

**SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PEACEBUILDING FUND  
PROJECT DOCUMENT TEMPLATE**



**PBF PROJECT DOCUMENT**

<b>Country(ies):</b> Sudan	
<b>Project Title:</b> Support to the Sudanese Peace Process <b>Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway (if existing project):</b>	
<b>PBF project modality:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> IRF <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRF	<b>If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund (instead of into individual recipient agency accounts):</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Country Trust Fund <input type="checkbox"/> Regional Trust Fund <b>Name of Recipient Fund:</b>
<b>List all direct project recipient organizations (starting with Convening Agency), followed by type of organization (UN, CSO etc.):</b>  UNDP, UNHCR	
<b>List additional implementing partners, specify the type of organization (Government, INGO, local CSO):</b> Local CSOs and academic institutions	
<b>Project duration in months<sup>1</sup>:</b> 24 Months <b>Geographic zones (within the country) for project implementation:</b> National	
<b>Does the project fall under one or more of the specific PBF priority windows below:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Gender promotion initiative <sup>2</sup> <input type="checkbox"/> Youth promotion initiative <sup>3</sup> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions <input type="checkbox"/> Cross-border or regional project	
<b>Total PBF approved project budget* (by recipient organization):</b>  UNDP: \$ 2,893,620 UNHCR: \$ 1,106,380  <b>Total: \$4,000,000</b>	
<i>*The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSO's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account. For payment of second and subsequent tranches the Coordinating agency needs to demonstrate expenditure/commitment of at least 75% of the previous tranche and provision of any PBF reports due in the period elapsed.</i>	

<sup>1</sup> Maximum project duration for IRF projects is 18 months, for PRF projects – 36 months.

<sup>2</sup> Check this box only if the project was approved under PBF's special call for proposals, the Gender Promotion Initiative

<sup>3</sup> Check this box only if the project was approved under PBF's special call for proposals, the Youth Promotion Initiative

Any other existing funding for the project (amount and source): N/A

**PBF 1<sup>st</sup> tranche (70%):**

UNDP: \$ \$2,025,534

UNHCR: \$774,466

**Total: \$2,800,000**

**PBF 2<sup>nd</sup> tranche\* (30%):**

UNDP: \$ \$868,086

UNHCR: \$331,914

**Total: \$1,200,000**

**PBF 3<sup>rd</sup> tranche\* (0%):**

**Total:**

**Provide a brief project description (describe the main project goal; do not list outcomes and outputs):**

The purpose of the project is to channel support to the peace process in Sudan, including implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) alliance on 3rd October 2020. Three areas of intervention are foreseen:

1. Support to National Peace Architecture, including design and establishment of the Peace Commission, which still does not have an agreed organisational structure nor terms of reference, and other entities at national and sub-national levels, mobilisation of civil society, and development of a National Strategy for Peace, with accompanying financing framework;
2. Immediate support to the ongoing peace process, as well as to pre-implementation of the JPA, including a communications, outreach and advocacy campaign at community level to popularise the agreement, technical and financial assistance to organisation of events and processes envisaged in the JPA, and data collection and analysis to establish baselines to inform programming of international assistance;
3. Support to Government to ensure that effective coordination and establishment of reporting, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are in place to promote accountability of peace agreement implementation, in line with binding international and regional legal instruments.

The project is an innovative attempt, built on the integrated nature of the UN mission and nexus working of the UN Agencies, to facilitate and support an unfolding national peace process. Implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement, and the development and implementation of a national Peace Strategy, will be both transformative and catalytic in establishing a new social contract, in preventing future conflict, and in all efforts toward SDG attainment.

**Summarize the in-country project consultation process prior to submission to PBSO, including with the PBF Steering Committee, civil society (including any women and youth organizations) and stakeholder communities (including women, youth and marginalized groups):**

The project has been prepared at the request of the Transitional Government of Sudan (TGoS) expressed at the September 2020 meeting of the PBF Joint Steering Committee for Sudan. It responds directly to needs expressed by the Peace Commissioner, following consultations with armed groups, UNAMID and UNITAMS and UNCT Agencies. The project was approved by a meeting of the Technical Level Working Group of the PBF Joint Steering Committee held 7<sup>th</sup> December 2020.

**Project Gender Marker score<sup>4</sup>: 2**

Specify % and \$ of total project budget allocated to activities in pursuit of gender equality and women's empowerment:

30% of the total project budget (\$1,234,245) has been programmed for activities in support of gender equality and women's empowerment.

**Briefly explain through which major intervention(s) the project will contribute to gender equality and women's empowerment<sup>5</sup>:**

The transformative role of women in Sudan's revolution is widely recognised and the goal of gender equality and women's empowerment is inscribed in the Constitutional Declaration of August 2019 and the Juba Peace Agreement of October 2020. The Peace Commission will be supported to undertake communications and advocacy work in favour of the JPA that acknowledges the lead role played by women in the revolution and speaks directly to their aspirations and concerns, through dedicated programming and targeting of resources.

The project will promote a gender-responsive approach to peacebuilding at all levels and actively support all signatory parties to meet gender commitments of the JPA, including 40% representation of women in all implementation mechanisms and processes of the peace agreement and national peace architecture for conflict prevention and resolution. The project will ensure that both the National Peace Strategy is gender-responsive and accompanied by a gender-disaggregated Results Framework and support to the Ministry of Finance for gender budgeting. All data and assessments to be supplied to Government in support of durable solutions in communities of origin will be similarly gender responsive and disaggregated.

A Monitoring and Evaluation mechanism to support implementation of the JPA will ensure monitoring and reporting on gender issues and all gender commitments made by Government and parties.

**Project Risk Marker score<sup>6</sup>: 2**

**Select PBF Focus Areas which best summarizes the focus of the project (select ONLY one)<sup>7</sup>:**

PBF Focus Area 2.3, Conflict prevention/management

If applicable, SDCF/UNDAF outcome(s) to which the project contributes:

**UNDAF Outcome 5:**

<sup>4</sup> Score 3 for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective and allocate at least 80% of the total project budget to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE)

Score 2 for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective and allocate between 30 and 79% of the total project budget to GEWE

Score 1 for projects that contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly (less than 30% of the total budget for GEWE)

<sup>5</sup> Please consult the PBF Guidance Note on Gender Marker Calculations and Gender-responsive Peacebuilding

<sup>6</sup> Risk marker 0 = low risk to achieving outcomes

Risk marker 1 = medium risk to achieving outcomes

Risk marker 2 = high risk to achieving outcomes

<sup>7</sup> PBF Focus Areas are:

(1.1) SSR, (1.2) Rule of Law; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;

(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management;

(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services

(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3) Governance of peacebuilding resources (including PBF Secretariats)

By 2021 community, security and stabilization of people affected by conflict will be improved through the utilization of effective conflict management mechanisms, peace dividends and support to peace infrastructures and durable solutions that augment peaceful coexistence and social cohesion.

**Sustainable Development Goal(s) and Target(s)** to which the project contributes:

SDG 16: "*Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels*".

<p><b>Type of submission:</b></p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>New project</b></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <b>Project amendment</b></p>	<p><b>If it is a project amendment, select all changes that apply and provide a brief justification:</b></p> <p><b>Extension of duration:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Additional duration in months (number of months and new end date):</p> <p><b>Change of project outcome/ scope:</b> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>Change of budget allocation between outcomes or budget categories of more than 15%:</b> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>Additional PBF budget:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Additional amount by recipient organization: USD XXXXX</p> <p><b>Brief justification for amendment:</b></p> <p><i>Note: If this is an amendment, show any changes to the project document in RED colour or in TRACKED CHANGES, ensuring a new result framework and budget tables are included with clearly visible changes. Any parts of the document which are not affected, should remain the same. New project signatures are required.</i></p>
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<p><b>UNDP</b></p> <p><i>Mr Yuri Afanasyev</i></p>   <p><i>Signature</i> <i>Name of Agency</i> <i>Date &amp; Seal</i></p>	<p><b>Peace Commission</b></p> <p><i>Prof. Suliman Mohamed El Debailo</i></p>   <p><i>Signature</i> <i>Peace Commissioner</i> <i>Date &amp; Seal</i></p>
<p><b>Recipient Organization</b></p> <p><i>Mr Axel Bisschop</i></p>   <p><i>Signature</i> <i>UNICEF</i> <i>Date &amp; Seal</i> 21/12/2020</p>	
<p><b>Head of UN Country Team</b></p> <p><i>Mr Babacar Cisse</i></p>   <p><i>Signature</i> <i>UN Resident Coordinator a.i.</i> <i>Date &amp; Seal</i></p>	<p><b>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</b></p> <p><i>Oscar Fernandez-Taranco</i></p>  <p><i>Signature</i> <i>Assistant Secretary-General, Peacebuilding Support Office</i> <i>Date &amp; Seal</i> 29 December 2020</p>

## **I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support (4 pages max)**

### **a) Conflict Analysis Findings**

The last two years have brought profound changes to Sudan and created a new potential pathway to comprehensive and sustainable peace. In December 2018, a deteriorating situation led to an uprising under the leadership of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) with the instrumental participation of women and youth. A state of emergency was declared in February 2019, and a new transitional federal government was formed with military officers appointed as governors of the 18 States. As protests continued, the military withdrew its support for President Omar al-Bashir and replaced him with a Transitional Military Council (TMC) in April 2019.

Following negotiations, the TMC and the FFC signed a Political Declaration establishing a 39-month timeframe for a transitional period on 17 July 2019. The Constitutional Declaration, signed on 17<sup>th</sup> August 2019, annulled the Interim National Constitution of 2005, and articulated the principles of sovereignty and rule of law as well as governance arrangements within the executive and the legislative. A Sovereign Council (comprising five members from the military and six from the FFC), and a transitional technocratic government was established to address the country's immediate challenges, including reforming state institutions, making peace with armed groups and addressing the dire economic situation. The transitional period, which was to be governed by a government with ministers selected by the FFC, is expected to culminate with elections by the end of 2022, following the adoption of a new Constitution.

The Constitutional Declaration, which governs the Transitional Period, envisaged the completion of a fair, inclusive, and comprehensive peace in Sudan no later than six months from its signing, which would address both causes and effects of conflict in the country.

The Juba Declaration for Confidence-building Procedures and the Preparation for Negotiation between the transitional authorities and a coalition of 10 armed groups and alliances, under the auspices of the President of South Sudan, was signed on 11th September 2019. After nearly a year of direct negotiations between the parties, an interim peace agreement with five armed groups comprising the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) was initialed on 30th August and signed on 3rd October 2020.

The signed peace deal does not include the faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N), loyal to leader Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, which has been participating in talks but has been negotiating separately with the government. Nor does it include the Sudan Liberation Army loyal to Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) which had rejected the peace process calling for a range of preconditions including establishment of a secure environment in Darfur and the return of IDPs. At the time of writing, however, formal negotiations with both groups appear imminent.

