**EVALUATION REPORT**

**The Kenya-Somalia Refugees and Peace building Cross Border Pilot Project for Voluntary Return, Co-existence and Sustainable Reintegration in the Areas of Return**

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Submitted to

UNHCR, Somalia

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**ACRONNYMS**

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| ADESO | African Development Solutions |
| AVORD  | African Volunteers for Relief and Development |
| BREK  | Bay regional education committee |
| CAP | Community Action Plan |
| CECs | community education committees  |
| DRC  | Danish Refugee Council  |
|  FAO’s |  Food Agricultural Organization |
| FGDs | Focus Group Discussion  |
| IDPs | Internally Displaced persons  |
| ILO | International Labor Organization  |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| MORDA | Ministry of Refugee and Diaspora Affairs  |
| NCRI | National Commission for Refugees and IDPs |
| NITA | National Industrial Training Authority |
| NRC  | Norwegian Refugee Council  |
| PUNOs | PUNO Partner United Nation Organizations  |
| PRMN | Population Return Monitoring Network |
| TLS | Temporary Learning Space |
| UNICEF  | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| WFP | World Food Programme  |
| YEP | Youth Education Programme |
| VST | Vocational Skill Training  |

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This evaluation study was conducted on behalf of UNHCR project on Kenya-Somalia Refugees Cross Border Peace building Pilot Project for Voluntary Return, Co-existence and Sustainable Reintegration for Baidoa Returnees which was a two (2) year project that commenced in January 2017 and ended in December 2018. The project was implemented by six (6) partners United Nations Organizations (PUNO), including UNHCR (lead), UNICEF, FAO, WFP, IOM and ILO in Somalia while in Kenya; UNHCR Kenya implemented the project through implementing partners; Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Government of Kenya in Dadaab refugee camp while UNHCR Somalia implemented the program in Baidoa town with other UN agencies and partners including, World Vision International (WVI), African Volunteers for Relief and Development (AVORD), Federal Government of Somalia-National Commission for Refugees and IDPs (NCRI), Ministry of Resettlement and Diaspora Affairs (MORDA) in South West State amongst others. The objective of the evaluation was to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and impact of the different projects and activities that the partners implemented in Baidoa district, South West State, Somalia and in Dadaab, Kenya. The evaluation further sought to assess the extent to which the project has reached the desired outcomes and how it managed relevant risks. In addition, the evaluation reviews the changes made on the project activities as a result of the severe drought in 2016/17 that resulted in the influx of IDPs; and whether these activities contributed to the original project outcomes and the project’s theory of change.

**Methodology**: Researchcare adopted a mixed-design approach, using both quantitative and qualitative techniques because they compensate for each other’s weaknesses; and each approach provides more value when used in a mixed-method design, providing information and conclusions that are more coherent, reliable, and useful than those from single-method studies. The study conducted 18 focus group discussions and 32 key informant interviews (KIIs) across Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya and Baidoa district in South West State of Somalia. This was complemented by quantitative data from a sample of 591 households across various settlements in Baidoa. Researchcare used mobile-based data collection system (ONA) for the household survey and data was collected using mobile/tablet devices and transmitted to secure online cloud servers on daily basis.

**Findings**

The evaluation employed five specific evaluation criteria from the OECD-DAC criteria to guide the study in addition to extracting lessons learnt. These are; assessing the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability to affected population.

**Efficiency**

**Efficiency of Project Implementation:** The PBF program had several complementing activities that were delivered by several UN agencies in collaboration with international and local partners, and Ministry of Refugee and Diaspora Affairs (MORDA) for the South West State. Most of the activities were implemented within the set time frame; however, due to external factors such as insecurity, severe drought in the region resulting influx of IDPs coupled with political uncertainty over the presidential election of South West State caused considerable delays in the implementation of some project activities.

The evaluation further noted that there was no-cost extension that enabled some of the remaining projects especially the road works to be completed on time. In addition, undue government interference in the contracting process of some project activities has occasioned setback for instance to IOM’s planned commencement of Kerrowfogi Bridge in Baidoa town. In terms of the timeliness of programme delivery, the implementation of the project activities coincided with a lean period that threatened the livelihoods of the host communities and returnees and influx of IDPs. Furthermore, while the evaluation notes that the operational environment in Somalia for INGOs is often quite costly as costs of delivering assist­ance is much higher than usual, the use of local organization as implementing partners by PUNOs was seen as a cost effective approach to programme delivery. Besides, there was an effective coordination amongst the local partners and PUNOs implementing the project in Baidoa but on the other hand there was somewhat weak cross-border coordination.

The study underscores there were synergies and complementariness between the PBF program and other programs including; Daldhis, Midnimo (Unity) and the Wadajir Framework, the link among these programs was the design of the activities and approach that extended the authority and accountability of the Federal Member State and district authorities through joint implementation of the program and gave visibility to MORDA, local municipality and local communities in the selection of beneficiaries and participation in the implementation process.

Besides, the *Midnimo* project, *Daldhis* project and PBF all contributed to the principles of Wadajir Framework that is designed to support the Federal Government of Somalia and its Federal Member States to rebuild their legitimacy vis-a-vis their citizens through the CRESTA approach. For instance, the PBF program activities coordinated with the MORDA and other government institutions thus improving their local engagement as well as leadership and visibility in the implementation of the project activities. Besides, by bringing diverse beneficiaries together such as returnees, IDPs and host communities the PBF program contributed to strengthened integration and community cohesion thus created good social linkages.

**Gender Sensitivity;** All PUNO agencies continued to employ gender sensitive beneficiary targeting approach in all its projects and where possible, prioritized women headed households, pregnant women and those with under-5 children, while ensuring that 30% of direct beneficiaries are women headed households for the livestock assistance. Participation of women and youth at all stages of the project management cycle consciously engaged with women. For instance, women have also been proactively involved and engaged in the formation and or strengthening of project management committee leadership positions to influence decision making and have their voices heard.

UNICEF’s PBF education support project included women in their teacher training. 18 out of 60 teachers trained were female, which represents 30 per cent of the total number of participants. Similarly, the vocational skills programme conducted by ILO and UNHCR was designed to ensure that skills preferred by female participants were included – this was done through consultation with girls and has encouraged the active involvement of female participants in the training. [[1]](#footnote-1) For instance, although the target was 40% for female trainees the project managed to reach 38%, which was still seen impressive, considering the circumstances of low literacy levels among Baidoa returnees, and the traditional low literacy levels of female youth among the Somali refugees in general.

**Effectiveness**

**Project Design;** The Kenya- Somalia refugees and peace building cross border pilot project for voluntary return, co-existence and sustainable reintegration in the areas of return project was one of the first programs offering reintegration of voluntary returnees in Bay region of Somalia, and the strong demand for such assistance demonstrates the relevance of such initiatives in that region. However, a key weakness in the project design was the lack of proper community mobilization in Dadaab. While UNHCR Kenya and its partners endeavored to engage communities, there were unfounded innuendos that targeting Baidoa returnees for the pilot project was a strategy to return communities from Bay region only. Another key challenge reported by implementing partners in Dadaab was that the project was at inception not well planned for in advance as DRC and NRC reported that they were given a very short notice to enroll and kick off trainings which ideally need quite a bit of time considering the logistics involved.

**Project Flexibility;** The PBF program activities were fairly flexible to the prevailing conditions. The PBF program was partly implemented during a severe drought that affected both rural and urban populations in South-Central Somalia especially Baidoa region. The interventions were successful at adapting to the challenges and some of the partners re-programed their activities. For instance, due to the increased internal displacement (triggered by drought in particular), UNHCR used the funds committed under the PRMN component of PBF (Indicator 2.1.2 # of returnees recorded and tracked in PRMN as successfully integrated and coexisting well with host communities for 3000 PoCs) towards tracking 244,000 IDPs in 261 IDP sites for better programming. There was also re-alignment of funds to address immediate water needs in Baidoa. Through PBF program activities 21 water points was either rehabilitated or constructed thus contributed to increased access of water to affected persons of concerns in Baidoa. Besides, the PBF program activities have enabled Education in Emergencies response in 14 schools in Baidoa, reaching more children than initially targeted through construction of temporary learning spaces and distribution of learning and recreational materials. In addition, the drought situation in Somalia in general and Baidoa in particular delayed the commencement of the agricultural inputs distribution by FAO. The targeted beneficiaries for farming have returned to the host communities after the onset of the Gu rains (April-July 2017) as such FAO did not find it technically appropriate to target the beneficiaries with agricultural and livestock inputs during Gu season. As a result, FAO reprogramed its activities to target the returnees and host communities during the oncoming Deyr season (October- December).

**Peace Building Component;** while no notable activity on peace building component was delivered in Baidoa; RET International trained peace ambassadors in Dadaab for potential returnees. FGDs with the peace ambassadors (elders) confirmed that RET International trained them but the elders reported that the vast majority of them are currently based in Dadaab. This was further confirmed by the quantitative analysis which shows that the vast majority (91.5%) of the returnees are of the view that the training on peace building and conflict resolutions has not helped them participate in democratic governance and reconciliation for they do not have any role in the government or security issues at present. However, 8.5% reported to have benefited from the training as camp leaders/solution committee, which is way below the targeted outcome for this activity. Nonetheless, in Baidoa, Community Based Planning applied by all the implementing partners as the methodology and entry point for building social cohesion among returnees, IDPs and host communities in Baidoa district proved beneficial in promoting peaceful settling-in for the returnees and cohesion among communities/groups.

**Beneficiary Selection:** Although the PBF program did not provide a harmonized approach for beneficiary selection process, PUNOs and respective partners adopted varied selection methods. The various mode of selection adopted by partners include; engagement with MORDA, local municipality, office of the regional governor and community leaders as well as camp leaders to identify beneficiaries based on a set vulnerability criteria while taking a supervisory role. The target beneficiaries were disproportionately selected from host community, returnees, and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The deliberate inclusion of returnees, IDPs and host communities in beneficiary selection was a positive step towards creating peaceful coexistence, ownership and acceptance.

**Effectiveness of Project Activities;** The implementation of the various project activities involved rehabilitation and construction of schools, markets, roads and government facilities etc. that were jointly done by women and men from various backgrounds that had limited or no engagement with each other before the project. Interviews with some of the beneficiaries revealed that the project created platforms for engagement and interaction among all groups and enhanced their relations after the project. The project was thus seen as having removed barriers and provided good interface for returnees who have fled the civil war in Somalia and run to Kenya but decided to voluntary to return after more than a decade as the experience of starting a new life in such environment is quite challenging.

**Reintegration of Returnees;** although the reintegration segment of the project was not well spelt out by all partners, the PBF program has had verifiably positive achievements in this area. Firstly, the main focus of assistance was at the local level, where municipal and non-government actors have been supported through funding and capacity development assistance for local return and reintegration projects, which resulted in the rehabilitation of local infrastructure such as schools, the provision of socio-economic assistance to returnees, and the undertaking of community development initiatives. The engagement of the South West State’s MORDA and other institutions were key steps to promoting the prospect for reintegration of the returnees. Analysis show that 84.8 % of the respondents strongly believe that host community were obliged to help returnees as much as they possibly can, while 13.2% indicated they felt less obliged to help returnees citing returnees should rely for help on their own clan members and only 2% felt an obligation to help returnees to get job for aid agencies and government.

**Assessment of Theory of Change Model:** The evaluation noted that the project has achieved considerable milestones in building the capacity of refugee returnees’ resilience through the provision of basic infrastructure and livelihoods support. The evaluation found out majority of prospective Baidoa returnees trained in peace building and conflict resolutions for increased participation in democratic governance and reconciliation processes and the 77 (39M, 38F) peace ambassadors trained to act as trainers of trainees were not able to be traced as most are still in Dadaab refugee camps. Therefore, the lack of return for these peace ambassadors to Baidoa is likely to affect the outcome on increased capacity of the returnees and to build peace dividends and enhance governance.

**Accountability to Affected Population (AAP);** The study found out that beneficiaries and community leaders including IDP camp heads, chiefs and traditional elders played a key role in the targeting and selection of beneficiaries. Interview with field teams indicated that they held meetings with government officials. The government played a role in the identification of sites especially IDP camps from protracted cases (existing camps). Further, the study noted that some UN agencies had conducted own evaluations and interviewed beneficiaries to assess project performance and impact.

**Efficiency of Coordination Mechanisms;** The PBF program in Baidoa had multiple levels of coordination mechanisms including; coordination between PUNOs and MORDA; PUNOs closely coordinated with local implementing partners, and local partners coordinated with community members and PUNOs followed up returnees to understand their challenges and progress. The evaluation established that there was a good level of in-country coordination, but there was evidently weak cross border coordination despite efforts by UNHCR and other PBF implementing partners to conduct regular video conferencing for coordination. This was further supported with special ‘go and see’ visits to Baidoa. However, potential returnees in Dadaab reported that there was little follow up on the VST trainees who voluntarily returned to Baidoa, as some of them came back to Dadaab citing lack of connection with the partner UN organizations that were supposed to receive them for reintegration process. Nonetheless, the evaluation also notes the return to Dadaab could be due to the low absorption capacity in the areas of return characterized by the lack of or inadequate social amenities.

 **Project Monitoring Framework;** although there was a coordination mechanism among the partners on monthly basis, there was no harmonized monitoring system for PBF program. Overall, MORDA had an oversight role in the implementation of some project activities. However, the evaluation identified the following aspects of the monitoring system that could be improved in the future. This approach could potentially create risk of bias and favoritism that would leave out marginalized groups.

Embedding an effective feedback mechanism is an integral part of project implementation that would be useful for agencies to support accountability, transparency, empowerment, monitoring and evaluation, and programme improvement, and to provide early warning of impending problems. However, this will require agencies to create awareness and create confidence of beneficiaries to give their feedback. This mechanism can also be used to monitor project progress and make timely adjustments.

**Project Sustainability:** Sustainability is fundamental to the success of the PBF project. The study noted the PBF program had incorporated sustainability in all the project activities. There were several notable activities implemented through the project that are deemed sustainable. For instance, the Rehabilitation of community infrastructures through UNHCR’S PBF program such as Hawlwadag primary and secondary school and blacksmith market are deemed fully sustainable. Since the project completion, the facilities were operational and beneficial to beneficiaries. The construction and rehabilitation of these facilities have shown high level of community ownership and long-term use of the facilities.

