Coordinator (UNRC) was formally requested by the JMC for UN support, both in the interim and longer-term. On 16 May 2016, the UNRC was formally requested by the Office of the State Counsellor to proceed with the interim support and prepare for a Myanmar-based UN platform for longer-term support. On 1 June 2016, UNDP initiated a 3-month 'bridging support' using a Micro-Capital Grant Agreement (MCGA) to support the JMC through its designated Technical Secretariat Centre (TSC-JMC)<sup>6</sup>. This support was subsequently extended until end-December 2016, to bridge the time needed to set-up the UN Platform. UNDP's bridge support has enabled the JMC political committees to convene; continue SOP drafting; undertake pilot verification and monitoring missions; put in place a TSC office at central level staffed by a stopgap team, and contract staff for the state/regional offices in some locations. The nature of this "bridging" support is different to that envisaged through a UN Platform. For example, the support is institutional and the UN does not have an explicit substantive role. At the same time, experiences from this period demonstrate the need for building trust with all stakeholders and for incrementally and carefully increasing

<sup>6</sup> The Technical Secretariat Centre (TSC) was set up based on a consensus decision of the JMC members as the operational arm of the JMC and is led by an Executive Director and a Deputy Executive Director, both Myanmar nationals, and composed of supportive technical and administrative staff.

normative and substantive engagement with an institution that is driven by the parties (including notably the military) and more operationally, for the significant investment that will be needed for strengthening the organizational capacities of the TSC.

The UNRC also hosted a high-level formulation mission in July 2016, who undertook consultations with the Government; Tatmadaw; JMC leadership, including EAO and civilian representatives; the TSC; and the international community, and provided recommendations on the structure and role of a possible "UN Platform" to assist the JMC. The mission recommended creating a mechanism called the JMC Support Platform; established and managed in-country; and serving as a conduit for international assistance to the JMC and providing coordinated financial, institutional and technical capacity building in support of the JMC's mandate and functions vis-à-vis the NCA. The mission also recommended adopting a phased approach, with an initial 12-month phase and a subsequent scale-up phase. The mission further recommended that this support platform is set-up as a local project structure and managed by UNDP in Myanmar.

In line with the mission's recommendations, the UN/UNDP has devised a 2-phase proposal, to allow for the establishment of the JMC structure in all six states and testing of a set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) within an initial 12-month phase, and a subsequent 3-year phase. This approach is designed to: a) aid the JMC and in turn the Platform to adjust its scope in response to changes in the peace process; b) allow the Platform to undertake an assessment of technical assistance needs to provide for predictable technical support to the JMC in the longer-term; c) facilitate a more informed multi-year phase based on the lessons of phase one.

The UN is keen to maintain a careful balance between respecting the JMC as a nationally driven mechanism while leveraging its normative and substantive role in supporting the JMC to undertake its core functions effectively, credibly and informed by international best practices, wherein lies the UN value-addition in heading-up the Platform. This balance to be struck is even more critical, given that the request for UN support to the JMC comes after the initial set-up of the JMC, and where the broad parameters of the JMC's structure, mandate and core functions have already been configured through a joint (EAO, Civil Society and Army) consultative process. The re-opening of these agreements to incorporate new approaches will require time and sustained advocacy. Against this reality, this phased approach for the Platform also allows the UN to establish trust and credibility with the JMC stakeholders and to incrementally strengthen its normative and substantive contributions on a stronger foundation of trust.

Currently, and against a first year budget of USD \$7.8 million, the JMC Support Platform anticipates securing approximately between USD \$4-5 million (including the proposed/requested PBF contribution). The UN is confident that it will be able to meet the full funding requirement over the course of the first year on a rolling basis (as well as for the subsequent years), particularly once the proposed donor coordination mechanism is set-up providing a platform for presenting these needs with strong endorsements from both the JMC and the GoM. In the event that the full resource needs are unmet, the UN and JMC will adjust the operational scope of the Platform to a phased operationalization without compromising on the core mandate and activities of the JMC. The work-plan and budgeting for the Platform has been undertaken with this in mind where, for example, recruitment will be undertaken in a phased manner over the course of the first year, and priority will be given to establishing offices in areas with the highest risk of ceasefire violation(s).

In broad terms, the international community is also well-positioned to provide support to the JMC over the next few years. China has already offered support over a three-year period (USD 1 million per year) and indicated a willingness to give more if needed. The multi-donor trust fund, the Joint Peace Fund (JPF) – set-up with resources from the Governments of the UK, USA, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Australia, Italy and the EU – is also actively considering providing support and is in ongoing discussions with UNDP. Norway, acting bilaterally, has recently made a USD \$150,000 contribution to the UNDP bridge funding, and in discussions to contribute an additional USD \$850,000 before the end of 2016. Other donors, including Switzerland and Japan, have expressed a willingness to engage in a sustained way with the UN Platform. The GoM through the office of the State Counsellor has conveyed to the UN its intention to send letters to the donor community asking that all consider supporting the JMC Support Platform administered by the UN.

At the same time, there are clear, and ultimately healthy, reservations expressed by many donors that while they are willing to give the benefit of the doubt to a new institution during its initial set-up period, long-term and more substantial support will be contingent upon the mechanism demonstrating its effectiveness in fulfilling its mandated role. In this regard, the JMC's multi-year funding prospects are strong but also closely tied to its own performance in the first year.

#### **b) Mapping of existing peacebuilding activities and gaps:**

At track one level, and as mentioned earlier, the NCA's JMC and UPDJC structures serve as the joint mechanisms for the ceasefire parties to uphold the ceasefire (the NCA) and engage in political dialogue. The UPDJC is made up of 16 representatives from the government, 16 from EAOs and 16 from political parties.

As a continuation of the inaugural 'Union Peace Dialogue' meeting held in January 2016 during the previous government's term, a '21st Century Panglong Conference' was held in August 2016.<sup>7</sup> The conference, which (re-)launched the national political dialogue process under the NLD's watch, saw attendance by both NCA signatory EAOs and non-signatory EAOs, along with political actors. Although it was a positive step that both EAO's and non-signatory EAO's attended, the conference did not discuss substantive issues to the extent that many parties had hoped for. The agenda for the next instalment of the conference, scheduled to take place in February 2017, is still taking shape. A parallel civil society forum will be held to feed civil society perspectives into the conference.

Following the signing of the NCA, the previous government, together with the Tatmadaw and EAOs, put their weight behind establishing the JMC mechanism. Upon taking office in April of this year, the State Counsellor has unambiguously endorsed the JMC. The GoM-Tatmadaw-EAO representation on the JMC, which was established under the previous government, has been maintained. The State Counsellor's support for the JMC is underscored by her 17 May 2016 letter to the UN Resident Coordinator in Myanmar,

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<sup>7</sup> The rebranding seeks to evoke the historic 1947 Panglong Conference which saw ethnic leaders and the State Counsellor's father, Aung San, agree to form together the post-independence Union of Burma.



which explicitly requests UN support for the JMC's implementation of the NCA (see section I. c), below, for further details).

There seems to be a consensus that the NCA and JMC provide a bedrock for political dialogue; that it must deliver results if the peace process is to be sustained, and will potentially be broadened to include current non-signatories. The ongoing flare-ups between the Tatmadaw and non-signatory EAOs in Northern Shan and the recent escalation in tensions in Rakhine, reinforce this imperative.

Additionally, at the formal level, on the GoM's side, there is a National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC) in place, which is in some ways an offshoot of the former Government's Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC)<sup>8</sup>, which was mandated to negotiate the NCA. On the non-signatory EAO's side, negotiations are being led by a Delegation for Political Negotiation (DPN) which represents the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). The signatory EAOs, have formed a Coordination Team (CT) to liaise with the government and coordinate activities and policies among the eight groups.

With regard to peacebuilding, Myanmar's civil society peacebuilding 'community' is vibrant and dynamic. External support for this sector is also increasing, with several new donor-funded initiatives in operation, including the multi-donor Joint Peace Fund and the Peace Support Fund. There are also a number of civil society and informal local ceasefire monitoring and civilian protection activities in conflict-affected areas that could serve as valuable interfaces to the formal JMC structures at the local level.

