



United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)/ Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)

<p>Project Title: A More Equitable Society: Promoting Social Cohesion and Diversity in BiH (Dialogue for the Future II)</p>	<p>Recipient UN Organization(s): UNICEF, UNDP and UNESCO</p>
<p>Project Contact:</p> <p><i>Peace and Development Unit</i> <i>Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in BiH</i> UN House: Zmaja od Bosne bb, 71000 Sarajevo</p> <p><i>Ivan Lupis</i>, Political and Development Advisor E-mail: ivan.lupis@one.un.org</p> <p><i>Dalila Sadinlija</i>, Peace and Development Specialist E-mail: dalila.sadinlija@one.un.org</p> <p>UNICEF: Convening Agency Contact <i>Geeta Narayan</i>, UNICEF Representative in BiH E-mail: gnarayan@unicef.org</p>	<p>Implementing Partner(s) – name & type (Government, CSO, etc):</p> <p>Presidency of BiH (main partner)</p> <p>Relevant government authorities at sub-national levels, as well as local CSOs and key actors, to be determined based on selected project locations.</p> <p>Project Location: Bosnia and Herzegovina</p>
<p>Project Description: Through providing spaces for dialogue and continued interaction between different groups at the local and BiH levels, the programme supports collective identification of issues that affect all citizens in BiH; and contributes to enhanced interaction and collaboration between groups. The aim will be for the different groups to realize solving problems affecting them all requires working together, and building on the strengths of diversity. The project has a major focus on youth, connecting young women and men opinion-makers, future leaders and key stakeholders with the BiH-level leadership and across the neighboring countries, thus linking them to a joint effort with their neighboring countries.</p>	<p>Total Project Cost: \$2,000,000 Peacebuilding Fund: \$2,000,000 (pledged) Amount to be transferred as first tranche:</p> <p>UNICEF \$548,432.78 UNDP \$452,036.20 UNESCO \$399,531.58</p> <p>Government Contribution: tbc Other:</p> <p>Proposed Project Start Date: 31 November 2017 Proposed Project End Date: 30 May 2019 Total duration (in months)¹: 18</p>

¹ The maximum duration of an IRF project is 18 months.

Gender Marker Score²: 2
Project Outcomes: Outcome 1: Increased interaction and collaboration between different groups at the local level (within and between municipalities); Outcome 2: Increased interaction and dialogue between different groups at the BiH level
PBF Focus Areas³ 2: <i>Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Priority Area 2)</i> <i>Focus area: 2.1 national reconciliation</i>

IRF PROJECT DOCUMENT

² PBSO monitors the inclusion of gender equality and women’s empowerment all PBF projects, in line with SC Resolutions 1325, 1888, 1889, 1960 and 2122, and as mandated by the Secretary-General in his [Seven-Point Action Plan on Gender Responsive Peacebuilding](#).

³ PBF Focus Areas are:

1: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1):

(1.1) SSR, (1.2) RoL; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;

2: Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Priority Area 2):

(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management;

3: Revitalise the economy and generate immediate peace dividends (Priority Area 3):

(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services

4) (Re)-establish essential administrative services (Priority Area 4)

(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3) Governance of peacebuilding resources (including JSC/ PBF Secretariats)

(for IRF-funded projects)

<p>Recipient UN Organization(s)⁴</p> <p><i>Ms. Geeta Narayan</i> <i>UNICEF Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina</i></p> <p><i>Mr. Siniša Šešum</i> <i>Head of Antenna Office in Sarajevo</i> <i>UNESCO Regional Office of Science and Culture in Europe</i></p> <p><i>Mr. Sukhrob Khoshmukhamedov</i> <i>UNDP Deputy Resident Representative</i></p> <p><i>Date & Seal</i></p>	<p>Representative of National Authorities</p> <p><i>On behalf of the BiH Presidency</i></p> <p><i>H.E. Dr. Dragan Čović</i> <i>Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina</i></p> <p><i>Date & Seal</i></p>
<p>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</p> <p>Peacebuilding Support Office, NY</p> <p><i>Date & Seal</i></p>	<p>Resident Coordinator (RC)</p> <p><i>Ms. Sezin Sinanoglu</i> United Nations Resident Coordinator in Bosnia and Herzegovina</p> <p><i>Date & Seal</i></p>

⁴ Please include signature block for each RUNO receiving funds under this IRF.

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I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support

a) Peacebuilding context:

Continued Issues and Trends which impede Peacebuilding

During the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, a tragic conflict engulfed Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) which resulted in tens of thousands of dead and disappeared; half of its pre-war population of 4.2 million displaced both internally and externally; and the destruction of most of its infrastructure, cultural heritage and economy. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) signed in November 1995 put an end to the war.

In the immediate post-war period, a sufficiently unified international community stabilized the country via a number of political and security instruments as well as by providing extensive humanitarian and development assistance to BiH. During this time, there was tangible progress, such as demilitarization and reintegration of former combatants, the creation of institutions and establishment of administrative frameworks, reconstruction and rehabilitation of homes and infrastructure, as well as the return of some refugees and displaced persons to their pre-war homes and full repossession of their property.

However, a consequence of the DPA agreement was that it essentially froze and legitimized a divided geopolitical and demographic picture. Thus, today, the principal constituent peoples – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats – live more or less in exclusive or dominant nationality areas in the country; often with minimal contact with the other groups. In addition, the BiH Constitution, created as part of the DPA, gave clear legal status to only three constituent nations of people (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) and provided reduced rights for “Others,” (i.e. minority groups with a recognized presence in the country).

Thus, beyond the geographic and communal cleavages generated by the war, the DPA itself directly contributed (and continues to contribute) to the divisions among the citizens of BiH: In essence, the former legally compelled the latter to develop a primary identification with one of the three constituent nationalities in order to enjoy the security and benefits afforded to those three groups in the Dayton framework. This is reflected in scores of studies that have been carried out over the past two decades around the themes of belonging and identification: They have nearly identical results i.e. the country’s citizenry identifies itself, above all, as Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs,” rather than as citizens of BiH.

This fractured social landscape is further plagued by a weak rule of law and governance; widespread corruption; a problematic election framework; an unwieldy and polarizing education system; a mixed track record around transitional justice; the lack of a broad-based, genuine and sustained reconciliation process; a divided international community; and the continued complexity of geopolitics in the region. Despite the successful submission of a credible application for the EU membership, BiH’s EU path remains extremely challenging. Political subjects are finding it harder or are unwilling to make the necessary compromises on key reform issues, and the trend is expected to continue as the negotiation process intensifies. The accession process, therefore, is moving too slowly and not yielding tangible and timely gains for the population that has been “stuck in limbo” for the last two decades.

Taken together, the factors listed below have played a large part in stymying on-going efforts aimed at establishing a durable peacebuilding environment in which the various communities of BiH move toward a common vision of a strong, vibrant country and shared interests and values.

Governance: Two decades following the war, different groups within the country are still divided on how BiH should be governed and where power lies. In tandem, the peace agreement and its annexes are full of contradictions, ambiguities and shortcomings that are continuously exploited by various leaders, thus contributing to the overall weakness of governance in BiH. When combined with the current political volatility, the country's ability to tackle pressing policy issues and move the country in a positive direction is greatly undermined.

BiH's current electoral system allows political candidates to seek votes from only one nationality to win office. The Constitution and Election Law also exclude persons who do not belong to one of the constituent peoples from being elected to the House of Peoples and to the tripartite Presidency. With no need to reach out across nationality, religious and cultural lines, this system has discouraged the need for politicians and communities from strengthening dialogue, working toward greater mutual understanding and seeking common, country-wide solutions. The strong links between territory and demographic divisions and political party governance – cemented first by the DPA and then by subsequent election cycles – contribute to all aspects of country's current dysfunctionality.

Because of the aforementioned dynamics, BiH finds itself in a constant state of political gridlock, where leaders often define almost every aspect of peacebuilding and decision-making in terms of zero-sum/us vs. them equations. Furthermore, a very splintered, media field serves to augment differences in BiH rather than support narratives of mutual understanding and inter-group cooperation.

International Engagement: The scale of international intervention in BiH's peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts greatly helped in some critical areas, especially at the outset of the DPA process (e.g. capturing indicted war criminals, removing obstructionist politicians in the early years; eliminating vehicle license plate symbols that accentuated differences and identified nationalist affiliations, etc). Today, a very divided international community – whose members make up a group of BiH's "peace guarantors" – is failing to act decisively around the country's challenges and hurdles in the way of timely progress. This prolonged dynamic is creating openings for spoilers to reintroduce war-time agendas and narratives of societal/group divisions and to issue pronouncements increasingly challenging the viability of the state. With the international community distracted and divided, the parameters of "acceptable behavior" in BiH's peacebuilding framework are being rolled back.

Education and Culture: One of the biggest identified structural faults in BiH in the past 20 years is the entrenched framework of an administratively-scattered, physically-segregated education system that does not contribute to strengthening ties between generations growing up in post-conflict BiH.

As per the DPA and the Constitution, the coordination role for education was given to the Ministry of Civil Affairs; the management of the education system is under jurisdiction of the entity-level in Republika Srpska (RS) and at the cantonal levels in the Federation. Thus, BiH, effectively has 13+1 ministries dealing with education with separate curricula tailored in

accordance to the constituent group forming a majority in the given canton/entity. Approximately 6% of students attend schools that are segregated by classes, the so-called “2 schools under 1 roof” principle, while the majority attends homogenous schools (i.e. with one constituent group only).

During their missions to BiH, both the Special Rapporteur on the right to education (in 2007) and the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights (in 2013) similarly noted the main issues and concerns in the fields, most notably the “excessive fragmentation and politicization, the segregation between ethnic groups and assimilation processes based on ethnic motives.”⁵ Analysis of textbooks of the national group of subjects for primary schools found that there is no evidence of promotion of universal human rights values and democratic principles and there is no evidence of content aimed at the development of critical thinking such as active learning, problem solving and multi-perspective approaches.⁶

In sum, group and cultural isolation is institutionalized in the education system and it spills over into social life, thus broadening existing divisions. There are few regular opportunities for youth from different nationalities, and other cultural, backgrounds to engage with one another. Therefore, the level of civic and intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding is extremely weak in BiH today.

This is why, in an unprecedented leadership move, the BiH Presidency identified education and culture as areas that require attention, with a specific focus on youth, underscoring that these areas (which exhibit highest risk for furthering divisions) can act as a springboard for dialogue and trust building in the country.

Reconciliation: A once genuinely multi-ethnic society suffered many shocks during the conflict. Now, during the long-horizon post-conflict phase, BiH’s communities are in danger of turning further inward, with new generations growing up in mono-national environments; in a polarized country; and with little knowledge about, and understanding of, ‘the other(s).’ These younger generations of BiH may thus become highly susceptible to exploitative political narratives that continue to thrive in a complex environment in-country (not to mention in the region and globally).

In addition, a splintered, often biased media field serves to augment differences in BiH rather than support richness of diversity and narratives of mutual understanding and inter-nationality cooperation.

In BiH, the difficulties for the three main constituent peoples to build some semblance of a common narrative or understanding of what transpired in the 1990s is exacerbated by all of the aforementioned structural and functional challenges. In addition, there was lack of dedication from top leaders across the country to twin the “hard” side of peacebuilding (reconstruction, development, institution-building, voting) with the more complex and sensitive, “soft” side of the equation i.e. pursuing sustained, broad, vertical and horizontal efforts at repairing and restoring relationships across communities – a vital element of genuine reconciliation. While there were numerous attempts to launch reconciliation

⁵ Special Rapporteur on the right to education BiH mission report: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/8session/A.HRC.8.10.Add.4_en.pdf
Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights BiH mission report: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/117/22/PDF/G1411722.pdf?OpenElement>

⁶ Obrazovanje u BiH: Cemu ne(ucimo) djecu?, Analiza sadrzaja udzbenika nacionalne grupe predmeta u osnovnim skolama, Fond otvoreno Drustvo BiH, 2017

initiatives in BiH, most of them unfolded at lower levels and lacked substantive high-level political support and acknowledgement. Many efforts were led by CSOs, religious leaders and other citizens at community or lower levels; they often remained unreported in the media, thus making little impact on public perceptions. Critically, even 22 years after the conflict, there is a dearth of inclusive strategies for peacebuilding in BiH that would help counteract the escalation of discourse of division and conflict-laden pronouncements of various leaders and public figures.

