



## **CONTEXT ANALYSIS REPORT**

in support of the project

# **WATER FOR PEACE IN YEMEN: STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN WATER CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION**

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## A. INTRODUCTION

### A1. Context, aim and geographic/ thematic scope of the context analysis

The current context analysis is an integral part of the UN Peacebuilding Fund funded “Water for Peace: Strengthening the role of women in water conflict resolution and climate change mitigation”. The project is jointly implemented in Yemen by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Furthermore, the analysis is part of the FAO’s strengthened focus on supporting local peace in the frame of its [Corporate Framework to support sustainable peace in the context of Agenda 2030](#) and the overall [2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#).

The aim of the context analysis is to a) provide information on the local community dynamics around water conflicts and their resolution mechanisms in Wadi Hadhramaut, and, based on them, b) to present recommendations to the project team on the implementation of the project activities in a conflict sensitive manner.

The analysis will focus on the Hadhramaut Valley area, called Wadi Hadhramaut, while also offering a short overview of the country context. The thematic focus will be on water conflicts in the mentioned geographic area, looking at what generates these conflicts, what divides and connects communities around the issue of water scarcity, what are the effects of water conflicts, and how the community engages in preventing or mitigating local water conflicts.

### A2. The Water for Peace project

The Water for Peace project is a joint FAO-IOM project, funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund. The overall objective of the project is to empower women, youth and marginalized members of the community to resolve re-emergent conflicts over water resources, in order to reduce the degrading relations between community members and the re-emergence of conflicts over water resources. The objective is supported by a robust theory of change, outlining the logical link between project activities and the foreseen support for local peace. This is as follows:

The project aims to create community-led efforts that engage various stakeholders in peaceful conflict-resolution of water-based disputes and to change attitudes and practices towards equitable access to natural resources.

The changes in knowledge and attitudes will lead to changes in practices and perceptions in terms of water-management, conflict-resolution, trust and acceptance of the rights of others. This should lead to changes in community relations since community members will be meeting and engaging in dialogue. The project will seek to establish regulations and understandings between various resource-based conflict parties, and will allow the community members to take a more organized, collective and strategic approach towards the resolution of water-based conflicts.

The project’s theory of change is as follows:

If water-management bodies (namely, Water User Associations or WUAs) that include key stakeholders are formulated and women and youth have a prominent role within those associations, then coherent and organized community-level bodies can play a vital role in the mitigation of a significant portion of the country’s resource-based conflicts. If these bodies have an adequate and robust public outreach mechanism, then they will play an influential role within their communities.

Moreover, if the capacity of these associations is well-established so as to sustain their presence, then peace-building efforts will be sustained within the areas of intervention. If peace-building efforts are sustained within the areas of intervention and resources are equitably distributed, then livelihoods, safety, and peace will be enhanced and sustained within the areas of intervention.

If water governance and management (irrigation) systems are improved and restored then the likelihood of water-based conflicts emerging will be reduced because livelihood assets will be more equitably shared across all community members and socio-economic groups. The project will further increase stability through the

rehabilitation of water infrastructure via the FAO-Cash for Work (CfW) approach to ensure that families not only have cash, but also the inputs, assets and training needed to manage their natural resources and support their needs to farm and herd. This approach thus will help families protect, recover, adapt and secure their livelihoods.

This combination of cash and the increase of agricultural production enhances households' food security, nutrition, employment opportunities for women and youth, and income generation potential and resilience, while simultaneously increasing social harmony and community peacebuilding. When complemented by community-level projects, community and household resilience is further enhanced through:

- The shared benefits of, and access to, community-managed natural water resource assets;
- The contributions to social cohesion accrued through collective action, and reinforced community structures;
- Taking the lead in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the role of women is strengthened as agents for social cohesion and positive change.

### A3. Methodology

The present context analysis is the result of joint data-gathering and report formulation efforts of the Water for Peace project team, and the Middle East Sub-Regional Resilience Team's Conflict-Sensitive Programming Specialist. The data necessary for the development of the report have the following sources:

- **Desk review** of analyses and resource materials about the country/ governorate context, water scarcity and related community dynamics. 33 publications were consulted in the process from various news agencies, international organizations, NGOs and academia, their date range being between 2010 and 2020.
- **Project inception meeting workshop** which hosted a 2-hour conflict mapping exercise with relevant stakeholders present. The workshop focused on a) mapping out the major water conflicts in Wadi Hadhramaut; b) listing the different factors that cause and feed these conflicts; c) looking at the effects such conflicts have on community cohesion; d) identifying deescalating mechanisms and processes; and e) developing a list of guiding principles that ensure that the project respects the community.
- **Field-level baseline surveys**, containing questions related to: a) the impact of the current war on community relations; b) local water conflicts; and c) water conflict resolution mechanisms.
- **Interviews with relevant project staff**, focusing on issues such as: a) general community dynamics/ relations in Wadi Hadhramaut; b) local water conflicts and their resolution mechanisms; and c) general community – development project dynamics.