Lack of trust is an impediment to building lasting peace. There is a pervasive lack of trust between and across key conflict parties in Myanmar, given the country's long history of conflict and authoritarian rule. Mistrust exists between the GoM and EAOs, between the GoM and CSOs and between decision-makers and communities. Many stakeholders also mistrust external actors, including international donors and organizations. There are also very few examples where conflict parties develop joint agendas and even fewer examples where they carry-out joint actions. Given the lasting hierarchical nature of decision-making in Myanmar, it is very difficult to facilitate dialogue and trust-building at the local level, if buy-in and endorsement at higher decision-making levels is not given. To this end, mechanisms such as the JMC that operate with explicit high-level buy-in provide rare and strategic entry-points for joint action at cascading levels and for building trust between parties at all levels.

The participation and representation of women in the formal peace structures (e.g. UPDJC) remains a big weakness in Myanmar's peace process. The NCA itself, only makes a passing and vague reference to gender and women's participation, and it makes no specific references to international standards including Myanmar's obligations under SCR1325 and SCR1888 which make more direct references to the situation of women in conflict and particularly in ceasefires. Women are markedly absent or under-represented in the formal peace structures at union level (this partly, but not solely explained by the fixed representation for the male-dominated Tatmadaw in these structures). Participation of women within civil society led peace initiatives is more pronounced and the evolving structures, including the JMC, at the sub-national level provide potential entry-points for addressing this gap.

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<sup>8</sup> The PBF supported the MPC under the project PBF/IRF-64 Start-up of the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC)

**Table 1 – Peacebuilding activities supported by PBF**

<b>Project outcome</b>	<b>Source of funding (Government / development partner)</b>	<b>Key Projects/ Activities</b>	<b>Duration of projects/activities</b>	<b>Budget in \$</b>
Establishment of the Centre for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH) - Myanmar	Peacebuilding Fund  In-kind contribution by the Government  CDNH	Fund, implement and monitor staff recruitment, procurement and operations in order to establish the CDNH	1 February 2015 to 31 December 2016	\$2,790.122 (PBF \$2,538.122 and CDNH \$252.000)
Contribution to Myanmar Peace Dividend Projects in Mon and Kayin States (Myanmar)	Peacebuilding Fund  UNHCR UNICEF	Building responsive governance in Mon and Kayin state strengthening peaceful co-existence in the conflict affected communities and engaging women, youth and media as critical stakeholders for peace.	July 2013 to April 2015	\$2,417.580 (PBF \$1,600.000, UNHCR \$472.580 UNICEF \$250.000)

Prevent the recruitment and use of children by armed forces/groups in Myanmar as an entry point for durable peace	Peacebuilding Fund	Support the implementation of the Joint Action Plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children by the Tatmadaw, to identify, verify and discharge underage recruits still associated with the Tatmadaw as well as support their reintegration back into their communities	Ongoing, start date 8 Oct 2015	\$1,526,890 (PBF)
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#### c) Rationale for this IRF

The IRF rationale is understood to be threefold. Firstly at the strategic level, it is a critical contribution to sustain the peace process in Myanmar, help progress the national political dialogue and eventually help reach a comprehensive peace agreement, through targeted support to a functioning JMC. Secondly, also at the strategic level, it is providing a strategic opening to boost the role of the UN as a trusted partner and neutral facilitator in the peace process. Thirdly at the catalytic level, it allows the UN Support Platform to support core JMC operations, provide foundational technical assistance to the JMC, and put in place a delivery structure to channel larger international assistance to the JMC.

The ceasefire and dialogue aspects of the NCA are inextricably linked, and the ceasefire stands as a *sine qua non* for the national peace dialogue. An effective ceasefire – as entrusted to the JMC - will create a **conducive environment for political dialogue to progress**, and ultimately arrive at a national consensus on a political settlement that will bring an end to the armed conflict(s). While this is a momentous factor in and of itself, it is even more so, given the significant number of EAOs that have not signed the NCA to-date, and whose participation in the NCA in the near future is critical for achieving a truly comprehensive peace. *A well-functioning NCA thus remains a key determinant and motivator for the remaining non-signatory EAOs to join this process.* A well-functioning and credible JMC is not an abstract political goal for these EAOs but rather a core part of their envisioned security arrangements after signing the NCA. The EAOs will not sign the NCA unless they are confident that the JMC can provide reasonable assurances for their own safety.

A further extension of this logic is that the JMC will *influence the architecture for political dialogue*. A ceasefire mechanism that reflects the principles of the NCA, embodies the spirit of ‘jointness’ and is seen to be delivering on its mandate, will set the right tone for the national political dialogue. Finally, the JMC provides the conflict parties with a *platform for modelling ‘joint structures’*. The JMC already serves as an important confidence-building mechanism between the parties to the conflict; the EAOs and Tatmadaw. Over the past 13 months, the EAOs and Tatmadaw have worked together to

define how the JMC will function, and taken some initial, but politically important, steps to make it operational. During this period, the senior leadership from both EAOs and Tatmadaw have gradually shifted from a notably cold and formal relationship to one where they routinely share meals and informally discuss matters on the margins of meetings. This confidence-building is a vital part of creating a deeper trust between the parties that will allow them to mutually signal and address needs and grievances. A JMC that credibly delivers on its mandate, particularly in resolving ceasefire-related disputes in a transparent, unbiased and consensus-based manner will considerably improve trust between the conflict parties, which in turn will lay the groundwork for what promises to be a lengthy and complex peace process.

The NCA, or more specifically its effective implementation as entrusted to the JMC, can create *conditions for peace, security and cooperation on the ground*, that are essential for delivering the dividends of peace to Myanmar's communities long-affected by violence. These dividends include providing humanitarian assistance and early recovery support for IDPs, returnees and host-communities; improving protection for at-risk groups including women and children; and creating the enabling conditions for sustainable development including through better service-delivery. Once operationalized at sub-national levels, the JMC is likely to be the most *direct point of interface between the peace process and civilians*. A mechanism that delivers in improving security and protection in communities, particularly in responding to civilian complaints, can help improve public confidence in, and support for, the national peace process.

The *effectiveness and credibility of the JMC is directly related to the technical competence of its functions and activities*, and in particular its role in monitoring, verification, reporting and resolving ceasefire violations. The JMC and the GoM recognize that the UN has an extensive history of peace-making work, and considerable technical and political expertise in the area of ceasefires. By drawing on knowledge residing in the UN's Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the JMC will be able to access information on international best practices and lessons learned in its ongoing formulation of SOPs, capacity-development and MVR activities. The explicit request for technical assistance provides **the UN with the unique opportunity to leverage its significant institutional expertise and international comparative experience** for the benefit of the people of Myanmar. Additionally, through the Support Platform, the UN can also play an important neutral facilitation role to coordinate technical assistance of different service-providers in response to assessed needs, rather than in response to the supply-driven and geo-political interests of bilateral actors.

The JMC requires significant and predictable financial support in order to undertake its mandated functions, with necessary geographic outreach, qualified personnel and programmatic resources, at central level and in areas under the NCA's jurisdiction. The JMC *will benefit from a single funding channel and one that is not hampered by conflicting interests and priorities*. Through the Support Platform, the UN will act as a *trusted 3<sup>rd</sup> party mechanism* to receive contributions from multiple donors and to allocate these resources in support of the beneficiary, the JMC. The Platform will take on the responsibility for receiving and managing funds, ensuring transparency, tracking results, and reporting, enabling the JMC to focus on its mandated functions. The Platform will also gradually strengthen the capacities of the JMC-TSC to increasingly take on this fiduciary accountability role.

The JMC's and GoM's request to the UN for support are likely motivated by a combination of valid considerations. One factor is the concern that international involvement in the peace process could feed into geopolitical frictions. The UN, by virtue of being an *impartial inter-governmental entity*, is a potentially useful partner for the GoM to utilize. Acting as a neutral broker, the UN can help navigate the geopolitical realities impacting the peace process and the broader political transition in Myanmar.