Without something deeper than mere coexistence – whereby communities live side by side, but not together and whilst they remain aggravated by the increasingly divisive views about the past, present and future – peace in BiH will remain fragile; a negative peace characterized by little more than the absence of direct violence. Thus, strong and sustained investments must be made around initiatives and opportunities that allow members of different constituents – particularly youth which has never known the multi-cultural environment that once was – to come together and work towards shared goals and visions. Broadening contact is an essential prerequisite for a genuine reconciliation to take root. And here, DFF should play a unique role for BiH and – potentially- for the neighborhood.

Gender: While in the early post-war period of the 1990s senior political leaders consistently underscored the valuable contribution of women in creating space for dialogue, the role of women in the political and socio-economic spheres today paints another picture: Women are surpassing men in education across the board (enrolment and graduation), yet they are still significantly lagging behind in participation in higher positions in education as well as overall management, employment and political positions.⁷ While the law proscribes mandatory inclusion of women on electoral lists, only five of the 26 nominated women were elected as heads of municipalities during 2016 local elections.⁸ Moreover, the gender wage gap places BiH as worst in Europe, with women making only 54% of what men make. Because government institutions have not been able to effectively address discrimination, violence, underemployment and other issues that disproportionately affect women more than men, the former have become particularly active in the civil society sector, including in the field of peace and trust building. Gender may provide an avenue for opportunities for dialogue in the current environment plagued with divisions and gridlock. DFF 2 will continue to seek to leverage the important role that women can play in BiH's peacebuilding processes and ensure that gender be utilized as a common issue of interest/concern among all groups in the country. In addition, since many gender roles and stereotypes are formed in early adolescence, DFF 2's focus on young people as key change agents will also help ensure gender-based stereotypes are tackled, along with other types of discrimination. Building on the RUNO's successful experiences with gender equality promotion as part of DFF phase 1, a gender informed approach and strong integration of gender concerns in the project activities will be continuously ensured. Such approach will strengthen capacities of men and women youth leaders and intellectuals to become the next generation leaders who believe in working together towards common goals and in harnessing the strengths of diversity. This would- inter alia- result in the establishment of gender-responsive dialogue and stronger joint problem-solving culture between different groups and mechanisms for peacebuilding. The programme will provide support to multi-stakeholder groups, including

⁷ 2015 assessment of gendered wage disparities, a World Bank report advances the claim that “social values in BiH remain conservative with most men and women expressing traditional perceptions of gender roles.”; <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/tea-hadziristic/women-in-bosnia>

⁸ BiH Ombudsman Dzumbur stressed that it is not enough to talk about equal “rights;” equality of “outcome” is something that has to be taken into account (to enable stronger role of women).

women's groups and women youth activists, to positively engage different stakeholders at the local, entity and BiH level aiming to, among others, contribute to gender equality and women's empowerment, while taking into account gender-specific issues relating directly to peacebuilding processes.

Youth: According to the latest available data, BiH is inhabited by 777.000 youth aged 15 to 29⁹ and 607.100 persons up to 15 years of age; as the key DFF targeted sub-group, youth aged 10-24 years accounts for 18.8% of the population.¹⁰ From the answers available in the Knowledge Attitudes and Practice (KAP) study on intercultural understanding in BiH, it is apparent that young people consider themselves (along with youth organizations and local authorities) as key actors in solving problems and improving life conditions of people in local communities. The Commission for the coordination of youth issues in BiH finds that a total of 5% of young people are members of youth oriented organizations, while 6% are members of political parties, and only 1% of youth representatives on different levels. Obstacles for greater youth participation and influence are, according to the Commission: (i) lack of legal regulations; (ii) lack of programmatic approaches; (iii) lack of transparency around public grant disbursements; (iv) extremely limited public space for youth; (v) low level of community engagement on youth issues; and (vi) low level of youth participation in all aspects of the BiH society.

In addition, the 2016 KAP study measured that:

- a) 26% of the general population over 15 years of age in BiH feels uncomfortable in the company of culturally, religiously and ethnically/nationality- different individuals;
- b) 33% of the general population of BiH would not visit certain parts of the country due to hostile attitudes.
- c) Only 34% of respondents reported contacts with culturally different communities and individuals on a daily basis.

The Voices of Youth – Research into Youth in BiH (VoY)¹¹ conducted in 2016 noted that when it comes to political participation in decision-making processes, youth did not believe they had any significant influence in this area, including around decisions related to youth. **81.2 %** thought they had the biggest influence in their own household or family, followed by among their friends, at **76.8 %**. Less than half of BiH's youth (**42.2%**) believe they have influence over decision making processes at work, in school or at university. Only **14.7 %** of BiH youth find that they have influence on the decision-making processes in their local community, and only **7%** in political organizations or NGOs.

In connection, BiH's citizens, on the whole, including especially young people, feel disempowered and are thus not civically engaged. 51.2% of young people believe that their voice has no influence at BiH-level governance, while 44.9% believes their voice has no influence at local level governance.¹² 76.8% of young people believes that BiH is stagnating in its development while the majority believes that citizens are responsible for initiating change and that everyone has a role to play. However only 13.8% did some type of

⁹ Through the unanimous adoption of resolution 2250 (2015), which defined youth as persons aged 18 through 29, the Security Council urged Member States to consider setting up mechanisms that would enable young people to participate meaningfully in peace processes and dispute resolution.

¹⁰The Commission for the coordination of youth issues in BiH: <https://goo.gl/SP2nMq>

¹¹ VoY Consolidated report on the quantitative and qualitative research, 2016

¹² UNDP-EU SE Perceptions of Youth 2016 research

volunteer work in 2016 (mostly around humanitarian activities) while the majority is not publically active nor feels represented by the young people currently active in politics.

Socio-Economic Picture: The challenges described above are contributing to growing frustrations, tensions around the lack of progress toward a more stable, predictable and secure state that provides opportunities for all citizens, irrespective of their background. The socio-economic sector reflects this vividly: High unemployment remains the immediate burning issue and especially among the youth (around 50 – 60%¹³) which makes up more than 20% of the overall population (over 750,000 young people). In February 2014, spontaneous spasm of civil unrest erupted across BiH in which citizens – of all nationalities and backgrounds – demanded root and branch political and socio-economic reforms that would allow BiH’s population to access more livelihood opportunities and pursue their aspirations within their own country. This crisis was marked by a citizenship that was either (i) deeply frustrated, but until then largely apathetic to active engagement in society; or (ii) the minority which is actively engaged, but feel that their voice is not being heard and is not reaching the proper channels. For various reasons, including the failure of a united leadership, the dynamics of discontent receded. However, the inability (and/or unwillingness) of key actors to respond to the collective demands of all of BiH’s communities has fed into a new crisis which scores of analysts refer to as a “slow motion bomb.” The country is being impacted by an on-going mass emigration of people, particularly youth, and this trend will continue having increasingly adverse effects on BiH in the future. While there is no official data available, different sources report that since 2013, some 100,000 young people left the country of less than 3.5 million citizens. Such a trend is unsustainable and – if not remedied – will prove to become one of the most significant challenges to the viability of BiH as a whole.

Mapping of existing peacebuilding activities and gaps

¹³ Reaching a historic high of over 60% in 2013 according to World Bank: **10 messages about youth employment in SEE; South East Europe**, Regular Economic Report No.9S, Special Topic 2016

Project outcome	Source of funding (Government/development partner)	Key Projects/ Activities	Duration of projects/ activities	Budget in \$	Description of major gaps in the Outcome Area, programmatic or financial
Outcomes 1&2	<p>USAID (* 14 percent matching funds from Catholic Relief Services as the implementing partner)</p>	<p>Pro-Future project: reconciliation initiative focused on 30 municipalities; 2 key activities include “Speaking out” events and public forums with religious communities/leaders</p>	2013 – 2017* continuation endorsed ; pending official announcement of 2 nd phase	\$4.8 million	Despite the name and surface similarities to DFF ¹ , the project is mainly focused on dealing with the past activities (e.g. events during which war victims publicly shared their war experiences; public forums with paired communities which were close prior to conflict, but are now divided) and work with religious communities. The geographic spread of 30 (with a total plan for 60) included municipalities proved challenging.
	<p>Governments of participating countries + other donors (not specified)</p> <p>*country contributions given in percentages: <input type="checkbox"/> Albania:17.3% <input type="checkbox"/> Bosnia and Herzegovina: 15.4% <input type="checkbox"/> Kosovo* 14 : 10.2% <input type="checkbox"/> (FYRo)Macedonia : 13.8% <input type="checkbox"/> Montenegro: 4.4% <input type="checkbox"/> Serbia: 38.9%</p>	<p>RYCO: Regional Youth Cooperation Office for Western Balkans</p> <p>Aims to “promote the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation between the youth in the region” through exchange. Initiative stems from the Western Balkans Summit in Vienna 2015, when a Joint Declaration was signed by the 6 WB Prime ministers.</p>		<p>Planned for the initial 3 years:</p> <p>€2 million per year</p>	<p>The highly anticipated initiative developed under the political auspices of the 6 WB governments aims to foster regional youth cooperation through exchange (base on Franco-German Cooperation Office). The office is yet to develop activity-action plan, on the basis of which gaps could be identified. Initiative is to be kept in mind for synergies, however careful deliberation is needed considering political patronage and specifically – participation of Kosovo*, FYRoM and Albania.</p>
	<p>US Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) & US Embassy in BiH</p>	<p>IRC BiH: Strengthening Inter-Religious Dialogue in BiH</p>	September 2017 – March 2019 (expected)	<p>\$450,000</p> <p>*at least \$200,000 is intended as a sub grant to IRC BiH</p>	<p>The overall goal of the recently announced program is to reduce the risk of renewed violence by countering the effects of segregation and ethnic isolation The Inter-Religious Council (IRC) has been identified by CSO and the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo for further support in communicating a positive, alternative narrative of inclusion through inter-religious dialogue and reconciliation, particularly in strained communities.</p> <p>Aim is to support the development, expansion, and self-sufficiency of IRC and its network of interreligious civil society councils, and – through a sub grant – provide them the financial means to engage and broaden their constituencies (targeting youth and women), and implement interreligious activities. While the scope of the proposal seems specific and narrowly linked to one key partner, more deliberate approach to work with the IRC will be explored under DFF2.</p>
	<p>British Government UN Action Government of Canada</p>	<p>UN Joint Programme on “Seeking Care, Support and Justice for Survivors of CRSV in BiH”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research and analysis of survivors’ needs and existing capacities of the system to guarantee the respect and enactment of survivors’ rights; • Expansion and improvement of the quality of services needed by survivors, in the sectors of health, psychosocial 	September 2014 – March 2018	<p>Planned : \$4 million</p> <p>Raised: \$ 2,704,209</p>	<p>Financial gap: about \$1.3 million</p> <p>The project combines expertise, mandates and experience of four UN agencies: IOM for legislation; UNDP for justice sector; UNFPA for health sector, combatting stigma; and UN Women for economic empowerment and capacity building of civil society. In this regard, as the project envisages development of a plan to address stigmatization at local levels, synergies could be sought.</p>