The rehabilitation of Isha police station through IOM’s PBF program to a modern facility with adequate offices contributes to government’s institution visibility, capacity to enhance law and order as well as boost the confidence of the security personnel to provide service. Further, the PBF program delivered by PUNOs including; WFP, IOM, ILO and UNHCR and their partners have cumulatively rehabilitated over 35KM roads in different settlements in Baidoa connecting IDPS camps, returnee settlements to urban centres through cash for work or food voucher. The UNICEF’s PBF education project involved building temporary learning spaces across six settlements, training of CECs and teachers. The establishment of management structures in the form of community education committees (CECs) has helped strengthen local ownership that ensured functionality even after the project close out. The PBF program provided numerous skills training for various youth. Majority of the trainees have indicated they have gotten employed or started own business in Baidoa while some of them hinted of moving to Mogadishu in search of jobs with high prospect of getting a job.

Besides, the PBF program had catalytic effects. For instance the UNHCR’s catalytic role in the PBF program manifested itself in a number of ways. The project acted as a catalyst for future community development, especially when this activity was supported by the federal government of Somalia and the south west state through MORDA. PUNOs catalytic role can be seen in its sponsorship of entrepreneurial activities, trainings, infrastructural support the provision of basic social services such as schools. UNHCR’s efforts in the PBF provided not simply a bridge for other development actors but acted as a catalyst, providing an alternative path to success and accelerating change. This catalytic role was clearly seen in PUNO’s assistance, which went well beyond the provision of return packages but provided access to crucial services such as schooling, productive assets and cash support and food voucher. What magnified their impact was the ability of PUNOs through reintegration and coordination of the PBF program activities, to add an additional social ingredient through peace building that resulted faster progress in cohesion among returnees and the host communities in Baidoa. Further, support of women through the provision of toolkits and donkey carts and agricultural inputs greatly enhanced productivity upon return. Another example of PBF’s catalytic role relates to the place of women and gender issues in community empowerment. PUNOs willingness to cultivate community member’s desire of social change opened up an alternative path to greater gender equality, and consequently accelerated the process by incorporating more women into peace building.

Meanwhile, according to ILO Somalia, the agency has secured funding of10 million Euros from KfW Development Bank from Germany that will be invested in the development of critical infrastructure that involves construction of 15KM road tarmac connecting IDP settlements and Baidoa town as well as establishment of productive centres. Discussions around the design and implementation are ongoing and the initial phase of the program is expected to commence in the coming months. This funding comes immediately ILO completed the PBF program activities. This additional funding complements the PBF program and once completed will boost the local economy and livelihoods of the community as well as contribute to stabilization process in south west state and national development framework. Given the program is expected to engage local companies and employ local communities, the immediate impact will be seen employment creation and improved access to cash that will subsequently improve household income.

**Challenges**

***Community prioritization in the design of the project***: Although PUNOs held community meetings and conducted assessments before the projects inceptions, however, interviews with some of the beneficiary respondents acknowledging the PBF projects provided temporary access to cash, food support, assets and skills trainings there was no broad-based stakeholders’ consultation to discuss priority needs. For instance they described FAO’s provision of agricultural inputs included some ‘foreign’ seeds (i.e. Amaranthus seeds, Ethiopian Mustard) that failed to grow as opposed to providing indigenous seeds such as Maize. Besides, majority of the returnees did not have farmlands and had to negotiate with farm owners to use their land for a fee or pay in-kind and experienced difficulties. They explained since they have not been engaged in farming while in Dadaab they found going back to farming difficult but had to consider for lack better alternative. In addition, UNICEF’s PBF constructed 12 TLs across 6 IDP camps, however, five of the 6 facilities were found operational but they had no teachers and are not seen as child friendly because they are overcrowded, do not have playground, lack teachers’ office and lack proper management. Besides, the UNHCR and WFP PBF program activities involved construction of five and three shallow wells respectively in IDP settlements in Baidoa that were experiencing acute water shortages, however, the shallows dried up immediately after construction. Respondents explained the water table is low therefore construction of productive and permanent shallow wells can be achieved through drilling as opposed to using casual labor which the projects used due to limited project budget.

***Duplication and overlapping*:** During the field study it was noted that UNICEF-PBF funded the construction of temporary learning spaces (TLS) and trained volunteer teachers in six settlements. Since the completion of the project one school has since been shut down after all the teachers left and sought employment in a new school built in close proximity by Save the Children and paid modest stipend and parents enrolled their children in the school citing the school provided feeding program. In addition, there was confusion between IOM and ADESO after both agencies received funding to rehabilitate Dr. Ayuub Football stadium. This delayed the commencement of the construction works and it took government intervention to resolve the matter long after the project completion.

***Feedback mechanism:*** Embedding an effective feedback mechanism is an integral part of project implementation that would be useful for agencies to support accountability, transparency, empowerment, monitoring and evaluation, and programme improvement, and to provide early warning of impending problems. However, this will require agencies to create awareness and create confidence among beneficiaries to be able to give their feedback. The study found ILO, IOM and UNHCR did not have a hotline system for provision of feedback but WFP and FAO had hotline numbers that was made available to the beneficiaries.

***Beneficiary Selection*:** The study found agencies have selection criterions but used varied approaches in the selection of beneficiaries. Interviews with local partners revealed that they had engaged either with MORDA or local municipality while maintaining minimal oversight role. It was noted that some partners delegated the responsibility of beneficiary selection to either MORDA or local municipality. This can arguably create risk of bias, favoritism and exclusion of marginalized groups.

***Interference from Local Administration:*** Baidoa local municipality barred a local company that won a bid to rehabilitate the Kerowfogi Bridge and delayed the project thus prompted IOM to re-advertise the bid and contract another company long after the program ended.

***Returnee Orientation:*** Given that majority of voluntary returnees are returning after being away for more than two decades there was little or no information about the socio-economic situation of the areas of return. Some of the returnees reported being coned or misappropriated of funds by some locals who took advantage of their ignorance.

***Start-up Kits:*** The lack of individual start up kits was challenging as this has ‘tied’ a group of four together hence rendering them to make a group decision which was not easy for them to cope with. A key reason reported for the low return for the trainee graduates was the issue of combining them together, for instance if a member of the group changes intention to return, then the other three would be forced to stay in Dadaab.

***Dropout of Trainees*:** Cases of drop out of trainees especially those that were dispatched to NITA accredited colleges in Nairobi. DRC enrolled about 70 trainees at various colleges in Nairobi but only 50 graduated as 20 of them dropped out.

***Low Absorption Capacity in Baidoa:*** Social services such as schools and health facilities for Baidoa area, especially remote locations in the outskirts of Baidoa had a very low absorption capacity as many were reported to have come back to Dadaab after return to their places of origin.

***Low Intention to Return:*** Return intention for Baidoa was quite low hence mobilization of potential trainees in Dadaab was a challenging endeavor.

**Lessons Learnt**

***Coordination with government institutions*:** Engaging with relevant government institutions in the delivery of aid is critical to ensure transparency and accountability. Government involvement in project will help improve their visibility, confidence and leadership. However, this engagement can sometimes cause friction among government institutions if it’s not carefully handled. Notably, there was standoff between MORDA and Baidoa municipality over the selection of beneficiaries. The ministry has since been disbanded by new south west state president allegedly due to its rise in prominence and overstepping its mandate following complaints from other government agencies. Therefore, future programs should consider working with relevant government agencies as opposed to engaging a single institution.

***Rehabilitation of community infrastructure***: Most of the PBF program activities involved rehabilitation of roads through cash for work or food voucher. Considering the road condition sometimes using beneficiaries only might not be ideal due to the limited technical capacity. The study found ILO engaged a local contractor that provided machinery and expertise to complement beneficiaries’ efforts. This collaborative effort produced quality work that is deemed sustainable. This approach provides useful lesson that using beneficiaries only to undertake road rehabilitation without using appropriate machines and knowledge might not produce desired results.

***Feedback mechanism***: Embedding effective feedback mechanism in the design of project is a critical component that will improve accountability, transparency, monitoring and evaluation and making appropriate changes in real-time. The study found only a few of the PUNOs provided hotlines to its beneficiaries, however, interview with some of the beneficiaries revealed that they were either not aware of it or did not know how to use it. Therefore, providing hotlines to beneficiaries was not enough without creating awareness on its usage to promote ownership, transparency and accountability without fearing of reprisals.

***Community consultation:*** Local consultations with actors and groups in the targeted population prior to project design often provides useful information on priority needs of the communities that can inform programing. The study found the priority needs especially of returnees supported through the project were somewhat different from own priorities which included; start-up capital, schools, health facilities, markets, water and shelter. Thus, there is need to undertake needs assessment prior to project design to inform programing.

***External factors should be considered in the design of the project***: Designing project should consider prevailing conditions such as security, drought and clan relations because some of these factors have a bearing on delivery as well as sustainability of the project. For instance, the study noted although some of the beneficiaries farmers and livestock encountered challenges such as insecurity due to Al-Shabab presence, reported GBV and kidnaping as well reported severe drought that depleted resources such as water and grass.

***Strengthening existing infrastructure is ideal:*** The study found UNHCR’s PBF program built five classrooms and concrete fence a public school in Baidoa. Due to improved conditions there has been an increase in school enrolment of children mainly from IDPs and returnees. Besides, IOMs rehabilitated Isha police in Baidoa was described to have enhanced the capacity of the facility security personnel to provide service. Further, the rehabilitation of over 35 KM roads by different organizations across Baidoa city was also applauded to have enhanced accessibility within camps and improved transport system. Therefore this is a good initiative that improves the conditions of the existing infrastructure as opposed to building new facilities.

***Coordination with partners and INGOs is critical***: The study noted although there was a good coordination among the PUNOs however, there was weak coordination with other international organizations involved in stabilization programs. Information sharing in cluster meetings and sharing information with seen as a challenge during the project implementation. This can be remedied by engaging and sharing relevant information with ministries to prevent potential overlap and duplication.

***Handover ceremonies should be held upon completion of projects:*** Integrating exit strategy in project design is critical. This will enable agencies to organize hand over ceremonies of the project activities after completion as a way to enhance ownership, increases government visibility, sustainability and transfer of responsibilities. Although a few PUNOs such as WFP organized handover ceremonies for its project activities, according to MORDA not all the projects were handed over to the ministry upon completion. Therefore, future projects should consider including handing over ceremonies to help the government showcase development initiatives.

**Recommendations**

***Beneficiary selection process:*** The study noted agencies have selection criteria but used varied approaches in the selection of beneficiaries. The study recommends agencies to collaborate and use multiple approaches in targeting various community segments that includes using PRMN[[2]](#footnote-2) in collaboration with local leadership and local administration while maintaining a clear oversight in the process to; i) prevent potential risks of bias and favoritism that would leave out marginalized groups; ii) prevent double registration of some beneficiaries that could end up benefiting from more than one project.

***Feedback Mechanism****;* The study noted agencies have used different feedback mechanisms. For instance, agencies like WFP and FAO provided hotlines to the beneficiaries while ILO, IOM, UNICEF and UNHCR did not provide hotlines. The study notes the need to integrate feedback mechanism in future projects and create awareness among the beneficiaries to support accountability, transparency, empowerment, monitoring and evaluation, and programme improvement, and to provide early warning of impending problems.

***Coordination among partners:*** The study noted although there was effective coordination mechanism among the PUNOs and government agencies, however, timely information sharing among sub-cluster partners was seen as a challenge. The weak coordination between PUNOs and partners and other development agencies has resulted overlap of projects as in the case of the rehabilitation of Dr. Ayub stadium between IOM and ADESO that also received different funding to rehabilitate the same facility. Further the building of a full-fledged school by Save the Children in close proximity to TLS built by UNICEF has seen the closure of one of the centres in ADC 3. To prevent the recurrence of similar overlaps future programs should clear coordination mechanism within the donors and partners as well as with other international agencies.

***Community prioritization in the design of the project***: Interviews with respondents indicated that although PBF projects provided temporary access to cash, food, assets and vocational skills trainings however, they cited they were not asked about their priority needs. For instance, FAO’s provision of agricultural inputs provided ‘foreign’ seeds (i.e. Amaranthus seeds, Ethiopian Mustard) failed to grow as opposed to providing indigenous seeds such as Maize. Besides, five of the 6 facilities constructed through UNICEF’s PBF supported education were found operational but they had few teachers, the classes were overcrowded and students did not have learning materials. Besides, the construction of shallow wells by UNHCR and WFP in IDP settlement in Baidoa was described as not effective approach to address water scarcity as prospect of getting water faded citing such activity required the use of heavy machines for drilling. Based on these feedbacks, future programs should enhance consultations with targeted populations through conducting baselines or needs assessments to inform the design of the projects.

***Completion of the remaining project activities:*** The study noted some activities of the IOM’s PBF projects were not implemented due local government interference, therefore there is need to speed up the rehabilitation of theKerowfogi Bridge and Dr. Ayuub stadium.

***Returnee Orientation and provision of start-up kits:*** Given that majority of voluntary returnees are returning after being away for more than two decades there was little or no information about the socio-economic situation of the areas of return. Therefore, it’s recommended that UNHCR and partners should create awareness about available business opportunities, social amenities (schools, hospitals and water points), exchange rates (dollars to Somali Shilling), and commodity prices before leaving Dadaab.

# Background and context

## Background

The protracted refugee situation in Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camps has created social, political and economic pressures. Security incidents in the recent years have been attributed to the presence of Dadaab camps and Alshabaab operatives in those camps, further increasing the pressures on Somali refugees, hence the need to offer a path towards solutions to ease tensions, while ensuring refugees and IDPs are able to take voluntary and informed decisions on their preferred durable solutions. A tripartite agreement signed by the Government of Kenya, UNHCR and the Federal Government of Somalia in November 2013 have further paved way for discussions on voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya. Furthermore, in May 2016, the Government of Kenya announced their intention to close the Dadaab refugee camps due to security reasons and the slow pace of refugee return to Somalia. Therefore, it has increasingly become important for humanitarian partners to realize the need to support refugee return to their original homelands.[[3]](#footnote-3) As a result, UNHCR and other partners redoubled their efforts to support the return and reintegration of refugees and IDP returnees, and enhance the absorption capacity in areas of return, especially in Southern and Central Somalia. Emphasis was particularly put on investments in the areas of access to basic social services and creation of livelihood opportunities for more conducive conditions for increased sustainable return and reintegration in the areas of refugee return. Alongside the need to increase absorption capacity of areas of return, UNHCR and partners realized the need to have complementary peace building efforts for sustainable reintegration of returnees who had been absent from their places of origin for a very long period of time. Thus, efforts to have peaceful reintegration devoid of hostility between the host communities in areas of return and the returning people were a paramount agenda in the return and reintegration process. It is against this backdrop that UNHCR, through funding from the Peace Building Fund (PBF) partnered with other Partner United Nation Organizations (PUNOs), DRC, NRC and RET to implement the “Kenya-Somalia Refugees Cross Border Peace building Pilot Project for Voluntary Return, Co-existence and Sustainable Reintegration for Baidoa Returnees” project.