The Juba Peace Agreement is therefore effectively the first in a larger set of peace agreement, that will need to be signed for there to be a comprehensive and sustainable peace in Sudan. This is also the first set what the transitional government hoped would be a longer series of negotiations. It includes seven protocols across a range of areas including security, power sharing, revenue sharing, land ownership and return of displaced populations and a range of measures and, more importantly, sees those armed group signatories that sign become partners in the transitional government<sup>8</sup> and sets back the 39-months of its transition to the date of its signature.

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<sup>8</sup> Power sharing, armed groups get: 3 seats on Sov. Council; 25% of TLC and 25% of Cabinet.

The agreement provides for multiple Commissions, Councils, Courts and Conferences and other processes to address all outstanding issues between the parties. Percentage representation of parties on key mechanisms is defined in many instances, and specific deadlines given for implementation. Fundamentally, the peace deal sees agreement on an asymmetric federal system based on 6 regions (pre-1989 arrangement), with the addition of two devolved regions for South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. It does not define the powers and competencies for each region, which are slated for agreement at a Governance Conference to be held within 6 months of signing. Meanwhile, the Two Areas will have their own legislative and executive powers and a single Darfur region will be created, with a Joint Task of 12,000 troops to ensure protection of civilians. On the development side, the Juba Peace Agreement creates a central fund with sub-funds for the Two Areas, East Sudan and Darfur, with government subsequently pledging a USD 750 million contribution over 10 years. The agreement foresees a new secular Constitution and offers a generational opportunity to establish a new social contract while addressing the complex root causes and drivers of conflict in Sudan.

The JPA deploys gender sensitive language and confirm the equality principles established in the 2019 Constitutional Charter<sup>9</sup>, though to varying degrees in the different component agreements. Various provisions in many of the agreements provide for greater gender equality. Article 1.20 of the ANI provides that the signatories recognize the “*importance of women’s representation in all levels of authority and decision making centers in a just and effective way and no less than 40% of representation*”. The Blue Nile, Kordofan, Eastern Path Agreements provide for 40% women participation at the national parliament. The Truth and Reconciliation Committee to be established under the Darfur Agreement will consist of 11 members altogether; five members will be appointed by each of the signatories, the chair will be appointed jointly by the two signatories, and both sides are required to appoint at least one woman each.

At the heart of conflict in Sudan are questions around governance, economic management, rule of law, the social legacy of decades of conflict and environmental mismanagement. Structural issues include displacement due to conflict, uncertain land tenure, the role of security institutions, and gender inequality. All of these issues have contributed to violent or latent conflict within Sudan and manifested themselves in different ways across the country under the previous regime, fostering armed opposition in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan and fomenting discontent in Sudan’s East. Inter-communal conflicts over scarce natural resources, land or contested tribal leadership continue to be widespread and, if unresolved, could easily flare into violence once again. Multiple recurring conflicts need to be resolved, inter-communal tensions managed peacefully, and consensus built around contested priorities before violence escalates.

Displacement due to conflict in Sudan is an enormous problem. The 2018 UN Humanitarian Needs Overview cites government figures of 2 million IDPs in Sudan, including 1.8 million in Darfur and nearly 200,000 in South and West Kordofan. There are also significant numbers of refugees from Sudan in Chad and South Sudan, and lower numbers in Ethiopia, Kenya and the Central African Republic. Approximately 1.2 million refugees and asylum seekers from other countries, primarily South Sudan, live within Sudan.

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<sup>9</sup> According to the Constitutional Declaration, one of the aims for the three-year transitional period is to “Repeal laws and provisions that restrict freedoms or that discriminate between citizens on the basis of gender” para. 7(2)). The declaration also promises women 40% representation in Sudan’s legislative assembly.

IDPs face ongoing issues in terms of security, uncertainty, and lack of economic opportunities. Tensions exist with host communities in urban areas, where the presence of IDPs has affected the communal makeup of towns and put strain on local resources. A significant proportion of violence in Darfur is directed at or occurs around IDPs and IDP camps. Women in IDP camps are still subject to sexual and gender-based violence while performing activities of daily living such as collecting water, fuel or animal fodder, or on their way to seek daily work in the hosting towns. Women continue to survive without access to needed reproductive health services, as well as limited access to justice and basic social and humanitarian services.

The return of displaced communities to their places of origin is limited by insecurity and lack of infrastructure. In many areas, new communities have reportedly established themselves in areas that have seen displacement, leading to conflict when displaced communities attempt to return.

Within this context of peace implementation, it is a Government of Sudan responsibility to provide protection to all its citizens, as per the National Protection of Civilians Strategy. However, there are significant challenges, and the number of protection incidents remains significant.

The fact that the vulnerabilities of women substantially increase during conflict and continue to escalate due to displacement and the resultant humanitarian situation, together with the under-representation of women in peace processes and the lack of commitments and accountability framework towards gender issues, gives weight to the need for women's protection and security to be considered as a priority and to be translated into action by decision-makers.

In the absence of trust in government institutions at the state-level and taking into consideration abuses committed in the past, there is need for a strengthened and enhanced protection monitoring through field presence by UNCT, NGO and civil society protection and human rights agencies. This work, which is intrinsically linked to the monitoring and evaluation commission, would be needed in those areas where the protection risks are highest, particularly parts of Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

As called for in the Constitutional Declaration of August 2019, a Peace Commission was originally established on 17<sup>th</sup> October 2019 as an independent body, and a Peace Commissioner appointed shortly thereafter. In addition to acting as rapporteur to the peace talks, the Peace Commission was entrusted with the execution of all aspects of the peace agreements reached. The Peace Commissioner is entrusted with all a) political processes directly linked to the implementation of peace agreements; as well as b) building up a consensus of a new system of values, norms and institutions that regulate the peaceful management of conflict; and c) enhancing the legitimacy of the state through improved capacity to deliver on human security, welfare, human rights and the rule of law.

While the Peace Commission is intended to operate at the apex of national peace architecture in Sudan, its basis in legislation is still to be established, its relationship to other JPA-agreed entities, as well as its structure, approach and operations, are all still to be defined as part of the peace process<sup>10</sup>. Article 20.1 of the Juba Peace Agreement states that: *“The Parties agree to form a Peace Commission tasked with implementing the comprehensive peace agreement with the participation of signatory parties in preparing the commission law and structure”*.

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<sup>10</sup> The 3<sup>rd</sup> October Agreement on National Issues calls for participation of signatory parties in preparing the Peace Commission law and structure.



Cognizant of the importance of the Peace Commissions role in peace implementation, Government representatives - including from the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Federal Governance, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning as well as the Peace Commissioner – requested PBF support to peace implementation and/or ongoing negotiations at the inaugural meeting of the PBF Joint Steering Committee on 13<sup>th</sup> September 2020 (see Section 1c below).

Preparation of a support project was endorsed by the PBF Joint Steering Committee and approved by the UN PBSO. In respect of conflict sensitivity considerations, as well as adherence to the “*do no harm*” principle, a decision has also been made to include support to ongoing negotiations.

## ***b) Strategic Frameworks & National Ownership***

UN Security Council resolution 2524 (2020) reiterates the principle of national ownership of the peace process, supports the creation and expansion of national peace infrastructure and an inclusive, community-based approach to peacebuilding, extends the UNAMID mission until end 2020, and establishes the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) to assist the country in its transition towards democratic governance. The four strategic objectives of UNITAMS under SCR 2524 (2020) are:

- i. Assist the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace.
- ii. Support peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements.
- iii. Assist peacebuilding, civilian protection and rule of law, in particular in Darfur and the Two Areas.
- iv. Support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance. The end result on the UNITAMS peacebuilding objective is that peace implementation progresses sufficiently to **sustain peace** through legitimate and functioning State institutions throughout Sudan that provide basic security, protection and services to the population with full respect of the rule of law and human rights.

**Sustaining peace** is a comprehensive UN agenda for preventing the onset, outbreak and recurrence of conflict by addressing its root causes and drivers<sup>11</sup>. It applies across contexts including where there is no open conflict. It is ongoing and iterative and calls for reducing the risks of fragility (conflict drivers) and strengthening the infrastructures for peace and social cohesion.

Sustaining peace demands more effective coordinated responses among the key pillars of the UN— peace and security, development, and human rights, as well as humanitarian action— and overcoming institutional and sectoral silos to develop collaborative and complementary solutions across the conflict cycle. This is reinforced by the 2030 Agenda, particularly SDG 16 at the nexus of security and development. The sustaining peace resolutions and the 2030 Agenda are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and together are shaping a common global vision of a sustainable peaceful future, including the values of national ownership, inclusivity, people-centred

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<sup>11</sup> The twin 2016 General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions 70/262 and 2282 on “Sustaining Peace” are the UN’s strongest commitment to ‘positive peace’ to-date, disconnecting the link between peace and violent conflict and the linear relationship between war, peace and development. Sustaining peace encompasses an array of interventions, including strengthening the rule of law, promoting sustainable economic growth, poverty eradication, social development, sustainable development and national reconciliation. Some of the means and principles by which these interventions are pursued are inclusive dialogue and mediation, access to justice and transitional justice, accountability, good governance, democracy, accountable institutions, respect for human rights and gender equality.

and transformative approaches, and long-term perspectives. Sustaining Peace and the SDGs represent system-wide frameworks that recalibrate towards long-term approaches that focus on root causes and building societal resilience.

The sustaining peace framework allows the UN to better support Sudan to achieve the SDGs, by stepping back from sectoral and projectized interventions and instead propose more integrated solutions; by taking a more deliberate approach to tackling group-based vulnerabilities; and by incrementally offering a broader framing of peace and development to national stakeholders.

UN Security Council Resolution 2254 underlines the importance of the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union in Sudan, and supports the African Union Peace and Security Council's call for the Government of Sudan to urgently identify areas in which the African Union could provide additional assistance and encourages UNITAMS, UNAMID and the African Union to ensure coherence, coordination and complementarity of their support Sudan, including through a United Nations-African Union senior level coordination mechanism.

As per Chapter 15 of the Constitutional Declaration, the TGoS has committed to "*Apply UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the relevant African Union resolutions regarding participation of women at all levels in the peace process, and to apply regional and international charters regarding women's rights*", "*Conduct legal reforms that guarantee women's rights, by repealing all laws that discriminate against women, and protect the rights granted to them by this Constitutional Charter,*" and under Chapter 7, ensure that, "*The participation of women is not be less than 40% of the membership of the Transitional Legislative Council.*"

In keeping with the above commitments, in March 2020, the TGoS endorsed the National Action Plan for UNSCR1325 (NAP1325). The NAP1325 objectives are to:

- Actively involve women in peacebuilding, peacekeeping, peace negotiations and decision-making processes at all levels, and in relief, reconstruction, and development.
- Promote the recognition of women's rights before, during and post armed conflict.
- Ensure the protection of women against any form of gender-based violence, such as rape and sexual slavery, and put an end to impunity.