The interactive data gathering methods engaged a total number of 61 individuals, out of which 25% women and 75% men.

The methodology was adapted to the contextual realities of operating within Yemen. Every effort was made to ensure that the information contained in the study is accurate or representative of the context.

### A4. Structure and navigation of the context analysis report

The report has five major parts.

**Chapter 1** offers a general overview of the Context Analysis Report, focusing on the aim of it, the context in which it was developed, the methodology used, the structure of the report and the limitations of the analysis.

**Chapter 2** of the report is dedicated to the overall Yemeni context. The chapter has two areas of focus. On the one hand it offers information on the ongoing crisis and its root causes, on the other, it covers shortly the water conflicts of Yemen, looking at the causes of water scarcity and the drivers of water conflicts.

**Chapter 3** hones in on the project implementation area, Wadi Hadhramaut. The focus of the chapter is water conflicts and their resolution. On the side of water conflict, information is offered on the main conflict lines around which disputes arise in the communities of the Wadi, the factors that feed these conflicts (structural, behavioral, attitudinal, historic-cultural and resolution blockers), and the effects of water conflict. On the side of the water

conflict resolution three dimensions are being considered: the overall practice of water conflict resolution in Yemen, the particular resolution mechanisms of Wadi Hadhramaut, and the role of women and youth in these processes.

**Chapter 4** focuses on the stakeholder analysis of the project, borrowing the analysis done by the project team for the project proposal.

Finally, **chapter 5** focuses on conflict sensitivity considerations, by gathering all the relevant contextual and thematic conflict drivers the report has dealt with in the previous chapter and attaching conflict sensitivity recommendations to each. The recommendations are based on international best practices in conflict sensitivity customized to the project content, and the recommendations of the baseline and inception workshop interlocutors.

For easier navigation of the report, key information relevant for conflict sensitive programming are provided in table format, reducing the time needed to identify them for programming purposes.

#### **A5. Limitations of the analysis**

The analysis is not intended as a national context analysis nor as an exhaustive community level conflict analysis, but instead as a “good enough” analysis to support the project implementation in a conflict sensitive manner.

## B. YEMEN - COUNTRY CONTEXT

### B1. General information

The Republic of Yemen is situated at the southern end of the Arab Peninsula. According to the 2018 estimates, the total population of the country is of 28 498 683 people, out of which Arabs are 92.8%, Somalis 3.7%, Afro-Arabs 1.1%, Indo-Pakistanis 1%, and others 1.4%.<sup>i</sup> The rural population represents 63.4% of the total population, while the urban one 36.6%.<sup>ii</sup> The country's main language is Arabic; its main religion is Islam.

The country occupies an area of 527 968 km<sup>2</sup>, out of which 1 546 hectares are cultivated land (arable lands and permanent crops). Its renewable water resources are internal, with a long-term average annual precipitation depth of 167 mm/year, and a volume of 88.17 km<sup>3</sup>/ year.<sup>iii</sup> There are several riverbeds (wadis) that drain rainwater during rains. Wadis that drain into the Red Sea are Rima, Rasyan, Mawr, Surdud, Siham, Zabid, and Mawza, while those that drain into the Gulf of Aden are Wadi Hadhramaut, Hajar, Jahr, and Warazan. Wadi Hadhramaut is the longest wadi of Yemen, stretching across 240 km.<sup>iv</sup>

As a result of the civil war, the current Yemeni crisis has produced an estimated 4 million internally displaced people (IDPs), with more than 20 million people facing food insecurity, and 14 million in need of urgent humanitarian intervention.<sup>v</sup> From the food security point of view, between 2016 and 2018 11 million people were undernourished (38.9% of the population).<sup>vi</sup> According to the World Bank, Yemen's GDP per capita in 2018 was of USD 994.<sup>vii</sup>

### B2. Brief conflict timeline of Yemen

Yemen's history is no stranger to internal strife, struggles and violent conflicts directed toward withholding or acquiring political power and influence, access to resources, territorial control, or the fulfilment of secessionist aspirations. The current country was formed in 1990, when the historically separate North and South united. Before the unification under Ali Abdullah Saleh, the North and the South existed as separate sovereign entities: in 1962 the Yemen Arab Republic was formed in the north, and in 1970 the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen came into existence in the south. The two engaged in brief wars in 1972 and 1978. The unification process wasn't a smooth one, it being derailed by the 1994 civil war, which was the result of the South declaring its independence.