## About the Project

The “Kenya-Somalia Refugees Cross Border Peace building Pilot Project for Voluntary Return, Co-existence and Sustainable Reintegration for Baidoa Returnees” was a two (2) year project that commenced in January 2017 and ended in December 2018. The project set out to reach two main outcomes namely: prospective Somalia returnees enhanced by improved capacities for economic revitalization, peace and community reconciliation and positive participation in democratic governance; and Somalia returnees in Baidoa peacefully co-existing with their host communities and contributing to local development.

Six (6) partners United Nations Organizations (PUNO), including UNHCR (lead), UNICEF, FAO, WFP, IOM and ILO were engaged in Somalia while in Kenya, UNHCR Kenya implemented the project through implementing partners in Dadaab. The implementing partners are: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Government of Kenya, World Vision International (WVI), African Volunteers for Relief and Development (AVORD), Federal Government of Somalia-National Commission for Refugees and IDPs (NCRI), Ministry of Resettlement and Diaspora Affairs (MORDA) in South West State amongst others.

The pilot project builds on the Tripartite Agreement between the Government of Kenya, the Federal Government of Somalia and UNHCR that was signed in November 2013 on the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya, and aims to enable a prospective group of Somali returnees in Dadaab, Kenya, to return specifically to Baidoa, Bay region of Somalia. Through the project, volunteer returnees were supported to enable them play a constructive and effective role in sustaining their return and reintegration, with good prospects for livelihoods and support measures to build resilience according to the principles of co-existence. The project also builds on the lessons from the recent UNHCR pilot reintegration projects and was also intended to leverage the Brussels Action Plan of October 2015. The pilot project was designed to support the Federal Government of Somalia’s strategic priorities for stabilization and delivery of direct peace dividends, including commitments to reconciliation and investments in job creation.

## Project’s Theory of Change Model

The project key assumptions was to contribute to the overall outcome of enhanced capacity for peace building, reduced vulnerabilities, enhanced capacities for conflict resolution and peace dividends through improved livelihoods and productive infrastructure and social services which would lead to the peaceful coexistence or returnees and resident communities. It was expected that resilient and cohesive communities would become key drivers of peace, together with a strengthened civil society, including community organizations, contributing to manage the root causes of conflict. The project envisaged that if the capacity of refugee returnees to engage constructively in rebuilding Somalia and their resilience is enhanced with the condition that the resident communities have the capacity to absorb the spontaneous returnees; there is likelihood that this would build peace dividends in form of strengthened livelihoods and enhanced governance. Below is a table illustrating the project’s Theory of Change Model.

Table 1 Theory of Change Model

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Hypothesis**  | **Condition**  | **Hypothetical Outcomes**  |
| Capacity of refugee returnees to engage constructively in rebuilding Somalia and their resilience.  | The capacity of the resident communities with their available infrastructure and services to absorb the spontaneous returnees will have dual outcome. | * Likelihood that the return movement may escalates tension with the potential for undermining the fragile peace.

 Or * Enhance the capacity of the returnee and residents communities to build peace dividends in form strengthened livelihood and basic services (schools, healthcare, roads, markets, etc.) and enhanced governance.
 |

## Assessment of Conflict Drivers

South West State is one of the federal member states in Somalia. The state is predominantly home to the Digil and Mirifle clan but with presence of other clans. Baidoa is the de facto regional capital and seat of the state. The city holds contrasting memories for local residents. For some, they reminisce the beautiful city that was fondly referred to as Baidoa Janay (the paradise city) because of the plenty of food, peace and stability, but to others, Baidoa holds bitter memories because of the atrocities and human rights violations that were committed by militias mainly from Darood and Hawiye clans following the collapse of the state. International media described Baidoa as the city of death due to starvation and mass killings of mainly children and women during this period.

The collapse of the state not only destroyed the government institutions but also institutional order like traditional system. The long absence of government in Somalia gave rise to the era of warlords that was mainly orchestrated by clan political elites that were jostling for political power and control of resources especially humanitarian aid in the pretext of defending their communities. The protracted inter-clan conflict took a new twist as control of resources dwindled and rivalry among groups became fierce. The conflict dynamics degenerated to intra-clan conflict that resulted violent conflict. Baidoa city serves as example of cities that experienced intra-clan conflicts that changed the demography of the city, creating deep mistrust and suspicion that continue to define relations to this day. The deep divisions are blurred and sometimes difficult to be noticed by outsiders but the city is largely divided into clans’ constituencies, however, this social division is not unique to Baidoa. Key conflict drivers/causes in the South West State are essentially as a result of dispute over politics, land, hostility pitting various communities, and Alshabaab presence.

**Political conflict**: It is almost five years since the South West state was established through a council of elders after grappling with the structure of the envisioned state in 2014. Anew president was elected in 2018 replacing Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, a seasoned politician who was largely unpopular with the people and the federal government, and was allegedly forced to drop his political bid so as to pave way for the government-backed candidate. The election of the current president, Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed (Lafta Gareen) was divisive and polarized the local community, not because the candidate was unpopular but was backed by the government and influenced the voting in his favor against his main challenger, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, former leader of Al-Shabab. Over 10 protestors were killed following the arrest of Mukhtar Robow, and subsequent disputed election. The newly elected government seems unpopular because of the federal government interference in the process.

The major contention is between the Mirifile sub clans especially the Leysan and Harin who dominate the key positions in the government. For instance, the president and the mayor are from the Harin sub clan and there is a feeling within the other sub clans that they are being marginalized and their elders are pushing the community to give up the mayor’s position to ‘others’. Political representation in Somalia is based on the 4.5 system (where the four dominant clans get equal seats in parliament and senate and minority clans get half of the seats their counterparts get). This is a major bond of contention that could undermine the relative peace and stability, not only in the district but also the state if it’s not amicably resolved. Therefore, there is need to promote peace building programs that will promote political dialogue to bridge the political divide and break social barriers.

**Community conflict**: The Mirifle clan, which is the dominant constituency of the Digil Mirifle clan, has engaged in a bitter political feud during the collapse of the state in Baidoa city. The conflict changed the landscape and settlement pattern as communities moved from rival-held areas to their clan-controlled areas. The reorganization of the settlement is a hallmark in Baidoa city. Besides, minority sub-clans have been ejected from their lands and are excluded from the political process. The community conflict has rendered the traditional institutions in effective to arbitrate disputes. Thus, there’s need to strengthen community engagement and support traditional institutions to address injustices and potential conflict.

Whilst there is no active community conflict at present, there’s latent conflict that could become active unless it’s addressed. There is need to establish or support peace building structures such as women, youth and traditional peace committees across communities by building their capacity on addressing latent conflicts and promoting peace among communities. Supporting such initiatives would be consistent with National Reconciliation Plan that was recently (March 2019) approved by the cabinet in Mogadishu.

**Land conflict:** Dispute over land is an emotive issue across Somalia and a major source of conflict. Historically, pastoral communities in Somalia have competed for natural resources such as water and pasture. Due to urbanization the demand for properties has soared thus increasing price of land in urban areas. For instance, disputes over grazing rights, farmland, and plots have triggered conflict in urban areas as well as in rural areas that traditionally caused full-blown conflicts. In Baidoa city, land dispute is a major challenge that the local administration has not managed to address. Respondents indicated there is little or no confidence in the courts to resolve land disputes due to corruption, favoritism, intimidation and lack of capacity. The lack of trust in the courts has interestingly seen locals seek alternative justice in Al-Shabab run-courts in the outskirts of the city. These courts have been described as swift in judgment, with no facilitation fee, and delivers final ruling that is binding. Due to fear of punishment and open threats, accused persons give back lands that they had forcefully acquired. Weak or ineffective justice system has failed to address the land conflict and forced people to seek alternative courts for a solution. Therefore, there is need to strengthen the capacity of the justice system and provide resources to enable them hear, investigate and adjudicate cases including land disputes so as to build the confidence of the people in their government and local courts and cut ties with Al-Shabab courts.

**Al-Shabab presence**: Al-Shabab remains a major threat to the security and stability of Somalia. The armed group has carried out asymmetric operations targeting federal state officials, security apparatus, development agencies and government installations. Communities interviewed explained that Al-Shabab extort money inform of taxation and disrupt the livelihoods of the farmers by taxing their proceeds and putting a blockage on the city. The Ethiopian troops who are part of AMISOM are propping up the administration and maintaining security in Baidoa airport that is hosting the government offices and some UN agencies. Al-Shabab has thrived on clan divisions and tapped into clan grievances. Given the deep divisions within the communities in Baidoa, Al-Shabab plays off clans and lures many of the unemployed youth to join their ranks in the guise of establishing a Muslim nation in Somalia. Therefore there is need to promote anti-radicalization narrative and support employment opportunities especially such as life skills and provision of livelihood support in form of start-up kits to promote reintegration for the youth from the various community segments and prevent the risk of being radicalized or migrating to overseas.

## Purpose of the Evaluation

The objective of the evaluation is to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and impact of the different projects and activities that the partners implemented in Baidoa district, South West State, Somalia and in Dadaab, Kenya. The evaluation further sought to assess the extent to which the project has reached the desired outcomes and how it managed relevant risks. In addition, the evaluation reviews the changes made on the project activities as a result of the severe drought in 2016/17 that resulted in the influx of IDPs; and whether these activities contributed to the original project outcomes and the project’s theory of change.

# Methodology

## Approach

The study primarily adopted a mixed-design approach, using both quantitative and qualitative technique because the methods compensate for each other’s weaknesses; and each approach provides more value when used in a mixed-method design, providing information and conclusions that are more coherent, reliable, and useful than those from single-method studies. Qualitative methods also improve survey design, identify social issues that are hard to quantify, and uncover unanticipated processes or outcomes.

Different qualitative data collection tools such as focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews (KIIs), observations, and desk reviews of relevant literature were used. This was complemented by quantitative data from a sample of 591 households across various settlements in Baidoa. Researchcare used mobile-based data collection system (ONA) for the household survey and data was collected using mobile/tablet devices and transmitted to secure online cloud servers on daily basis. The evaluation employed five specific evaluation criteria from the OECD-DAC criteria to guide the study in addition to extracting lessons learnt. These are; assessing the efficiency, effectiveness, Accountability to Affected Population (AAP), efficiency of the coordination mechanisms and sustainability of the re-integration project.

## Sampling Procedure

To ensure representativeness, a disproportionate and systematic sampling method was used to ensure equity in household distribution and representation in the final sample of the quantitative survey. A number of steps were followed. The population and sample was first determined, followed by the selection of the villages and respondents. An appropriate sample size was then determined using a sample determination formula as illustrated below. Data was collected from 200 returnees, 203 IDPs and 195 host communities in Baidoa to understand perception and opinion of both returnees, IDPs and host on return implications and impact using the using the sample determination formula[[4]](#footnote-4)[[5]](#footnote-5) below. Systematic sampling method was used to select the direct households to participate in the study per selected village/settlement of the Baidoa town selected and visited in consultation with UNHCR and the South West State administration. In total, 598 households composed of returnees; IDPs and host communities participated on the perception survey of the evaluation. Systematic sampling ensures that each unit has equal probability of inclusion in the sample and the results are representative of the population. In this method of sampling, the researcher first randomly picks the first household from the population/settlement, followed by the selection of each nth subject.

## Focus Group Discussions

Purposive sampling technique was used to select key informants and FGD participants to partake in the study. The use of this technique was helpful in the selection of participants who are especially informative and possess the knowledge, ideas or experiences that are particularly relevant to the topic of the study. In the selection of the participants, Researchcare observed gender sensitivity and demographic characteristics of the participants. Researchcare ensured that the targeted groups are the precise groups able to provide the required information for a better understanding of the context. To maximize participation among selected respondents, separate FGDs were arranged for women, elders and men. 8-12 members participated in each discussion group that was facilitated by two experienced research assistants.

A total of 18 FGDs composed of youth; women and elders were conducted as indicated in table 3. Twelve (12) FGDs composed of 6 returnee FGDs, 3 IDPs FGDs and 3 host community FGDs were conducted in Baidoa. Similarly, 6 beneficiary FGDs were conducted in Dadaab.

Table 2 Proposed Focus group Discussions

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **FGDs** | **Baidoa**  | **Dadaab** | **Total** | **Grand total** |
|  | Returnees | Host communities | IDPs | Returnees | Host communities | Returnees | Host communities |  ALL |
| Female FGD | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 6 |
| Male FGDs | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 6 |
| Youth FGDs | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 6 |
| **Total**  | **6** | **3** | **3** | **6** |  | **12** | **3** | **18** |

## Key Informant interviews

Researchcare engaged knowledgeable key informants with diverse set of representatives drawn from different backgrounds and from different groups to be able to triangulate and enrich the data collected. Researchcare used semi-structured KII guide, customized for each group of key informants. For instance, a separate key informant interview guide was developed for government representatives, UNHCR and project implementing partners and NGOs representatives. Researchcare interviewed 32 key informants as shown in the table below.

Table 3 Proposed Key Informant Interviews

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Partner UN Organization** | **# key Informants** |
| PBSO / RCO | 2 |
| UNHCR Somalia | 3 |
| UNHCR Kenya | 3 |
| IOM | 3 |
| ILO | 3 |
| UNICEF | 3 |
| FAO | 3 |
| WFP | 3 |
| Ministry of Resettlement and Diaspora Affairs (MORDA) | 1 |
| Local Administration (DCs and Chiefs) | 2 |
| National Commission for Refugees and IDPs (NCRI) | 1 |
|  Refugees Affairs Department (Kenya) | 1 |
| NGO representatives (NRC, DRC) WVI, African Volunteers for Relief and Development (AVORD) | 4 |
| **Total**  | 32 |

## Data Collection

During the data collection, the evaluation team established rapport with the local community participants by providing an explanation of the purpose of the focus group discussions, the intended use of the information and gave assurance of confidentiality. Probing techniques to encourage the participants to detail the basis for their conclusions and recommendations was adopted. In addition, the data collection team maintained a neutral attitude to avoid giving the impression of having strong views on the subject under discussion. Researchcare prioritized to engage the selected key informants on face-to-face in-depth meetings/interviews. Skype interviews were also conducted for crucial key informants who were not available for one-on-one meeting. At the end of each interview, the interviewer/s prepared an interview summary sheet capturing all the relevant information. The information collected was then refined before it was submitted for further analysis.