### ***c) Strategic Needs Assessment & Existing Interventions***

The Peace Commissioner outlined broad thematic priorities in his speech to the *Friends of Sudan* donor group in Dubai on 8th August and has since made separate specific requests for assistance to UNITAMS and the PBF Steering Committee for consideration. In summary, the support requested from PBF falls into three categories:

1. Establishment and capacitation of national peace architecture, with initial focus on the Peace Commission itself and the process for preparation of a National Strategy for Peace;
2. Support to the phase of pre-implementation of peace agreements, including i) strategic communications and advocacy; ii) dialogue processes and events; iii) data and assessments for durable solutions and transition to the longer-term peace and development processes of Agenda 2030.
3. Facilitation of international support to the implementation of peace agreements.

<b>Project name (duration)</b>	<b>Donor and budget</b>	<b>Project focus</b>	<b>Difference from/ complementarity to current proposal</b>
Support Peace and Development Centers in Sudan on dissemination of Juba Peace Agreement	UNDP Core TRAC Resources	Dissemination of the Juba Peace Agreement among local communities	Complementarity
Dissemination of Juba Peace Agreement in Darfur	UNAMID	Dissemination of the Juba Peace Agreement in Darfur	Complementarity
Support Peace Talks and Secretariat in Juba	UNAMID	Juba Peace Secretariat	Complementarity

## **II. Project content, strategic justification and implementation strategy (4 pages max Plus Results Framework Annex)**

### ***a) Project Overview***

The purpose of the project is to channel support to the peace process in Sudan, including implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) alliance on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2020. Three areas of intervention are foreseen:

4. Support to National Peace Architecture, including design and establishment of the Peace Commission, which still does not have an agreed organisational structure nor terms of reference, and other entities at national and sub-national levels, mobilisation of civil society, and development of a National Strategy for Peace, with accompanying financing framework;
5. Immediate support to pre-implementation of the JPA, including a communications, outreach and advocacy campaign at community level to popularise the agreement, technical and financial assistance to organisation of events and processes envisaged in the JPA, and data collection and analysis to establish baselines to inform programming of international assistance;

In order to ensure conflict sensitivity, the project would provide support to ongoing discussions and mediation of additional tracks as required. This might include negotiations between the Transitional Government of Sudan (TGoS) and the SPLM-N/Al Hilu and, in the future, SLA Abdel Wahed.

6. Support to Government to ensure that effective coordination and establishment of reporting, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are in place to promote accountability of peace agreement implementation, in line with binding international and regional legal instruments.

The project seeks to build partnerships wherever possible to promote coherence, coordination and complementarity of both policy and programming. It will facilitate the integrated mission, UNITAMS, African Union and IGAD engagement as appropriate and support Sudan's cross-border relations and regional integration; it will serve as a platform to support relevant inter-Agency working of the UNCT, as part of the integrated UNITAMS mission; it will establish a monitoring

and evaluation mechanism by which parties, guarantors and witnesses can jointly assess progress toward implementation of the peace agreement; it will work with the donor community to promote joint analysis, common methodology, and consensual agreement to baselines, targets and indicators to support implementation of both the Juba Peace Agreement and the proposed National Strategy for Peace.

*b) Project Theory of Change*

The central premise of the project is that while political will and good faith remain prerequisites, Sudan will only be able to achieve a lasting and just peace settlement if it has the capacities, processes and external support to make and sustain it.

The project assumes political goodwill of all parties, and their genuine commitment to the peace process; it also assumes interest of the international community in supporting Sudanese efforts to bring about lasting and just peace in the country.

The project also assumes that all stakeholders recognise the need to address the legacy of the conflict in multiple dimensions, including accountability for gross human rights violations and durable solutions for protracted displacement of Sudanese within the country and in the neighbouring countries.

Going forward, an all-inclusive and participatory approach is understood as the best guarantor that the peacebuilding effort will be perceived and accepted as demonstrably for the public good, undertaken in the interests of all and in accordance with the rule of law, fairly applied.

The rationale and pathways to achieving desired outcomes in these areas are outlined below, along with the key outputs and indicative activities that will be required.

*c) Key Project Components*

**Outcome 1:** *Sudan has broad-based, inclusive, participatory and gender-responsive peace architecture in place, at national, regional and local levels, for ongoing dispute resolution and the transparent, accountable, multi-stakeholder implementation of an overarching National Strategy for Peace.*

Inclusive decision making is fundamental to sustaining peace at all levels, as are long-term policies to address economic, social and political aspirations, and to achieve the SDGs. Fostering the participation of young people as well as of the organisations, movements, and networks that represent them is crucial. Women's meaningful participation in all aspects of peace and security is critical to effectiveness, including in peace processes, where it has been shown to have a direct impact on the sustainability of agreements reached.

**Output 1.1:** **Peace Commission established in law and functioning at national and sub-national levels.**

The project will support institutional planning for Terms of Reference and governance structure of the national and sub-national Peace Commission Offices, and as regards the definition of the vertical and horizontal institutional relationships and inter-linkages with between the Peace Commission and other Commissions and entities of the peace agreement, as well as existing national and sub-national governance structures. This will include relationships between the implementing mechanisms and commissions and the TGoS oversight bodies, including the Monitoring and Evaluation Commission.

Establishment and development of the operational methodology of the Peace Commission, commensurate with the guiding principles and global good practices for building inclusive approaches to conflict prevention identified in the recommendations of the UN-World Bank study, *Pathways for Peace*<sup>12</sup>.

Technical assistance may also be provided to the establishment and operational methodology of other permanent or peace-agreement specific institutions, Commissions or entities to be established under the purview of the Peace Commission, including, *inter alia*, the IDPRC, Lands and Hawakeer Commission, Transitional Justice, Herders, Nomads, and Farmers Commission, etc. of the JPA, or those that may be envisaged under potential future peace agreements. In regard to ensuring focus on the need for durable solutions for IDPs and refugees, the Peace Commission's capacity will be strengthened in the following areas, in support of the forcibly displaced:<sup>13</sup>

- Planning and assessments, as to facilitate realistic nationally owned durable solutions planning, which takes all solutions into account, including return and local integration.
- Engagement of IDP (and returnee) communities in peace and durable solutions planning that takes in consideration underlying rights and protection challenges and risks.
- Returnee and protection monitoring, analysis of the findings and referrals to relevant Government entities.
- Legal aid for returnees and IDPs.

International assistance to peace agreements must be subject to Government coordination at both national and sub-regional level. New mechanisms will need to be agreed and established in support of implementation of the peace agreement. The project will work with the Peace Commission and signatories to develop governance options and provide secretariat support on behalf of Government and international partners.

**Output 1.2: Civil society mobilised and articulated to implementation of peace agreements and development of a National Strategy for Peace.**

The project will support the Peace Commission to identify and map all infrastructure for peace including academic institutions and civil society organisations and clarify their role and possible linkages with the Peace Commission to support peacebuilding and reconciliation processes at national, sub-national and community levels. In line with the findings of '*Pathways to Peace*', the long-term guarantor of sustainable peace in Sudan is likely to be the strong engagement of civil society and local communities<sup>14</sup>, properly capacitated and coordinated, as partner to the implementation of activities, as advocates for policy reform and budget provision, and as monitors of the overall transparency, accountability and efficacy of the national effort.

Given the particularly strong role played by women in the revolution, and in line with commitments made in the Constitution and the JPA, it is considered of particular importance that women's CSOs and CSOs working on gender issues are identified and articulated to the work of the Peace Commission at all levels.

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<sup>12</sup> <https://www.pathwaysforpeace.org>

<sup>13</sup> Reference is made to the activities specified in the Darfur Peace Agreement Implementation Matrix, including (a)4/13/15/16/21/22, among other workstreams outlined for other regions.

<sup>14</sup> "Conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile and other parts of the country have fragmented social cohesion and institutions, especially on a local level, including through forced displacement and repeated cycles of rebellion and repression." Cf. WBG, Country Engagement Note for the Republic of Sudan for the period FY21-FY22, September 10, 2020, p.4, available [here](#).

Insider mediation draws upon the ability of institutions, groups or individuals that are seen as insiders or internal to the conflict within a given context who are able to broker differences, build consensus and resolve conflict.<sup>15</sup> The project will support establishment of common spaces for free and open discussions and dialogue among political parties, women and youth groups, civil society and academia on peacebuilding issues and peaceful settlement of differences. This will be facilitated by insider mediators using their credibility and influence.

In key areas affected by forced displacement, in Darfur and elsewhere, the project will organise inclusive and participatory consultations at community level to develop and guide interventions in favour of durable solutions for IDPs and refugees, informed by good practice and lessons learned, as well as data and analysis available to UNHCR and UNDP from ongoing and new collaborative projects<sup>16</sup>. Wherever possible, the consultative process should build on robust initiatives, mechanisms and alliances (including women networks) already established in the context of durable solutions multis-stakeholder processes (for instance, for the Durable Solutions Action Plans in eighteen localities across the five states of Darfur).

### **Output 1.3: National Strategy for Peace prepared and adopted.**

UN Security Council Resolution 2524 requests the Secretary General, in partnership with all relevant actors, including International Financial Institutions, to support the Government of Sudan in conducting a comprehensive assessment to define the country's longer term conflict prevention, recovery and peacebuilding needs and in developing relevant strategies to address these needs. The various accords and respective peace agreements on regional issues should be moulded into a single, coherent framework, as highlighted in the recent Security Council debate on the situation in Sudan just days before the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement.<sup>17</sup>

The project will support the Peace Commission to lead the preparation of a National Strategy for Peace, as well as constituent sub-national strategies, ensuring coherence and alignment between the Strategy and the five tracks of the Juba Peace agreement. Stakeholders to the process will include the FFC, PMO, Sovereign Council, Higher Council for Peace, signatories to the JPA, civil society, women and youth groups, IDPs and refugees, nomads and international partners.

The process by which the Strategy is prepared will itself need to be agreed through consultation and consensus to achieve legitimacy, transparency and accountability. The methodology to be utilised should be inclusive and participatory in design and in implementation; transparent, accountable and rights-based; appropriately targeted, suitably informed and collaborative, as well as subject to ongoing processes of coordination, monitoring and evaluation, and programmatic adjustment. The Strategy will need to be accompanied by a robust M&E framework, to ensure that every intervention can demonstrate its value as an effective investment with positive impact for affected communities.