		<p>support, access to justice and economic empowerment.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improvement of legislation and its implementation. • Reduction of stigma and sensitization of persons in contact with survivors or reporting on their cases. 			
Government of Switzerland	Government of Sweden	<p>UNDP project on local communities/ Mjesne zajednice</p> <p>Overall project objective is to improve the quality of life of the citizens of BiH through bolstering local services, increasing governmental accountability, and promoting social inclusion.</p> <p>The project's purpose is to foster citizen participation in municipal decision making, in the ensured provision of quality services by the municipality, and in the implementation of local development activities, by underlining the democratic role of MZs in BiH.</p>	July 2015 – July 2019	\$ 8,327,507.23	Project is focused on socially inclusive, stronger and accountable local community units (“mjesne zajednice”, the basic administrative units). With its highly relevant social cohesion scope, the project is perfectly placed to provide access to local communities/governance, i.e. synergizing with the proposed “institutional” component of the DFF2 (while DFF can contribute and link with other two proposed components if the selected communities overlap).
EU UNDP COs	Local governments	<p>UNDP Regional Programme on Local Democracy in the Western Balkans (ReLOAD)</p> <p>Overall objective of the project is to strengthen participatory democracies and the EU integration process in the Western Balkans by empowering civil society to actively take part in decision making and by stimulating an enabling legal and financial environment for civil society.</p>	February 2017 – February 2020	\$10.70 million	ReLoaD aims to improve cooperation between local governments and CSOs, while strengthening capacities of all relevant stakeholders to engage more productively in such partnerships. Plan is to support 200 CSO projects in selected local governments across the 6 WB countries. Specific focus of the project is on capacitating CSOs and local governments with regards to public funds-disbursement.
EU Instrument contributing to stability and peace		<p>UNDP-EU Project on Insider Mediation</p> <p>9 countries globally implement small-scale activities contributing to conflict prevention; BiH focus on supporting youth-led initiatives, identifying youth insider mediators and supporting independent</p>	August 2015 – May 2018* BiH-component	BiH-component \$ 300,000	Small-scale activities are piloted within the global EU-UNDP partnership on support to insider mediation (coordinated by PDA Units). Out of the 9 countries, BiH is the only one completely piloting the insider mediation concept, and in particular – with youth and independent online voices and media outlets. Youth outreach activities were already built around some of DFF's most prominent young activists, Project support is ending May 2018 without the extension option, thus a gap will remain in further exploration of youth-led insider mediation potential in BiH, while some of the elements (e.g.

¹⁴ As defined by UN Security Council Resolution 1244, dated 1999

		online media outlets and voices.			online media voices mapping) could be further used for the DFF2 proposed media component.
	SDC (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation) SECO (State Secretariat for Economic Affairs)	*Swiss Cooperation Strategy for BiH *While not a concrete activity, Swiss focus as a donor is highly relevant for DFF2 activities.	2017 - 2020	CHF 41 million (only for the Democratic Governance portfolio)	Overall objective of the intervention is: Public authorities at all levels adopt and implement more inclusive, accountable and responsive policies which constitute the base of a resilient governance system. They provide efficient high quality services - particularly in infrastructure - for all, and improve access to justice, thereby restoring citizens' trust towards institutions and within the society. 4 corresponding outcomes have been selected. UN is mentioned as a partner under the "implementing agencies" and – considering overall good levels of cooperation with the SDC- further partnership can be sought whereby the UN can ensure access to proposed local levels, expertise and expand Swiss targeting to youth.
	Membership fee ensures sustainability, certain specific projects funded by various donors	*Mreza Mira/ The Peace Network Non- formal network of 112 organizations and 16 schools working on the reconciliation and peacebuilding activities. Helsinki Parliament of Citizens BL acts as Secretariat.	ongoing		Not a project or a formal-organization, but – as the lead coordinating unit - the Network is mentioned as a platform for information-sharing and monitoring of various smaller-scale funding schemes and peacebuilding initiatives.

b) Rationale for this IRF:

Following the arc of the context analysis, recent developments in BiH reveal additional negative dynamics that should be noted: (i) the civil unrest seen in 2014 died out due to a number of reasons (no leadership, too informal, no access to connect to any institutionalized policy-processes, etc.); (ii) surveys increasingly find that citizens are no longer willing to take any significant civic engagement apart from voting (even if they continue to vote in “traditional” patterns; and due to not seeing anything coming out of the unrests); (iii) those young people who are engaged are precisely the ones most likely to emigrate abroad; and (iv) young people who remain in BiH continue to feel increasingly disempowered and become apathetic, believing that their votes do not have influence on governance at any level . From a trust-building and social integration-building perspective, if such trends continue, BiH will soon have a (severely diminished) generation of young people who grew up in polarized/divided communities burdened by the structural challenges described at the outset of this document. These young men and women will be entering the workforce and the country’s political space (i.e. as voters, candidates) without the necessary values, knowledge, capacities, access or will to influence it positively. This places BiH society at risk of continuing to be susceptible to political narratives and rhetoric of division, nationalism, radicalization and violence in various forms.

The first DFF peacebuilding initiative resulted in significantly more positive attitudes towards diversity and social cohesion among the key target groups of citizens of BiH from various backgrounds. It reached a significant level of young people and established safe spaces for dialogue between them in an environment where such places are diminishing; it also succeeded in enabling – for the first time ever – an opportunity for a vertical dialogue with the high-level political leadership.

Even with its successes, DFF only managed to make a modest forward movement within the still existing peacebuilding needs in BiH given its short timeframe. This first effort (viewed by the BiH Presidency as an “experimental” or “pilot” phase) offered some useful lessons learned: While young people were encouraged to participate in youth forums and learn from each other, their individual capacities needed to be more systematically strengthened. Obstacles at the school and community levels still needed removing; and understanding of civic processes still needed to be enhanced for them to be empowered participants in society -- especially in their own communities.

While the key focus of the initial project – fostering dialogue – was enhanced to an extent possible in the limited timeframe, an overall framework of a substantive discussion for the common future was lacking. High-level political support was provided, but the significant gaps remain in ensuring overall institutional support; in empowering relevant institutions at all levels to foster dialogue and trust-building initiatives, as well as to foster their own inclusiveness in policy-making.

Wide communications outreach contributed to advancing public dialogue and shifting public perceptions on trust-building, however media would need to be more systematically engaged in fostering unbiased reporting and highlighting positive movements in a severely apathetic environment. Finally, to be kept in mind as a concluding point from the DFF Final Evaluation: “Institutional changes and behavioural changes take time to achieve and require effort and commitment much longer than a two-year project.”

In sum, DFF “phase 1” succeeded in establishing a strong peacebuilding foundation that is comprised of: (i) a central (BiH Presidency) partnership document called the “Dialogue Declaration;” (ii) Dialogue platforms, as standard mechanisms for enabling direct communication between BiH’s highest-level elected political representatives and citizen representatives; (iii) a “DFF brand” which highlighted not only the initiative’s direct project activities, but the impact of over 40 country-wide, DFF-funded small initiatives; and (iv) a broad and strong network of agents, partners and beneficiaries. All these tools and platforms are on the ready in order to allow the BiH Presidency and the UN to carry on with more work and activities as needed.

Most importantly, DFF is the only peacebuilding initiative that enables people from all of BiH’s constituent groups, and others, to directly engage their Presidency. It is also the only initiative which brings together the highest-level leaders around the concerns of BiH’s citizens despite the on-going political differences and divisions between them.

The BiH Presidency clearly articulated its desire to continue partnering with the UN in this joint peacebuilding initiative when its member, Mr. Izetbegovic, argued at the June 2016 Dialogue Platform Conference that:

“Based on positive experiences gained through the Dialogue for the Future, it is necessary to continue with such activities, given that trust-building and reconciliation are on-going processes which – apart from mere good will – require time, determination and dedication. For the sake of making the useful legacy of this project permanent, it is necessary to preserve the achieved synergy in the activities of the international community, government institutions at all levels, civil society and other

stakeholders. I also believe it would be extremely useful to extend the scope of activities to the region, and thereby achieve a both qualitative and quantitative advance, because politics, economy, interests, and thus the fate of our country is closely intertwined with its neighbors.”

This vision falls in line with the adopted conclusions of the June 2015 Brdo-Brijuni Summit in which the Presidents of Western Balkans recognized DFF and encouraged its expansion into Southeast Europe. The multi-country aspect of DFF 2 also dovetails with one of the Dialogue Platform Declaration’s core aspirational goals: “to increase the focus on regional cooperation and reconciliation...” and to have “neighboring countries accept a proactive approach to reconciliation and confidence building.”

Thus, in September 2016, on the margins of the UN General Assembly, the Presidency of BiH officially requested the SG to have the UN continue the DFF initiative in BiH while elevating the joint peacebuilding initiative to a multi-country level. In this regard, a second phase of DFF is well placed to further expand and develop both vertical and horizontal peacebuilding opportunities and spaces which, in turn, will help strengthen social cohesion, respect for diversity and reconciliation, and improve governance.

The DFF peacebuilding initiative has, to date, revealed a number of additional areas where the scope of activities can be expanded and built up; whether it’s the work on specific cultural and educational policies and curricula, the Sustainable Development Goals, youth innovation, rights-based issues or reconciliation activities. These themes are also equally relevant for the wider region.

Most recently (in August/ September 2017), the BiH Presidency proffered its theory of change for the BiH-stream and multi-country streams of DFF so as to guide the programmatic design of this second phase of the initiative: In an environment where political narratives and rhetoric of division is increasing and may become entrenched, citizens from different groups and authorities at the local and state levels are unable to articulate convergent views on challenges and solutions to those challenges. Through opening up space for dialogue in selected mixed groups, as well as between different homogenous communities, DFF 2 aims to bring citizens from across BiH together at the local level, and eventually at state-level, to collectively identify problems that affect all, and to develop common solutions to those problems. This face to face participation will contribute toward a convergence of views; to moving toward a shared vision of the future; and to help a greater number of citizens (particularly the younger generation) break down barriers, challenge prejudices and enhance their ability to work together to build a prosperous future for all.

In this regard, the Dialogue Platform Declaration¹⁵ will continue to serve as the backbone of the peacebuilding initiative with its call to “all peoples and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially the youth, to become active participants and engines of change and to work together with us in developing policies aimed at overcoming the key challenges faced by Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

¹⁵ Declaration was signed at the initial Dialogue Platform Conference in April 2015 between the BiH Presidency and the UN in BiH.

I. Objectives of PBF support and proposed implementation

Geographic targeting

The programme will have a major focus at the local level, targeting six to nine locations where communities will lead local assessments of common problems and issues, and design appropriate local mechanisms for dialogue and peacebuilding. The locations will be selected during the first project board meeting, through the following criteria:

1. Communities that are mixed or homogenous but which directly border communities of other groups (or with large number of returnees) at the IEBL or at international borders;
2. At least two communities selected will have entity or state borders;
3. Communities where inter-group relationships already exist, or there are entry points for peacebuilding work;
4. Communities where the Programme can add value (ensuring complementarity with other peacebuilding programmes, and to avoid duplication)
5. Balance between different groups.

The Presidency of the BiH will provide leadership to the programme at the BiH level, providing opportunities for engagement with the local stakeholders and youth at different levels. The Presidency commits to hosting dialogues on issues of common concern facilitated by their advisors and members of the Presidency. The mechanisms for these dialogue spaces will be defined during the first six months of the programme implementation. However, the intention is to move beyond holding “one-off” dialogues or consultations, and towards developing a mechanism that allows for ongoing, meaningful interactions that would continue beyond the project itself.

Youth leaders, intellectuals and opinion makers will also be targeted at the BiH level for dialogues on issues negatively affecting youth and with the aim of developing capacities of youth to become next generation leaders that believe in working together towards common goals and in harnessing the strengths of diversity. Specific efforts will be made to engage young men and young women, equally and to ensure that they work together.