The UN's support to the JMC Support Platform will create an *important linkage between the UN and the national peace process*. This will be particularly critical during the UN's own internal transition and planning processes under the NLD-led GoM. The long-standing UN "good offices" mandate from the UN General Assembly's Third Committee was not renewed in late 2016, and the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General, Mr. Vijay Nambiar, is ending his role and closing his Myanmar office by the end of 2016. UN support to the JMC will also create an entry point for the UN system to engage with the EAOs and Tatmadaw on a range of issues (e.g. management of natural resources) that are of central importance to the peace process. Additionally, the NCA stipulates that the JMC will have a role in ensuring the protection of civilians, allowing the delivery of humanitarian assistance, conducting de-mining activities, and cooperating on the resettlement of internally displaced people (IDPs) and return of refugees. These are all areas where the UN plays a strong normative and assistance role, and the UN's relationship to the JMC can provide an important entry point for engaging on these other issues.<sup>9</sup>

In sum, the UN's institutional expertise in peace-making and ceasefires, combined with its impartiality, make it the best partner for the GoM to work with to operationalize the NCA through the work of the JMC. By engaging now with the JMC, the UN will be positioning itself as the key partner for the GoM on the peace process, and in doing so, help attract other donors to contribute tangibly to Myanmar's peace process by providing support to the JMC.

### **Catalytic effects**

The IRF contribution is catalytic because it will enable the JMC Support Platform to kick-start its proper functioning by providing a core layer of institutional support to the JMC; undertake foundational technical support for the JMC; and put in place the basic delivery structure necessary for channelling international assistance to the JMC.

To-date, the JMC stands as the most administratively solid and politically coherent entity of the national peace architecture. It has an active tripartite (EAO, Tatmadaw and civil society) representation supported by a secretariat headed by national staff. This tripartite structure has undertaken a process of negotiating the core terms of reference and operating procedures of the JMC. Given the nature of ceasefire implementation functions, and the geographic breadth that comes under the NCA's remit, *the effectiveness of the JMC will be*

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<sup>9</sup> With regard to the other pillar of the NCA, the national political dialogue, the context in relation to possible UN technical support is still taking shape, and it is unclear whether the Government or EAO's would like the UN to become more involved. The JMC has already played an important role in helping to set up the August 2016 Panglong Conference and follow-on discussions, and the UN has remained engaged on these issues with a view to identifying technical or other needs that might be requested as the national political dialogue moves forward.


*largely determined by a combination of its operational capacity and the political will of the parties to make it a functional entity*

The TSC, as the JMC's implementation arm, plays a pivotal role in fulfilling the JMC's mandate. To effectively support the JMC, TSC secretariat offices need to be set-up in close succession to committee structures. Given their technical role, the TSC also needs to be staffed with qualified personnel. Timely and predictable support to the JMC will enable the TSC to set-up and fully staff its offices at central, state/region and local levels (where the secretariat currently functions at partial strength) and attract and retain qualified personnel (where the secretariat is currently offering short-term contracts). Timely support to the JMC is necessary to ensure that there is no lapse in its current core operations from the current support provided by the UNDP bridge funding, but also to enable the JMC to step up its operational capacity to fulfil the full scope of its mandated functions vis-à-vis the NCA.

**Table 2 – JMC & TSC basic structure**

The JMC is one of the NCA's key instruments, mandated to serve as an effective mechanism for upholding the ceasefire, by monitoring commitments of the parties under the NCA. As per the NCA, the JMC is constituted through committees at union, state/region and local levels (JMC-U, JMC-S and JMC-L) and additionally, through joint verification teams.

The Technical Secretariat Center (TSC) functions as the JMC's implementation and technical arm. The TSC was established in January 2016 by policy decision of the JMC-



U.

The JMC is currently following a phased-implementation approach based on consensus decision making.

Having established its core functions at union level with an office and 23 staff, the JMC is currently starting its state level presence in 6 states and setting up state level TSCs with a total staff capacity of 12 (2 in each office). While the JMC has jointly established its own ToRs and finalized a handful of critical SOPs, there is a significant volume of technical work to be undertaken to have all SOPs in place, and to improve their technical rigor and normative standards. Pilot monitoring and verification missions were undertaken during October and November 2016. Additionally, the TSC does not have sufficient capacity in place to manage the full operationalization of the JMC and will require more skilled human resources as well as effective and efficient rules and procedures in place in order to fulfil its role as the functioning arm of the JMC.

The JMC intends to evolve from its current incipient/temporary operational capacity to be a fully functioning mechanism that fulfils its core mandate by the end of 2017. At full strength, JMC bodies will be made-up of 204 representatives. The TSC is correspondingly constituted at union, state/region and local level. At full strength, the TSC will be staffed by 139 personnel.

Operationally this means the JMC mechanisms will be up and running at central level, in 6 states/regions and 10 priority local areas; the JMC will maintain and convene its committee bodies at all levels; it will draft, test and put in place SOPs; develop the

capacities of its committee bodies and staff; undertake monitoring, verification and reporting (MVR) activities beyond current pilot activities; and undertake information-sharing and community outreach activities. The UN engagement will provide critical administrative oversight, both with regard to the JMC's finances and staffing selection, and capacity-building activities. The UN will also be in critical position to ensure that the JMC develops its substantive monitoring and verification efforts informed by international normative standards and best practices.

The JMC has undertaken planning discussions about an expansion of coverage to incorporate the EAOs that opt to sign the NCA in the months ahead. This has included a preliminary identification of potential sites for JMC-S offices and corresponding staffing and logistical needs.

The catalytic nature of the IRF contribution can be highlighted as follows: With IRF support, the Platform will provide a core layer of institutional support to the JMC in the first year of its operation. This support will enable the JMC to maintain existing core operational capacities at central level, step-up operations at state/region levels and initiate the first phase of operationalization at local level in 5 priority locations. This initial injection of support is catalytic because the effectiveness and credibility of the JMC rests largely in its ability to maintain multi-level operations in order to undertake its core functions.

With IRF support, the Platform will undertake **foundational technical support activities**. Primarily, this will include a comprehensive assessment of the JMC's technical needs covering the full scope of ceasefire implementation, MVR, and cross-cutting issues such as gender and human rights protection. This assessment is catalytic because it will serve as the foundational reference for the Platform's technical assistance provision to the JMC. Prior to the conduct of this needs assessment, and recognizing that there will be more immediate technical needs, the IRF support will be utilized to provide short-term technical assistance to the JMC through short-term expert placements, training and exchange visits. In addition, the UN support will include the recruitment of at least one senior UN ceasefire expert. The expert will be co-located in the JMC offices and serve as a permanent real-time advisory service to the JMC and its TSC.

With IRF support, the Platform will put in place the **basic delivery structure** necessary for channelling international (financial and technical) assistance to the JMC in an accountable manner. Concretely, this support will be used to set-up a small project management team, with the responsibility for day-to-day management and implementation of the Platform project as well as strengthening the institutional capacities of the TSC. This is catalytic because the ability of the Platform to live up to its fiduciary accountability role in the early phase will build donor confidence and broaden donor support.

Potential donors have indicated that strong initial support from the UN (including from the PBF/IRF) will send a strong signal of UN support to the overall peace process and would likely serve to catalyse support from other donors to the project and by extension, allow the JMC to effectively carry out its mandate as described in the NCA.

Although there is strong donor commitment to supporting the JMC, most of this support is unlikely to be made available for some months. This is partly due to the fact that the



government's donor coordination mechanism – the Joint Coordination Body (JCB) has yet to become operational – and its start is now slated for late 2016 or early in 2017. And some donors will likely await this mechanism to finalize their commitments to the JMC and other aspects of the peace support. Therefore, the IRF support enables the Platform to kick-start the more substantive and technical support to the JMC, while waiting for other resources to become available.

A break in the JMC's work and development at this critical point, because of a lack of funding, risks the loss of the political momentum which is currently behind it. Given that the JMC is also a significant confidence-building measure for the peace process, opportunities for the development of stronger rapport between the Tatmadaw and EAOs (especially non-signatories) will also be lost.