## Data analysis

Narrative analysis on transcripts of the FGDs and key informant interviews with various stakeholders was conducted. For the quantitative data, Researchcare analysed using IBM SPSS software. Descriptive statistics was computed to examine the state of each variable studied and the findings from the quantitative data of the household survey presented in the form of frequency distributions, cross-tabulations, socio-economic variables (age, gender, and education).

# Results and findings

## Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

In addition to the focus group discussions and key information interviews, quantitative data was collected from 598 household beneficiaries through household survey. The survey sought to establish the respondents’ household residential status at the time of the interview and it was established that 33.4% were returnees, 33.9% were IDPs and 32.6% were host community households. In addition, the returnees were further enquired about the duration of their stay since their arrival into their current location. From the analyses, most returnees have stayed in the country for more than 2 years (68.9%) with majority being females (56.3%). 27.3% of returnees had been in the country for between 1 and 2 years, while 3.8 % of the returnees had stayed in the country for less than a year (3.3% female and 0.5% males).

Table 4 Length of Stay of Returnee

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Length of stay of returnee** | **Gender** |
| **Male** | **Female** | **Combined Total** |
| Between 6 months and 1 year | N% | 12.9% | 64% | 73.8% |
| Between 1 and 2 years | N% | 1029.4% | 4026.8% | 5027.3% |
| More than 2 years | N% | 2367.6% | 10369.1% | 12668.9% |
| Total | N% | 34100% | 149100% | 183100% |

## Efficiency

### 3.2.1 Efficiency of Project Implementation

The criteria of efficiency looked at the extent to which the programme objectives and sub-objectives have been achieved with the appropriate amount of resources. Under efficiency the evaluation specifically focused on assessing to what extent the logistics and quickness of implementation of the peace building project responded to returnees and their host needs; the timely implementation as well as the quality of the delivery process; the cost-effectiveness of the project; aspects of the project that could be improved; and the gender sensitive aspects of the project in its design and implementation. Similarly, the evaluation looked into the extent to which potential synergies and complementarities with other PBF projects such as Midnimo, Daldhis and Support to Stabilization, were harnessed during project implementation.

The PBF program had several complementing activities that were delivered by several UN agencies in collaboration with international and local partners, and Ministry of Refugee and Diaspora Affairs (MORDA) of South West State. The project was implemented from 2017-2018 and was geared towards strengthening social cohesion among returnees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and host communities. Most of the activities were implemented within the set time frame; however, due to external factors such as insecurity, severe drought in the region resulting influx of IDPs coupled with political uncertainty over the presidential election of South West State, that caused considerable delays in the implementation of some project activities.. In addition, local government’s interference in the contracting process of some project activities has delayed IOM’s planned kick-off of the construction of Kerrowfogi Bridge. Nonetheless, despite the challenge PUNOs created efficient systems especially for the food voucher and cash for work that targeted all groups (host community, returnees and IDPs).

In terms of the timeliness of programme delivery, the implementation of the project activities coincided with an extended lean season caused by 2016-2017 droughts in Somalia that threatened the livelihoods of the host communities and returnees and influx of IDPs. The project intervention was successful at adapting to these challenges and some of the partners re-programed their activities. For instance, due to the increased internal displacement (triggered by drought in particular), UNHCR used the funds committed under the PRMN component of PBF (Indicator 2.1.2 # of returnees recorded and tracked in PRMN as successfully integrated and coexisting well with host communities for 3000 PoCs) towards tracking 244,000 IDPs in 261 IDP sites for better programming. There was also re-alignment of funds to address immediate water needs in Baidoa. Through PBF program activities 21 water points was either rehabilitated or constructed thus contributed to increased access of water to affected persons of concerns in Baidoa. Besides, the PBF program activities have enabled Education in Emergencies response in 14 schools in Baidoa, reaching more children than initially targeted through construction of temporary learning spaces and distribution of learning and recreational materials. In addition, the drought situation in Somalia in general and Baidoa in particular delayed the commencement of the agricultural inputs distribution by FAO. The targeted beneficiaries for farming have returned to the host communities after the onset of the Gu rains (April-July 2017) as such FAO did not find it technically appropriate to target the beneficiaries with agricultural and livestock inputs during Gu season. As a result, FAO reprogramed its activities to target the returnees and host communities during the oncoming Deyr season (October- December). Field interviews with beneficiaries of donkey carts, food voucher and cash for work revealed that these interventions improved their capacity to access immediate cash to meet their household needs. The provision of donkey carts by UNHCR and restocking by FAO has been described as timely and useful by beneficiaries for improving their household income and restoring their dignity at a time when their lives were at stake.

Furthermore, while the evaluation notes that the operational environment in Somalia for INGOs is often quite costly as costs of delivering assist­ance are much higher than usual, the use of local organization as implementing partners by majority the partner UN organizations was seen as a cost effective approach. PUNO’s engagement with local communities and local administrations was instrumental in building buy-in and ownership hence galvanizing support and continuity of the project. Through partnerships with local stakeholders and NGOs, UNHCR and other UN organizations engaged dynamic and experienced agencies and MORDA, which was deemed effective.

The evaluation also looked at the extent to which potential synergies and complementarities, in particular with other PBF projects such as Midnimo, Daldhis and Support to Stabilization, were harnessed during project implementation. The study found there good linkage between the PBF program with other development programs such as Midnimo, Daldhis and Support to Stabilization. The programs strengthened the capacity of the south west state and particularly the local administration’s capacity to deliver services. Given that the state lacks adequate resources PBF injected substantial resources that has created temporary employment and rehabilitated over 35 KM road thus improving accessibility within the camps.

The study underscores there were synergies and complementariness between the PBF program and other programs including Daldhis, Midnimo (Unity) and the Wadajir Framework.The link among these programs was the design of the activities and approach that extend the authority and accountability of the Federal Member State and district authorities through joint implementation of the program and giving visibility to MORDA, local municipality and local communities in the selection of beneficiaries and participation in the implementation process.

Besides, the *Midnimo* project, *Daldhis* project and PBF all contributed to the principles of Wadajir Framework that is designed to support the Federal Government of Somalia and its Federal Member States to rebuild their legitimacy vis-a-vis their citizens through the CRESTA approach. For instance, the PBF program activities coordinated with the MORDA and other government institutions thus improving their local engagement as well as leadership and visibility in the implementation of the project activities. Besides, by bringing diverse beneficiaries together such as returnees, IDPs and host communities the PBF program contributed to strengthened integration and community cohesion thus creating linkage,

### 3.2.2 Gender Sensitivity

In assessing whether the gender sensitive aspect of the project were considered by different partners, the evaluation sought to find out whether the implementation of the project was conducive to women empowerment and whether gender sensitivity was taken into account during project design and implementation. All PUNO agencies adopted gender sensitive approach during the beneficiary targeting in all its projects and where possible, prioritized women headed households. Participation of women and youth at all stages of the project management cycle consciously engaged with women, monitoring of projects engaged all sections of the community including women. Women have also been proactively involved and engaged in the formation and or strengthening of project management committee leadership positions to influence decision making and have their voices heard. Certain activities like the vegetable production kits, tailoring trainings, etc. in particular, focused primarily on women.

Similarly, community consultations have been carried out with men and women separately as a key step in planning activities ensuring that women's voices were heard in the prioritization of projects and identification of project sites (in the case of WFP). For the training of primary school teachers, each school nominated at least one female teacher in order to organize training sessions with gender-balanced participants. For instance, 18 out of 60 teachers trained were female, which represents 30 per cent of the total number of participants. Similarly, the vocational skills programme was designed to ensure that skills preferred by female participants were included – this was done through consultation with girls and has encouraged the active involvement of female participants in the training. [[6]](#footnote-6)

Furthermore, the registration of targeted beneficiaries gave priority to vulnerable groups including pregnant women and those with under-5 children, women headed households, while ensuring that 30% of direct beneficiaries are women headed households for the livestock assistance. Community sensitization sessions on gender issues related to nutrition, education and livelihoods were also held where male household members for instance are targeted for nutrition sensitization. Participatory tools, such as social mapping, wealth ranking, and the use of VENN diagrams and transect walks were most appropriate for marginalized and less educated people (mainly women), because these tools enabled them to visualize and understand the issues, communicate with each other, analyze options and make decisions.

Whilst the project took into consideration the needs of women, men, boys and girls of concern, special attention was accorded to women and girls through specific protection measures for their physical safety and actively supporting their involvement in all stages of the process. All staff of the PUNOs has been trained on gender issues that include how to address such issues on how to deal with cases of sexual and gender based violence. DRC and NRC made particular effort to engage women in their trainings. For instance, although the target was 40% for female trainees the project managed to reach 38%, which was still seen impressive, considering the circumstances of low literacy levels among Baidoa returnees, and the traditional low literacy levels of female youth among the Somali refugees in general.

## Effectiveness

### 3.3.1 Project Design

The Kenya- Somalia refugees and peace building cross border pilot project for voluntary return, co-existence and sustainable Reintegration in the areas of return project was one of the first programs offering reintegration of voluntary returnees in Bay region of Somalia, and the strong demand for such assistance demonstrates the relevance of such initiatives in that region. Returnees interviewed were in general satisfied with the possibility offered by the program because their situation in the host country had become very difficult upon return, especially as it came at a time when there was a severe drought and they feared for their security. In Dadaab, DRC and NRC implemented the vocational skills training component of the project with the aim of imparting high impact skills to potential voluntary returnees from Baidoa. The choice of training courses was based on ILO Labour Market Study that covered areas of return which highlighted ‘marketable’ courses in the areas of return. Furthermore, DRC and NRC utilized their experiences of managing Youth Education Programme (YEP) Centers, which exposed them to the popular courses amongst Somalis that have higher potential for self-employment.

The training courses were largely from three main sectors: construction (masonry, electrical etc.), transport (motor vehicle mechanic), and service industry (Beverages, housekeeping and hospitality etc.). Integrated into the curriculum was a peace-building component aimed at preparing the trainees for sustainable peace upon their return to Baidoa. Courses such as governance, religion, hygiene, and politics were some of the co-curricular courses means to make the training tailor-made. Partnership with the National Industrial Training Authority (NITA) accredited colleges was also a very relevant consideration in the project design.

However, a key weakness in the project design was the lack of proper community mobilization in Dadaab. While UNHCR and its partners endeavored to engage communities, there were unfounded innuendos that targeting Baidoa returnees for the pilot project was a strategy by UNHCR and partners to return communities from Bay region only. Therefore, the fact that Somalis are traditionally divided along clan lines, and that some clans within the Rahanweyn are traditionally marginalized communities, UNHCR and the implementing partners ought to have devised a more inclusive and robust approach to forestall such sensitive matters, which would consequently affect project delivery and outcomes. Whilst the project was well planned but engagement of implementing partners, actors and relevant stakeholders needed to start early right from projects design stage.

### 3.3.2 Project Flexibility

The project was partly implemented during a severe drought that had affected both rural and urban populations in South-Central Somalia. The PBF program had clear implementation approach, with a built-in flexibility, offering a range of response options based on real-time needs and priorities on the ground, as they evolved. This allowed the project to adjust to climatic vagaries, needs and coverage by the partners, as well as fill critical gaps in assistance when it was needed most. Part of the flexibility was the construction of shallow wells in different IDP settlements to cater for their immediate needs without undermining the overall objectives of the PBF project. The evaluation team noted that some of these unplanned project activities had not only alleviated beneficiary community needs but have had a complementary role in the achievement of peace building amongst the various communities i.e. returnees, IDPs and the host population. For instance, one of the key drivers of conflict among communities in Somalia is dispute over resources such as water; therefore the project’s flexibility to allow for the provision of water infrastructure was seen as a notable unintended impact of the project. Given the unpredictable cycle of rainy/dry seasons in the country and the fluidity of the general humanitarian environment, this programmatic flexibility also allowed for better targeting and prioritization of the project interventions to respond more effectively to the evolving immediate and recovery needs that could result from the unpredictability of the humanitarian context in the region.

Furthermore, the intervention successful at adapting to these challenges and some of the partners either re-programed or aligned their planned activities due to the prevailing conditions. For instance, due to the increased internal displacement (triggered by drought in particular), UNHCR used the funds committed under the PRMN component of PBF (Indicator 2.1.2 # of returnees recorded and tracked in PRMN as successfully integrated and coexisting well with host communities for 3000 PoCs) towards tracking 244,000 IDPs in 261 IDP sites for better programming. There was also re-alignment of funds to address immediate water needs in Baidoa. Through PBF program activities 21 water points was either rehabilitated or constructed thus contributed to increased access of water to affected persons of concerns in Baidoa. Besides, the PBF program activities have enabled Education in Emergencies response in 14 schools in Baidoa, reaching more children than initially targeted through construction of temporary learning spaces and distribution of learning and recreational materials. In addition, the drought situation in Somalia in general and Baidoa in particular delayed the commencement of the agricultural inputs distribution by FAO. The targeted beneficiaries for farming have returned to the host communities after the onset of the Gu rains (April-July 2017) as such FAO did not find it technically appropriate to target the beneficiaries with agricultural and livestock inputs during Gu season. As a result, FAO reprogramed its activities to target the returnees and host communities during the oncoming Deyr season (October- December).

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### 3.3.3 Peace Building Component

Under outcome 2, the project envisaged that Somalia returnees in Baidoa peacefully co-existing with their host communities and contributing to local development. There were seminars conducted on peace building in Baidoa lead by MORDA while RET International trained peace ambassadors in Dadaab for potential returnees. FGDs with the peace ambassadors (elders) confirmed that RET International trained them but the elders reported that the vast majority of them are currently based in Dadaab. This was further confirmed by the quantitative analysis which shows that the vast majority (91.5%) of the returnees are of the view that the training on peace building and conflict resolutions has not helped them participate in democratic governance and reconciliation for they do not have any role in the government or security issues at present. However, 8.5% reported to have benefited from the training as camp leaders/solution committee, which is way below the targeted outcome for this activity.