Finally, the programme will have a regional component to connect groups in BiH to their counterparts in the neighboring countries. Dialogue between the neighboring countries (surrounding BiH) historically affect internal BiH dynamics, either constructively or divisively. Recognizing that this dialogue is the key for BiH stability and progress, as well as for the regional positive dynamics, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro are being asked to join the initiative together and illustrate the will and need for constructive engagement rather than disruptive engagement; to promote strength through diversity rather than accentuating divisions; and to aim for greater stability in the region through bolstering understanding, tolerance, and common aspirations in BiH.

Through this programme, an initial youth consultation is organized in BiH for the development of a regional initiative appropriate for youth concerned in all the four countries. The programme will also explore cross-border collaboration through the two initiatives in areas where communities selected are at state borders.

N.B. By end of quarter one 2018, the multi-country programme is to be submitted to the PBF either in a separate IRF submission or as a revision with cost implications to this IRF; it will aim to address some of the sub-regional elements referenced above, and in this way, buttress the BiH DFF2 outcomes as well.

a) **Project outcomes, theory of change, activities, targets and sequencing:**

Programme theory of change

If sustained dialogue and joint problem solving is supported between different groups and mechanisms for local peacebuilding are established, *then* collaboration and trust between groups is enhanced and social cohesion promoted, *because* different groups will identify common goals and realize positive change can only be achieved through collaboration and harnessing the strength of diversity.

The programme will be organized around two main outcomes:

- Outcome 1: Increased interaction and collaboration between different groups at the local level (within and between municipalities)
- Outcome 2: Increased interaction and dialogue between different groups at the BiH level

Outcome 1: Increased interaction and collaboration between different groups at the local level (within and between municipalities)

The programme will seek to address issues related to the lack of interaction and collaboration between the citizens, groups and their local leaders. The issue of inclusiveness of local level governance will be addressed through joint assessments of common problems and based on these, creating dialogue platforms bringing together local leaders as well as civil society, youth, religious leaders, women's organizations and relevant local level authorities. These platforms will be established as genuine bases for collaboration and joint problem solving and youth will be given a key role in these dialogue platforms so that they will be empowered to build collaborative leadership skills. Their purpose will be to address issues hindering social cohesion and creating permanent spaces for dialogue. The local mechanisms created (or strengthened in places where they already exist) will go beyond the approach of holding few dialogues and will rather attempt to institutionalize dialogue and joint problem solving at the local level. The UN partners will accompany the platforms and support them financially to become embedded in the local communities during the programme period and beyond. The UN will also ensure that women and girls will become active participants of the platforms.

With an effort to overcome the discomfort that different groups, especially youth, feel towards the other groups, the programme will support local communities in identifying their common problems and concerns through processes facilitated by conveners and peacebuilders in their communities. Young leaders will be targeted to become conveners and 'change agents' in their local communities. The aim for the joint problem analysis, and the dialogue platforms will be to encourage communities to notice that the challenges they are facing are common in nature – and that finding solutions to these problems requires

collaboration. The activities implemented will be informed by this analysis and will encourage working together across different groups ensuring that the groups interact in a regular basis and will start working together on joint initiatives.

Small grants will be allocated for the groups to undertake small-scale activities and initiatives that promote peacebuilding. The scope and types of activities that will be eligible for the grants will be identified through the local assessments and prioritization exercises, with a priority to be given to activities addressing issues affecting youth, and youth led peacebuilding activities. Youth will be given the opportunity to form types of ‘project boards’ in their locations to both lead on the selection of the grant activities, and also to be part of monitoring the implementation of these activities. The youth participation in the project board for the grant selection will also give them an opportunity to directly engage with the members and advisors of the Presidency. The small grants are important to empower youth to take concrete action to initiate positive change in their communities, and to assure them that the programme is not just another ‘talk-shop’.

The grants will be complemented with targeted skill building and activities directly enhancing youth’s understanding of ‘other’ groups, and their common interests, including through exchange visits in other programme locations. Moreover, they will be complemented by direct work with local authorities to contribute to the further sustainability of the dialogue platforms as a tool. While specific to each targeted community, options such as e.g. mandatory co-financing, partnering with local private sector entities or building on the foundations of the UN’s broader work to support local development and governance initiatives will be sought in order to fully localize and embed the activity.

The education sector should be viewed as the medium for reaching young citizens and for passing on the skills, dispositions, and behaviors that must be learned for critical thinking, a prerequisite for young people to engage in politics and in becoming future leaders, leaders with the ability to change the negative patterns of the past. Engaging adolescents as peacebuilders extends beyond the traditional peace education goal of creating peaceful adolescents and children, and instead embraces adolescents as active participants who can promote peace as active ‘change agents’, and prevent and transform conflict through their interactions with others.

Youth are also vulnerable to negative narratives and have been accused of being prone to violent extremism. *If* identified as the priority by the communities, the programme can also foster discussions around PVE and related narratives. This could include key stakeholders such as municipalities, religious leaders, and education authorities and aim to contribute to social inclusion and peace through demonstrating how all groups in BiH are opposed to violent extremism.

Finally, the activities will also provide opportunities for the local stakeholders to call upon the entity and BiH-level leadership to support them in resolving local issues, enhancing interaction between the local, entity level and BiH-level leaders. For example, local communities will be supported to develop proposals to resolve larger issues in their communities that are hindering social cohesion, and to approach state authorities and other donors (including in the private sector) to support proposals to resolve the jointly identified priorities that are not within the scope of this programme.

The outputs and indicative activities for Outcome 1 are outlined below:

Output 1.1 Local communities lead local assessments on common problems and priority issues of concern

Activities

- 1.1.1 Select local municipalities for dialogue and peacebuilding initiatives;
- 1.1.2 Identify conveners and stakeholders for the local assessments together with local authorities, youth and civil society, including women's organizations;
- 1.1.3 Support the capacity of the conveners (especially youth) to be able to facilitate multi-actor processes;
- 1.1.4 Build the skills of youth to play a leadership role in the assessments and set up mechanisms for youth led community consultations (e.g. through uReport);
- 1.1.5 Assist youth, local leaders and groups in undertaking local assessments on common priority issues hindering social cohesion;
- 1.1.6 Support a participatory process to validate the findings of the assessment and a local prioritization process.

Output 1.2: Social cohesion at the local level enhanced through establishment of local dialogue platforms/peacebuilding mechanisms

Activities

- 1.2.1. Establish platforms for dialogue¹⁶ in all target locations consisting of representatives of local authorities (municipalities, relevant Ministries, youth, schools, Interreligious Council/local religious organizations and civil society organizations representing different groups in each location);
- 1.2.2. Support local leaders (including youth leaders) in organizing regular dialogue meetings on issues of common concern;
- 1.2.3. Assist local stakeholders in leading interventions to resolve some of the concrete issues identified through the dialogue platforms through provision of small grants;
- 1.2.4. Facilitate the institutionalization of the local peacebuilding mechanisms within the appropriate local structures;
- 1.2.5. Support local leaders and youth in organizing cross-border dialogues bringing together citizens cross entity and state borders regularly (at least quarterly for each cross-border location during the project duration);
- 1.2.6. Support cultural exchanges between schools to enhance understanding on the shared cultural heritage and history

Outcome 2: Increased interaction and dialogue between different groups at the BiH level

The programme will work with youth as the priority target group beyond the selected locations for the local level (Outcome one) in an aim of generating a group of future leaders

¹⁶ The platforms will be informed by the prioritization exercises and local agreement on priorities (activity 1.1.6)

with an ability to lead collaboratively. Youth will be supported to lead dialogues on issues particularly affecting youth and to engage on both less divisive issues, such as the SDGs, education and youth emigration; as well as on some of the more contentious issues of political nature.¹⁷ The Presidency believes that youth will need to build their capacity to engage politically now to be able to become consensus-builders and future generation of leaders. The programme will generate opportunities for the youth to engage with the Presidency and their advisors during the programme implementation.

The programme will target key BiH authorities and institutions for dialogue on specific issues affecting different sectors. There is currently no BiH-level dialogue on the implementation of the SDGs, and the programme partners and the Presidency identified the SDGs as a useful non-contentious, potentially unifying entry point for cross-BiH dialogue. The programme will seek opportunities for dialogue on the ways of achieving the SDGs in BiH, and in a complementary effort, to localize SDGs (including SDG 16) in the entity and canton level action plans. In tandem, BiH's potential to be at the forefront of promoting greater appreciation and acceptance of diversity with its intercultural dynamics will be enhanced. Activities in this sphere aim to demonstrate that culture can be revived as the "connective tissue" of a rich and diverse BiH society, and cultural engagement provides one of the most acceptable entry points for collaboration and interaction between groups.

The programme will seek to address the issues of division affecting the education sector and to facilitate dialogue between the fourteen Ministries of Education on the role of education institutions in enhancing social cohesion. The programme will build on the work related to the PISA 2018 test, which provides an opportunity for country-wide dialogues on improving learning outcomes (which is a common goal across all three constituent groups), and the introduction of a common Code of Ethics in primary and secondary schools across the country.

Media will be targeted to capitalize on their potential for peacebuilding rather than divisive rhetoric. Currently the mainstream and social media outlets play a role in spreading divisive narratives within the country. Based on the experience and lessons from DFF1's communications pillar, a new approach to engaging media will be adopted in phase II, including for example expansion from youth, CSOs and vulnerable groups to local authorities, independent media outlets and young women as a sub-targeted group; and onto a greater use of sub-regional media outlets.) The programme partners will initiate a process of engaging mainstream media (especially the 'bigger players') in a dialogue on peacebuilding and the role of media in rational and impartial reporting, and its importance and role in the country and the region. The programme will aim for the media outlets and journalists to sign a pact for promoting peace through their reporting.

Finally, the programme will be linked to a regional initiative connecting BiH and its neighboring countries. The Presidency of BiH through its advisors will connect to their counterparts in the neighboring countries to engage them in a consultation for the vision of the regional joint programme. At the same time, programme partners in BiH will organize a regional youth consultation to bring together young stakeholders to agree on scope of the regional programme. This interaction of young people in BiH with its neighboring countries will be a key objective of the regional initiative and it will be promoted through this programme as well as the regional programme.

Output 2.1. Youth leaders from BiH are capacitated to become conveners and peacebuilders

Activities

- 2.1.1. Support youth leaders¹⁸ to become ‘agents’ for social cohesion and network across the country;
- 2.1.2. Facilitate informal dialogues among young opinion-makers and future leaders on common issues of concern (such as socio-economic issues, SDGs, political participation and the vision for a future BiH);
- 2.1.3. Develop a tool for social media messaging (e.g. uReport) to allow youth in BiH to respond to polls and make suggestions for policy makers on issues related to social cohesion.
- 2.1.4. Facilitate exchange and opportunities for dialogue between youth and BiH and entity level authorities on concerns of youth.

Output 2.2 Dialogue between relevant authorities and institutions, and citizens, facilitated at BiH level

Activities

- 2.2.1. Provide a platform for facilitated dialogue between key/leading authorities and citizens on issues that promote cohesion between groups at the BiH level (possible entry points include the SDGs, socio-economic issues, youth emigration etc);
- 2.2.2. Identify opportunities to include peacebuilding and social cohesion objectives into the BiH, entity and cantonal level action plans to localize SDGs in BiH;
- 2.2.3. Convene relevant authorities and institutions from different levels, with citizens, to analyze barriers to social cohesion within the relevant thematic areas (e.g. education, culture, youth, inter-religious understanding, sport, role of schools in prevention of violent extremism);
- 2.2.4. Support multi-stakeholder groups, including women’s groups, inter-religious councils, and leaders to positively engage different groups at the local, entity, BiH levels;
- 2.2.5. Facilitate dialogue between mainstream media as well as social media to work jointly towards a declaration of impartiality in reporting, or media pact for peacebuilding.