Moreover, a prolonged period of technical capacity constraints – particularly if a serious breach of the NCA occurs – may lead to an erosion in the JMC's ability to effectively implement the NCA. At this time, Myanmar can ill afford the JMC's credibility to be eroded or for it to fail. By providing strategic and financial support to the work of the JMC at this juncture, the UN can inject much needed impetus and support to the implementation of the NCA and make a real contribution to Myanmar's peace process.

## **II. Objectives of PBF support and proposed implementation**

### **a) Project outcomes, theory of change, activities, targets and sequencing:**

The envisaged impact of the PBF Support to the JMC Support Platform is: **the nationwide ceasefire agreement is maintained and strengthened, creating a conducive space for the national political dialogue and improving public confidence and trust in the national peace process.**

The overarching outcome of the PBF Support to the JMC Support Platform is: **The JMC engages effectively in ceasefire monitoring in accordance with the NCA.**

In order to contribute to this outcome, the key outputs of the PBF Support to the JMC Support Platform are:

- Output 1: JMC has capacity to carry out its core functions**
- Output 2: JMC's core functions are strengthened and informed by best practices**
- Output 3: A UN-led Platform in place to channel institutional and technical assistance to the JMC**

These outputs and related sub-outputs (key activity results, KARs) are described below:

#### **Output 1: JMC has capacity to carry out its core functions**

The JMC will maintain its current scale of operations at union level, step up operations in the 6 target states/regions, and start-up operations in 5 priority local areas in 5 target townships. At core operational levels, the TSC will have 44 technical and support staff at

central level, 24 programme and support staff in 6 state/region offices; and 1 programme staff each in 5 local level offices. The 6 target states/regions are: Kayah, Mon, Chin, Bago, Shan and Tanintharyi Region that cover the areas coming under the NCA, and the first 5 local level area offices to be determined by the JMC at union level based on conflict hotspots, remoteness and access. These sites provide the JMC with local capabilities for responding to ceasefire violations, and in particular, for interfacing with and addressing the complaints of communities. The JMC has invited the UN to participate as an observer on joint Army-EAO hiring panels and provide a measure of quality assurance. This has already been carried out for various recruitments and has been well-received by both parties.

This operational support enables the JMC to carry-out its core functions in a way that capitalises on ongoing learning and refinement. The JMC will have in place its core set of SOPs, including detailed arrangements for MVR and dispute resolution, conflict de-escalation and civilian monitoring; it will have undertaken capacity-development and training for committee members and staff at multi-levels planned during the first year; and have undertaken MVR activities in response to ceasefire violations and complaints; it will also have undertaken periodic information-sharing with stakeholders and run outreach activities with communities in 6 target states/regions.

The UN support to the JMC will be guided by an important framework of UN Security Council resolutions including 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010) and 2106 (2013). In addition, it will take into account the recommendations of the Myanmar Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process (AGIPP). One important measure will be to advocate that the JMC secures the minimum 30% representation of women in its political committees and corresponding secretariat structures.

#### Sub-outputs/KARS:

- The JMC tripartite mechanism established at central level, in target states/regions and in priority local areas (townships);
- JMC-TSC offices are functioning and staffed, at central level, in target states/regions and in priority local areas (townships);
- The JMC tests, puts in place and continuously improves its core SOPs on MVR, dispute resolution, conflict de-escalation and civilian monitoring;
- The JMC initiates capacity-development and training for JMC members and TSC staff on all essential normative functions of ceasefire monitoring at multi-levels;
- The JMC undertakes MVR activities in response to ceasefire violations and complaints;
- The JMC undertakes periodic information-sharing with stakeholders at all levels; and is able to run outreach activities with communities in 6 target states/regions

#### **Output 2: JMC's core functions are strengthened and informed by best practices**

On a rolling basis, the JMC's core functions and activities will be strengthened through technical advisory services, training and international exchange and exposure. In the first half of 2017, the Platform will undertake a Technical Needs Assessment (TNA) of the JMC. The purpose of a TNA is to assess the JMC's technical needs vis-à-vis its core functions in order to develop a TA plan for the Support Platform in both phase I and phase

2 of the Support Platform project. Based on the results, technical assessment will be provided on a demand basis and responsive to specific stakeholder needs. The TNA will provide a key entry-point for the UN to engage with the JMC on its mandate, on SOPs that have already been formulated, on SOPs that need to be formulated, on context-specific provisions relating to humanitarian access, demining, IDPs etc., and more broadly on security and protection issues that fall within the NCA's remit. By mid-2017, a TA plan will be devised and validated, which will allow the Platform to plan, source and provide TA to the JMC and TSC in a more systematic and effective manner. In the interim, the JMC's immediate technical needs will be met through technical expert placements, training and exposure visits. With this support, the normative and technical substance of the JMC's functions and activities will improve in line with international standards.

The Platform's TA will also prioritize the issue of gender, in order to strengthen awareness of the JMC on gender issues as they pertain to ceasefires and to strengthen the gender responsiveness of the JMC's SOPs, capacity-development and MVR activities.

A Technical Support Group (TSG) drawn from the UN, donors, development partners, I/NGOs and civil society, both in-country and remotely based, will be set-up and will guide the provision of technical assistance to the Platform. The TSG will also serve as a mechanism to coordinate different offers of technical support to the JMC from various service-providers.

**Sub-outputs/KARS:**

- A validated multiannual technical assistance provision plan is in place for the JMC
- The Platform puts in place a mechanism for coordinating technical support - Technical Support Group
- The JMC benefits from access to an in-house technical expert, and capacity-development and exposure to international comparative experience including on key ceasefire interface issues such as gender and human rights protection

**Output 3: A UN-led Platform in place to channel institutional and technical assistance to the JMC**

In early 2017, the Platform will set-up a core delivery structure to perform the functions of receiving, coordinating, channelling and being accountable for international assistance to the JMC. A small UNDP project management team, made-up of a project manager, a deputy project manager, finance associate and administrative associate, will be in place, and working within the TSC. This team will be responsible for all day-to-day project management functions, i.e. with the JMC they will devise annual work plans, budgets and targets; convene project boards, undertake donor reporting; and support audits and evaluations. The UNDP project team will undertake a capacity needs assessment of the TSC during the initial months of the project. Based on the results of this assessment, the TSC will be able to test and put in place SOPs for procurement, human resource management and finance to ensure that administrative systems are functioning according to international standards. By end-2017, it is assumed that the TSC will be administratively stronger (assessed by a year-end capacity assessment and financial audit) and thus incrementally able to take on some of the functions performed by the UNDP project team

during the multi-year phase (2018-2020). Also, by end-2017, the full multi-year JMC Support Platform will be set-up and resourced.

**Sub-outputs/KARS:**

- The core delivery, governance and M&E structures for the JMC Support Platform are set-up and maintained.
- The administrative capacities of the TSC are strengthened
- The multi-year JMC Support Platform is designed and set-up

The Peacebuilding Fund's support will be provided in two tranches, as indicated on this project document cover page. The second tranche will be released upon completion of the following key milestones: a validated Technical Needs Assessment and capacity building plan; recruitment of required posts from union, state and local levels in at least one state; and capitalisation of the JMC Support Platform of at least an additional \$2,750,000 from other donors for 2017.

**b) Theory of Change**

This Theory of Change explains how the project will contribute to long-term change, what changes the project will directly aim to contribute to; how and through which pathways change will happen, and what assumptions and risks underpin the assessment.

**Problem statement**

The internal conflict in Myanmar is one of the *world's longest-running internal conflicts*. The conflict landscape is complex and multifaceted with multiple conflicts occurring in different parts of the country's territory. While each conflict has a different historical trajectory, the key contestations are between the Bamar-dominated state and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) over the degree and nature of self-determination, future power- and resource sharing mechanism, and the assertion and protection of ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural identities. The strong link between progress on the national political dialogue, and in parallel, progress on a number of *key political questions around federalism, decentralization and constitutional reform* adds to the complexity, while at the same time reinforces the key role the NCA plays for the wider political dialogue to progress.