Table 5 Participation of Returnees’ Training on Peace Building

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Returnee training on peace building and conflict resolutions in Dadaab improved their participation in democratic governance and reconciliation processes | Responses |
| N | % |
| Yes | 17 | 8.5% |
| No | 183 | 91.5% |
| Total | 200 | 100% |

Nonetheless, in Baidoa, Community Based Planning applied by all the implementing partners as the methodology and entry point for building social cohesion among returnees, IDPs and host communities in Baidoa district proved beneficial in promoting peaceful settling-in for the returnees and cohesion among communities/groups. The community based planning/community consultations brought returnees, IDPs and host community together, contributing to their peaceful coexistence. Local leadership, IDPs and the broader existing communities in Baidoa were able to jointly negotiate and prioritize community-based projects that they will implement to improve access to basic services, security and recreation. From community feedback, it can be deduced that the process contributed to increased acceptance of IDPs and returnees by host community members thereby promoting integration and social cohesion.[[7]](#footnote-7)

### 3.3.4 Beneficiary Selection

Although the PBF program did not provide a harmonized approach for beneficiary selection process, PUNOs and respective partners adopted varied selection methods. The various mode of selection adopted by partners include; engagement with MORDA and community leaders to identify beneficiaries based on a set vulnerability criteria while taking a supervisory role. Some partners used local municipality or office of the governor and community leaders to assist in the selection process, while a section of partners tasked MORDA to do the selection on their behalf with minimal supervision in the process. The target beneficiaries were disproportionately selected from host community, returnees, and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Interviews with UN organizations and their implementing partners revealed that all the agencies adopted similar approaches. The deliberate inclusion of returnees, IDPs and host communities in project beneficiary selection was a positive step towards creating peaceful coexistence and acceptance. All the community segments were able to jointly work on community projects thereby enabling closer interaction, building trust and creating a harmonious living environment. In terms of beneficiary targeting for the vocational skills training, the study noted that UNHCR used SOPs for Dadaab. Calls for proposals in both English and Somali were placed at strategic centers in all the camps. The same was also announced at local FM stations to ensure wider coverage. While all partners admitted that the literacy level for Baidoa returnees was relatively low, the process was competitive and the best were selected from refugees originally from Baidoa. To confirm whether those targeted were from Baidoa, UNHCR used its Progress Data to verify if indeed those enrolled were from Baidoa area. The age bracket was, 15-24 years.

Table 6 Beneficiary selection process[[8]](#footnote-8)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| UN Agency  | Partners  | Beneficiary selection process  | Inclusion of community segments  |
| FAO | SYPD, SOWELPA, FEERO | The field team explained the list of beneficiaries was selected from UNHCR master list of returnees from Dadaab refugee camp | 100% of the beneficiaries were returnees  |
| UNCHR  | AVORD | The team explained the beneficiaries selection and verification was done in collaboration with respective community leaders  | 80% of the beneficiaries were returnees, while the remaining 20% of beneficiaries were proportionally distributed among host community and IDPs |
| WFP | WVI | Beneficiary selection was done in collaboration with MORDA | 78% of the beneficiaries were returnees, while 12% and 10% of the beneficiaries were IDPs and host community respectively |
| IOM |  | The team explained the beneficiary selection was done by Mayor’s office in consultation with co-facilitation team from Governor’s office, MORDA, and Ministry of interior with oversight from IOM. | Majority of the beneficiaries were returnees, followed by IDPs. Only 2% of the beneficiaries were host community |
| ILO | WARDO | The team explained the beneficiary returnees were selected from UNHCR database while IDPs and host communities were selected in consultation by MORDA and local communities.  | 50% beneficiaries were returnees while 30% and 20% were IDPs and host community respectively |
| UNICEF  | BREK | The team explained the site identification was done in consultation with camp leaders. The TLS targeted all the children in the camps irrespective of their background | Although TLS were built in IDP camps, all the children were from IDPs, returnees and host community households |

### 3.3.5 Effectiveness of Project Activities

The implementation of the various project activities involved rehabilitation and construction of schools, markets, roads and government facilities that were jointly done by women and men from various backgrounds that had limited or no engagement before the project. Interviews with some of the beneficiaries revealed that the project created a platform for engagement and interaction among all groups and enhanced their relations after the project. The project was thus seen as having removed barriers and communities cultivated relations and have shared information about business environment and opportunities. The PBF therefore provided good interface for returnees who have fled the civil war in Somalia and run to Kenya but decided to voluntary to return after more than a decade as the experience of starting a new life in such environment is quite challenging.

Overall, a total of 1,863 children (850 female, 1013 male) have been supported in 14 target schools through distribution of teaching and learning materials, construction of temporary learning spaces, emergency school cash grants, procurement of school furniture and monthly social mobilization campaigns on hygiene promotion, including prevention of acute watery diarrhea/cholera. In addition, the construction of 300 meters tarmac road was completed directly employing 62 beneficiaries (refugee returnees, IDPs and members of host community) and 2,340 worker days created. Further, the rehabilitation of Shigaale market in Baidoa employed 40 people (17 returnees, 10 IDPs and 13 host community members). This improved economic opportunities through increased availability of business stalls for starting up enterprises. In Dadaab, 562 Persons of Concern (PoC) (422 male, 140 female) completed training in various training institutions in Kenya to undertake skills development in 2017. Additionally, 490 (238 male, 252 female) prospective Baidoa returnees were trained in peace building and conflict resolutions, democratic governance and reconciliation processes. Additionally, 77 (39 male, 38 female) peace ambassadors were trained in Dadaab to act as trainers of trainees.[[9]](#footnote-9) The analysis of the household survey show that most assistance returnees got from UNHCR was return voucher as reported by 59.5%, support for children (43.5%) and VST training (23%). The assistance was either given independently or a combination of others. Other support reported includes peace building and reconciliation (18%) and shelter (10%).

Table 7 Support Returnees Received from UNHCR

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Support returnee received from UNHCR | Returnee Respondents |
| N | %  |
| Return Voucher | 119 | 59.5% |
| VST, business/entrepreneurial skills trainings | 46 | 23% |
| Peace building and conflict resolutions | 36 | 18% |
| Support for children education | 87 | 43.5% |
| Business start-up grants | 4 | 2% |
| Agriculture packages | 20 | 10% |
| Allocation of land | 32 | 16% |
| Shelter  | 20 | 10% |
| Total | 364 | 182%[[10]](#footnote-10) |

The support for children largely involved facilitation of access to schools in the areas of return. UNICEF was the partner UN organization that implemented this segment of the project. From the analysis, 58.2% of the interviewed households reported that ‘some of the respondent’s children were attending schools in the region’, while 16.6% had enrolled all their children in schools in the region. However, 25.3 % of respondent’s children are not attending school. Disaggregating this by the residential status of the respondents, a larger number of returnee children were all attending schools in Baidoa (26.5%) compared to IDP children (18.72%) and host community children (4.1%). FGDs with the returnees explained that some households preferred sending out children to engage in casual labour as a means of earning income for the households.

Table 8 School Attendances for PoC Children

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Children attend school in this location** | **Returnee** | **IDP** | **Host Community** | **Combined Total** |
| Yes, All attend | N% | 5326.5% | 3818.72% | 84.1% | 9916.6% |
| Yes, Some of them attend | N% | 11859% | 8240% | 14875.9% | 34858.2% |
| None attend | N% | 2914.5% | 8340.89% | 3920% | 15125.3% |
| Total | N% | 200 100% | 203100% | 195 100% | **598****100%** |

Similarly, the evaluation established the effectiveness of the project activities especially on the livelihoods of beneficiaries. Beneficiaries shared evidence of stories of the how the project has contributed to improving household income, in breaking barriers and building bridges. Despite the FAO project beneficiaries being returnees who received agricultural inputs but did not have farmlands, they were able to negotiate with landowners mainly host communities and were allowed to till a portion of their land and recorded a bumper harvest during the *deyr* season of 2018*.* Besides, community leaders indicated the PBF projects have contributed to improved livelihoods as some returnees have opened business outlets and especially those who received donkey carts are currently supplying water to host communities at a fee.

Analysis of the survey data shows that returnees started income generating activities upon their return to Baidoa. 62% of returnee respondents indicated to have started income generating activities, while a notable proportion (38%) of the returnee population reported to have started none.

Table 9 Income Generating Activities Started by Returnees

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Returnee has started income generating activities after coming to Baidoa | N | % |
| Yes | 124 | 62% |
| No | 76 | 38% |
| Total | 200 | 100% |

The type of income generating activities started by the returning households include farming (30.2%), kiosk trading (37.6%) or use of acquired VST related business (25.5%).

Table 10 Type of Income Generating Activity

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Type of Income generating activity started | N | % |
| Employment | 10 | 6.7% |
| Farming | 45 | 30.2% |
| Kiosk/petty trading | 56 | 37.6% |
| Acquired VST related business such as tailoring, Sewing, Masonry, Carpentry, Henna | 38 | 25.5% |
| Total | **149** | **100%** |

Interview with various beneficiaries have given mixed reaction about their various PBF projects implemented in Baidoa. Overall, the communities gave positive feedback about the impact of the project but most importantly made critical observations. A summary of the views on each project is illustrated in table 11.

Table 11 *Beneficiary experiences and preferences about PBF projects*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Partners**  | **Activities**  | **Beneficiaries observation** |
| UNHCR &Implementing partner AVORD | * Infrastructure (school, market centre and shallow wells) rehabilitation through cash for work
* Vocational skills training for youth, mainly from IDPs and host community and provision of carpentry tool kits
* Provision of donkey carts
 | * The construction of a concrete fence for Hawlwadag School and construction of five additional classes and rehabilitation of 600 meters road in IDP camps has been described as effective. The additional classes and fence has improved security, improved the capacity of the school to admit more students thus enhancing integration, and improved overall learning environment. The road rehabilitation has improved road conditions and access to IDP camps.
* The rehabilitation of a blacksmith market was welcomed by blacksmiths who were mostly from minority clans. The chairman indicated the project constructed corrugated roof for their premises which accommodates over 40 members.
* Provision of donkey carts was lauded as effective in improving the beneficiaries’ incomes, however due to its high demand and potential income it generates, the number of donkey carts distributed was not adequate.
* The host community members complained they feel marginalised considering the small number of beneficiaries allocated to them as opposed to the Returnees who received the largest allocation.
 |
| FAO &Implementing partners SYP, SOWELPA & FEERO | * Provision of tools kits and seeds
* Restocking
 | * The project purely targeted returnees and provided assorted seeds and tools as well as restocking to 160 households. The returnees indicated that majority of them borrowed or rented farms which they planted. Although there was bumper harvest, they had to share the proceeds with landowners. They indicated that transportation of the proceeds from farms to the market centres was challenge and the cost incurred in hiring donkey carts or vehicles was expensive. They observed provision of donkey carts to famers would have eased their burden and save the cost of hiring transport. They also indicated some of the vegetable seeds such as Amaranthus and Ethiopian Mustard failed to germinate due to poor weather conditions. They indicated their staple food is Maize and beans and hence noted Maize should have been included in the seeds distributed.
* Majority of the livestock beneficiaries indicated they have either sold to boost the household income or lost to drought because of high cost of maintenance.
* Host community and IDPs leadership suggested they would have preferred if they could also benefit from kits and restocking was extended to the returnees.
 |
| WFP &Implementing partner World Vision | * Rehabilitation of community infrastructure through cash for work
 | * The project rehabilitated 31KM feeder roads linking Baidoa town and IDP settlements as well within IDP settlements through food voucher. The project has delivered significant impacts that included improved households income and increased access to food and dietary diversity during the project.
* Besides, the project saw an improved quality of access roads through rehabilitation of 31km stretch road from the main road of Baidoa cutting and interconnecting through 21 IDPs within the area.
* The rehabilitated road reduced travel time to the markets especially during rainy season, improved social services e.g. Hospitals for pregnant and elderly, increased vehicular activity. There has been an increase in use of the roads for both commercial and non-commercial. One of the resident quoted that, before, the rehabilitation, the small vehicles ‘Tuk Tuk’ would not enter the IDP camps because of the state of the road but now they can making it easy to carry foodstuff and other items from their market.
 |
| UNICEF &Implementing partner BREK | * Construction of Temporary Learning Spaces
* Training of teachers
* Vocational skills training for teachers
 | * Beneficiaries indicated that the TLS was helpful in providing learning spaces for children in IDPs or informal settlements. Given their nature as temporary spaces, community leaders pointed myriad challenges in operating such facilities and suggested the following; that there’s need to improve the standards of TLS to include a staffroom for the teachers, children playing ground, review of student-teacher ratio and sustainability of such spaces. There’s preference for permanent schools for children that are disaggregated into grades. Most of the returnee children found the centres not convenient because it was taught is Somali or Arabic as opposed to English and Kiswahili that are used to while in Kenya (Dadaab camps).
 |
| ILO &Implementing partner WARDO | * Construction of community road through cash for work
* Vocational skills training to boost employment opportunities
 | * The road rehabilitation activity and vocational skills training was hailed as having increased accessibility and availability of cash to beneficiaries. Besides, the vocational skills exposed students to various courses including; Auto-Mechanic and Driving, Hospitality/catering; Electrical installation; Business Entrepreneurship and Mobile and Electronic repairing. The skills development course also linked trainees to relevant job placements with Beco Company, Horyal Hotel, Bay Workshop and medina Salon thus reducing the unemployment rates among the youth selected from diverse community segments.
* Local community leaders suggested that there is need for market linkage and provision of start-up grants to boost the confidence of the graduates and motivate them to use the skills gained.
 |
| IOM  | * Construction of ISHA Police Station,
* Construction of Kerowfogi Bridge
* Rehabilitation of Dr. Ayub Stadium had to be delayed
 | * The construction of the police post was welcomed as improving service delivery and security situation in Baidoa town.
* However, the construction of the bridge and Dr. Ayub stadium is yet to start due to government interference in the award of the tender. IOM has since re-advertised the tender and construction of the bridge and stadium is expected to commence in March 2019.
 |

For the VST training in Dadaab-Kenya, although the project initially aimed at providing start up kits for the graduate trainees, this was not fully realized. Therefore, the post-training support of business startup was not sufficiently addressed. Implementing partners reported that per project budget the amount allocated would be ksh. 7000 (approximately $70), hence they couldn’t be able to achieve this. Nonetheless, DRC and NRC offered to cluster the trainees into groups of four and provided them with some little start up kits, which according to the trainees was far from enough to support their business’s needs. Some of these trained youth even reported that because of challenges emanating from group disagreements, most of them ended up selling the kits, affecting their morale.