Output 2.3 BiH leadership and youth leaders connected to leaders in the neighboring countries

- 2.3.1. Support the Presidency of BiH in connecting with their counterparts in the regional countries to agree on the parameters of the regional initiative, and discuss priorities for dialogue and peacebuilding;

¹⁸ All efforts will be made to have an equal balance of female and male youth leaders supported through the programme.

- 2.3.2. Organize a regional youth consultation for the development of the regional peacebuilding project;
- 2.3.3. Promote youth in BiH in inviting youth from different groups in the neighbouring countries to host dialogues on issues of common concern.

In summary, the programme will include but move beyond changing attitudes and opinions across constituent groups to actual behavior change through local-level initiatives amongst youth, wider communities and institutions. Peacebuilding and cohesion-strengthening efforts that are to ensure more sustainability of results and a greater overall impact require a longer-horizon timeframe to shepherd along, and support, an empowered generation willing to talk to each other and to act together for common interests and aspirations. Thus, Dialogue platforms will not be supported for one-off dialogue events but rather for consistent and meaningful citizenship engagement, and will focus on contributing to social cohesion both vertically and horizontally.

Noting the difficulty in achieving such multifaceted behavior change within the 18-month implementation period, this program forms a part of the UNCT’s longer-term social cohesion vision (transitioning from the current UNDAF to the following one (to start in 2021) with a stronger conflict prevention and SDGs focus). The minimum envisaged period for the planned activities to continue is 36 months (i.e. additional 18 months), with the task of developing an external donor-engagement strategy which would cover a five-year period. Part of the overall strategy for the project is therefore to engage other development partners (and possible eventual donors) throughout the project’s activities, in order to demonstrate the specific value-added of the project.

*b) **Budget:** Provide the envisaged project budget, using the two tables below: (1) activity by activity budget and (2) UN Categories budget. Provide any additional remarks on the scale of the budget and value-for-money, referring to the Value for Money checklist.*

Funds transfers will be made in two performance-based tranches. Tranche two will be released upon authorization by PBF that the following benchmarks or conditions have been met:

1. Identification of and clear plans to launch the mechanisms for Presidency-led dialogue spaces
2. Submission of the regional project (component) to PBSO, including completion of the regional youth consultation to inform the design of the regional component.
3. Evidence of commitment of 80% of the first tranche
4. Completion of baseline survey
5. On time uploading to MPTFO Gateway of all required reports

Table 2: Project Activity Budget

Outcome/ Output number	Output name	Output budget by RUNO - UNICEF	Output budget by RUNO - UNDP	Output budget by RUNO - UNESCO	UN budget category (see table below)	Any remarks (e.g. on types of
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					for list of categories)	inputs provided or budget justification)
Outcome 1: Increased interaction and collaboration between different groups at the local level (within and between municipalities)						
Output 1.1	Local communities lead local assessments on common problems and priority issues of concern	165,405.95\$	94,445.99\$	39,590\$	UNICEF: 1. Staff and other personnel: 2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials: 3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation) 4. Contractual services: 5. Travel: 6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts: 7. General Operating and other Direct Costs Indirect cost: UNDP: 1. Staff and other personnel: Supplies, Commodities, Materials: 4. Contractual services: Indirect cost: UNESCO: 1. Staff and other personnel: 4. Contractual services: Indirect cost:	
Output 1.2	Social cohesion at the local level enhanced through establishment of local dialogue platforms/peacebuilding mechanisms	282,169.70\$	272,357.16\$	455,466.90\$	UNICEF: 1. Staff and other personnel: 4. Contractual services: 5. Travel: 6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts: 7. General Operating and	

					<p>other Direct Costs: Indirect cost:</p> <p>UNDP: 1. Staff and other personnel: 2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials: 4. Contractual services: 5. Travel: Indirect cost:</p> <p>UNESCO: 1. Staff and other personnel: Supplies, Commodities, Materials: 4. Contractual services: 5. Travel: 7. General Operating and other Direct Costs: Indirect cost:</p>	
Outcome 2: Increased interaction and dialogue between different groups at the BiH level						
Output 2.1	Youth leaders from BiH are capacitated to become conveners and peacebuilders	173,725.20\$	75,211.30\$	13,375\$	<p>UNICEF: 1. Staff and other personnel: 4. Contractual services: 5. Travel: 6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts: 7. General Operating and other Direct Costs: Indirect cost:</p> <p>UNDP: 1. Staff and other personnel: 2 Supplies, Commodities, Materials: 4. Contractual services: 5. Travel: Indirect cost:</p> <p>UNESCO: 1. Staff and other personnel:</p>	

					4. Contractual services: Indirect cost:	
Output 2.2	Dialogue between relevant authorities and institutions, and citizens, facilitated at BiH level	148,724.65\$	82,921.16\$	59,652.50\$	<p>UNICEF: 1. Staff and other personnel: 4. Contractual services: 5. Travel 6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts: 7. General Operating and other Direct Costs: Indirect cost</p> <p>UNDP: 1. Staff and other personnel 2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials: 4. Contractual services: 5. Travel: Indirect cost:</p> <p>UNESCO: 1. Staff and other personnel: 4. Contractual services: Indirect cost</p>	Activity 2.2.4 “Support multi-stakeholder groups, including women’s groups, inter-religious councils, and leaders to positively engage different groups at the local, entity, BiH levels” will contribute to gender equality and women’s empowerment. The total envisioned budget for this activity is 53,387.88\$
Output 2.3	BiH leadership and youth leaders connected to leaders in the neighboring countries	13,449.90\$	120,830.39\$	2,675\$	<p>UNICEF: 1. Staff and other personnel: 4. Contractual services 5. Travel 7. General Operating and other Direct Costs Indirect cost:</p> <p>UNDP: 1. Staff and other personnel: 2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials: 4. Contractual services: 5. Travel: 7. General Operating and</p>	

					other Direct Costs: Indirect cost:	
					UNESCO: 1. Staff and other personnel: Indirect cost:	
Total		783,475.40\$	645,766.00\$	570,759.40\$		

Table 3: Project budget by UN categories

PBF PROJECT BUDGET								
CATEGORIES	Amount Recipient Agency UNICEF		Amount Recipient Agency UNDP		Amount Recipient Agency UNESCO		TOTAL	
	Tranche 1	Tranche 2	Tranche 1	Tranche 2	Tranche 1	Tranche 2	Tranche 1	Tranche 2
1. Staff and other personnel	125,212.50	53,662.50	104,944.46	44,976.20	69,300	29,700	299,456.96	128,338.7
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	1,890.00	810.00	10,985.77	4,708.18	2,940	1,260	15,815.77	6,778.18
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	2,100.00	900.00					2,100	900
4. Contractual services	182,728.00	78,312.00	143,430.00	61,470.00	274,141	117,489	600,299	257,271
5. Travel	5,323.50	2,281.50	7,588.00	3,252.00	4,900	2,100	17,811.50	7,633.50
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	189,000.00	81,000.00	112,875.00	48,375.00			301,875	129,375
7. General Operating and other Direct Costs	6,300.00	2,700.00	42,640.51	18,274.51	22,113	9,477	71,053.51	30,451.51
Sub-Total Project Costs	512,554.00	219,666.00	422,463.74	181,055.89	373,394.00	160,026.00	1,308,411.74	560,747.89
8. Indirect Support Costs*	35,878.78	15,376.62	29,572.46	12,673.91	26,137.58	11,201.82	91,588.82	39,252.35
TOTAL	548,432.78	235,042.62	452,036.20	193,729.80	399,531.58	171,227.82	1,400,000.56	600,000.24

* The rate shall not exceed 7% of the total of categories 1-7, as specified in the PBF MOU and should follow the rules and guidelines of each recipient organization. Note that Agency-incurred direct project implementation costs should be charged to the relevant budget line, according to the Agency's regulations, rules and procedures.

- c) **Capacity of RUNO(s) and implementing partners:** *This section should provide a brief description of the RUNO capacity in the Country, including the overall annual budget (regular and emergency) and the staff. It should include its peacebuilding expertise, its previous experience with joint programming and an outline of its strengths/ value-added, which will be put to use in the project implementation. It should also outline the M&E capacity. This section should also outline any additional implementing partners, including their role and experience and how the RUNO will provide quality assurance. Please use the following table for the RUNO budget and add rows if more than one RUNO.*

This project will be implemented by three RUNOs - UNDP, UNICEF and UNESCO, supported by the UN Peace and Development Unit, and in close partnership with the offices of the BiH Presidency members. Further locally-based implementing partners are to be identified following final selection of the targeted locations (and with thorough assessments of their capacities and potential role), as well as through the small-grants facility.

The three RUNOs and RCO have significant experience in joint programming in BiH, starting in particular with the 2008-2012 “Culture for Development” project (funded by the MDG-F). Currently, the agencies are participating in a number of UNCT’s joint programs, including CRSV (Conflict-Related Sexual Violence; 2015-ongoing), Disaster Risk Reduction (2017-2020), Birac Region Advancement, (2013-2017); with a number of JPs in development (e.g. IT Girls, PwD), including this expansion of the Dialogue for the Future. With the Delivering as One approach UNCT in BiH has demonstrated capacity and a track record in delivering joint programming, in particular within the framework of the current 2015-19 UNDAF (which specifically outlines conflict prevention and trust-building as one of the key areas of engagement).

For this IRF/PBF project submission, the initial DFF (2014-16) track record testifies to the expertise (provided and) needed for successful delivery of the activities, with UNICEF and UNESCO well placed to implement activities in the education and cultural sectors (with expanding on a greater policy-development/expertise role than before), and UNDP adding a broader development assistance focus and link to strategic planning; all three agencies bring experience working at the local level with municipalities and an extensive network of civil society organizations (especially the youth-network which came out of the DFF1). All three RUNOs will use their extensive local-level networks in the selected targeted locations, with an effort to ensure operationalization and sustainability of the wider local peacebuilding and dialogue mechanisms (as described in planned activities).

Table 4: Overview of RUNO funding in the country				
	RUNO 1: UNICEF	Key Source of Funding (government, donor etc)	Annual Regular Budget in \$	Annual emergency budget (e.g. CAP)

Previous calendar year	3,479,885\$	Donors, UNICEF regular resources	3,386,454\$	93,431\$
Current calendar year	4,090,948	Donors, UNICEF regular resources	4,056,271\$	34,677\$
	RUNO 2: UNDP	Key Source of Funding (government, donor etc)	Annual Regular Budget in \$	Annual emergency budget (e.g. CAP)
Previous calendar year	30,338,772\$	EU, Government of Switzerland, GEF, Government of Sweden, Government of Netherlands, BiH Authorities	23,308,391\$	7,030,381\$
Current calendar year	28,987,458\$	EU, Government of Switzerland, GEF, Government of Sweden, Government of Netherlands, BiH Authorities	28,907,458\$	80,000\$
	RUNO 3: UNESCO	Key Source of Funding (government, donor etc)	Annual Regular Budget in \$	Annual emergency budget (e.g. CAP)
Previous calendar year	1,301,284\$	Donors, and UNESCO Regular Programme funding	1,256,324\$	50,000\$
Current calendar year	1,635,000\$	Donors, and UNESCO Regular Programme funding	1,635,000	25,000

II. Management and coordination

The management and coordination arrangements will follow the guidelines in the UNCT Guidance Note on Joint Programmes.¹⁹

The agencies participating in the Joint Programme will include UNDP, UNESCO and UNICEF. Under the overall leadership of the Programme Board, the participating UN agencies will have the ultimate responsibilities for achievement of results of the UN activities conducted through Programme. UNICEF will act as the Convening Agency of the Joint Programme responsible for the strategic and programmatic leadership of the Joint UN Programme and ensuring cohesive and coordinated approach of the participating UN agencies. The Convening Agency, in partnership with other participating UN Agencies, will be responsible and accountable to the Joint Programme Board for facilitation of the achievement of agreed delivery and results of the Joint UN Programme in a manner consistent with the One Programme 2015-2019.