The National Strategy should articulate specific paths to achieve peace dividends, including for the many forcibly displaced, internally and across the borders with neighbouring countries. The project will ensure substantive alignment of the Strategy with the National Strategy for Durable Solutions separately under preparation.

The project will provide technical assistance to ensure that conflict sensitivity and gender are mainstreamed within the Strategy. All consultative processes for Strategy development will target 40% representation of women, in line with provisions of the Juba agreement and relevant articles

<sup>15</sup> UNDP Guidance Note, April 2020 <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/conflict-prevention/engaging-with-insider-mediators---sustaining-peace-in-an-age-of-.html>

<sup>16</sup> Including from UNCT work already underway with support from PBF and CERF.

<sup>17</sup> See UN Doc. S/PV.8761, 25 September 2020.

of UNSCR 2254<sup>18</sup>. It will also build capacities of the Ministry of Finance for public finance management, to ensure that it is able to prepare, manage and monitor a transparent financing framework to accompany the National Peace Strategy. This will include support to gender budgeting, with a view to promoting accountability and transparency in fiscal planning, increasing gender responsive participation in the budget process by involving women and men equally in budget preparation, advancing gender equality and women's rights.

**Outcome 2:** *Pre-implementation support to peace agreements has mobilized popular goodwill and participation, established agreed machinery and processes of the peace process, and improved the evidence base upon which agreements are finalized and implemented.*

While it is anticipated that the Government of Sudan will move imminently to establish the Peace Commission in law and furnish it with the necessary resources to fulfil its mandate, institutional set-up of sub-regional offices, selection and training of staff, and effective roll-out of the mechanisms and processes of peacebuilding is likely to be a process that can realistically be achieved only over the medium term.

In the meantime, the Peace Commission should be fully staffed and operational in 2021 to develop and implement its strategy. There is an urgent need for the Peace Commission to provide pre-implementation support to the peace agreement already signed, and to have resources available as and when other agreements are reached.

**Output 2.1 Advocacy and Communications Campaign conducted.**

The local and inter-communal nature of conflict in Sudan requires a strong advocacy and communications campaign to be conducted at grassroots level in support of each peace agreement, to promote understanding and buy-in, and to prepare the ground for the inclusive local dialogue and planning processes that are envisaged. It is particularly important that the campaign is specifically designed to speak to women and reflects adequately their concerns and interests; it should also explicitly raise awareness of gender provisions in the JPA, the newly-endorsed UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan and the Constitution.

The project will support implementation of a Communications and Visibility Strategy/Action Plan for the Peace Commission, currently under preparation with separate support of PBF.<sup>19</sup>

**Output 2.2 Dialogue forums and processes supported.**

In complex multilevel mediation efforts that span various stages of political negotiation toward a comprehensive settlement, development actors can help to identify and frame technical issues, assess the developmental and fiscal impacts of negotiated settlements, and provide advisory assistance on options<sup>20</sup>. The project will channel expertise of the integrated mission to negotiations in Juba in this regard and provide technical support and assistance to both parties in the negotiations including but not limited to support to SPLM-N Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu and the TGoS on issues around security arrangements, constitution issues and federalist options. It may also entail, together with

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<sup>18</sup> UNSCR 2254 calls upon the Government of Sudan to ensure women's full, equal and meaningful participation in peace processes, implementation of future peace agreements, conflict prevention and decision making- and reform processes related to peace and security.

<sup>19</sup> To be included in the unearmarked \$300,000 allocation for DPPA assistance under the existing PBF Secretariat Project.

<sup>20</sup> *Pathways to Peace*, Chapter 8.

UNDP, a series of forums to discuss practicalities of peace agreement implementation: lessons learned from Sudanese experience, including best practices from around the world.

The partial peace agreement signed on the 3rd October includes a significant number of events and processes to be organised and undertaken to agreed deadlines. Further peace agreements may add to these mechanisms or may modulate plans for implementation or sequencing of those already agreed. While responsibility for the organisation and financing of these remains with the Government of Sudan, the project will retain unearmarked resources to provide technical assistance to the design and facilitation of events and processes, to be unlocked at the request of the Peace Commissioner and upon approval of the Technical working Group of the PBF Joint Steering Committee. Technical advisory support will be provided to the Peace Commission, and potentially to other commissions as requested by the Peace Commission, to ensure that standing operations and bespoke event, mechanisms and processes for supporting peace agreements conform to international standards and model global good practice.

### **Output 2.3 Data and assessments inform durable solutions for IDPs and refugees.**

Lasting and just peace in Sudan requires durable solutions for refugees and IDPs. Subject to safe and unhindered access to target areas in question, intentions and impediments to return must be surveyed to the extent and depth possible through profiling exercises of individuals and area-based assessments of current conditions that identify what will be required to ensure security and rule of law, access to basic services and livelihoods opportunities to the standard necessary to support safe and dignified returns, and to sustain the choices of returnees over the long-term.

The credibility of data and analysis will be essential to ensure an evidence base for the conversation with the development and peacebuilding stakeholders backing durable solutions for the forcibly displaced in and *from* Sudan. Existing tools for planning, programming and analysis, agreed upon and piloted by UN agencies and the Government of Sudan, and in some cases by the World Bank,<sup>21</sup> should be used and streamlined, to ensure a holistic approach to protection, durable solutions and sustaining peace, as cross-cutting dimensions underpinning the overarching peace process in Sudan. A common data grammar and interoperable methodologies are prerequisites for strategic and operational coherence of the Peace Commission.

The project will support relevant Agencies of the UNCT Durable Solutions Working Group to prepare data, undertake assessments and formulate inter-agency programmes in response to specific requests from the Peace Commissioner approved by the technical committee of PBF Joint Steering Committee. Wherever possible, area-based assessments should be planned and conducted with other actors, eg, World Bank and other IFIs, African Union, IGAD, European Union etc., with a view to working toward shared conflict analysis, baseline data and target indicators, with agreed collective outcomes aligned to fulfilment of the peace agreement and a common monitoring framework to assess and evaluate progress (see Output 3.3).

### **Outcome 3: *Peace agreements in Sudan implemented in a transparent and accountable manner, in line with relevant international norms and standards, and Sudan better integrated in sub-regional peace architecture***

In line with its global remit, PBF in Sudan aims to be ‘catalytic’, and to actively facilitate international support to peace in Sudan. For all external partners, as well as for the parties to the

<sup>21</sup> In late 2017, the UN Country Team and Government of Sudan jointly agreed to pilot durable solutions profiling exercises in rural Um Dukhun and urban El Fasher in North Darfur, respectively. See “Measuring progress towards durable solutions in Darfur”, which includes an evaluation of the intervention in El-Fasher and a “lite” durable solutions toolkit for Sudan. Karen Jacobsen and Therese Bjorn Mason, May 2020.



agreement itself, it is vital that the process of implementation of the peace agreement meets the highest possible standards in regard to inclusion, transparency, and accountability, as well as for the protection of civilians and respect for human rights.

### **Output 3.1 Responsibility and accountability promoted.**

Article 21.1 of the Agreement on National Issues signed on 3<sup>rd</sup> October calls for the establishment of a mechanism to monitor and evaluate the final peace agreement. The mechanism is to be composed of “*representatives of the signatory parties, the mediator, the guarantors and any other components agreed to by the Parties*”. Guarantors to the JPA include South Sudan, Chad and the UAE; witnesses to date<sup>22</sup> include the UN, African Union, European Union, League of Arab States, Qatar and Egypt. References in the Agreement to the UN Peace mission are to the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission for Sudan (UNITAMS).

The project will underwrite UN support to establish the resu mechanism, facilitating the members to fulfil their roles and responsibilities, including in specific issues relevant to humanitarian, development and peace/security dimensions of the Agreement, as well as on cross-cutting areas eg, gender equality, human rights, protection and durable solutions. Technical assistance is likely to include development of a results framework, establishment of a monitoring and evaluation tools and regime, planning for any operational presence required, and agreement to reporting and communications modalities and protocols.

### **Output 3.2: Coherence with international policy and programmes enhanced.**

The project will provide technical and legal assistance to the Peace Commission to ensure coherence of activities with international and regional instruments binding Sudan, as well as to assist the Commission in advocating for, and contribute (as applicable) to the accession,<sup>23</sup> domestication, reform<sup>24</sup> or implementation of relevant laws, policies and other legally binding commitments.<sup>25</sup>

The project will also contribute to the engagement of the Peace Commission, and other entities created pursuant to the Juba Peace Agreement, in current initiatives of the African Union<sup>26</sup> or IGAD<sup>27</sup>, to which Sudan has been party and a leading proponent.<sup>28</sup>

The project will facilitate IGAD in regard to sharing of lessons, good practices, and methodologies as they relate to analyses and operations related to prevention. Sudan already participates in the IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) for addressing conflicts in

<sup>22</sup> Other countries are expected to witness the agreement once an official English language translation is available.

<sup>23</sup> Sudan is not a party to any of the two statelessness conventions, however it is a party to a number of other conventions that include some safeguards against statelessness at birth, for instance. Sudan is signatory of the Declaration of International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Member States on the Eradication of Statelessness (2017), and the Brazzaville Action Plan, which entails reforms of national laws and regulations.

<sup>24</sup> For instance, the terms of the Peace Agreement in relation to transitional justice and forced displacement, among other topics under the national issues chapter, will likely warrant a debate on the existing national policy on the protection of IDPs, and the need to bring its provisions closer to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Equally, Sudan’s commitment to the Brazzaville Action Plan.

<sup>25</sup> e.g., Tripartite agreements on returns have been signed between the Sudanese, Chadian government and UNHCR

<sup>26</sup> One example is Sudan’s engagement on the process behind the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Specific Aspects on the Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa.

<sup>27</sup> IGAD and UNHCR in collaboration with the core-group members of the IGAD Support Platform are in the process of initiating a regional discussion on durable solutions for protracted displacement in Sudan and South Sudan.

<sup>28</sup> That is notably the case with the Nairobi Declaration, an agreement by IGAD countries to have a comprehensive regional approach to deliver durable solutions for refugees while also maintaining protection and promoting self-reliance in the countries of asylum. The IGAD Support Platform for the implementation of the Nairobi Action Plan, launched in December 2019 at the occasion of the first Global Refugee Forum in Geneva, consists of humanitarian and development organizations, private sector partners, and donors committing to show solidarity by providing concrete financial and development support to refugees in the East and Horn of Africa.. The core group members of the Nairobi Process include EU, Germany, UNDP and the World Bank.

the region<sup>29</sup>. The project will work with IGAD and the Peace Commission to integrate CEWARN and other relevant IGAD cooperation and support platforms into Sudanese infrastructure for early warning of conflict, to be developed as a network of academic Peace and Development Centers (PDCs), active in all current 18 states of Sudan, and embedded in local communities at grass roots level. Data to be gathered will feed into the Crisis Risk Dashboard (CRD) which the UN is currently establishing on UNDP's CRD methodology. The CRD facilitates information gathering, management, analysis and visualisation of crisis risk data, both in terms of immediate risks (e.g. violence, population displacement, political instability) as well as longer-term risks (e.g. macroeconomic instability, weak institutions, poor access to basic services).