*Distrust* between the military (Tatmadaw) and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), resulting from decades of conflict and military rule, and associated human rights abuses, is deep-seated. Mistrust also exists between the GoM and CSOs, between decision-makers on all sides and communities. Many stakeholder groups also mistrust external actors, including donors and international organizations. Mistrust between stakeholders and between groups is a *barrier to peace and development* and there are still few opportunities for systematic dialogue and working together.

*Myanmar's peace process remains nascent and highly fragile*, as highlighted by continued fighting between the Tatmadaw and non-signatory EAOs in different parts of the country. This at the same time also highlights the importance to make full use of the existing structures as laid out in the NCA and create the environment and conditions for the peace process (and the national political dialogue) to become more inclusive.

In other areas of Myanmar where ceasefire agreements have been widely sustained, *communities are waiting to see concrete peace dividends at the local level*. Communities

are vulnerable to conflict, poverty, land-grabbing and natural resource exploitation, systemic prevalence of sexual and gender based violence, both conflict-related and otherwise. Local groups and communities feel and are widely excluded from peacebuilding, governance and local development activities. This is largely due to the *limited trickle-down of information from decision-makers*; limited information sources available to communities; *and relatively weak channels for citizens' participation*. Without meaningful ways through which they can learn about and participate in peacebuilding, and local development, local groups and communities remain largely mistrustful of and isolated and excluded from these efforts, and neither can their voices be adequately heard.

*Limited capacities for engagement, facilitation, dialogue and peacebuilding.* While there are numerous activities at various levels and scopes, there is still immense potential for strengthening the capacities of the cross-section of stakeholders to engage more meaningfully in peacebuilding and subsequently governance and development. Many stakeholders have relatively poor technical knowledge and skills on issues they are mandated to work on and little exposure and knowledge to good practices or international standards.

#### **Long-term change**

This project will support the establishment and ongoing functioning of the JMC as the official national ceasefire monitoring and dispute resolution mechanism in Myanmar to engage effectively in ceasefire monitoring in accordance with the NCA and international standards.

A well-functioning and credible JMC will contribute to increased public confidence and trust in the overall national peace process by showing that the parties to the NCA have the capacity to solve ceasefire violations without resorting to violence. A well-functioning and credible JMC will also encourage other EAOs (non-signatories) to join the NCA. It will further create a supportive environment for the national political dialogue that will encourage long-term peacebuilding and open up discussions on related issues such as demining, humanitarian assistance, inclusive local development, and the return of IDPs.

#### **Pathways to change**

In order to achieve the project outcome – effective ceasefire monitoring in accordance with the NCA and international standards – and to contribute to sustaining ceasefire arrangements in the country, to progress in the national political dialogue, and to building of public confidence and trust in the peace process, the following key intermediary changes are expected building on realization of project outputs:

- i) the JMC tripartite mechanism is established and operational at central level, as well as initially in 6 target states/regions and in 5 priority locations and reaching over time full operational scope;
- ii) trust and relationship building among the JMC members is enhanced;
- iii) JMC SOPs, policies and good practices at all levels are effectively guiding JMC/TSC operations and MVR activities are being set up and continuously adjusted in accordance with international best practice;
- iv) the Civilian component of the JMC becomes operational;
- v) information sharing, outreach of JMC to populations in target areas results in increased public trust in the JMC mechanism;
- vi) the equal participation of men and women in the functioning of the JMC is visibly enhanced;

- vii) the Multiyear technical assistance plan (based on TNA) is agreed upon and rolled out;
- viii) a coordination mechanism for provision of needs based technical assistance to the JMC is established; and
- ix) the TSC functions in an effective, efficient, accountable and credible manner as the operational arm for all areas of JMC operations.

### **Assumptions**

The project rests on a number of assumptions:

- i) continued support from the Myanmar Government and the Office of the State Counsellor to the NCA and the JMC platform;
- ii) NCA signatories continue to support the implementation of the NCA according to the principles and objectives stipulated herein;
- iii) the JMC will continue to function as an effective platform for joint decision making, ceasefire monitoring, verification and reporting by signatories;
- iv) enhanced cooperation and dialogue within the JMC will lead to better conflict resolution and trust among NCA signatories;
- v) if more EAOs join the NCA and the JMC over time, a positive momentum towards a nationwide ceasefire agreement will be maintained; and
- vi) the interest of donors and development partners to fund the JMC to fully implement its operational mandate will be sustained.

On the operational and management side it is assumed that the JMC will be able and willing to continuously expand and adapt its procedures on MVR functions in accordance with established normative practices of ceasefire monitoring, and to progressively set up and strengthen civilian components, public outreach and gender equality at all levels of its operations. For this to happen it is also assumed that the role of the Technical Service Centre (TSC), as the operational arm of the JMC will be maintained and strengthened, and that the TSC based on the inputs and capacity development received by the JMC support platform will be able to increase its administrative, financial and technical capacities to increasingly take over responsibilities from the UNDP project team.

### **Stakeholders**

Key stakeholders are the members of the JMC and the staff of the TSC who will be the direct partners and main beneficiaries of the JMC Support Platform through the implementation of the UNDP-administered project. The Platform will support JMC members and TSC staff to work directly with civilian monitors as well as to reach out to the public regarding the NCA and the JMC. The project will be embedded in the wider Myanmar peace support architecture, and linked to other relevant national structures and mechanisms (e.g. UPDJC, NRPC, JCB). The funding partners of the Support Platform will also be represented in the UNDP project's governance structure.

### **Risks**

Among the key risks are;

- i) weak functionality of the JMC despite strong technical and financial support for activity roll out based on political factors and/or technical capacity gaps (including within the TSC);
- ii) lack of progress towards a wider group of EAOs (including non-signatories) becoming partners of the NCA and the JMC, thus impeding progress in the national political dialogue;
- iii) limitations of the UN's own administrative and technical procedures preventing the JMC from becoming a fully functional and credible entity;
- iv) tension and competition among the development partners/donors with the UN on its lead role for setting up the Support Platform thus negatively impacting on the capacity of the UN to deliver in financial and/or technical terms;
- v) lack of funding by donors/development partners thus limiting the functionality of JMC to fulfil its mandate.

c) **Budget:** Provide the envisaged project budget, using the two tables below: (1) activity by activity budget and (2) UN Categories budget. Provide any additional remarks on the scale of the budget and value-for-money, referring to the Value for Money checklist.

**Table 3: Project Activity Budget**

Outcome/ Output number	Output name	Output budget by RUNO	UN budget category (see table below for list of categories)	Any remarks (e.g. on types of inputs provided or budget justification)
<b>Outcome 1: JMC engages effectively in ceasefire monitoring in accordance with NCA and international standards</b>				
<b>Output 1: JMC has capacity to carry out its core functions</b>				
Sub-Output 1.1.	The JMC tripartite mechanism established at central level in target states/regions and in priority township locations	442,230	Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	Meeting costs (air-fare, ground travel, accommodation and allowances for multi-level committee meetings.
Sub-Output 1.2	JMC-TSC offices are functioning and staffed, at central level, in target states/regions and in priority local areas	473,576	Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	Core HR posts and phase 1 hires

Sub-Output 1.3	The JMC tests and puts in place its core SOPs for MVR, dispute resolution, conflict de-escalation and civilian monitoring	136,788	Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	
Sub-Output 1.4	The JMC initiates capacity-development and training for JMC members and TSC staff on all essential normative functions of ceasefire monitoring at multi-levels	443,800	Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	Meeting costs (air-fare, ground travel, accommodation and allowances for training workshops, budgeted for up to 2 central level trainings and a training each in 6 target states/regions.
Sub-Output 1.5	The JMC undertakes MVR activities in response to ceasefire violations and complaints	151,020	Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	Air-fare, ground travel, accommodation and allowances for verification teams, budgeted for up to 1 JMC-U MVR mission; state/region MVR missions and monthly regular JMC-L MVR activities
Sub-Output 1.6	JMC undertakes periodic information-sharing with stakeholders at all levels and outreach with communities in target states/regions	89,170	Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	Meeting costs, allowances, research and publications and billboards in all target states/regions.
Output 2: JMC's core functions are strengthened and informed by international standards				