¹⁹ updated June 2017

Overall oversight and strategic guidance of the Programme will be provided through Joint Programme Board. The Board will be co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator and the dedicated representative of the Presidency, and composed of the representative(s) of Presidency, the Heads of UNICEF, UNDP and UNESCO. The Programme Board will meet first time after one month of the Programme inception to adopt terms of reference and agree on the composition of the Board, and how often the Board will be meeting. New members to the Board can be added by Board approval.²⁰

The Programme Coordinator, hosted by the Convening Agency, will serve as the Secretary during the Board meetings. The Board will be the main decision-making authority of the joint programme and will be responsible for the strategic oversight of the overall implementation and interagency coordination. Board gives guidance to joint programme team and the Coordinator and will be responsible for the resolution of the implementation issues, if required. The Board also reviews and endorses the annual work plans, reviews implementation progress and annual reports. The Board approves any substantial changes in the budgets or activities.

Each of the participating UN agencies will be substantively and financially accountable for the activities designated to it in the joint programme. The participating agencies will be individually responsible for: ensuring the timely implementation of the activities and delivery of the reports and other outputs identified in this project document; contracting and supervising qualified local and international experts, financial administration, monitoring, reporting and procurement for the activities they are responsible for; and carrying out all the necessary tasks and responsibilities to assist the Board.


Joint Programme Coordinator (JPC) will be tasked to coordinate the overall implementation of the programme, ensuring implementation of activities as approved in the work plans endorsed by the JPB and, in cooperation with RUNOs, coordinating activities with the Joint Programme Team, ensuring the programme is implemented as envisaged and agreed with the Board, and coordinating closely with the Head of the Convening Agency and RUNOs. The Coordinator will also be responsible for consolidation of the inputs of all agencies for consolidated narrative reporting to the donor. Additionally, the JPC will be tasked to elaborate a fundraising strategy for ensuring additional resources for the sequenced +18 months of the project continuation, as well as with contributing to the framing of UNCT's longer-term visioning around social cohesion and trust-building. The fund raising is to be coordinated by the Chair of the UNDAF Result Group, under which the project falls. The position will be administratively managed by the Convening Agency who will be issuing the contract. The Joint Programme Coordinator will consult with the agencies on the financial plans and expenditures related to activities defined within the work plans. The Coordinator reports to the Programme Board and is required to abide by Board decisions, and not to be affected only by steering or guidance by one agency, including the Convening Agency. The Coordinator will inform the Board on any substantial revisions to budgets and activities that go beyond the prescribed minimal threshold prescribed in the donor agreement. Such changes have to be endorsed by the Board. The RUNOs are also encouraged to share with the JPC any budgetary changes or revisions which

²⁰ In order to strengthen institutional ownership of the project, inclusion of other relevant representatives of BiH authorities in the work of Project Board, can be discussed and agreed during the Board meetings, taking into account specific mandates of Institutions which might be invited to take the part in the work of Joint Programme. A Civil Society Representative, on an ad-hoc basis, may be invited to participate as an observer, together with the International donors with a strong interest in supporting peace and trust building can also be invited to participate as observers if the Board members agree.

vary from the originally approved budget, even for those that are below minimal threshold so that all agencies are aware of any changes in the programme implementation.

The UN Peace and Development Unit (PDU), led by the Political and Development Advisor (PDA), will provide overall strategic oversight, quality assurance, guidance and technical advice, from a political perspective, to the Board and the RUNOs and the Programme Coordinator, given the sensitive nature of this peacebuilding/conflict prevention project. The PDA will be responsible for the day-to-day liaison with the members of the Presidency through their Advisors, and the Peace and Development Specialist will provide advice on the programme quality assurance from peacebuilding perspective. In collaboration with the RUNOs and JPC, the PDU will, in an on-going basis, liaise with (i) the BiH Presidency; (ii) PBSO/PBF, DPA and EOSG (when necessary); and (iii) relevant counterparts in participating countries to ensure coherence with the multi-country stream of DFF2 initiative.

Following is the organizational chart of the Joint Programme:



Risk management

The main risks affiliated with Project implementation are identified below, together with likelihood of occurrence, severity of impact, as well as adequate mitigation measures. Overall, the risk level for this Project is assessed as **low to medium**, attributed mainly to political factors. A preliminary assessment shows that the Project is not a high-risk

intervention, based on extensive experience during the previous DFF intervention and in transferring ownership to local governments and stakeholders, as evidenced in other UN initiatives.

The following risks for project implementation and mitigation measures have been identified:

Table 5 – Risk management matrix

Risks to the achievement of PBF outcomes	Likelihood of occurrence (high, medium, low)	Severity of risk impact (high, medium, low)	Mitigating Strategy (and Person/Unit responsible)
October 2018 elections and change in power structure can hamper implementation of activities; specifically, the expected change of the BiH Presidency membership.	High	High	A rapid start of activities and launch of the Dialogue Platform, Grants facility will ensure that the bulk of the project activities are kick-started before the elections. Considering that at least one of the current BiH Presidency members will be new after October 2018, the Project will call upon the partnership relationship with the Presidency affirmed with the “Dialogue Declaration”, with PDU in constant liaison with the Presidency advisors to ensure uninterrupted engagement in the transition period. Project will also aim to sign Agreements with other identified institutional partners, thus formalising their commitment and contribution to the Project, as well as familiarising the newly-elected officials and policy-makers with the Project purpose.
Complex, multi-tier governance structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina may pose difficulties in vertical consolidation of the sub-national planning system.	Medium	Medium	The Project will seek to mobilise interest and motivation among all government stakeholders and political leaders from the outset. Wide media promotion and sharing of Project results and achievements will be ensured, leveraging public scrutiny over governments’ performance.
Political developments of pre-elections related campaigning undermine the ability or willingness of the Presidency and local leaders to engage in Programme activities.	Low	High	Programme initiates activities fast during the inception period and ensures activities are well underway at the local level before immediate pre-election period. Focus on youth will mitigate the need for constant high-level decision-making on the programme. PDA to be in constant liaison with the Advisors of the Presidency to ensure productive interaction.
High frustration among the population may fuel political polarization and increase the possibility of social unrest.	Medium	Low	Measures of confidence building are included in the project; The project will encourage parties to implement the activities unless the security risk is too high.
Referendums on a number of issues challenging official institutions and/or policies conducted in one of the entities.	Low	Low	Strengthened community-level relationships in-between groups and with local communities in targeted locations will aim to mitigate any spill-over that might occur from entity-based (politically-induced) informal referendums.
Insufficient engagement of public institutions at all levels in providing policy support and accessibility (e.g. relevant MoEs deny project access to schools).	High	High	The Project will encourage a structured participation, facilitate awareness-raising advocacy and dialogue with all key stakeholders throughout the process so that they understand and ‘buy in’ to the joint activities and see their value; as well a support voicing out of communities’ interests and needs, with focus on the most vulnerable.
Insufficient number of target group beneficiaries are eligible and/or	Low	High	As the Action is targeting the most vulnerable segments of the population, it is possible that the Open Calls for participation throughout the Project will not identify the required number

interested for participation in project activities.			of eligible stakeholders. As a mitigation measure, the Project will advertise the Calls and hold public presentations of the call frequently, and in partnership with local champions identified in DFF (phase 1) and local governments. In addition, in such case, the Action may propose to the Project Board to expand the outreach to beneficiaries to other.
Unfavorable and misused media reporting and messaging	Medium	Medium	Continuous engagement with media actors to ensure they understand the objectives of the project; maintaining various channels of communication/outreach to the public including social media outlets from the PUNOs to ensure countering any mis-messaging directly; and engagement of the Presidency and its networks to ensure accurate portrayal of the project by the media
Unfavourable dollar exchange rate fluctuations.	Low	High	The Action will apply pro-active early warning and financial planning and management system.
Overlap with other donor funded reconciliation initiatives (eg. Catholic Relief Services, USAID etc.)	Low	High	Continuous coordination with other donors active in the peacebuilding/ reconciliation area. Continuous coordination will complement other IC-funded efforts, both those that are explicitly and implicitly peacebuilding in nature; bring specific focus to culture, youth and education sectors re peacebuilding; elevate politically the issue, provide greater visibility; and together with other donors and actors increase impact collectively.
Inter-cultural dialogue activities supported through the project touch on potentially sensitive topics and disestablish the participation of targeted groups.	Medium	Medium	Throughout the project, emphasize the support of inter-cultural dialogue as a process whilst maintaining a clear neutral stance with regards to the content; ensure Presidency support to open dialogue (if/when needed).
Oversaturated project locations in terms of active UN/UNDP local development/local governance projects	Medium	Medium	Continuous coordination with other UN/UNDP initiatives active in the development/governance area.
Force Majeure (e.g. act of nature) impacts Project activities.	Low	High	The Project will have a flexible approach, including reprogramming of activities to respond to the emerging needs.

Monitoring & evaluation:

The programme will follow the monitoring and evaluation procedures of Joint Programmes in BiH. The Programme Coordinator is responsible for the day to day monitoring of the programme under the overall guidance of the Board. The programme will undertake a perception survey at the inception of the programme (nation-wide and with detailed focus groups in the selected locations) that will inform the implementation and contribute to the assessment of the results and impact of the programme. A company will be contracted to undertake the perception survey through a competitive procurement process. Communication outreach and activities implemented directly with the media will be informed by lessons from DFF1 and in line with the (internally) agreed approach and key engagement messages. In addition, a final independent evaluation of the programme will be undertaken at the end of programme and appropriate budget has been allocated for the evaluation (not exceeding \$50,000, depending on the defined scope, e.g. potential inclusion of the regional component).

The RUNOs will undertake project monitoring activities under the overall coordination of the Joint Programme Coordinator. Monitoring activities would include site visits; meetings with partners and beneficiaries to assess progress and obstacles; continued assessments of the efficiency of the local-level mechanisms and financial assurance of granted activities such as spot checks (in line with the agency-specific standards). Continuous media monitoring will

also be conducted, as there are several output-level indicators in the RRF that relate to the media's messaging around social cohesion issues.

Aside from being a core project activity, uReport will be a key monitoring and feedback tool. uReport is an online polling platform that will allow registered uReporters (adolescents and youth throughout the country) to respond to questions in real-time, e.g. questions related to their perceptions of social cohesion and diversity in their communities, or related to specific project initiatives. Furthermore, monitoring will be devised to ensure that every output/outcome is implemented in a gender-informed way (e.g. with sex-disaggregated indicators wherever possible, with 50-50 breakdown of M/F participation in project events, etc.)

As outlined in the above section, the PDU team based in the Resident Coordinator's Office will also provide substantive monitoring of the programme vis-à-vis its intended peacebuilding objectives, guiding the RUNOs on the political developments having a possible impact on the programme, on issues related to conflict sensitivity of the programme implementation, and ensuring that the programme is implemented as envisaged and contributing to peacebuilding and social cohesion in the country.

In order to ensure quality in the process of planning and implementation of the SGF projects and, uniformity in the use of tools and documentation, the SGF programmatic and financial performance will be subject to the established M&E methodology and experience from DFF Phase 1. This **methodology** is a transparent, public and inclusive tool for recognizing the needs in the community, funds allocation, expenditure monitoring and result analysis. The methodology prescribes both detailed (i) reporting and (ii) monitoring of projects:

a. Reporting:

Reporting is an important part of the process through which the SGF beneficiaries will ensure that the DFF team obtains accurate and timely information on the activity implementation progress. Timely and quality reporting will ensure the proper flow of information between the funds users and the DFF team. The reports prepared and submitted by SGF beneficiaries will be sex- disaggregated and informed and will determine the level of met targets set in the proposed and approved project proposal. The SGF beneficiaries will be required to create a feedback mechanism within their project proposals and include project participants and target groups into evaluation of performance/response to community priorities. This will ensure that both the SGF beneficiary gets feedback from project participants and target groups coming from the locations of intervention, as well as for the DFF team to get information right from the ground. The reports will be annexed to the Final narrative reports of the projects.