Figure 1 - Yemen Control Map, October 2019

The years leading up to the Arab Spring, brought little centralization of authority in the country. The relationship between the center and periphery (i.e. local elites and tribal leaders) has proven to be transactional and negotiated. On the one hand, there was little reliance on Sana'a in the periphery; on the other hand, Sana'a has exercised its influence through patronage, with the occasional use of force. Overall, this period is characterized by various powerful, local-level separatist movements, a strengthening conflict between the central government and the Ansar Allah movement, and the resulting tensions and clashes of forces pertaining to the different actors across the political and identity divide.

The years 2011 to 2012 represented a change of political leadership in Yemen, a process accompanied by shifting loyalties, strengthening of various non-state actors, and unrestrained use of violent means. In 2011 the 30-year president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was forced to resign, the leadership of the country being delegated to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. The change of power did not mean a change in the support base of either of the two figures. Hadi's lack of support-base made him eager to strengthen his own position by delegitimizing the former president, while Saleh retained the support of his party, still acting as its leader. The resulting power struggle opened the space for non-state actors to fortify their positions in various parts of the country, one of the most prominent one being the Houthi movement, Ansar Allah. The Ansar Allah movement has emerged in the 1990s in Sa'dah, northern Yemen, becoming soon a fierce critic and opponent of the former president, Saleh. Between March 2013 and January 2014 Yemen hosted its National Dialogue Conference, with the main aim of reforming the existing constitution. The process was not well-supported by the general population, as it did not sufficiently account for the needs and interests of the already marginalized groups (women, youth, various tribes, etc.), and excluded key formal and most importantly informal decision makers. The content of the conference created tensions with both the Ansar Allah and the community. Ansar Allah resented the idea of federalization, while the community disliked the fact that the transitional process did not address the crumbling economic situation of the country. The second part of 2014 only added to the tensions, when president Hadi disbanded the Presidential Guards, the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division, and announced the cutting of fuel subsidies. This generated clashed between the Ansar Allah and governmental forces, at which end the former took control of capital Sana'a and obtained a peace deal that included: various economic reforms and the formation of an inclusive government, where Houthi and Hirak<sup>viii</sup> representatives became presidential advisers.

With 2015 the conflict escalated into full war, a state which only currently started to show signs of de-escalation. The year 2015 saw the reemergence of the federalization idea and the opposition of the Ansar Allah to it, the house arrest and later escape of president Hadi to Aden and then to Saudi Arabia, the dissolution of the parliament and its replacement with the Supreme Revolutionary Committee (SRC), and a protracted battle for Aden. The same year the war acquired a regional character, when nine Arab countries intervened militarily to restore President Hadi to power. In 2016 the struggle for power continued: a power sharing deal was struck between the Ansar Allah and the former president Saleh, a move that was later countered by President Hadi through the firing of the Central Bank governor and moving the bank to Aden. The same year Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was driven out of Mukalla, after having taking over territory in the south and launching terrorist attacks on various targets from there. The regional efforts to counter the Ansar Allah expansion continued in 2017 with the operation Golden Arrow, led by Saudi Arabia. Meantime, the internal secessionist movements intensified, culminating in the Inclusive Hadhramaut Conference, which has called for a greater autonomy of the Hadhramaut governorate. As a result of the conference, and the consequent dismissal of the governor of Aden, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) was formed. The middle of the year also brought new tensions in the Ansar Allah-Saleh alliance. The years 2018 and 2019 saw an intensified battle for the South of Yemen between the Yemeni government forces and the UAE-backed STC forces. Only the end of 2019 brought a power-sharing agreement that would signal the end of the violence in the south of Yemen.