### 3.3.7 Reintegration of Returnees

While the reintegration component of the project was not well spelt out by all partners, the PBF program has had verifiably positive achievements in this area. Firstly, the main focus of assistance was at the local level, where municipal and non-government actors have been supported through funding and capacity development assistance for local return and reintegration projects, which resulted in the rehabilitation of local infrastructure such as schools, the provision of socio-economic assistance to returnees, and the undertaking of community development initiatives. From the focus group discussions with the host communities and returnees, these infrastructural projects benefitted the whole community in terms of improved relations and therefore played a role in supporting the reintegration of the returnees. The engagement of the South West State’s MORDA was a key step in promoting the prospect for reintegration of the returnees. A Community Action Plan (CAP) developed through a five-day community consultation, held in Baidoa district in July 2017, with local authorities and government line ministry focal persons also served both as a monitoring and as a joint planning tool for implementing partners and the district authorities working in Baidoa.[[11]](#footnote-11)

Another important aspect of reintegration is the local community perception on their role in welcoming the returnees. Analyses show that 84.8 % of the respondents strongly believe that host community are obliged to help returnees as much as they possibly can, 13.2% feel less obliged to help returnees and are of the opinion that returnees should rely for help on their own clan members and only 2% feel the obligation to help returnees is the job for aid agencies and government.

Table 12 Host Community Obligation to Returnees

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Host community obligation to helping returnees** | **Returnee** | **Host Community** | **Combined** |
| Strong obligation to help as much as possible | N% | 14170.5% | 19499.5% | 33584.8% |
| Limited obligation to help the returnees: should rely mainly on their own clan members | N% | 5125.5% | 10.5% | 5213.2% |
| No obligation to help, that is the job of the aid agencies and government | N% | 84% | 00% | 82% |
| **Total** | **N****%** | **200****100%** | **195****100%** | **395****100%** |

The implementation of some project activities especially the education project, which was part of UNICEF reintegration project for children released from armed groups and forces and other vulnerable children including children returning from refugee camps in Kenya proved to have unintended consequence of promoting reintegration. The initiative reached 349 children of which 56 are returnees from Kenya. Evidence from activities at school level shows that education delivered in an inclusive manner positively impacted the promotion of peaceful attitudes and tolerance among children of different ethnic backgrounds. The support to schools through rehabilitations and scholastic materials enabled schools to absorb more IDP and returnees families thus furthering the much-desired coexistence.[[12]](#footnote-12)

Nevertheless, as interviewed stakeholders acknowledged that sustainability of return and reintegration remains the outstanding challenge for any returns project. Therefore carefully targeted follow-up is required to ensure the sustainable reintegration of the returnee families supported by the project. For instance, a key concern raised by the host community in Baidoa is the low percentage number of beneficiaries allocated to their constituencies despite the presence the existence of vulnerable household. They lamented that aid development should not be skewed towards returnees and IDPs and they warned that this might strain relations and create negative perceptions towards IDPs and returnees. Nonetheless, in assessing the perception on the level of security the returnees enjoy in Baidoa, and the extent to which capacity building programmes that were carried out in Kenya contributed to peaceful coexistence and re-integration for Baidoa returnees, the evaluation indicates that returnees enjoy the same level of protection as the local population is the strongest belief (99%) among the respondents. This is indicative of the warm relationship between the returning and host communities.

Table 13 Level of Security Enjoyed by Returnees

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Level of security the returnees enjoy** | **Returnee** | **Host Community** | **Combined Total** |
| They enjoy the same security and protection as the local population | N%  | 19698% | 195100% | 39199% |
| They enjoy somewhat less security and protection than the local population | N%  | 31.5% | 00% | 30.8% |
| They enjoy much less security and protection than the local population | N%  | 10.5% | 00% | 10.3% |
| **Total** | **N****%**  | **200****100%** | **195****100%** | **395****100%** |

### 3.3.8 Assessment of Theory of Change Model

The theory of change was based on the assumption that the project is expected to contribute to the overall outcome of enhanced capacity for peace building if reduced vulnerabilities, enhanced capacities for conflict resolution and peace dividends in the form of improved livelihoods and productive infrastructure and social services lead to the peaceful coexistence of returnees and resident communities. It was expected that resilient, cohesive communities would become key drivers of peace together with a strengthened civil society, including community organizations, contributing to manage root causes of conflict. The model hypothesized that if the capacity of refugee returnees to engage constructively in rebuilding Somalia and their resilience is enhanced with the condition that the resident communities have the capacity to absorb the spontaneous returnees, it would have dual outcome; that there is likelihood that the return movement may escalates tension with the potential for undermining the fragile peace; or the enhanced capacity of the returnee and residents communities would build peace dividends in form strengthened livelihood and enhanced governance.

Overall, the evaluation noted that the project has achieved considerable milestones in building the capacity of refugee returnees’ resilience through the provision of basic infrastructure and livelihoods support. The construction of schools for returnee children was for instance an important intervention considering the limited availability of social services in Baidoa. Other interventions such as development of road networks and provision of tools for returnee farmers have been welcomed by the beneficiaries as it provided alternative income for these returning families. Nevertheless, it has been noted that a critical element in the theory of change model, i.e. enhanced capacity of the returnee and residents communities to building peace dividends was not properly delivered by the implementing partners. In fact the evaluation found out that this component was not delivered in accordance with the project proposal, despite the theory of change model’s linkage of this element to the reduction in the likelihood that the return movement may escalates tension with the potential for undermining the fragile peace. Majority of prospective Baidoa returnees trained in peace building and conflict resolutions for increased participation in democratic governance and reconciliation processes and the 77 (39M, 38F) peace ambassadors trained to act as trainers of trainees were not able to be traced as most are still in Dadaab refugee camps. Therefore, the lack of return for these peace ambassadors to Baidoa is likely to affect the outcome on increased capacity of the returnees and to build peace dividends and enhance governance.

Similarly, due to unforeseen circumstance created by undue government interference and overlapping of some project activities such as rehabilitation of Kerrowfogi bridge and Dr. Ayuub stadium were delayed and are yet to be implemented during the field study, nevertheless the issues were resolved and according to IOM project team the activities were planned to commence immediately. Besides, due to the severe drought caused some partners to change some project activities midway through project implementation, hence affecting activities, which acted as a pillar for the theory of change. For instance, the drought situation in Somalia in general and Baidoa in particular delayed the commencement of the agricultural inputs distribution by FAO. The targeted beneficiaries for farming have returned to the host communities after the onset of the Gu rains (April-July 2017) as such FAO did not find it technically appropriate to target the beneficiaries with agricultural and livestock inputs during Gu season. As a result, FAO reprogramed its activities to target the returnees and host communities during the oncoming Deyr season (October- December). However, as demonstrated in the progress report results matrix below, most of the project’s outcomes especially in the area of enhanced capacities for economic revitalization and opportunities for reintegration were achieved.

Table 14 Project Outcomes & Indicators[[13]](#footnote-13)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcomes** | **Performance indicators** | **End of project Indicator Target** |
| **Outcome1:** Prospective Somali returnees have enhanced capacities for economic revitalization, peace and community reconciliation and positive participation in democratic governance. | **Indicator 1.1 #** of returnees trained in peace building and conflict resolutions and are participating in democratic governance and reconciliation processes | 750 |
| **Indicator 1.2 #** of youth aged 15-24 enrolled in certified livelihoods training | 750 |
| **Indicator 1.3 #** of persons of concern (18-59) with own business/self-employed for more than 12 months | 750 |
| **Outcome 2** Somalia returnees in Baidoa coexist peacefully with their host communities and contribute to local employment creation and economic development | Indicator 2.1 # of persons benefitting from social services provided in newly resettled areas | 3000 |
| Indicator 2.2 # of returnees recorded and tracked in PRMN as successfully integrated and coexisting well with host communities | 1500 |
| Output 2.1 Equitable access to social services, enhanced capacities for peace and social reconciliation for returnees in Baidoa  | Indicator 2.1.1 # of persons benefitting from social services provided in newly resettled areas | 3000 |
| Indicator 2.1.2 # of returnees recorded and tracked in PRMN as successfully integrated and coexisting well with host communities | 1500 |
| Output 2.2 Provision of basic needs and services to returnees, IDPs and host communities in Baidoa | Indicator 2.2.1 # of children attending primary school.  | 1800 |
| Indicator 2.2.2 # of teacher training and incentives  | 75 |
| Employment opportunities created and economic infrastructure improved | Indicator 2.3.1 # of short-term jobs created. | 200 |
| Indicator 2.3.2 # of beneficiaries with VST, business/entrepreneurial skills | 100 |
| Output 2.4 Reduced vulnerabilities s and enhanced coping capacities to shocks for both the returnees and the local community through coherent humanitarian and early recovery to development response in return/newly recovered areas. | Indicator 2.4.1: # of short-term jobs created and number of beneficiaries receiving agricultural package.  | 610 |
| Indicator 2.4.2 # of beneficiaries receiving livestock package | 160 |

## Accountability to Affected Population (AAP)

The study found out that beneficiaries and community leaders including IDP camp heads, chiefs and traditional elders played a key role in the targeting and selection of beneficiaries. Interview with field teams indicated that they held meetings with government officials including MORDA, local municipality and respective community leaders and shared them with the design of the project, nature of activities, objectives and number of target beneficiaries required from each community segments. The government played a role in the identification of sites especially IDP camps from protracted cases (existing camps). In addition, some implementing partners explained that beneficiaries’ details were obtained from UNHCR or were given final list of beneficiaries by PUNO agency. For accountability and transparency, implementing partners did verification of beneficiaries. This indicates that despite the government’s involvement in the process, beneficiaries interviewed observed that it (government) had minimal no role in the targeting process. Further, the study noted that some UN agencies had conducted own evaluations and interviewed beneficiaries to assess project performance and impact. The table below illustrates a summary of how PUNOs and their implementing partners embedded mechanism of accountability to affected populations.

Table 15 Implementing Partners’ Feedback Mechanisms

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| UN Agency  | Partners  | Feedback Mechanism  |
| FAO | SYPD, SOWELPA, FEERO | The field teams explained feedback mechanism was embedded in the project implementation. Beneficiaries were provided with hotlines in which they could call to seek information or complain. Caller’s identity is concealed at all times and a follow up is made by the agency to address complaints.  |
| UNCHR  | AVORD | The team acknowledged the project did not provide hotline or feedback mechanism to beneficiaries. The team explained if beneficiaries had complains they would come to their offices or call one of the staffs or can talk to project committees who will in turn call the partner. The challenge with such mechanism is that it does provide confidentiality and discourages beneficiaries to report concerns.  |
| WFP | WVI | The field teams explained they had a feedback mechanism. Beneficiaries were provided with hotlines in which they could call to seek information or complain to a call centre in Mogadishu. Complaints are compiled and sent to WFP area manager to investigate the matter and respond urgently. Caller’s identity is concealed at all times and a follow up is made by the agency to address  |
| IOM |  | The team explained the project did provide feedback mechanism to beneficiaries. The team explained if beneficiaries had complains they would come to their offices or call one of the staffs. |
| ILO | WARDO | The team explained the project did provide feedback mechanism to beneficiaries. The team explained if beneficiaries had complains they would come to their offices or call one of the staffs. |
| UNICEF  | BREK | The partner did not have feedback mechanism but beneficiaries are able to channel their grievances to the community although this not the preferred system.  |

The evaluation further assessed the level of awareness created regarding the entitlements of beneficiaries on what they are to receive every distribution. Partners held meetings with the beneficiaries and informed them of their entitlements. For instance, respondents involved in the cash for work or food voucher indicated that they knew about their daily wages/entitlements or monthly stipends. Similarly, food voucher beneficiaries working with WFP were informed about the quantities of food they could collect from selected vendors prior to the commencement of the activities. Likewise, FAO’s implementing partners created awareness about the types of agricultural inputs and quantities of assorted seeds and the number of goats that respective beneficiaries were entitled to receive from the project. Interview with beneficiaries confirmed that partner conducted awareness about their entitlements hence creating a sense of openness. Interestingly though, the quantitative analysis of survey data indicates that only 19.7% of the respondents had knowledge of the formal mechanism through which they could lodge their grievances, with 80.3% of interviewed respondents reporting of having no knowledge of community feedback mechanisms.

Table 16 Awareness on Community Feedback Mechanisms

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Awareness of formal mechanism or procedures in place to report concerns or grievances on this project** | **Returnee** | **IDP** | **Host Community** | **Combined Total** |
| Yes | N%  | 7738.5% | 3416.7% | 73.6% | 11819.7% |
| No | N%  | 12361.5% | 16983.3% | 18896.4% | 48080.3% |
| Total | N%  | 200100% | 203100% | 195100% | 598100% |

For those who reported to be aware of community feedback mechanisms, they reported that grievances or concerns were mainly channelled through friends (55.9%) or phone calls (50%), which are largely considered as informal mechanism.

Table 17 Channels for Submitting Grievances

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Channel for grievances | Responses  |
| **N** | **%** |
| Meeting with staff | 27 | 22.9% |
| Through a friend | 66 | 55.9% |
| Notice boards | 1 | 0.8% |
| Through Project committees | 19 | 16.1% |
| Phone call/messages | 59 | 50% |
| Through camp leader | 9 | 7.6% |
| Total | **181** | **153.4%[[14]](#footnote-14)** |

In terms of feedback from the PUNOs and implementing partners, the vast majority (83.4%) of respondents who had submitted complaints/feedback reported that they did not receive response from UNHCR or Partners after reporting concerns or grievances on the project. Only 16.6% of respondents reportedly received feedback on grievances/concerns that they had raised

Table 18 Feedbacks from UNHCR or PUNO Partners

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Receive feedback from UNHCR or Partners after reporting concerns or grievances on this project** | **Returnee** | **IDP** | **Host Community** | **Combined** **Total** |
| Yes | N%  | 6231% | 3617.7% | 10.5% | 9916.6% |
| No | N%  | 13869% | 16782.3% | 19499.5% | 49983.4% |
| **Total** | **N****%**  | **200****100%** | **203****100%** | **195****100%** | **598****100%** |

Feedback from UNHCR/partners is mainly through telephone (82.8%). Community meetings and communication through local leaders (7.1%) is also a means through which agencies provide feedback.