#### *d) Project Sequencing & Targeting*

The project will be national in scope, with initial sub-national focus on Darfur and the Two Areas in respect of implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement. Project focus will be widened subject to other conclusion of other peace agreements. All activities at sub-national level will be subject to access and security arrangements to be defined and sequenced between parties as part of the peace implementation process itself.

Given the rapidly evolving context, and the need to remain flexible but timely in following the contingent sequencing of peace agreement implementation, the project will be implemented in two phases. The Results Framework in Annex B distinguishes between first phase activities of the project, which respond to foreseeable immediate priorities, and outline activities of a second phase of assistance, that will be subject to review and further elaboration following the envisaged Governance Conference and other imminent key milestones in peace agreement implementation.

The project will pay special attention to needs of vulnerable groups – women, youth, IDPs and refugees<sup>30</sup> – to support their efforts to participate equally and effectively in governance institutions and peacebuilding mechanisms, to build on the advocacy by women's groups inside the country and deliver on the revolution's key demands – Freedom, Justice and Peace. All activities to be conducted by this project are intended to actively promote, as well as conform to, this inclusive agenda.

Armed groups party to the Juba Peace Agreement joined the TGoS on 15<sup>th</sup> November and have been consulted on the design of the project herein via the Peace Commissioner. Consultations with non-signatory groups – the Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) and the faction of the Sudan Liberation Army loyal to Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) – were conducted by UNITAMS on a mission to Juba, November 2020.

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<sup>29</sup> The African Union has developed a Continental Early Warning System to advise the Peace and Security Council on "potential conflict and threats to peace and security" and "recommend best courses of action." The IGAD CEWARN platform forms part of the AU framework, with a focus on pastoralist-related conflicts. Through field monitors in different areas, CEWARN observes cross-border and internal pastoral conflicts and provides information related to potentially violent conflicts, their outbreak and escalation, also liaising with local administrations and communities within and across borders to avert crises.

<sup>30</sup> The exact number/scope of target populations will greatly depend on the conditions on the ground, in relation to access to new areas as the implementation of the JPA advances. In any case, in relation to IDPs, the primary target population of this project – considering the potential impact on returns and reintegration – will include: about 335,000 internally displaced in West Darfur; 377,200 IDPs in Central Darfur; and 503,200 IDPs in North Darfur. Depending on priorities from the Peace Commission, other entities newly created under the JPA, and the broader strategy for peacebuilding and durable solutions of the Government of Sudan, the project can also target at least 60% of the estimated 330,000 Sudanese refugees registered across the border in Chad (as of November 2019) who originate from West Darfur state.

### III. Project management and coordination (4 pages max)

#### a) Recipient organizations and implementing partners

The PBF project “*Support to the Sudanese Peace Process*” will engage UNDP and UNHCR as recipient organizations, under the convening authority of the RCO. UNDP was selected based on its mandate and thematic lead for peacebuilding, governance and rule of law within the UNCT; UNHCR as thematic lead and co-chair (with UNDP) of the UNCT Durable Solutions Working Group, and according to its global mandate to assist and protect refugees, persons internally displaced by conflict, and stateless people.

Both Agencies have significant operational capacity in Sudan, as per table below, and are already in receipt of PBF funds for five “sister projects” under implementation in Darfur. Moreover, the country-level collaboration in Sudan builds on the robust institutional partnership between the two agencies at the global level, through which standing technical capacity and expertise can be leveraged from teams (at headquarters and regional offices) in issues underpinning the PBF project.<sup>31</sup> UNDP acts as administrative agent for the PBF Secretariat in Sudan, and will act as Convening Organisation for this project.

UNDP and UNHCR will work with and through local implementing partners (IPs) wherever it makes sense to do so. IPs will be selected based on a detailed technical assessment of their implementation capacity, presence, experience and local knowledge of the targeted localities and according to agency-specific procurement processes and procedures.

Agency	Total budget in previous calendar year	Key sources of budget (which donors etc.)	Location of in-country offices	No. of existing staff, of which in project zones	Highlight any existing expert staff of relevance to project
UNDP:	129,141,089	KOICA, MPTF, PBF, TRAC, UN, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, IT, etc.	1 HQ office in Khartoum and 9 projects offices with co-location presence in other states	180 staff	Peace Building advisor, ER & Stabilisation officer, Peacebuilding associate,
Implementing partners:					
UNHCR:	274,593,587.64	U.S.A and CERF; NL, EU, UK.	1 Branch Office in Khartoum, 4 Sub-Offices and 9 Field Offices <sup>32</sup> .	285 Natl. staff 68 Intl. staff 109 AWF	Associate M&E Officer (P2), Protection Officer (P3), Protection Assistant (G6), Associate Protection Officer (P2); Durable Solutions Officer (P2)
Implementing partners:					

<sup>31</sup> *Local governance and rule of law contributions to prevent, address and solve forced displacement and statelessness situations, UNHCR-UNDP Programmatic Framework 2020-2023.*

<sup>32</sup> Sub Offices in El Fasher, Kassala, Kadugli and Kostī. FO in Abu Jubeiha, Ed dEain, El Gencina, El Obeid, El Radoom, El Fula, Khashm El Girba, Nyala and Zalingei.

## b) Project management and coordination

### *Project Management*

UNDP will recruit an International UNV (IUNV) as Peacebuilding Project Manager. The Project Manager will be supported by a Community Dialogue and Facilitation Expert (IUNV), an Institutional Capacity Development Officer (IUNV) and a national Peacebuilding Officer (SB4). All staff will be resident in Khartoum. UNHCR staff will implement the project largely through existing staff, including a Peacebuilding and Solutions Officer (P3), a Protection Sector Coordinator (P4), a Senior Protection Cluster Coordinator (P4), a Durable Solutions Officer (P3) and an Information Management Officer (P3).

Some staff positions under this project might be co-located with the Peace Commission once reconstituted, subject to agreement with TGoS and without prejudice to mandate specificities of the RUNOs involved. Administrative and support staff may be based within Agency offices. The project team will benefit from technical capacity of the PBF Secretariat in Sudan, including ongoing support of a Gender Expert and M&E Expert.

### *Coordination and Oversight Arrangements*

Ultimate responsibility for coordination and oversight rests with the PBF Joint Steering Committee (JSC), which meets on a bi-annual basis, co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator and the Peace Commission of the Government of Sudan, and inclusive of senior-level representation of the Recipient Agencies as well as UNAMID and UNITAMS. A technical committee of the JSC will evaluate and approve quarterly workplans and provide ongoing guidance to Project Management between formal meetings of the full JSC.

Given the fluid and inherently uncertain nature of the peace process, the need to evaluate and respond to unforeseen events and requests, and to adjust activity implementation accordingly, a standing Contact Group of UN colleagues will be established by the DSRSG/RC/HC to ensure coordination of effort and to provide guidance to the Project Manager on an ongoing basis. The Contact Group will follow the project on an ongoing basis, meeting on an *ad hoc* basis as required, and will comprise the PBF Programme Coordinator in Sudan and representatives of the RCO, UNITAMS, and Recipient Organisations.

The project will be implemented as part of the overarching Priority Peacebuilding Programme of UNITAMS and the UNCT in Sudan. UNHCR will ensure coordination and collective effort of Agencies comprising the UNCT DSWG, as co-chair and thematic lead, integrating their work within the broader UNCT effort to model a *new way of working* to address the humanitarian-development-peace nexus through the lens of peacebuilding.<sup>33</sup> The DSWG's purpose is threefold: to inform and advise, develop policy and coordinate a variety of stakeholders. Its members and work plan fit neatly across the Humanitarian- Development Peacebuilding Nexus (HDPN).<sup>34</sup> The DSWG is at the initial stage of supporting the Government of Sudan with a Durable Solutions Strategy.

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<sup>33</sup> UNDP formally adhered to the OECD-DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus, of 22 February 2019, and UNHCR is currently conducting an internal reflection on how to operationalize the triple nexus. The engagement in Sudan, notably with support from the PBF, is an important piece on the learning process of both agencies about the nexus approach, and this value should not be overlooked.

<sup>34</sup> Durable Solutions Working Group members: IOM, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, OCHA, UN-Habitat and representatives from the INGO Steering Committee and donors.

c) **Risk management**

The overall risk level of the project is considered to be high, on the basis of political uncertainty and the evolving nature of the peace process, as well as the consequent need for the project to remain flexible as to the design of activities to meet the Outputs.

An initial Risk Analysis appears in tabular form below. The Risk Analysis will be updated by the Project Manager on a quarterly basis, in consultation with the PBF Programme Coordinator, for presentation and discussion at the PBF Joint Steering Committee.

Project specific risk	Risk level	Mitigation strategy (including Do No Harm considerations)
<p><b>Political Risk #1:</b> Key political risks include loss of Government authority, delays to establishment of the Peace Commission, setbacks in the peace process, insufficient buy-in of key stakeholders, or attempts by parties to peace agreements to misuse assistance for political ends, or to side-line or isolate other parties or actors. Replacement of local or national government leaders, or the inability of local governments to function due to political transition, constitutes another political risk.</p>	High Risk	<p>The political risks identified can be mitigated by ongoing conflict analysis and project re-adjustment, and an inclusive and participatory, conflict-sensitive approach at the local level. The risk of local government turnover can be partially mitigated by identifying and aligning with key community members who can support and promote ongoing community participation in the implementation process.</p>
<p><b>Political Risk #2:</b> Operational risk to the peace process relating to horizontal and vertical interoperability of overall architecture and individual components of the peace agreement.</p>	High Risk	<p>The success of the project (at least on relevance and effectiveness, and to some extent on its sustainability) rests on the ability to support the Peace Commission with coordinating policy and programmatic areas scattered across mandates, strategies and priorities from different agencies and stakeholders, while ensuring ownership and inclusivity of a political process defined by fragmentation of actors, interests and mechanisms.</p>
<p><b>Political Risk #3:</b> Risk that key actors ignore or resist commitments made under the JPA and elsewhere in regard to gender equality and women's empowerment.</p>	Medium Risk	<p>Agencies will continue to advocate for Government and parties to respect GEWE commitments made, supported by the Gender Expert of the PBF Secretariat for Sudan.</p>
<p><b>Security Risk:</b> The drawdown of UNAMID, unmet expectations of the change in Government, or spoilers in the peace process may all trigger increased insecurity or an upsurge in conflict that could threaten the wellbeing of staff, impede access to project sites, or derail implementation of project activities.</p>	Medium Risk	<p>Negotiations with formal and informal authorities and community leaders will be held to secure a safe environment for project staff and any implementing partners. All PBF projects will be implemented under the guidance of the UN Department for Safety and Security and the authority of the UN Designated Security Official for Sudan.</p>