Sub-Output 2.1	A validated multiannual technical assistance provision plan is in place for the JMC	106,000	Contractual services and travel	A technical consultant to undertake the TNA and related travel
Sub-Output 2.2	The Platform puts in place a mechanism for coordinating technical support - Technical Support Group	NA	NA	
Sub-Output 2.3	The JMC benefits from access to a long-term technical consultant, capacity-development and exposure to international comparative experience including on key ceasefire interface issues such as gender and human rights protection	100,000	Contractual services and travel	Short-term consultants, related travel, meeting costs
<b>Output 3: A UN-led Platform in place to channel institutional and technical assistance to the JMC</b>				
Sub-Output 3.1	Core delivery, governance and M&E structures for the JMC Support Platform set-up and maintained	148,284	Contractual services and travel	2/3 of the costs of project manager (4 months), deputy project manager (3 months), finance associate (3 months), administrative associate (3 months)  5% standard allocation for M&E activities

Sub-Output 3.2	Strengthened administrative capacities of the TSC	24,000	Contractual services and travel	Training costs, short-term consultants, contracts for undertaking capacity-assessments of the TSC at inception and mid-point
Sub-Output 3.3	Lessons learned from phase one formalised (through a learning event)	20,000	Contractual services and travel	
Sub-Output 3.4	Design and set-up of a multi-year JMC Support Platform based on phase 1 experience	74,142	Contractual services and travel	1/3 of the costs of project manager (4 months), deputy project manager (3 months), finance associate (3 months), administrative associate (3 months)

**Table 4: Project budget by UN categories**

<b>PBF PROJECT BUDGET</b>			
<b>CATEGORIES</b>	<b>First Tranche</b>	<b>Second Tranche</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
1. Staff and other personnel	75,000	34,648	109,648
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials			
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)			
4. Contractual services	120,000	80,000	200,000
5. Travel	20,000	30,000	50,000
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts#	1,290,972	445,612	1,736,584
7. General Operating and other Direct Costs	40,335	72,443	112,778
<b>Sub-Total Project Costs</b>	<b>1,546,307</b>	<b>662,703</b>	<b>2,209,010</b>
9. Indirect Support Costs*	108,241	46,389	154,630
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,654,548</b>	<b>709,093</b>	<b>2,363,641</b>

\* The rate shall not exceed 7% of the total of categories 1-7, as specified in the PBF MOU and should follow the rules and guidelines of each recipient organization. Note that Agency-incurred direct project implementation costs should be charged to the relevant budget line, according to the Agency's regulations, rules and procedures.

Note:

# Breakdown for budget line #6 (transfers and grants to counterparts) is as follows:

Human resources (Union, State, Local): \$300,806

Secretariats (Union, State, Local) set-up costs: \$315,000

Secretariats (Union, State, Local) running costs: \$300,000

meeting, travel, allowance costs for tripartite policy meetings (Union, State, Local): \$136,788

resource-person, meeting, travel, allowance costs for JMC and TSC training (Union, State, Local): \$443,800

meeting, travel, allowance costs for MVR (Union, State, Local): \$151,020

meeting and publications costs for outreach: \$89,170

Total (line 6): \$1,736,584

#### **d) Capacity of RUNO(s) and implementing partners:**

UNDP has been providing development assistance to the people of Myanmar since the 1950s. It has an annual budget of approximately US\$25 million and has a total of 141 staff. By virtue of coming under the oversight of the Resident Representative, UNDP is closely linked to the political role of the UN Resident Coordinator in Myanmar.

UNDP has worked with the JMC since June 2016 through the bridge funding arrangements.

UNDP was a RUNO for the PBF-funded *Contribution to Myanmar Peace Dividend Projects in Mon and Kayin States (Myanmar)*, which was implemented in a region of Myanmar where much of the JMC's work is expected to take place.

<b>Table 4: Overview of RUNO funding in the country</b>				
	<b><u>Name</u></b>	<b><u>Key Source of Funding (Govt. Donor etc.)</u></b>	<b><u>Annual Regular Budget in \$</u></b>	<b><u>Annual Emergency Budget (e.g. CAP)</u></b>
<u>2013</u>	<u>UNDP</u>	<u>UNDP Core funding</u>	<u>9,311,805</u>	
		<u>Bilateral Donors (Non-Core funding)</u>	<u>17,405,843</u>	
<u>2014</u>	<u>UNDP</u>	<u>UNDP Core Funding</u>	<u>8,312,606</u>	
		<u>Bilateral Donors (Non-Core funding)</u>	<u>11,800,008</u>	
<u>2015</u>	<u>UNDP</u>	<u>UNDP Core Funding</u>	<u>9,427,182</u>	
		<u>Bilateral Donors (Non-Core funding)</u>	<u>18,333,491</u>	
<u>2016</u>	<u>UNDP</u>	<u>UNDP Core Funding</u>	<u>8,356,787</u>	
		<u>Bilateral Donors (Non-Core funding)</u>	<u>16,613,017</u>	

### **III. Management and coordination**

#### **a) Project management:**

##### **Implementation arrangements**

This project will be directly implemented (DIM) by UNDP. All UNDP projects in Myanmar are currently implemented using DIM. Under DIM, UNDP will bear full responsibility and accountability to manage the project, achieve project outputs and ensure the efficient use of funds. UNDP as Implementing Partner can enter into agreements with other entities, i.e. Responsible Parties – government institutions, other UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations – to deliver project outputs. The TSC-JMC will function as a Responsible Party for carrying out key project activities and producing key project outputs. The TSC-JMC is identified as the Responsible Party without competitive procurement or selection, because it is the exclusive and mandated entity established to fulfil ceasefire implementation functions on behalf of the JMC.

Acting on behalf of UNDP, the day-to-day management of the project will be delegated to a Project Management Unit (PMU). The PMU will be located at the JMC-TSC and will be staffed by a Project Manager (P-4), Deputy Project Manager (national), a Finance Officer (national) and an Administrative Officer (national). The Project Manager shall be recruited based on a mix of managerial and substantive qualities that include technical

UN Peace and Development Advisor, will receive technical advice and political analysis, as well as access to UN Secretariat (e.g. DPA and DPKO) resources including the Mediation Support Unit, and consultation with staff involved in peace missions with ceasefire monitoring duties. An international consultant(s) will also be recruited on a temporary basis to coordinate the provision of technical assistance and capacity-building activities to the JMC-TSC.

PDA

With regard to coordination between the project and other aspects of Myanmar's peace architecture, the project will maintain a line of communication with the NCA-established Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting, and the National Peace and Reconciliation Committee.

During the hiring process the project will be managed by existing UNDP staff supported by RCO staff. The Peace and Development Advisor will provide technical advice, particularly during the initial roll-out of the project. The PDA will also ensure that the UN system wide capacities will be accessed in undertaking and providing quality assurance/oversight of specific technical work - such as for ceasefire monitoring involving relevant expert capacities from DPKO and DPA.

Although UNDP will be the implementing partner, the UNRC will have the overall responsibility for the project, hence will have the possibility to tap into other UNCT members' areas of expertise and ensure complementarity with other projects in the same sector.

### **Management arrangements and oversight**

This project will fall under the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP 2013-2017). The CPAP comes under the oversight of a Steering Committee established to guide overall Programme implementation, which is co-chaired by UNDP and the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MoPF) and made-up of government counterparts and contributing donors and convened annually or as requested by the Chairs. The CPAP further sub-divides into programme pillars and outputs, which are in turn governed by corresponding pillar and output boards. The project will be established as a new project (output) under the existing pillar 1 programme within the current programme cycle. The multi-year Platform project will be housed under the new CPAP (2018 and onwards).

A Project Board (steering mechanism) will bear overall authority for the project and responsibility for its initiation, direction, review and eventual closure. The Project Board is the highest authority of the project. The Project Board will review and endorse workplans and progress reports and provide direction and recommendations including on risk management. The Project Board will comprise of the following:

PrBd

- Project Executive: Representing the project ownership and acting as the chair. This function will be undertaken jointly by the UN Resident Coordinator or her/his delegated representative and joint Government and EAO representatives.
- Senior Supplier: Providing guidance regarding the overall feasibility of the project. This function will be undertaken by UNDP, contributing donors and in the event of government cost-sharing, the Government of Myanmar (GoM).