The SGF beneficiaries will, during the course of the projects, submit Periodic Progress Reports, both narrative and financial, as well as Final financial and Narrative reports.

- **Periodic Narrative report:**

The Narrative report is a descriptive reporting of the project implementation progress in accordance with the contract signed with between DFF Programme and beneficiary. Narrative reporting is carried out within the framework of the results stated in the contract, and is based on activities from the activity plan. Reporting should be related to the results from the logical framework and activity plan, which form an integral part of the proposal, and the level of their achievement. The Narrative Report is reviewed by the designated DFF team member, the

statements and results reported are reviewed and affirmed through regular DFF team monitoring field visits.

- Periodic Financial Report:

The Periodic financial report on expenditures of SGF beneficiaries should be in line with the level of results' implementation and based on the budget specified in the contract. Periodic financial report shows the costs incurred during the reporting period and has to be in line with the Narrative Report. **Narrative and Financial reports for any reporting period are submitted jointly.** The Financial Report is reviewed by the designated DFF team member, the report is reviewed and affirmed through regular DFF team monitoring field visits.

- Final Narrative Report:

The Final Narrative Report through detailed project results, and effect on direct beneficiaries to the entire local community, will confirm that the project implementation resolved pertinent issues. The results achieved are analyzed in comparison with the results proposed in the project proposal and the progress per each individual goal or result is recorded.

- Final Financial Report:

The Final Financial Report shows the final and total spending of the SFG beneficiary during the project implementation.

b. Monitoring

Monitoring of implementation of a project is the verification process that ensures that the project is being implemented in accordance with the plan and is in order to meet the planned objectives. Project monitoring is an integral part of daily project management and provides information based on which management can therefore identify and solve problems that arise during implementation, and thus achieve progress. Monitoring will be based on information obtained through progress reports (including financial reports) prepared by the SGF beneficiaries and other information obtained through **field visits**.

Field visits are necessary to further verify the financial and technical progress and compare the actual situation with that reported, as well as to ensure the physical evidence of the project implementation progress. Regular, day-to-day email and telephone communication is also important to exchange information however field visits will be key to project monitoring and evaluation.

The Joint Project Implementation Monitoring Guidelines will be designed to provide a framework and a principle of monitoring that aims to provide accurate and appropriate information on the level of the project implementation progress. The Guidelines will describe in detail all the steps that are to be taken during monitoring of project implementation.

Project Monitoring Reports should include all necessary information on project progress, project achievements, the compatibility of activities and expenditures, potential difficulties, and so forth. A key segment of the report is the recommendation/s, or conclusion/s of the monitoring team/commission on implementation of activities.

In addition, please use the table annexed to this template (Annex 2) to set out the Results Framework. For additional information on Results Frameworks, see Section 7 of the PBF Guidelines. Please attach a separate M&E Plan using Template 4.1 ONLY if the project will have an evaluation (please see Section 7 of the Guidelines for information on when an independent evaluation is a requirement).

a) Administrative arrangements

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

AA Functions

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved “Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds” (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate narrative reports and financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is notified by the RUNO (accompanied by the final narrative report, the final certified financial statement and the balance refund);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any costs extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

- Bi-annual progress reports to be provided no later than 15 June;
- Annual progress reports to be provided no later than 15 November;

- Final (end of project) narrative reports, to be provided no later than three months after the operational closure of the project;
- Annual financial statements as of 31 December with respect to the funds disbursed to it from the PBF, to be provided no later than four months (30 April) after the end of the calendar year;
- Certified final financial statements after the completion of the activities in the approved programmatic document, to be provided no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.
- Unspent Balance at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent's website (<http://mptf.undp.org>).

Annex A: Project Summary (to be submitted as a word document to MPTF-Office)



**PEACEBUILDING FUND
PROJECT SUMMARY**

Project Number & Title:	A More Equitable Society: Promoting Social Cohesion and Diversity in BiH (Dialogue for the Future II)	
Recipient UN Organization:	UNICEF, UNDP and UNESCO	
Implementing Partner(s):	<p>Presidency of BiH (main partner)</p> <p>Relevant government authorities at sub-national levels, as well as local CSOs and key actors, to be determined based on selected project locations.</p>	
Location:	BiH	
Approved Project Budget:	\$2,000,000	
Duration:	Planned Start Date: 31 November 2017	Planned Completion: 30 May 2019
Project Description:	<p>Through providing spaces for dialogue and continued interaction between different groups at the local and BiH levels, the programme supports collective identification of issues that affect all citizens in BiH; and contributes to enhanced interaction and collaboration between groups. The aim will be for the different groups to realize solving problems affecting them all requires working together, and building on the strengths of diversity. The project has a major focus on youth, connecting young opinion-makers, future leaders and key stakeholders with the BiH leadership and across the neighboring countries, thus linking them to a joint effort with their neighboring countries.</p>	
PBF Focus Area:	<p><i>Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Priority Area 2)</i></p> <p><i>Focus area: 2.1 national reconciliation</i></p>	
Project Outcome:	<p>Outcome 1: Increased interaction and collaboration between different groups at the local level (within and between municipalities);</p> <p>Outcome 2: Increased interaction and dialogue between different groups at the BiH level</p>	
Key Project Activities:	<p><i>Output 1.1 Local communities lead local assessments on common problems and priority issues of concern</i></p> <p>1.1.7 Select local municipalities for the dialogue and peacebuilding initiatives;</p> <p>1.1.8 Identify conveners and stakeholders for the local assessments together with local authorities, youth and civil society, including women's organizations;</p>	

	<p>1.1.9 Support the capacity of the conveners (especially youth) to be able to facilitate multi-actor processes;</p> <p>1.1.10 Empower youth to play a leadership role in the assessments and set up mechanisms for youth led community consultation (e.g. through uReport);</p> <p>1.1.11 Assist youth, local leaders and groups in undertaking local assessments on common priority issues hindering social cohesion;</p> <p>1.1.12 Support a participatory process to validate the findings of the assessment and a local prioritization process.</p> <p><i>Output 1.2: Social cohesion at the local level enhanced through establishment of local dialogue platforms/peacebuilding mechanisms</i></p> <p>1.2.7. Establish platforms for dialogue²¹ in all target locations consisting of representatives of local authorities (municipalities, relevant Ministries, youth, schools, Interreligious Council/local religious organizations and civil society organizations representing different groups in each location);</p> <p>1.2.8. Support local leaders (including youth leaders) in organizing regular dialogue meetings on issues of common concern;</p> <p>1.2.9. Assist local stakeholders in leading interventions to resolve some of the concrete issues identified through the dialogue platforms through provision of small grants;</p> <p>1.2.10. Facilitate the institutionalization of the local peacebuilding mechanisms within the appropriate local structures;</p> <p>1.2.11. Support local leaders and youth in organizing cross-border dialogues bringing together citizens cross entity and state borders regularly (at least quarterly for each cross-border location during the project duration);</p> <p>1.2.12. Support cultural exchanges between schools to enhance understanding on the shared cultural heritage and history</p> <p><i>Output 2.1. Youth leaders from BiH are capacitated to become conveners and peacebuilders</i></p> <p>2.1.5. Support youth leaders²² to become 'agents' for social cohesion and network across the country;</p> <p>2.1.6. Facilitate informal dialogues among young opinion-makers and future leaders on common issues of concern (such as socio-economic issues, SDGs, political participation and the vision for a future BiH);</p> <p>2.1.7. Develop a tool for social media messaging (e.g. uReport) to allow youth in BiH to respond to polls and make suggestions for policy makers on issues related to social cohesion.</p> <p>2.1.8. Facilitate exchange and opportunities for dialogue between youth and BiH and entity level authorities on concerns of youth.</p> <p><i>Output 2.2 Dialogue between relevant authorities and institutions, and citizens, facilitated at BiH level</i></p> <p>2.2.6. Provide a platform for facilitated dialogue between key/leading authorities and citizens on issues that promote cohesion between groups at the BiH level (possible entry points include the SDGs, socio-economic issues, youth emigration etc);</p>
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²¹ The platforms will be informed by the prioritization exercises and local agreement on priorities (activity 1.1.6)

²² All efforts will be made to have an equal balance of female and male youth leaders supported through the programme.

	<p>2.2.7. Identify opportunities to include peacebuilding and social cohesion objectives into the BiH, entity and cantonal level action plans to localize SDGs in BiH;</p> <p>2.2.8. Convene relevant authorities and institutions from different levels, with citizens, to analyze barriers to social cohesion within the relevant thematic areas (e.g. education, culture, youth, inter-religious understanding, sport, role of schools in prevention of violent extremism);</p> <p>2.2.9. Support multi-stakeholder groups, including women’s groups, inter-religious councils, and leaders to positively engage different groups at the local, entity, BiH levels;</p> <p>2.2.10. Facilitate dialogue between mainstream media as well as social media to work jointly towards a declaration of impartiality in reporting, or media pact for peacebuilding.</p> <p><i>Output 2.3 BiH leadership and youth leaders connected to leaders in the neighboring countries</i></p> <p>2.3.4. Support the Presidency of BiH in connecting with their counterparts in the regional countries to agree on the parameters of the regional initiative, and discuss priorities for dialogue and peacebuilding;</p> <p>2.3.5. Organize a regional youth consultation for the development of the regional peacebuilding project;</p> <p>2.3.6. Promote youth in BiH in inviting youth from different groups in the neighbouring countries to host dialogues on issues of common concern.</p>
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Annex B: IRF Results Framework

Country name: BiH						
Project Effective Dates: 31 November 2017-30 May 2019						
PBF Focus Area: Focus area 2: Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts						
IRF Theory of Change: <i>If</i> sustained dialogue and joint problem solving is supported between different groups and mechanisms for local peacebuilding established, <i>then</i> collaboration and trust between groups is enhanced and social cohesion promoted, <i>because</i> different groups will identify common goals and realize positive change can only be achieved through collaboration and harnessing the strength of diversity.						
Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification	Year 1	Year 2	Milestones
Outcome 1: Increased interaction and collaboration between different groups at the local level (within and between municipalities)		<p>Outcome Indicator 1 a: percentage of local leaders and community representatives, including youth leaders, indicate increased collaboration between different groups</p> <p>Baseline: minimal interaction and collaboration between different groups including local leaders, youth, religious networks and civil society.</p> <p>Target: 75% of target groups report increased interaction after 12 months of project implementation. 50% of target groups report change in attitude towards collaboration 12 months from programme inception</p>	Perception survey uReport			Perception survey with representative sample to be conducted at programme initiation as a baseline in target locations and in 'control group' locations. All conducted perception surveys will disaggregate data based on gender, age and (reported) constituency.
		<p>Outcome Indicator 1 b: Increased level of collaboration between youth from different groups; as well as between youth and local leaders</p> <p>Baseline: young people in BiH have very little interaction with other young people from different groups; and youth are seldom included in municipal decision-making processes</p> <p>Target: In 75% of the selected locations, young people have jointly identified priorities on issues affecting</p>	<p>Joint assessments</p> <p>Youth participation in board meetings to be assessed through meeting minutes</p> <p>Reports by youth/beneficiaries of small grants on initiatives implemented</p>			Follow-up survey to be conducted after 12 months of programme inception