<p><b>Operational Risk #1:</b> Key risks related to those inherent to the peace process itself, including the scope, timing, and level of access to territories and local populations currently beyond Government control. The project must remain flexible and capable of programmatic adjustment if it is to support the evolving Sudanese peace process in an effective and timely way.</p>	<p>Low Risk</p>	<p>While the PBF seeks to be innovative, and is in principle a risk-tolerant fund, this increases rather than decreases the need for detailed and ongoing risk management. The context, pathways and means of the project will need to remain under permanent review by the Project Management, by the PBF Secretariat, the project Contact Group and Technical Committee of the PBF Joint Steering Committee, and attendant risks re-profiled as part of the review process.</p>
<p><b>Operational Risk #2:</b> UN system architecture in Sudan is in transition, with UNITAMS about to deploy as UNAMID continues to drawdown. New personnel, coordination arrangements and processes will take some time to settle and become effective and may delay efforts to achieve the desired coherence of whole-of-system response and/or DSWG customisation of Durable Solutions planning to the peace process.</p>	<p>Low Risk</p>	<p>The project will be implemented in the framework of an RCO-led Peace Support Programme designed to ensure coherence of UN response, and considered high priority by all relevant UN principals.</p>
<p><b>Reputational Risk:</b> Reputational risks include associations (real or perceived) with parties of the conflict, political actors, or rights violators.</p>	<p>Low Risk</p>	<p>Regularly updated local conflict analyses and conflict-sensitive approach; wide stakeholder engagement, communication, and coordination with human rights and political arms of the UN system. The UN RCO will ensure that the project is fully compliant with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP).</p> <p>Transparent communication of project activities to all stakeholders by the PBF Secretariat as well as regular consultation with counterparts will help in mitigation. In addition to communicating intentions and achievements, controlling the narrative is also an essential component in the management of reputational risk.</p>

The project will be implemented according to a conflict sensitive approach. The first aspect of conflict sensitivity requires that PBF and relevant partners analyse and understand the impact of national and local conflict dynamics on the ability of PBF and its recipient Agencies to deliver peacebuilding activities. The second aspect of conflict sensitivity considers the impact of PBF projects on the various national and local conflicts. This includes but goes beyond the *do-no-harm* approach by explicitly providing support to local actors to transform the conflicts.

All geographically targeted work, including advocacy and outreach activities, sub-national dialogue processes, area-based assessments and planning for durable solutions, will be subject to a local conflict sensitivity analysis prior to activity implementation, for review by the project Contact Group. The purpose of the conflict sensitivity analysis will guide design and implementation of

proposed activities, and ensure proper mitigation mechanisms to identified human rights related risks, ensuring, among others, that implementation does not in any way legitimise institutions or leaders that have been associated with egregious violations of human rights.

The project will follow *do-no-harm* approach to all gender aspects of risks during activity implementation.

**d) Monitoring and evaluation**

In so far as success of the project is success of the peace process itself, project monitoring and evaluation will rely on the same methodology and tools to be developed under Output 3.1 to support monitoring and evaluation of peace agreement implementation. This will include prospective baseline and impact surveys, and ongoing feedback from Focus Groups, in different areas of the country.

Monitoring and evaluation of the project will be undertaken separately by UNDP and UNHCR in respect of the activities that each will implement, and collectively by the M&E Expert attached to the PBF Secretariat in Sudan. The M&E Expert will work with the Project Manager to ensure that activities proposed in all bi-annual work plans for PBF Joint Steering Committee approval conform and contribute to the overarching Results Framework.

A closing evaluation will be carried out on behalf of the Joint Steering Committee in the final month of implementation. The evaluation will be carried out to assess overall impact of the intervention and lessons learnt for consideration in future programming.

<b>M&amp;E Breakdown Table</b>			
<b>Agency/Secretariat</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Timeline</b>	<b>Cost (5-7% of budget)</b>
UNDP	Prospective Studies/Focus Groups	Ongoing	90,000
UNDP	Project Assurance	2-23 month	20,000
UNHCR	Project Assurance	2-23 month	20,000
Consultant(s)	Evaluation	23-24 month	60,000
<i>Total M&amp;E Cost</i>			<i>190,000</i>

**e) Project exit strategy/ sustainability**

The purpose of the project is to support the process of implementation of the peace agreement, which has a fixed timeframe of 39 + 1 months from signature. While the project has been designed for PBF funding over a two-year duration, the project may be extended to align with the end date of the peace process subject to further PBF or donor support.

It is anticipated that a Multi-Party Trust Fund will be established in support of the UNITAMS mandate and key aspects of peace agreement implementation. The PBF Coordinator in Sudan maintains permanent liaison with the donor community in the country, under the guidance of the DSRSG/RC/HC.

#### **IV. Project budget**

The project is primarily a capacity development initiative, with corresponding categories of expenditure – technical assistance and other forms of consultancy, costs of meetings and workshops, travel and per diem costs. International travel costs will be incurred in ensuring UNCT and UNITAMS inputs into the Juba mediation effort.

The project is divided into two phases. Detailed formulation of the second phase is contingent upon milestones in the peace process to be reached as a result of first phase assistance. At the end of the first phase, the implementing Agencies will revise activities in line with priorities agreed by the PBF Joint Steering Committee for Sudan, for review and approval by PBSO prior to second tranche disbursement.



**Annex A.1: Support to the Sudanese Peace Process - Checklist of project implementation readiness**

Question		Yes	No	Comment
<b>Planning</b>				
1.	Have all implementing partners been identified? If not, what steps remain and proposed timeline	X		IP identification underpins the feasibility analysis behind the RF and budget: each activity has a careful appraisal of how and with which partners it can be implemented successfully and efficiently.
2.	Have TORs for key project staff been finalized and ready to advertise? Please attach to the submission		X	This will happen during the inception phase, as it is highly dependent on developments in the peace process.
3.	Have project sites been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline		X	Extensive consultation through the Peace Commission took place with TGoS entities involved. Consultation with communities will take place during the inception phase.
4.	Have local communities and government offices been consulted/ sensitized on the existence of the project? Please state when this was done or when it will be done.	X		Early findings from the data/evidence component of the PBF/Darfur were taken in consideration on the choice of activities for the new project (for relevance and sustainability).
5.	Has any preliminary analysis/ identification of lessons learned/ existing activities been done? If not, what analysis remains to be done to enable implementation and proposed timeline?	X		Broadly, yes. Detailed definition will happen in the inception phase.
6.	Have beneficiary criteria been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline.	X		Through the Peace Commission.
7.	Have any agreements been made with the relevant Government counterparts relating to project implementation sites, approaches, Government contribution?	X		
8.	Have clear arrangements been made on project implementing approach between project recipient organizations?	X		A strategic and operational discussion is planned between UNHCR and UNDP once the project is signed, with a view to link the project with the broader landscape of engagement for both

			agencies, including leveraging existing partnerships and arrangements in issues relevant for peace in Sudan.
9. What other preparatory activities need to be undertaken before actual project implementation can begin and how long will this take?		N/A	
<b>Gender</b>			
10. Did UN gender expertise inform the design of the project (e.g. has a gender adviser/expert/focal point or UN Women colleague provided input)?	X		The UNDP gender focal point has reviewed the project and gender scoring
11. Did consultations with women and/or youth organizations inform the design of the project?		X	There were no direct consultations with women or youth organizations
12. Are the indicators and targets in the results framework disaggregated by sex and age?	X		As far as possible
13. Does the budget annex include allocations towards GEWE for all activities and clear justifications for GEWE allocations?	X		Yes, except for activities considered gender blind

#### Annex A.2: Checklist for project value for money

Question	Yes	No	Project Comment
1. Does the project have a budget narrative justification, which provides additional project specific information on any major budget choices or higher than usual staffing, operational or travel costs, so as to explain how the project ensures value for money?		X	With the exception of international travel costs relating to shuttle support to the mediation effort in Juba, South Sudan, there are no major budget choices or exceptional items to be justified.
2. Are unit costs (e.g. for travel, consultancies, procurement of materials etc.) comparable with those used in similar interventions (either in similar country contexts, within regions, or in past interventions in the same country context)? If not, this needs to be explained in the budget narrative section.	X		Costing of specific budget items underpinning each activity are aligned with costs of similar items from other projects in Sudan, factoring all important differences related to geographic focus of implementation (urban/rural areas for instance)
3. Is the proposed budget proportionate to the expected project outcomes and to the scope of the project (e.g. number, size and remoteness of geographic zones and number of proposed direct and indirect beneficiaries)? Provide any comments.	X		The budget balances geographic and institutional scope, with right allocations for support to central institutions, their state-level representation, and

			the need to include target populations, by reaching out to where they currently live.
4. Is the percentage of staffing and operational costs by the Receiving UN Agency and by any implementing partners clearly visible and reasonable for the context (i.e. no more than 20% for staffing, reasonable operational costs, including travel and direct operational costs) unless well justified in narrative section?	X		
5. Are staff costs proportionate to the amount of work required for the activity? And is the project using local rather than international staff/expertise wherever possible? What is the justification for use of international staff, if applicable?	X		
6. Does the project propose purchase of materials, equipment and infrastructure for more than 15% of the budget? If yes, please state what measures are being taken to ensure value for money in the procurement process and their maintenance/ sustainable use for peacebuilding after the project end.		X	
7. Does the project propose purchase of a vehicle(s) for the project? If yes, please provide justification as to why existing vehicles/ hire vehicles cannot be used.		X	
8. Do the implementing agencies or the UN Mission bring any additional non-PBF source of funding/ in-kind support to the project? Please explain what is provided. And if not, why not.	X		Where relevant, logistics and infrastructure in the field, including in remote areas, will be provided to the implementation of the project.

## **Annex B.1: Support to the Sudanese Peace Process - Project Administrative arrangements for UN Recipient Organizations**

*(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)*

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the [signed Memorandum of Understanding](#) between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

### **AA Functions**

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved “Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds” (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate the financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF annual consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is completed by the RUNO. A project will be considered as operationally closed upon submission of a joint final narrative report. In order for the MPTF Office to financially close a project, each RUNO must refund unspent balance of over 250 USD, indirect cost (GMS) should not exceed 7% and submission of a certified final financial statement by the recipient organizations’ headquarters);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any cost extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

### **Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations**

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures

applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Semi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

#### Financial reporting and timeline

Timeline	Event
<b>30 April</b>	Annual reporting – Report Q4 expenses (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
<i>Certified final financial report to be provided by 30 June of the calendar year after project closure</i>	

UNEX also opens for voluntary financial reporting for UN recipient organizations the following dates

<b>31 July</b>	Voluntary Q2 expenses (January to June)
<b>31 October</b>	Voluntary Q3 expenses (January to September)

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250, at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

### **Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property**

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

### **Public Disclosure**

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website ([www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund](http://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund)) and the Administrative Agent's website ([www.mptf.undp.org](http://www.mptf.undp.org)).