- **Senior Beneficiary:** Ensuring the realization of project benefits from the perspective of beneficiaries. This function will be primarily undertaken by the 3 co-chairs of the JMC or their delegated representative. They may invite JMC representatives from union, state and local levels and CSO and community representatives to participate as additional beneficiaries in the Project Board.

It is important to note that this project has important political and peacebuilding ramifications of relevance to not only UNDP, as implementing entity, but also to the UNCT and broader UN System in Myanmar. Thus the UNCT and relevant UN entities will be kept up to date on the evolution of this project, in part with a view to enabling other agencies to develop complementary programmatic activities.

UNDP, through the UN Resident Coordinator will keep relevant Headquarters entities informed about project-related developments, and receive strategic and policy-related advice as relevant.

The project will adhere to output and outcome indicators in its Annual Work Plan (AWP), which will be monitored using the resources established there-in, based on an annual monitoring plan. The Project will also comply with the following, adhering to UNDP's policies.

- A quarterly progress report, on progress against pre-defined quarterly targets;
- An annual report, on progress and results against pre-defined annual targets;
- An issue and risk log, regularly updated;
- Bi-annual and annual progress reports submitted to the Project Board and project reports submitted to PBSO (15 June and 15 November); and
- The Project will be subject to a final external evaluation and an audit.

### **Funding arrangements**

Donor contributions will be considered as specific and earmarked contributions to the JMC Support Platform Project and formalized through individual cost-sharing agreements with UNDP. Financial resources will be received into the Project without earmarking against specific activities, to allow for the Project to deliver a comprehensive response.

Rep

b) Risk management:

Table 5 – Risk management matrix

Risks to the achievement of PBF outcomes	Likelihood of occurrence (high, medium, low)	Severity of risk impact (high, medium, low)	Mitigating Strategy (and Person/Unit responsible)
Weak functionality of the JMC due to internal causes	Medium	High	<p>There is a risk that the JMC, due to a combination of its own political and technical issues, is unable to credibly carry out its basic monitoring and investigative functions. The UN can play a supportive role but ultimately it cannot substitute for a lack of political will or a lack of institutional capacity.</p> <p>The primary strategy for mitigation of this reputational risk is for the UN to place reasonable and realistic pre-requisites on the JMC as conditions for its engagement and sustained support. The JMC is interested in the UN as a partner for funding support, technical expertise and legitimization of its work before the Myanmar public and broader international community. As the JMC continues its roll-out and begins to mature, the UN must also communicate that it expects certain basic standards of functionality and professionalism to be met. In this regard, the UN can be strongly supportive, while noting that it reserves the option of withdrawing from the</p>

			partnership if the JMC is not making reasonable progress against a number of benchmarks.
Weak functionality of the JMC due to the UN's limitations	Low	Medium	<p>The risk is that the UN's own administrative and technical limitations impede the JMC from becoming a functional and credible entity. This could include, for example, excessively bureaucratic processes for disbursement of funding or procurement of goods and services, and difficulties and delays in identifying and contracting suitable technical staff.</p> <p>This also translates into a reputational risk as the UN would be both associated with a potentially flawed mechanism and blamed for its failings.</p> <p>Mitigating the risk might include UNDP exploring expedited procurement and hiring rules for exceptional contexts. Personnel with relevant ceasefire monitoring expertise, most of which likely reside in current or former peace mission staff (DPA or DPKO) will need to be identified and contracted appropriately. Given the time sensitive nature of the process, it may be worth starting these processes immediately. It might also be worthwhile for UNDP to explore collaboration agreements with DPKO or DPA to facilitate secondments or similar arrangements for short-term deployment of staff to Myanmar.</p>
Exacerbated tensions with donor community	Medium	Medium	The request of the GoM to have UNDP take a lead role in providing and coordinating



			<p>funding and technical support to the JMC had come as something of an unexpected development for a number of donors that had worked together to set-up a multi-donor trust fund, the Joint Peace Fund (JPF). The participating Member States had envisioned that the JPF would function with a strong, if not principal role, in delivering funding and technical support to the JMC. There is a risk that some Member States might criticize the UN for seeking to play a too prominent role in the peace process through its support to the JMC.</p> <p>Minimizing this risk will require a multi-faceted strategy that includes requesting the GoM to reach out to Member States to explain its vision of bilateral and multi-lateral assistance in the current peace process context. Another option might be to promote an inclusive approach to funding the JMC project, and seek to receive support in a balanced manner that includes a broad range of Member States.</p>
Lack of acceptance of the JMC by NCA non-signatories	Medium	High	<p>The non-signatory EAO's may not accept whole or part of the NCA provisions that led to the establishment of the JMC. This may include terms of references, composition and modalities. It must be appreciated that any ceasefire agreement of this magnitude shall require a monitoring, verification and coordination mechanism (names and modalities notwithstanding). Therefore, the way the JMC</p>

			will be established is crucial and requires proper planning and consultations. Necessary training will be provided to make sure monitors will be able to gather correct information and evaluate the impact, with ability to assimilate changes that may be introduced to the JMC mechanism. Training will also be provided to the JMC and the TSC to ensure they can respond to complaints and NCA violations in an active and professional manner.
Risk of funding gaps due to lack of donor support.	Medium/Low	High	<p>The JMC is one of the core mechanisms of the NCA. Due to this significance and its additional significance for the wider peace process in the country (as described in detail above in the rationale) it is expected that development partners will be interested to support its full operationalisation.</p> <p>Currently, and against the first year/phase 1 budget about USD 5 million (64%) out of the projected budget of USD 7.8 million are deemed as hard commitments. The UN is confident that it will be able to meet the full funding requirement over the course of the first year on a rolling basis particularly once the proposed donor coordination mechanism is set-up providing a platform for presenting these needs with strong endorsements from both the JMC and the GoM. Given the significance attributed by the Government of Myanmar to the peace process and the NCA, it is expected that the Government will approach development</p>

			<p>partners with direct requests for funding in parallel and once the platform is set up, and that a significant number of development partners will follow such a call.</p> <p>In the event that the full resource needs are unmet, the UN and JMC will adjust its operational scope to a phased operationalization without compromising on its core mandates and activities.</p>
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#### **c) Monitoring & evaluation:**

Monitoring and Evaluation of the project shall be under the direct supervision of the Project Manager. She/he will be supported by an international consultant(s) and the Deputy Project Manager in collecting, verifying and analysing data related to the project Outcomes, Outputs and Activities. This effort shall rely on the JMC's own data collection and management systems, including an incident tracking database that is in process of being established. Until the Project Manager, Deputy Project Manager and international consultant(s) have been hired, existing UNDP staff and RCO staff will bear the responsibility for Monitoring and Evaluation.

At the start of the implementation of this project, a basic baseline survey and a public perception survey at Union, State and Local level (relevant areas) will be conducted by a national consultant to better understand current capacity of the JMC and TSC and peoples' perception about the NCA and JMC in relevant areas through a public perception survey. The project will also include a mid-term evaluation and an independent final evaluation to understand if the benchmarks in the initial phase of the platform have been achieved. The outcome of the evaluations will be very important to inform planning and implementation of the next phase of the JMC Support Platform.

#### **d) Administrative arrangements**

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

#### **AA Functions**

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved “Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds” (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate narrative reports and financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is notified by the RUNO (accompanied by the final narrative report, the final certified financial statement and the balance refund);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any costs extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

#### **Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations**

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

- Bi-annual progress reports (reviewed by DPA) to be provided no later than 15 June;
- Annual progress reports (reviewed by DPA), to be provided no later than 15 November;
- End of project reports (reviewed by DPA) to be provided no later than three months after the operational closure of the project;
- Annual financial statements as of 31 December with respect to the funds disbursed to it from the PBF, to be provided no later than four months (30 April) after the end of the calendar year;

- Certified final financial statements after the completion of the activities in the approved programmatic document, to be provided no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.
- Unspent Balance at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.


### **Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property**

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

### **Public Disclosure**

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent's website (<http://mptf.undp.org>).