Table 19 UNHCR/PUNOs Channels of Communication

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **UNHCR/Partners channel of communicating feedback** | **Returnee** | **IDP** | **Host Community** | **Combined Total** |
| Community Meetings | N%  | 69.7% | 12.8% | 00% | 77.1% |
| Through local leadership | N%  | 69.7% | 12.8% | 00% | 77.1% |
| Project Staff | N%  | 11.6% | 12.8% | 11% | 33% |
| Telephone | N%  | 4979% | 3391.7% | 00% | 8282.8% |
| **Total** | **N****%**  | **62****100%** | **36****100%** | **1****100%** | **99****100%** |

## Efficiency of Coordination Mechanisms

The PBF program in Baidoa had multiple levels of coordination mechanisms including; coordination between PUNOs and MORDA; PUNOs closely coordinated with local implementing partners, and local partners coordinated with community members and PUNOs followed up returnees to understand their challenges and progress. Being the lead agency, UNHCR assumed the role of coordination of project activities, which was also used as a monitoring mechanism on status of the project as implementation, progressed and whether targets were met. The evaluation established that there was a good level of in-country coordination, but there was evidently very weak cross border coordination despite efforts by UNHCR and other PBF implementing partners to conduct regular video conferencing for coordination. This was further supported with special ‘go-and-see’ visits to Baidoa. However, potential returnees in Dadaab reported that there was little follow up on the VST trainees who voluntarily returned to Baidoa, as some of them came back to Dadaab citing lack of connection with the partner UN organizations that were supposed to receive them for reintegration process. Youth FGD participants in Dadaab indicated that about 10 graduates of the vocational skills trainings offered by DRC and NRC who voluntarily returned to Baidoa ended up coming back to Dadaab. Some of these youth lamented that; this was a key reason for the lack of voluntary return for the trained youths. Similarly, RET-implemented component of training peace ambassadors lacked proper coordination and connection of the elders with partners across the border. Nonetheless, the evaluation also notes the return to Dadaab could be due to the low absorption capacity in the areas of return characterized by the lack of or inadequate social amenities.

Understandably, delivery of aid in fragile environment is often riddled with enormous challenges especially where there’s high poverty level, unemployment and insecurity and resources available are inadequate. These challenges also exist in Baidoa and the involvement of ministry officials and security agencies in the implementation of the project activities has contributed to the smooth implementation of the activities and prevented the perennial conflicts that usually characterize aid distribution in fragile situation.

**Coordination between PUNOs and MORDA**

The program had efficient coordination mechanism between UN Partner Organizations and with the National Commission for Refugees and IDPs (NCRI) at the national level but more crucially at the project site by the Ministry of Resettlement and Diaspora Affairs (MORDA) in the South West State. For instance, there were series of joint coordination meetings held on monthly basis at the ministry and chaired by government focal points at MORDA, attended by partner agencies to share updates and progress attained or jointly strategizes to overcome challenges encountered. UNHCR as the lead partner also worked closely with MORDA to monitor ongoing projects implemented by partners in Baidoa.

MORDA was instrumental in the implementation of the program in Baidoa. Interviews with UN and partners in Baidoa revealed that they coordinated with the ministry officials in the selection of beneficiaries, site identification, and identification of returnee settlements and also played an oversight role and monitoring of various project activities that were running simultaneously in different locations. Besides, some of the implementing partners coordinated with the local municipality in the selection of the beneficiaries. Interview with FERO official, a local partner for FAO that conducted the distribution of 1,600 goats to 160 returnees’ households indicated that the distribution process was overwhelming and engaged security agencies and community leaders to manage the crowd and called out the names of the beneficiaries as they filled their details. Interview with other partners such UNHCR’s local partner AVORD cited the distribution of donkey carts to beneficiaries was done in collaboration with government agencies and local leaders.

**Coordination among PUNOs, Local Partners and Local Communities**

**The PUNOs** and local partners jointly implemented the various PBF program activities in Baidoa. This created coordination that ensured complementarity in the implementation of the project activities. This was so because local organizations have presence and understanding of social dynamics and cultural systems while the UN agencies have technical skills and systems and was responsible for implementation, financial management and reporting and updating government officials regularly. This close coordination was significant in mobilization of various community segments including returnees, IDPs and host community in the targeting and selection of beneficiaries in line with selection criteria. For instance, interview with ILO officials indicated that they have coordinated with a local construction company to rehabilitate 300 meters feeder roads and jointly selected casual labors that took part in the rehabilitation of the road as company deployed graders and other heavy machines. The locals welcomed such joint collaboration as laudable because the approach was seen as unique and produced a permanent infrastructure that would be serving the communities for decades.

Besides, interview with UNICEF’ local partner, BREK explained that through working with local community leaders they were able to construct a total of 12 temporary learning spaces across six settlements two units in each location. The projects teams established and trained 105 Community Education Committee (CEC) as well as 57 volunteer teachers from local community. The CECs were trained on school management, resources mobilization and management, social mobilization and conflict management that were geared to promoting ownership and self-reliance after the end of the project period. Despite structural challenges five out of the six temporary learning spaces are operational and CECs are running the centres and mobilizing resources from the members.

Local organizations collaborated with the camp leaders, local community leaders, village heads in the selection of target beneficiaries based on set criteria that priority should be given to vulnerable women and female headed households, minority groups, and elderly and widowed persons. Community leaders helped in building consensus and assisted agencies identify deserving members in their respective locations. Given that some of the project activities involved distribution of livestock and agricultural inputs and tools and donkey carts as well employment generation which were not adequate to address the needs all the constituents, the involvement of community leaders and use of such criteria helped avert potential resources conflict since the process targeted returnees, IDPs and host community.

Interviews with various stakeholders including PUNOs, MORDA, local partners and community members noted there was coordination mechanism, however, they equally highlighted several challenges in terms of information sharing vertically or horizontally within the partners. Firstly, some of PUNOs field team noted that there was lack of clarity between their head offices and field team due to lack of proper briefing on the outcome from the coordination meetings within PUNOs to the extent they did not know the PBF program; secondly some of the local partners of PUNOs indicated they were only contracted to implement the project and submitted field reports and did not know about the objectives of the projects and PBF program; thirdly, there was little information sharing during the beneficiary selection process among the implementing agencies despite the existence of the database of beneficiaries by WFP and UNHCR. Finally, government officials have also complained about MORDA (which has since been disbanded by the newly elected president of South West State) for allegedly usurping the mandate and role of other government agencies. For instance, ministries of agriculture and education that ought to work closely with FAO and UNICEF on the respective projects were eclipsed by MORDA, which allegedly did not share information with its counterparts.

In addition, a visit to project sites and interview with local beneficiaries, the team noted that IOM did not commence construction of Kerrowfogi Bridge and rehabilitation of Dr. Ayub Stadium although it has successfully constructed Isha police station. It was realized the two project activities did not kick-off for varying reasons; local municipality barred the local contractor that had won the tender for the construction of the bridge while the rehabilitation of stadium stalled because there was somewhat duplication of activities when an another international organization(i.e. ADESO) received funding to rehabilitate the same stadium. Understandably, the challenges could have avoided or addressed if there was proper information sharing not only among PUNOs but also with other international organizations and MORDA. Finally, MORDA explained that despite the PBF program rehabilitating key infrastructure projects there was no hand-over ceremony that was conducted to showcase these achievements.

Further, the evaluation noted one of the six UNICEF PBF-supported Temporary Learning Spaces in ADC 3 IDP camp was shut down after Save the Children International opened a school in close proximity and recruited teachers from the UNICEF-PBF supported school by doubling the teacher incentives being paid. As a result, all teachers and children moved to the Save the Children supported school. UNICEF-PBF supported schools have therefore reduced from 6 to 5. Community members cited the TLS are overcrowded; lack grading system, lack curriculum, and teacher lack offices and the facilities do not have adequate spaces and playgrounds. Coordination and timely and accurate information sharing among sub-cluster partners remains a main challenge in terms of avoiding overlap of resources/interventions.

## Project Monitoring Framework

Although there was a coordination mechanism among the partners on monthly basis, there was no joint or harmonized monitoring system for PBF program. Overall, MORDA had an oversight role in the implementation of some project activities. Since PUNOs engaged local partners in the implementation of project activities, they contracted independent firms separately or own staff to conduct third party monitoring or evaluation of the project activities. For instance FAO engaged a local company that conducted a technical review of its project. To this end, the evaluation identifies the following aspects of the monitoring system that could be improved in the future.

1. The study noted agencies have selection criteria and but used varied approaches in the selection of beneficiaries. Interviews with some revealed that they had engaged either MORDA or local municipality and maintained minimal oversight role. This approach could potentially create risk of bias and favoritism that would leave out traditionally marginalized groups. It is recommended that agencies to have an oversight role in the selection process to ensure fairness and transparency.
2. Embedding an effective feedback mechanism is an integral part of project implementation that would be useful for agencies to support accountability, transparency, empowerment, monitoring and evaluation, and programme improvement, and to provide early warning of impending problems. However, this will require agencies to create awareness and create confidence of beneficiaries to give their feedback. This mechanism can also be used to monitor project progress and make timely adjustments. The study found ILO, IOM and UNHCR did not have a hotline system for provision of feedback but WFP and FAO had hotline numbers that was made available to the beneficiaries. However, interviews with the some of the beneficiaries revealed that they were not aware of it or simply could not launch their complaints for fear of reprisals that could include being excluded in future programs by community leaders.
3. Coordination and timely information sharing among sub-cluster partners was seen as a challenge during the implementation of the PBF program in Baidoa. There was little or no coordination with PUNOs and local partners despite the monthly meetings. The weak coordination has resulted overlap of projects as in the case of the rehabilitation of Dr. Ayub stadium by IOM. Further the building of a full-fledged school by Save the Children in close proximity to TLS has seen the closure of one of the centres in ADC 3. Such challenges could be prevented if there is an improved information sharing mechanism with field teams to ensure smooth delivery of the project.
4. Future programs that involve multiple partners should design a joint monitoring system or design own monitoring system to track project implementation progress and address potential challenges to avoid delays. Notably, FAO and WFP have conducted final reviews of their projects by engaging independent firms.

## Project Sustainability

Sustainability is fundamental to the success of the PBF project. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there have been many reported instances of previous returns of returnees from Dadaab, which have not proved sustainable. Return itself is relatively simple in comparison to the comprehensive approach required to promote integration and ensure that returns are sustainable. The UNHCR and PUNOs used their experience in this area, gained through implementing returns projects especially in Kismayo, to develop a project which aimed to address all the needs of returnees; from providing training and socio-economic assistance to returnees, to implementing community development projects and balancing components to promote reintegration of returnees in their communities. Providing economic assistance to beneficiaries with the aim of facilitating their efforts to generate their own livelihoods is crucial to ensuring the sustainability of returns.

Rehabilitation of community infrastructures through UNHCR’S PBF program such as Hawlwadag primary and secondary school and blacksmith market is deemed fully sustainable. Since the project completion the facilities were operational and beneficial to beneficiaries. A visit to Hawlwadag School found the project built five additional classrooms and renovated the school compound by constructing a concrete fence. Interview with teachers and community leaders revealed the classes helped decongest previously overcrowded classes and has seen an increase in the school enrolment and improved the general learning environment. Besides, the project rehabilitated a previously dilapidated blacksmith market (that is purely run by members from excluded communities who would otherwise left from resource distribution) to a more conducive market (although it’s still not in perfect shape) has enhanced their capacity and confidence to continue with their businesses of producing household items such as Knives, Panga and Axe. The construction and rehabilitation of these facilities has shown high level of community ownership and long-term use of the facilities.

The rehabilitation of Isha police station through IOM’s PBF program to a modern facility with adequate offices contributes to government’s institution visibility, capacity to enhance law and order as well as confidence of the security personnel to provide service. A visit to the station found the station operational and teaming with people. Previously, the station was in bad shape that was unable to provide services and security personnel were absent most of the time for lack of adequate space. Given that the country is emerging from decades of conflict that saw the destruction of government facilities such projects restores the image of the government and raises optimism of the people for peace and stability.

Further, The PBF program delivered by PUNOs including WFP, IOM, ILO, FAO, UNICEF and UNHCR and their partners have cumulatively rehabilitated over 30KM roads in different settlements in Baidoa connecting IDPS, returnees settlements to urban centres through cash for work or food voucher. The rehabilitation of these roads has improved accessibility and movement within settlements thus increasing movement of vehicles and people. Although the project provided temporary cash it is also contributed to improved community engagement among the IDPs, returnees and host community. During the rehabilitation of the roads PUNOs coordinated with MORDA thus improving government’s leadership and visibility.

UNICEF’s education project involved building of temporary learning spaces across six settlements, training of CECs and teachers. The delivery of the project was somewhat sustainable by empowering communities to manage the learning facilities after the end of the project. Despite structural and operational challenges with running these temporary spaces, the project placed substantial focus on the reintegration of returnee children, particularly into mainstream schooling to achieve sustainability. UNICEF and its implementing partner BREK ensured that schools were constructed and managed to ensure sustainable return and reintegration. A visit to these learning spaces has found them operational. The establishment of management structures in the form of community education committees (CECs) has helped strengthen local ownership that will ensure functionality even after the project life span.

The PBF program provided numerous skills training for various youth including youth female and men on carpentry, metal fabrication, computer skills, mobile repair, entrepreneurship and hospitality. Some of the graduates interviewed during the study acknowledged to have received toolkits. Majority of the trainees have indicated they have got employed or started own business in Baidoa while some of them hinted of moving to Mogadishu in search of jobs with high prospect of getting a job. The activities imparted relevant knowledge and skills that could enable vulnerable youth to start own job and create hope to get employment as this will reduce prevent youth in crime and joining of Al-Shabab ranks.

Besides, the PBF program had catalytic effects. For instance the UNHCR’s catalytic role in the PBF program manifested itself in a number of ways. The project acted as a catalyst for future community development, especially when this activity was supported by the federal government of Somalia and the south west state through MORDA. PUNOs catalytic role can be seen in its sponsorship of entrepreneurial activities, trainings, infrastructural support the provision of basic social services such as schools. UNHCR’s efforts in the PBF provided not simply a bridge for other development actors but acted as a catalyst, providing an alternative path to success and accelerating change. This catalytic role can clearly be seen in PUNO’s assistance, which went well beyond the provision of return packages but provided access to crucial services such as schooling, productive assets and cash support and food voucher. What magnified their impact was the ability of PUNOs through reintegration and coordination of the PBF program activities, to add an additional social ingredient through peace building that sparked faster progress in cohesion among returnees and the host communities in Baidoa. Further, support of women through the provision of toolkits and donkey carts and agricultural inputs greatly enhanced productivity upon return. Another example of PBF’s catalytic role relates to the place of women and gender issues in community empowerment. PUNOs willingness to cultivate community member’s desire of social change opened up an alternative path to greater gender equality, and consequently accelerated the process by incorporating more women into peace building.