**Annex C: Support to the Sudanese Peace Process - Project Results Framework (MUST include sex- and age disaggregated data)**

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification/ frequency of collection	Indicator milestones
<p>Outcome 1:   <b><i>Sudan has broad-based, inclusive and participatory peace architecture in place, at national, regional and local levels, for ongoing dispute resolution and the transparent, accountable, multi-stakeholder implementation of the Peace Agreements and an overarching National Strategy for Peace.</i></b></p> <p>SDG Target(s):                      Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all.                      Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere.</p>	<p>Output 1.1  <b>Peace Commission established and functioning at</b></p>	<p><b>Outcome Indicator 1 a</b>                      Baseline: Commitment of TGoS and the signatories to development of national peace architecture (2020) as currently articulated by the peace agreements in place.                      Target: Sudan has conflict early warning systems and conflict resolution mechanisms fully functioning at all levels (2022) to protect civilians and ensure accountability</p> <p><b>Outcome Indicator 1 b</b>                      Baseline: No National Strategy for Peace (2020)                      Target: An inclusive National Strategy for Peace developed and adopted with operational plan and budgets included in MTEF (2022)</p> <p><b>Outcome Indicator 1c</b>                      Baseline: The Constitutional Declaration and Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) commit to no less than 40% representation of women (2020)                      Target: Staffing of Commissions and other structures, and participation in all mechanisms and processes of peace agreements, achieves 40% representation of women. (2020-2022)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 1.1.1</b>                      Baseline: Peace Commission lacks legal basis, agreed TORs and governance structure, SOPs and budget (2020)                      Target: Peace Commission established at national and sub-national levels with primary</p>	<p>Legal Gazette; public and project records</p>	<p>Multi-stakeholder agreement to Peace Commission TORs, structure and operations (2021)</p>

<p><b>UPR Recommendations:</b></p> <p>Both the Government and armed groups immediately take necessary steps to cease all forms of conflict and ensure humanitarian access for internally displaced persons.<sup>35</sup></p> <p>The harmonization of national laws with international human rights principles has advanced at a slow pace. Parts of the legal framework, such as the National Security Act and the emergency laws in Darfur, continue to infringe on fundamental rights.<sup>36</sup></p> <p>Adopt a holistic approach to development and effectively implement the poverty reduction strategy to address the root causes of inequalities in the country.<sup>37</sup></p>	<p><b>national and sub-national levels</b></p> <p><b>Phase I Activities:</b></p> <p>1.1.1 Technical assistance to prepare TORs, structure and SOPs of Peace Commission</p> <p>1.1.2 Technical assistance to prepare ToRs, structure and SOPs of IDPRC.</p> <p>1.1.3 Technical assistance to the ToRs, regulations and rules of procedures of Compensation and Reparations Fund in Darfur.</p> <p>1.1.4 Organise broad based consultations with the signatories to JPA and other stakeholders and peace actors to develop a comprehensive roadmap and pre-implementation prerequisites of phase II</p> <p><b>Phase II Activities:</b></p> <p>1.1.5 UNDP TA/capacity development training for establishment and operations of Peace Commission and other Commissions, institutions and CSOs comprising national peace architecture</p> <p>1.1.6 UNHCR TA/capacity development/CD training for establishment and operations of</p>	<p>and secondary legislation, operational plan and agreed multi-year budget (2021)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 1.1.2</b></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> No Government coordination mechanisms exist to support implementation of the peace agreement</p> <p><b>Target:</b> # of Government coordination mechanisms established at national and sub-national level for implementation of the peace agreement</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 1.1.3</b></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> Stakeholder commitment to gender equality and gender responsive institutions (2020)</p> <p><b>Target:</b> TORs, SOPs, and staffing of all Commissions and entities reflect gender aspirations and targets (2021)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 1.1.4</b></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> 0 entities agreed upon the JPA formed as Dec.2020.</p> <p><b>Target:</b> 3 entities constituted and having clear organic role and functions by Q3 2021.</p>	<p>Public records/site visits/project closing evaluation</p> <p>Legal Gazette; public and project records</p> <p>Legal Gazette; public and project records</p>	<p>Multi-stakeholder agreement to Peace Commission TORs, structure and operations (2021)</p>
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<sup>35</sup> UPR of Sudan, Second Cycle, Recommendation 138.133.

<sup>36</sup> Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, UN Human Rights Council (A/HRC/39/71 of 13 August 2018), para 73.

<sup>37</sup> Idem, para 76 (e).



<p>Peace &amp; other Commissions and institutions foreseen</p> <p>1.1.7 Delivery of capacity building workshops for TGoS officials at central and State level on development approaches to HLP issues as relevant for durable solutions.</p> <p>1.1.8. HLP baseline assessments representative of main displaced populations and affected communities in Darfur and other areas emerging from conflict, as accessible.</p>	<p>Output 1.2</p> <p><b>Civil society mobilised and articulated to implementation of peace agreements and development of a National Strategy for Peace</b></p> <p><i>Phase I Activities:</i></p> <p>1.2.1 Mapping of civil society "assets" at national and sub-national levels for articulation to Sudanese peace architecture and implementation of peace agreements</p> <p><i>Phase II Activities:</i></p> <p>1.2.2 Mobilisation workshops held at sub-national level, bringing relevant civil society actors and</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.2.1</p> <p>Baseline:</p> <p>Target:</p> <p>Output Indicator 1.2.2</p> <p>Baseline:</p> <p>Target:</p> <p>Output Indicator 1.2.3</p> <p>Baseline: Number and capacities of women's NGOs and CBOs in Sudan varies by geographic area. (2020)</p> <p>Target: Women's groups are able to reflect and channel gender issues and concerns of their members in all peacemaking and implementation processes (2021-2022)</p>	
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	<p>affected groups, including IDPs and refugees, together to discuss support to implementation of peace agreements and preparation of National Strategy and constituent sub-national strands.</p>			
<p><b>Output 1.3</b> <b>National Strategy for Peace prepared and adopted</b> <i>Phase I Activities:</i> 1.3.1 TA to initiate discussion and consensus building with all peace actors and stakeholders, and prepare a road map with action plan and timelines for the national and sub-national consultation processes for the Peace Strategy and The Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Stabilization Strategies for Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan and East Sudan</p> <p><i>Phase II Activities:</i> 1.3.2 Inclusive and participatory Conferences and processes organized at national and sub-national level to articulate civil society organisations to National Strategy preparation, inclusive of IDP and refugee communities, women, and youth groups</p> <p>1.3.3 TA to organize inclusive and participatory multi-stakeholder consultation workshops to design and develop Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Stabilization</p>	<p><b>Output Indicator 1.3.1</b> Baseline: No process for preparation of National Strategy defined (2020) Target: Inclusive and participatory process for development of National Peace Strategy and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Stabilization Programmatic Framework agreed between all relevant stakeholders (2021)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 1.3.2</b> Baseline: No National Strategy for Peace or Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Stabilisation (2020) Target: National Peace Strategy and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Stabilization Strategies (for Darfur, Blue Nile South Kordofan and East Sudan) developed and adopted, founded on peace agreements reached, with clear partnership and resource mobilization plan to make and maintain peace in Sudan for the long-term (2022)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 1.3.3</b> Baseline: No Strategy or process for preparing Strategy in place (2020) Targets: a) Process of Strategy preparation includes minimum 40% representation of women at all levels and in all consultations (2021)</p>	<p>Project and public records; stakeholder interviews</p> <p>Legal Gazette, project and public records; project closing evaluation</p> <p>Public and project records; stakeholder interviews; closing project evaluation</p>	<p>Inclusive public process validation event (to be determined)</p> <p>Implementation of agreed process steps (Output Indicator 1.4.1) Formal adoption of National Strategy, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Stabilisation Strategies and accompanying budget for implementation</p> <p>Implementation of agreed process steps (Output Indicator 1.4.1)</p>	

<p><b>Outcome 2:</b></p> <p><b><i>Pre-implementation support to peace agreements has mobilized popular goodwill and participation, established agreed machinery and processes of the peace</i></b></p>	<p>Strategies for Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan and East Sudan</p> <p>1.3.4 Drafting of National Strategy and inclusive development and validation workshops for all constituent area-based strands</p> <p>1.3.5 Mainstreaming cross-cutting approaches of conflict-sensitive programming, human-rights approaches and gender equity in the strategy and mandate of the Commission</p> <p>1.3.6 Ministry of Finance capacity development training for public finance management and gender budgeting</p> <p>1.3.7 National Conference to validate National Peace Strategy and post-conflict Peacebuilding and Stabilisation Strategy for Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan and East Sudan</p> <p>1.3.8 Communications and advocacy work with Parliamentarians to support adoption process</p>	<p>b) Gender issues mainstreamed across the Strategy, and Strategy accompanied by gender-disaggregated Results Framework and Budget (2020)</p>		
		<p><b>Outcome Indicator 2 a</b></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> Unknown levels of popular support for peace agreement and peace process (2020)</p> <p><b>Target:</b> Increasing levels of public support for implementation of peace agreement(s), gender disaggregated (2021-2022)</p> <p><b>Outcome Indicator 2 b</b></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> JPA requires successful implementation of multiple Conferences and sub-processes to determine key next steps</p>	<p>Prospective Studies/Project Focus Groups (in accessible target areas)</p>	<p>Public records</p>

<p><b>process, and improved the evidence base upon which agreements are finalized and implemented.</b></p> <p><b>SDG Target(s):</b> Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere. By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration.</p> <p><b>UPR Recommendations:</b> Root causes of the conflict, including discrimination and access to land and livelihoods, remain a major challenge for the long-term stability of Darfur.<sup>38</sup></p>	<p><b>Output 2.1</b> <b>Advocacy and Communications Campaign conducted</b></p> <p><b>Phase / Activities:</b> 2.1.1 Peace Commission outreach public meetings 'roadshow' 2.1.2 Dissemination of the JPA among the local communities in key locations, cities, and IDPs/refugee camps 2.1.3 Two initial TV or radio talk shows (one mixed, one women-only panel), x 2 for Darfur and the two Areas and East Sudan (6 total)</p>	<p>toward sustainable peace and durable solutions for IDPs and refugees (2020)</p> <p><b>Target:</b> Implementation of peace agreements proceeds smoothly, and key events/processes reach consensus on pathways to peace (2021-2022)</p> <p><b>Outcome Indicator 2 c</b> <b>Baseline:</b> Peace agreement and peace process require data and assessment (2020) <b>Target:</b> Peace process and implementation of peace agreement has benefited from UNITAMIS and its UNCT partners expertise and experience (2021-2022)</p>	<p>Feedback from parties to peace agreement and process; project closing evaluation</p>	
		<p><b>Output Indicator 2.1.1</b> <b>Baseline:</b> Weak public understanding of provisions of Juba Peace Agreement (2020) <b>Target:</b> 50% increase in public awareness of JPA and work of Peace Commission (2021)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 2.1.2</b> <b>Baseline:</b> No public information campaign in place to communicate peace agreement(s) and accompany implementation process (2020) <b>Target:</b> Public information campaign designed and implemented (2021)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 2.1.3</b> <b>Baseline:</b> Lead role of women in revolution acknowledged; consensus on need to deliver on gender equality and WPS agenda (2020)</p>	<p>Prospective Studies/Project Focus Groups (in accessible target areas)</p> <p>Project records/ closing evaluation</p> <p>Project records/ closing evaluation</p>	<p>Airing of first talk shows on TV/radio</p> <p>Definition and approval of Peace Commission communications strategy</p>

<sup>38</sup> A/HRC/39/71, op.cit., para 49.