**Annex A: Project Summary (to be submitted as a word document to MPTF-Office)**



**PEACEBUILDING FUND  
PROJECT SUMMARY**

<b>Project Number &amp; Title:</b>	PBF/Support to JMC Support Platform	
<b>Recipient UN Organization:</b>	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	
<b>Implementing Partner(s):</b>	Myanmar's Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC)	
<b>Location:</b>	Myanmar; Yangon with Nay Pyi Taw and six States/Regions	
<b>Approved Project Budget:</b>		
<b>Duration:</b>	<b>Planned Start Date:</b> 1 January 2017	<b>Planned Completion:</b> 31 December 2017
	<p>The PBF project will run for 12 months (January-December 2017) to ensure catalytic support to the UN/UNDP administered JMC support platform during its initial first phase.</p> <p>(The initial 12-month first phase will then be followed by a multi-year continuation of the project (phase 2) building on the results and experience of phase 1.</p>	
<b>Project Description:</b>	<p>The Project contributes to the JMC Support Platform, a mechanism set-up by the UN to respond to the requests from national stakeholders for a UN-led conduit for channelling institutional and technical assistance to the joint ceasefire monitoring mechanism, set-up by the nationwide ceasefire agreement, and mandated to uphold the ceasefire and monitor compliance of the parties to its principles and procedures. The Project, enables the UN to put the Platform in place, in the function of supporting the JMC to undertake its core functions in accordance with the NCA and international standards.</p>	
<b>PBF Focus Area:</b>	Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1) (1.3) DDR	
<b>Project Outcome:</b>	Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC) engages effectively in ceasefire monitoring in accordance with the NCA and international standards	

## **Annex B: IRF Results Framework**

**Project Effective Dates: 12-months, 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2017**

**PBF Focus Area: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1)**

**IRF Theory of Change:** This project will support the ongoing establishment of the JMC as the official ceasefire monitoring mechanism in Myanmar. A functional JMC will contribute to increased public confidence in the overall peace process by showing that the parties to the NCA have the capacity to solve ceasefire violations without resorting to violence. A functioning and successful JMC will also lay the ground for the national political dialogue that will encourage long-term peacebuilding and open up for discussions on de-mining, humanitarian assistance, the return of IDP's and for concrete peace dividends of communities.

Outcome	Output	Sub-outputs	Indicator s	Means of Verificati on	Year 1				Milesto nes
Outcome: JMC engages effectively in ceasefire monitoring in accordance with NCA and international standards  <u>Outcome Indicator 1:</u> - # of NCA violations resolved informed by international standards Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: tbc  <u>Outcome Indicator 2:</u> - Percepti ons of confide nce of NCA signator ies in	Output 1: JMC has capacity to carry out its core functions	Output 1.1: The JMC tripartite mechanism established at central level in target states/regio ns and in priority township locations	<u>Output Indicator 1</u> # of JMC committee bodies fully operation al at union, state/regi on and local levels  Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: 1 JMC-U, 6 JMC-S and 5 JMC-L	JMC Meeting Minutes	X	X	X	X	Dec-17
			<u>Output Indicator 2</u> % of women members in JMC committee bodies at union, state/regi on and local levels Baseline: 0 (2016) Target:	JMC Meeting Minutes	X	X	X	X	Dec-17



<p>the JMC</p> <p>Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: tbc</p> <p><u>Outcome Indicator 3: % Public understanding of the JMC</u></p> <p>Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: tbc</p>		30%						
	Output 1.2: JMC-TSC offices are functioning and staffed, at central level, in target states/regions and in priority local areas	<u>Output Indicator 3</u> # of JMC-TSC offices fully functional at union, state/region and local levels Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: 1 JMC-U, 6 JMC-S and 5 JMC-L	JMC Progress Report	X	X			Jun-17
		<u>Output Indicator 4</u> % of women employed in JMC-TSC at union, state/region and local level Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: 30%	JMC Progress Report	X	X			Jun-17
	Output 1.3: The JMC tests and puts in place its core SOPs for MVR, dispute resolution,	<u>Output Indicator 5</u> # of SOPs tested and put in place Baseline: 0	JMC Meeting Minutes	X	X	X	X	Dec-17

		conflict de-escalation and civilian monitoring	Target: tbc						
		Output 1.4: The JMC initiates capacity-development and training for JMC members and TSC staffs on all essential	<u>Output Indicator 6</u> # number of tested training curricula developed Baseline: 0 Target: tbc	JMC Progress Report	X	X			17-Jun
		normative functions of ceasefire monitoring at multi-levels defined	<u>Output Indicator 7</u> # number of JMC-TSC staffs completing function-specific training courses Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: tbc	JMC Progress Report			X	X	Dec-17
			<u>Output Indicator 8</u> # of JMC members completing training courses Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: tbc	JMC Meeting Minutes	X	X	X	X	Dec-17
		Output 1.5: The JMC undertakes MVR	<u>Output Indicator 2</u> # of	JMC Meeting Minutes	X	X	X	X	Dec-17

		activities in response to ceasefire violations and complaints	ceasefire violations resolved by the JMC Baseline: 1 JMC-U (2016)  Target: 1 JMC-U, 6 JMC-S					
		Output 1.6: JMC undertakes periodic information-sharing with stakeholders at all levels; and able to run outreach with communities in target states/regions	Output Indicator 7 % of JMC members expressing confidence in the JMC Baseline: tbc Target: tbc	Perception Survey				X Dec-17
			Output Indicator 8 # of civilians reached with information on the JMC Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: tbc	JMC Progress Report	X	X	X	X Dec-17
	Output 2: JMC's core functions are strengthened and	Output 2.1: The JMC is supported to draw a validated multiannual technical	Output Indicator 9 Technical Needs Assessment	JMC Progress Report	X			Mar-17

	informed by international standards	assistance provision	complete d and validated Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: 1						
			<u>Output Indicator 10</u> Multi-annual technical assistance plan developed Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: 1	JMC Progress Report		X			Jun-17
			<u>Output 2.2: The Platform puts in place a mechanism for coordinating technical support - Technical Support Group</u> <u>Output Indicator 11</u> Coordinated technical support work plan prepared and implemented Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: 1	Technical Support Group Meeting Minutes			X	X	Dec-17
			<u>Output 2.3: The JMC benefits from access to a long-term technical consultant, capacity-development and exposure to international comparativ</u> <u>Output Indicator 12</u> # of JMC-TSC staffs and JMC members received capacity development support Baseline: 0 (2016)	JMC Progress Report	X	X	X	X	Dec-17

		e experience including on key ceasefire interface issues such as gender and protection of civilians.	Target: tbc						
			Output Indicator 13 # of JMC- TSC staffs and JMC members received capacity developm ent support on gender issues Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: tbc	JMC Progress Report			X	X	Dec-17
			Output Indicator 14 # of JMC- TSC staffs and JMC members received capacity developm ent support on protection of civilians. Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: tbc	JMC Progress Report			X	X	Dec-17
	Output 3: A UN-led Platform in place to channel institution	Output 3.1: Core delivery and governance structures for the	Output Indicator 15 USD 5 mil mobilized Baseline:	JMC Support Platform Annual Report	X	X	X	X	Dec-17

	al and technical assistance to the JMC	JMC Support Platform set-up and maintained	0 (2016) Target: 90%						
		Output 3.2: Administrative capacities of the TSC are strengthened	Output Indicator 16 Platform is satisfactorily audited Baseline: 0 (2016) Target: Yes	Audit Report				X	Dec-17
			Output Indicator 17 JMC-TSC demonstrates positive progress in capacity assessment Baseline: 0 (2017) Target: Yes	Capacity Assessment	X			X	Dec-17
		Output 3.3: Multi-year JMC Support Platform is designed and set-up	Output Indicator 18 Platform Phase 2 approved and funded for initiation Baseline: 0 Target: Yes	JMC Support Platform Phase 2 Project Document				X	Dec-17

			Target: Yes						
		Output 3.3: Multi-year JMC Support Platform is designed and set-up	Output Indicator 18 Platform Phase 2 approved and funded for initiation Baseline: 0 Target: Yes	JMC Support Platform Phase 2 Project Docume nt				X	Dec-17