		<p>them, and are jointly implementing initiatives related to sustaining peace in their communities</p>	Direct observation by programme team									
		<p>Outcome Indicator 1 c: percentage of target groups report increased interaction between members of community and their local representatives</p> <p>Baseline: very little interaction between local communities and their leaders, community members, and youth.</p> <p>Target: 75% of target locations report increased interaction between community members and local leaders.</p>	<p>Perception survey uReport Reports by project beneficiaries on joint activities</p>									
		<p>Outcome Indicator 1 d: percentage of target groups report increased trust between members of community and their local representatives</p> <p>Baseline: low overall level of trust between communities and their representatives. Youth especially do not trust that their leaders take their concerns into consideration in decision making.</p> <p>Target: 25% of target locations report increased trust between members of community and their leaders 24 months after project initiation</p>	<p>Perception survey uReport Reports by project beneficiaries on joint activities</p>									
	<p>Output 1.1 Local communities lead local assessments on common problems and priority issues of concern</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.1.1: number of locations selected for the local peacebuilding initiatives</p> <p>Baseline: limited number of locally led peacebuilding programmes being implemented throughout the country</p>	Project board meeting minutes									Target locations selected during the first project board meeting after one month of the project inception

		Target: 6-9 locations selected for the locally led dialogue and social cohesion initiatives											
		Output Indicator 1.1.2: percentage of local conveners demonstrate capacity to facilitate multi-stakeholder processes Baseline: Association of mediators exists, and UNDP has trained young facilitators via DFF1. However, they are not regularly engaged in local peacebuilding initiatives, and there is no assessment on whether they would be the appropriate conveners with the legitimacy in the target locations. Target: 80% of selected conveners and facilitators demonstrate ability to regularly convene local stakeholders	Direct observation by UN partners Regular project monitoring visits to target locations										
		Output Indicator 1.1.3. number of agreements/MOUs/commitments with the local leaders on the local peacebuilding process and with the programme partners Baseline: Number of MOUs signed between the UN agencies and local authorities on development projects but limited number of agreements on local peacebuilding programmes Target: 6-9 municipalities/clusters of municipalities agree to lead local dialogues on priorities and local social cohesion initiatives. Agreements/MOUs signed with all target communities.	Signed MOUs between local authorities and UNICEF, UNDP, and/or UNESCO.									Agreements signed between the agreed target communities and the UN after two months of programme inception	
		Output Indicator 1.1.4: number of locally led assessments of common concerns and priorities completed in the target communities	Assessment reports Minutes of local validation meetings for the assessments										Assessment phase to be completed within 2 months after signature of the MOUs/Agreements

		<p>Baseline: Several local surveys have been undertaken to assess specific issues, however, no known local multi-stakeholder process to assess common problems or issues hindering social cohesion have been completed</p> <p>Target: Local assessments completed and approved by a participatory local platform in 80% of all target communities</p>									
		<p>Output Indicator 1.1.5: percentage of local stakeholders, especially youth, who express satisfaction with the local prioritization processes</p> <p>Baseline: Communities view BiH-level and local-level decision making processes with suspicion, and do not feel that their views are heard. Youth are especially dissatisfied.</p> <p>Target: 75% of target communities, and youth participants, express satisfaction in the prioritization process following the local assessments</p>	<p>uReport</p> <p>Surveys following the prioritization workshops/processes</p>								
	<p>Output 1.2: Social cohesion at the local level enhanced through establishment of local dialogue platforms/peacebuilding mechanisms</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.2.1 number of local mechanisms/platforms for dialogue established and strengthened</p> <p>Baseline: No reoccurring/permanent dialogue spaces in the selected municipalities (12 inter-municipal youth forums supported in the past are no longer active. These youth forums would have required more capacity building and accompaniment to take on the work without the UN. This capacity gap will be addressed through this programme in locations selected.)</p>	<p>Local MOUs or statements signed by representative group (such as local authorities, youth, civil society)</p> <p>Statements by local leaders</p> <p>Media articles by local and country-wide news channels</p>								

		<p>Target: A platform or forum for regular dialogue established in all target locations consisting of representatives of local authorities (municipalities, relevant Ministries, youth, Interreligious Council/local religious organizations and civil society organizations representing the different groups in each location).</p>										
		<p>Output Indicator 1.2.2 Number of programme locations hold regular dialogues and/establish local structures for peacebuilding</p> <p>Baseline: limited number of communities have institutionalized dialogue mechanisms</p> <p>Target: 75% of selected locations have a platform or another local mechanism that meets regularly and leads local social cohesion initiatives</p>	<p>Project reports to monitor the progress and alert partners on the need for additional support in cases of deadlock</p> <p>Regular calls with conveners</p> <p>Direct observation by UN partners</p> <p>Regular project monitoring visits to target locations</p>									
		<p>Output Indicator 1.2.3: Number of local issues resolved by the platforms based on the findings of the assessment & number of proposals referred to local, entity and BiH authorities</p> <p>Baseline: Several development, education and cultural activities being implemented at the local level, however, limited number of peacebuilding interventions identified through multi-stakeholder process and being led by local stakeholders</p> <p>Target: At least 2-3 local small scale initiatives being implemented by different groups jointly in each</p>	<p>Project proposals</p> <p>Commitment from municipalities and/or other authorities for co-financing</p> <p>Project progress reports</p> <p>Field monitoring visits</p>									

		location. At least one proposal for entity or state level authorities submitted by each programme location.																
		<p>Output Indicator 1.2.4: number of youth leaders connect across different groups and lead dialogues on issues of common concern (locally and regionally), including outside of activities implemented through this programme</p> <p>Baseline: There are limited numbers of young intellectuals, leaders and opinion makers with the capacity to resist and overcome divisive rhetoric and narratives. Some municipalities have Municipal Youth Officers; however, their capacity to coordinate and network is weak.</p> <p>Target: Group of young generation leaders from local level supported through capacity building and small grants.</p>	<p>Perception survey</p> <p>uReport</p> <p>Survey to participants and recipients of small grants</p>															
		<p>Output Indicator 1.2.5: number of local dialogue and peacebuilding initiatives jointly implemented by youth (funded through small grants)</p> <p>Baseline: 43 small grants were provided to NGOs and individuals by the RUNOs between 2015-2016 nationwide. Based on the evaluation report, the grants were valuable and supported some important peacebuilding initiatives but had limited strategic value and cumulative effect given they were scattered over many locations, objectives and could not support institutionalization within the organizations and individuals they were given to.</p>	<p>Grant proposals</p> <p>Commitment letters from relevant local or state authorities on co-financing</p> <p>Reports by grant recipients</p>															

		<p>Target: number of small grants provided to local initiatives that have a positive impact on social cohesion and civic engagement and are in line with the agreement on local priorities identified by the local dialogue platforms. Exact number will be defined after the assessment is finalized in each location. Each grant should be co-financed by the relevant local, entity or state authority.</p>									
<p>Outcome 2: Increased interaction and dialogue between different groups at the BiH level</p>		<p>Outcome Indicator 2 a: programme partners and beneficiaries indicate increased interaction between the Presidency, local authorities, and youth</p> <p>Baseline: young people have very limited interaction and opportunities to engage with the Presidency in addition to local authorities</p> <p>Target: 50% of target groups report increased interaction between the Presidency, local authorities and youth</p>	<p>Perception survey</p> <p>Programme Board Meetings</p> <p>Survey of youth involved in the programme activities</p>								<p>Perception survey to be conducted at programme inception and repeated 12 months after programme inception</p> <p>Surveys or informal conversations with youth focal points to be conducted regularly by the Programme team</p>
		<p>Outcome Indicator 2c: number of provocative/negative statements in the mainstream media about the 'other' groups during elections period</p> <p>Baseline: Elections related competition has a tendency to increase divisive rhetoric throughout the country</p> <p>Target: reduced likelihood of elections period having negative effects on relationships at the community level</p>	<p>Perception survey</p> <p>uReport (for social media aspects/monitoring)</p> <p>Standard media monitoring (TV/Newspapers as main media used in BiH)</p>								
		<p>Output Indicator 2.1.1. number of youth with enhanced skills in</p>	uReport								

	Output 2.1: Youth leaders from BiH are capacitated to become conveners and peacebuilders	<p>collaborative leadership and peacebuilding</p> <p>Baseline: Limited knowledge/skills in the area of collaborative leadership and peacebuilding among youth in the selected municipalities (programme partners will further assess these gaps and address them)</p> <p>Target: Representative group of youth (including girls and boys) in target locations demonstrate competence on collaborative leadership and peacebuilding</p>	Project reports																
		<p>Output Indicator 2.1.2 number of instances that youth facilitate dialogues on issues of common concern in BiH</p> <p>Baseline: 3 large scale conferences organized by the DFF partners with youth, however, very small number of dialogue initiatives have been led by youth themselves</p> <p>Target: Youth from different groups meet and dialogue on common priorities at least quarterly during programme implementation</p>	<p>Dialogue reports</p> <p>Statements by youth leaders and opinion makers</p> <p>Direct observation by UN agencies</p>																
		<p>Output Indicator 2.1.3. number of users utilizing the social messaging tool for civic engagement</p> <p>Baseline: none (tool not yet established)</p> <p>Target: At least 10,000 users registered in year 1, with 80% under the age of 30 and 50% female.</p>	<p>uReport</p> <p>Facebook</p>																
	Output 2.2: Dialogue between relevant	Output Indicator 2.2.1 percentage of relevant entity and cantonal level	Entity and cantonal action plans																

	authorities and institutions, and citizens, facilitated at BiH level	<p>action plans localize peacebuilding components of the SDGs in BiH</p> <p>Baseline: no entity or cantonal level action plans</p> <p>Target: At least one BiH- level dialogue utilizing SDGs as the entry point, and at least two entity and cantonal level action plans integrate relevant peacebuilding elements through SDGs into action plans</p>	<p>Dialogue meeting minutes</p> <p>BiH-level statements on SDGs</p>																
		<p>Output Indicator 2.2.2: number of dialogues; number of key mainstream and social media outlets engaged in dialogue; media articles with positive messages of tolerance and peacebuilding</p> <p>Baseline: #1 targeted Communications Strategy produced for DFF1 implementation; Media plays a very divisive role in the country with most of the media reporting focusing on the negative news and very little media coverage for the positive cross-group collaborative initiatives.</p> <p>Target: Revised and adjusted Comms strategy to include specific targeting (e.g. as defined in the narrative, including approach for independent media outlets and young women). At least two dialogues bringing together mainstream and social media outlets to discuss the role of media in promoting social cohesion. At least ten positive wide-spread media articles published during the programme implementation.</p>	<p>BiH-level/cross-country news</p> <p>TV</p> <p>Newspaper articles</p> <p>News articles in the neighboring countries</p>																

		<p>Output Indicator 2.2.3: number of dialogues between institutions and authorities managing education, culture, youth and other relevant authorities at BiH level</p> <p>Baseline: Limited entry points for BiH-level dialogue currently exist. In the field of Education, BiH has no state-level Ministry of Education; the coordination role rests with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the management of education system is under jurisdiction of the RS and at the cantonal levels in the Federation. BiH, a country of 3.5 million people has 13+1 ministries dealing with education and different groups and locations use different curricula meaning no common narrative of history and group cohesion exists.</p> <p>Target: Dialogues on thematic priority issues bringing together the relevant BiH authorities held quarterly.</p>	<p>Dialogue reports</p> <p>PDU reports</p>									
	<p>Output 2.3 BiH leadership and youth leaders connect to leaders in the neighbouring countries</p>	<p>Output Indicator 2.3.1: representative number of youth covering different groups from BiH and the neighbouring countries participate in the regional consultation for the development of the regional initiative</p> <p>Baseline: no consultation held on the regional initiative</p> <p>Target: Youth representing different groups in BiH and the neighboring countries participate in the consultation for the regional initiative. Regional initiative to be launched in January 2018.</p>	<p>Consultation report</p> <p>Regional programme document for BiH and the neighbouring countries</p>									<p>Regional consultation to be held in 2017</p> <p>Regional project to be launched in January 2018.</p>