<p>2.1.4 Preparation of public awareness/communications strategy for Peace Commission that fosters and enables dialogue, awareness, advocacy, engagement, and participation by citizens, civil society, and peace actors</p> <p><b>Phase / Activities:</b></p> <p>2.1.5 Implementation of Peace Commission public awareness/communications strategy</p> <p>2.1.6 Public awareness campaign among IDPs and refugees to help them understand their rights, durable solutions options, and prevailing conditions in their original home areas as pursuant to JPA.</p>	<p><b>Target:</b> Gender-responsive Peace Commission communications strategy implemented (2021)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 2.1.4 - # of advocacy interventions made for creation of conducive conditions for durable solutions</b></p> <p><b>Baseline</b></p> <p><b>Target</b></p>		
<p><b>Output 2.2</b></p> <p><b>Dialogue forums and processes supported</b></p> <p><b>Phase / Activities:</b></p> <p>2.2.1 Integrated mission inputs to mediation effort via informal workshops convened to assist the parties, and the GoS either separately or together, to come to a negotiation position.</p> <p>2.2.2 TA to support development of vision of both autonomy and decentralization in and around Governance Conference to define the responsibilities that would need to be undertaken at national,</p>	<p><b>Output Indicator 2.2.1</b></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> SPLM-N Abdelaziz Al-Hilu has requested UNITAMS/UNCT inputs to mediation effort, to inform process and decision-making of parties</p> <p><b>Target:</b> All parties express satisfaction with UNITAMS/UNCT facilitation</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 2.2.2</b></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> No existing local structures specifically mandated to receive and adjudicate compensation claims by refugees and IDPs.</p> <p><b>Target:</b> 10 local claims commissions established in Darfur by Q4 2021 (including five in target localities of PBF/Darfur and CERF)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 2.2.3</b></p>		

<p>regional and sub-national levels, and in the Two Areas, to design and options for discussion, on separation of state and religion and subsequent security arrangements.</p> <p>2.2.3 Technical assistance to define the ToRs and regulations of the local committees for claims in Darfur as pursuant to the JPA and support to define the underlying consultative process, including with refugees and IDPs, as well as women.</p> <p>2.2.4 Support to IDPRC in the elaboration of a working plan for a resettlement and repatriation strategy as per the JPA.</p> <p><i>Phase II Activities:</i></p> <p>2.2.5 Ongoing provision of mission inputs to Juba mediation effort as required</p> <p>2.2.6 TA in response to specific requests for UNCT experience and expertise</p> <p>2.2.7 Provide technical support in promoting and facilitating consensus building through dialogue and safe spaces for deepening relationships of trust and an increase participation of local communities, women and youth in peacebuilding and peace implementation</p>	<p><b>Baseline:</b> No resettlement and repatriation plan</p> <p><b>Target:</b> Resettlement and repatriation plan developed in consultation with affected populations and communities and in respect for international law and standards.</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 2.2.4</b></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b></p>		
<p><b>Output 2.3</b></p>	<p><b>Output Indicator 2.3.1</b></p>		

	<p><b>Data and assessments inform durable solutions for IDPs and refugees</b></p> <p><i>Phase I Activities:</i></p> <p>2.3.1 Technical support to a comprehensive mapping and gap analysis of data and evidence for durable solutions, r(e)integration and protection as needed for the implementation of the JPA.</p> <p>2.3.2 Technical support to development of methodologies, tools and analysis for comprehensive assessments on protection issues as relevant for planning returns and reintegration.</p> <p>2.3.3 Support the Peace Commission, and other relevant government entities with capacity building, in establishing a protection and peacebuilding network through existing mechanisms in the field, including through relevant committees at the locality level (e.g Peaceful Coexistence and Agriculture Protection Committees) and IDP Camp Coordination structures.,</p> <p>2.3.4. Support to the development of peacebuilding and conflict resolution plan for Peace Commission staff and implementing partners in areas affected by conflict and displacement.</p> <p><i>Phase II Activities:</i></p>	<p><b>Baseline:</b> No comprehensive mapping of data and evidence needed for the successful implementation of the JPA provisions concerning IDPs and refugees.</p> <p><b>Target:</b> 1 comprehensive data mapping document available to guide Peace Commission and other entities on coordinating durable solutions, reconciliation and transitional justice activities related to the forcibly displaced by conflict in Sudan.</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 2.3.2</b></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> No nationwide baseline data on HLP rights as relevant for refugees and returnees, or legal identity/civil registry by IDPs and refugees.</p> <p><b>Target:</b> 2 concept notes and methodologies for broad baseline assessments of HLP issues as relevant for returns, and of legal identity rights by forcibly displaced populations.</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 2.3.3</b></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> No nationwide plan for entry points and reception centers.</p> <p><b>Target:</b> Transit and reception plan available to the Peace Commission and IDPRC by Q2 2021 as a basis for predictable and peaceful returns of persons displaced by conflict</p>		
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<p>Outcome 3:</p> <p><b><i>Peace agreements in Sudan implemented in a transparent and accountable manner, in line with relevant international norms and standards, and Sudan better integrated in sub-regional peace architecture.</i></b></p> <p>SDG Target(s): Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all</p>	<p>2.3.5 Assessment of issues enabling returns, including HLP and other criteria for achieving durable solutions, in target IDPs and returnee communities.</p> <p>2.3.6 Area-based assessments for durable solutions for IDPs and refugees with common methodology in main areas of potential return or (re)integration.</p> <p>2.3.7 Design and facilitate workshops/training on peacebuilding and conflict resolution for the Peace Commission staff and implementing partners.</p>	<p><b>Outcome Indicator 3 a</b></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> Accountability mechanism for peace agreement implementation agreed in JPA but not yet established (2020)</p> <p><b>Target:</b> Parties, Guarantors and Witnesses to the Juba Peace Agreement express high levels of satisfaction with the way in which it is implemented (2020)</p> <p><b>Outcome Indicator 3 b</b></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> Negative public perceptions of implementation of previous peace agreements.</p> <p><b>Target:</b> 70% public satisfaction with peace agreement implementation.</p> <p><b>Outcome Indicator 3 c</b></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> Establishment of national peace architecture would benefit from further sub-regional integration (2020)</p> <p><b>Target:</b> Sudan cooperates closely with its neighbours and participates fully in all sub-</p>	<p>Project and public records; project closing evaluation.</p> <p>Prospective Studies/Project Focus Groups (in accessible target areas)</p> <p>Project and public records; project closing evaluation.</p>	
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<p>levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.</p> <p>UPR Recommendations:</p>	<p><b>Output 3.1</b></p> <p><b>Responsibility and accountability promoted</b></p> <p><i>Phase I Activities:</i></p> <p>3.1.1 Agree and facilitate UN support to establishment and operations of mechanism to monitor and evaluate the JPA</p> <p><i>Phase II Activities:</i></p> <p>3.1.2 Ongoing servicing of JPA monitoring and evaluation mechanism on behalf of parties, guarantors, and witnesses to the Agreement</p>	<p>regional initiatives for conflict prevention and response (2022)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 3.1.1</b></p> <p>Baseline: M&amp;E Commission for peace agreement agreed but not established (2020)</p> <p>Target: M&amp;E Commission for monitoring implementation of the peace agreement(s) established and functioning smoothly (2021-2022)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 3.1.2</b></p> <p>Baseline: No methodology envisaged for implementation of M&amp;E Commission mandate (2020)</p> <p>Target: M&amp;E regime for monitoring of implementation of the agreement is gender responsive and gender disaggregated (2021)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 1.1.3</b></p> <p>Baseline: Lack of mechanism to measure and monitor public opinion toward peace agreement terms and implementation (2020).</p> <p>Target: M&amp;E regime utilizes prospective perception studies to monitor public opinion of peace agreement implementation and contribute to national early warning system (2022)</p>		
	<p><b>Output 3.2</b></p> <p><b>Coherence with international policy and programmes enhanced</b></p> <p><i>Phase I Activities:</i></p>	<p><b>Output Indicator 3.2.1</b></p> <p>Baseline: # of international treaties and obligations outstanding for domestication</p> <p>Target: # legislative acts adopted</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 3.2.2</b></p> <p>Baseline: Transitional Government of Sudan has yet to agree design of conflict early</p>	<p>Legal Gazette, project and public records; project closing evaluation</p>	

	<p>3.2.1 Joint UN/IAU/IGAD workshop to ensure coherence, coordination and complementarity of programming</p> <p><i>Phase II Activities:</i></p> <p>3.2.2 TA for domestication of relevant international, continental, and regional policy frameworks</p> <p>3.2.3 Support to Peace Commission to engage with relevant sub-regional events and processes (AU, IGAD, etc).</p> <p>3.2.4 Facilitation of 6x IGAD workshops/consultations at sub-national level in regard to cross-border platform methodology and operations</p> <p>3.2.5 Support establishment of Crisis Risk Dashboard (CRD) as conflict early warning platform with Peace Research Institute (PRI) of the University of Khartoum in collaboration with Regional Peace and Development Centers to develop conflict/risk indicators, regularly gather, update and analyse conflict data</p>	<p>warnings system as part of national peace architecture (2020)</p> <p><b>Target:</b> Design of Sudanese conflict early warnings system integrates relevant IGAD platforms for prevention and resilience and Conflict Risk Dashboard (2021)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 3.2.3</b></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b></p> <p><b>Target:</b></p>	<p>Project and public records; project closing evaluation</p>	
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