According to ILO Somalia, the agency has secured funding of10 million Euros from KfW Development Bank from Germany that will be invested in the development of critical infrastructure that will involve construction of 15KM road tarmac connecting IDP settlements and with Baidoa town and establishment of productive centres. Discussions around the design and implementation are ongoing and the initial phase of the program is expected to commence in the coming months. This funding comes immediately ILO completed the PBF program activities. This additional funding complements the PBF program and once complemented will boost the local economy and livelihoods of the community as well as contributes to stabilization process in south west state and national development framework. Given the program is expected to hire local companies and employ local communities, the immediate impact will be employment creation and improved access to cash that will subsequently improve household income.

# Challenges and Lessons Learnt

## Challenges

1. ***Community prioritization in the design of the project***: Although PUNOs held community meetings and conducted assessments before the projects inceptions, however, interviews with some of the beneficiary respondents acknowledging the PBF projects provided temporary access to cash, food support, assets and skills trainings there was no broad-based stakeholders’ consultation to discuss priority needs. For instance they described FAO’s provision of agricultural inputs included some ‘foreign’ seeds (i.e. Amaranthus seeds, Ethiopian Mustard) that failed to grow as opposed to providing indigenous seeds such as Maize. Besides, majority of the returnees did not have farmlands and had to negotiate with farm owners to use their land for a fee or pay in-kind and experienced difficulties. They explained since they have not been engaged in farming while in Dadaab they found going back to farming difficult but had to consider for lack better alternative. In addition, UNICEF’s PBF constructed 12 TLs across 6 IDP camps, however, five of the 6 facilities were found operational but they had no teachers and are not seen as child friendly because they are overcrowded, do not have playground, lack teachers’ office and lack proper management. Besides, the UNHCR and WFP PBF program activities involved construction of five and three shallow wells respectively in IDP settlements in Baidoa that were experiencing acute water shortages, however, the shallows dried up immediately after construction. Respondents explained the water table is low therefore construction of productive and permanent shallow wells can be achieved through drilling as opposed to using casual labor which the projects used due to limited project budget.
2. ***Duplication and overlapping*:** During the field study it was noted that UNICEF-PBF funded the construction of temporary learning spaces (TLS) and trained volunteer teachers in six settlements. Since the completion of the project one school has since been shut down after all the teachers left and sought employment in a new school built in close proximity by Save the Children and paid modest stipend and parents enrolled their children in the school citing the school provided feeding program. In addition, there was confusion between IOM and ADESO after both agencies received funding to rehabilitate Dr. Ayuub Football stadium. This delayed the commencement of the construction works and it took government intervention to resolve the matter long after the project completion.
3. ***Feedback mechanism:*** Embedding an effective feedback mechanism is an integral part of project implementation that would be useful for agencies to support accountability, transparency, empowerment, monitoring and evaluation, and programme improvement, and to provide early warning of impending problems. However, this will require agencies to create awareness and create confidence among beneficiaries to be able to give their feedback. The study found ILO, IOM and UNHCR did not have a hotline system for provision of feedback but WFP and FAO had hotline numbers that was made available to the beneficiaries.
4. ***Beneficiary Selection*:** The study found agencies have selection criterions but used varied approaches in the selection of beneficiaries. Interviews with local partners revealed that they had engaged either with MORDA or local municipality while maintaining minimal oversight role. It was noted that some partners delegated the responsibility of beneficiary selection to either MORDA or local municipality. This can arguably create risk of bias, favoritism and exclusion of marginalized groups.
5. ***Interference from Local Administration:*** Baidoa local municipality barred a local company that won a bid to rehabilitate the Kerowfogi Bridge and delayed the project thus prompted IOM to re-advertise the bid and contract another company long after the program ended.
6. ***Returnee Orientation:*** Given that majority of voluntary returnees are returning after being away for more than two decades there was little or no information about the socio-economic situation of the areas of return. Some of the returnees reported being coned or misappropriated of funds by some locals who took advantage of their ignorance.
7. ***Start-up Kits:*** The lack of individual start up kits was challenging as this has ‘tied’ a group of four together hence rendering them to make a group decision which was not easy for them to cope with. A key reason reported for the low return for the trainee graduates was the issue of combining them together, for instance if a member of the group changes intention to return, then the other three would be forced to stay in Dadaab.
8. ***Dropout of Trainees*:** Cases of drop out of trainees especially those that were dispatched to NITA accredited colleges in Nairobi. DRC enrolled about 70 trainees at various colleges in Nairobi but only 50 graduated as 20 of them dropped out.
9. ***Low Absorption Capacity in Baidoa:*** Social services such as schools and health facilities for Baidoa area, especially remote locations in the outskirts of Baidoa had a very low absorption capacity as many were reported to have come back to Dadaab after return to their places of origin.
10. ***Low Intention to Return:*** Return intention for Baidoa was quite low hence mobilization of potential trainees in Dadaab was a challenging endeavor.

## Lessons Learnt

1. ***Coordination with government institutions*:** Engaging with relevant government institutions in the delivery of aid is critical to ensure transparency and accountability. Government involvement in project will help improve their visibility, confidence and leadership. However, this engagement can sometimes cause friction among government institutions if it’s not carefully handled. Notably, there was standoff between MORDA and Baidoa municipality over the selection of beneficiaries. The ministry has since been disbanded by new south west state president allegedly due to its rise in prominence and overstepping its mandate following complaints from other government agencies. Therefore, future programs should consider working with relevant government agencies as opposed to engaging a single institution.
2. ***Rehabilitation of community infrastructure***: Most of the PBF program activities involved rehabilitation of roads through cash for work or food voucher. Considering the road condition sometimes using beneficiaries only might not be ideal due to the limited technical capacity. The study found ILO engaged a local contractor that provided machinery and expertise to complement beneficiaries’ efforts. This collaborative effort produced quality work that is deemed sustainable. This approach provides useful lesson that using beneficiaries only to undertake road rehabilitation without using appropriate machines and knowledge might not produce desired results.
3. ***Feedback mechanism***: Embedding effective feedback mechanism in the design of project is a critical component that will improve accountability, transparency, monitoring and evaluation and making appropriate changes in real-time. The study found only a few of the PUNOs provided hotlines to its beneficiaries, however, interview with some of the beneficiaries revealed that they were either not aware of it or did not know how to use it. Therefore, providing hotlines to beneficiaries was not enough without creating awareness on its usage to promote ownership, transparency and accountability without fearing of reprisals.
4. ***Community consultation:*** Local consultations with actors and groups in the targeted population prior to project design often provides useful information on priority needs of the communities that can inform programing. The study found the priority needs especially of returnees supported through the project were somewhat different from own priorities which included; start-up capital, schools, health facilities, markets, water and shelter. Thus, there is need to undertake needs assessment prior to project design to inform programing.
5. ***External factors should be considered in the design of the project***: Designing project should consider prevailing conditions such as security, drought and clan relations because some of these factors have a bearing on delivery as well as sustainability of the project. For instance, the study noted although some of the beneficiaries farmers and livestock encountered challenges such as insecurity due to Al-Shabab presence, reported GBV and kidnaping as well reported severe drought that depleted resources such as water and grass.
6. ***Strengthening existing infrastructure is ideal:*** The study found UNHCR’s PBF program built five classrooms and concrete fence a public school in Baidoa. Due to improved conditions there has been an increase in school enrolment of children mainly from IDPs and returnees. Besides, IOMs rehabilitated Isha police in Baidoa was described to have enhanced the capacity of the facility security personnel to provide service. Further, the rehabilitation of over 35 KM roads by different organizations across Baidoa city was also applauded to have enhanced accessibility within camps and improved transport system. Therefore this is a good initiative that improves the conditions of the existing infrastructure as opposed to building new facilities.
7. ***Coordination with partners and INGOs is critical***: The study noted although there was a good coordination among the PUNOs however, there was weak coordination with other international organizations involved in stabilization programs. Information sharing in cluster meetings and sharing information with seen as a challenge during the project implementation. This can be remedied by engaging and sharing relevant information with ministries to prevent potential overlap and duplication.
8. ***Handover ceremonies should be held upon completion of projects:*** Integrating exit strategy in project design is critical. This will enable agencies to organize hand over ceremonies of the project activities after completion as a way to enhance ownership, increases government visibility, sustainability and transfer of responsibilities. Although a few PUNOs such as WFP organized handover ceremonies for its project activities, according to MORDA not all the projects were handed over to the ministry upon completion. Therefore, future projects should consider including handing over ceremonies to help the government showcase development initiatives.

# Conclusion and Recommendation

## Conclusion

The evaluation study conducted on the Peace Building Fund implemented by multi-donor agencies in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya and Baidoa district in South west state of Somalia. The program funded numerous projects that were implemented by FAO, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, ILO and IOM in partnership with local partners. The projects implemented targeted voluntary returnees, IDPs and host communities. The activities delivered through the program including trainings on peace building activities, vocational skills trainings, rehabilitation of community assets such as roads, schools and markets as wells as provided assets such as donkey carts, tool kits and farm inputs. Despite structural and environmental challenges the study found the PBF program largely achieved set objectives. The program contributed to community integration and community cohesion. The projects activities were found efficient, effective with a strong accountability in place. The impact of the different projects varied across the locations. Target beneficiaries reported improved household income as well increased access to temporary cash. The study documents lessons learnt learned, challenges and recommendations that would be useful for donors and provide insight for future programs.

## Recommendations

1. ***Beneficiary selection process:*** The study noted agencies have selection criteria but used varied approaches in the selection of beneficiaries. The study recommends agencies to collaborate and use multiple approaches in targeting various community segments that includes using PRMN[[15]](#footnote-15) in collaboration with local leadership and local administration while maintaining a clear oversight in the process to; i) prevent potential risks of bias and favoritism that would leave out marginalized groups; ii) prevent double registration of some beneficiaries that could end up benefiting from more than one project.
2. ***Feedback Mechanism****;* The study noted agencies have used different feedback mechanisms. For instance, agencies like WFP and FAO provided hotlines to the beneficiaries while ILO, IOM, UNICEF and UNHCR did not provide hotlines. The study notes the need to integrate feedback mechanism in future projects and create awareness among the beneficiaries to support accountability, transparency, empowerment, monitoring and evaluation, and programme improvement, and to provide early warning of impending problems.
3. ***Coordination among partners:*** The study noted although there was effective coordination mechanism among the PUNOs and government agencies, however, timely information sharing among sub-cluster partners was seen as a challenge. The weak coordination between PUNOs and partners and other development agencies has resulted overlap of projects as in the case of the rehabilitation of Dr. Ayub stadium between IOM and ADESO that also received different funding to rehabilitate the same facility. Further the building of a full-fledged school by Save the Children in close proximity to TLS built by UNICEF has seen the closure of one of the centres in ADC 3. To prevent the recurrence of similar overlaps future programs should clear coordination mechanism within the donors and partners as well as with other international agencies.
4. ***Community prioritization in the design of the project***: Interviews with respondents indicated that although PBF projects provided temporary access to cash, food, assets and vocational skills trainings however, they cited they were not asked about their priority needs. For instance, FAO’s provision of agricultural inputs provided ‘foreign’ seeds (i.e. Amaranthus seeds, Ethiopian Mustard) failed to grow as opposed to providing indigenous seeds such as Maize. Besides, five of the 6 facilities constructed through UNICEF’s PBF supported education were found operational but they had few teachers, the classes were overcrowded and students did not have learning materials. Besides, the construction of shallow wells by UNHCR and WFP in IDP settlement in Baidoa was described as not effective approach to address water scarcity as prospect of getting water faded citing such activity required the use of heavy machines for drilling. Based on these feedbacks, future programs should enhance consultations with targeted populations through conducting baselines or needs assessments to inform the design of the projects.
5. ***Completion of the remaining project activities:*** The study noted some activities of the IOM’s PBF projects were not implemented due local government interference, therefore there is need to speed up the rehabilitation of theKerowfogi Bridge and Dr. Ayuub stadium.
6. ***Returnee Orientation and provision of start-up kits:*** Given that majority of voluntary returnees are returning after being away for more than two decades there was little or no information about the socio-economic situation of the areas of return. Therefore, it’s recommended that UNHCR and partners should create awareness about available business opportunities, social amenities (schools, hospitals and water points), exchange rates (dollars to Somali Shilling), and commodity prices before leaving Dadaab.

# Annex

## Data collection Tools

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **No** | **List of Tools** | **Attachment**  |
|  | Survey questionnaire for Host communities and Returnees |  |
|  | FGD Guide for project Beneficiary Returnees in Baidoa |  |
|  | FGD Guide for project Beneficiary IDPs in Baidoa |  |
|  | FGD Guide for project Beneficiary Returnees in Dadaab |  |
|  | FGD Guide for project Beneficiary Host community in Baidoa |  |
|  | Key informant Interview Guide for UNHCR and Partner Stakeholders |  |
|  | Key informant Interview Guide for Government representatives in Baidoa |  |

1. UN-MPTF Annual Report, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The Population Return Monitoring Network (PRMN) component of the project tracks movements regardless of any ethnicity, political affiliation or otherwise. PRMN is used as a tool for protection interventions and support of victims of human rights violations. Source: Somalia Un Multi-Partner Trust Fund January - June 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. PBF Proposal for Somalia-Kenya IRF Cross Border Project [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. https://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Cochran, W. G. (1977). Sampling techniques (3rd Ed.).New York: John Wiley & Sons [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. UN-MPTF Annual Report, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. UN-MPTF Annual Report, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. PUNOs Project Documents [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. UN-MPTF Annual Report, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. The total is more than 100% because the Reponses was multiple choices [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. UN-MPTF Annual Report, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. UN-MPTF Annual Report, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. UN-MPTF Annual Report, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. The total is more than 100% because the Reponses was multiple choices [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The Population Return Monitoring Network (PRMN) component of the project tracks movements regardless of any ethnicity, political affiliation or otherwise. PRMN is used as a tool for protection interventions and support of victims of human rights violations. Source: Somalia Un Multi-Partner Trust Fund January - June 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)