### **B3. Root causes of the current Yemeni context**

The roots of the current Yemeni crisis run deep and are multi-sectoral. They are entrenched in the country's political and governance sector, its economic life, social services, natural resources and environmental related grievances, which well predate the 2015-present time-frame. In 2014 the UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA) undertook a comprehensive conflict analysis<sup>x</sup> that has highlighted the main causes and drivers of the various conflict lines existing in Yemen, which in the end culminated in the still ongoing civil war. The below table aggregates the findings of this conflict analysis, which are just as representative of today's context as they were 5 years ago, before the onset of the civil war.

Table 1 - Underlying causes of the Yemeni Civil War<sup>x</sup>

POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE
<p><b>“Political corruption and exclusion:</b> Exclusive, elitist politics and traditional patronage networks have replaced broad coalitions and alienated the population. Exclusion and patronage-based politics have limited the development of a national identity, threatened the Government's legitimacy and given rise to violent opposition groups.</p> <p><b>Inequitable government service delivery:</b> Absent, inadequate and inequitable basic service provision, particularly in health and education, has worsened economic circumstances for many people, fostered opposition to government, contributed to intergroup competition and increased the attractiveness of armed groups that provide salaries and protection.”</p>
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
<p><b>“Inequitable economic development, poverty and rising prices:</b> Declines in economic growth and rising consumer prices following the uprising have contributed to increased poverty across the country. In recent years, more than half of the population is considered to be poor and food insecure. The concentration of wealth, oil revenues and government resources within a small group of political elites is in stark contrast to the lives of average Yemenis and a considerable source of grievance against the State. Chronic malnutrition prevents children from succeeding at, or even attending, school.”</p>
SOCIAL ISSUES
<p><b>“Youth alienation and vulnerability to recruitment into violence:</b> Almost half of Yemen’s population is under the age of 15. High rates of unemployment and poor education among youth leave them vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups. While many youth have no voice politically, economically or socially, militant groups offer them access to resources, influence and a sense of belonging – creating a situation that drives ongoing conflict across the country.</p> <p><b>Poor-quality education:</b> The poor quality of education contributes to high rates of unemployment, with highly skilled jobs in the oil and gas sector going to foreigners. The education system in Yemen is also criticized for failing to spark critical thinking skills, which leads to a willingness to accept the ideologies and claims of armed groups.</p> <p><b>Sexual and gender-based violence:</b> Women lack civic and political rights. Sexual and gender-based violence, female genital mutilation and early marriage rates are increasing as the economy declines. Girls are being used as currency, sold off to pay debts, gain protection or compensate host communities. One third of girls are illiterate and three quarters of internally displaced people are female.”</p>
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
<p><b>“Natural resource management:</b> Water tables in Yemen have declined to the point where water supplies in urban areas are anticipated to last 10 to 15 years at most. At least 40 per cent of water is used to farm qat, a chewable narcotic plant. Upstream land owners have control of the scarce resource, often sparking violent disputes. Oil reserves are also only predicted to last another ten years. There is hope that liquefied natural gas will provide an economic alternative.</p> <p><b>Land disputes:</b> Disputes over land registration and ownership, inheritance, and rapid population growth resulting in subdivided family lands, are all common causes of violence and disputes. The use of public land is also a source of contention.”</p>
SECURITY AND JUSTICE
<p><b>“External influences:</b> Iran and Saudi Arabia are known to be financing armed groups within Yemen, which sustains internal fighting and destabilization. In addition, deportation of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia and migrants from the Horn of Africa exacerbate the unemployment crisis, increase poverty (as a result of loss of remittances) and cause tensions in returnee communities.</p> <p><b>Small arms proliferation:</b> There are more than 10 million weapons in Yemen – a higher than 1:1 ratio per adult male – which facilitates violence and conflict on a larger scale.</p> <p><b>Weak national security capabilities:</b> National security forces are mostly concentrated in larger urban areas such as Sana'a, which limits their presence and capacity to quell violence that arises elsewhere in the country or to contain the growth of armed groups, including AQAP. Consequently, some factions have been able to expand their control over geographical areas unchallenged.”</p>

#### B4. The water conflicts of Yemen

While the more than a half of a decade long Yemeni war is mostly seen as a result of “the Houthi-Hadi conflict; the regional conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia; the extremist organizations AQAP and the Islamic State (IS) which have seized the opportunity to establish themselves in Yemen; and local power affecting tribal and sectarian divisions”<sup>xi</sup>, there are longer standing conflicts that claim around 4 000 lives per year.<sup>xii</sup> These are the water conflicts of Yemen.

##### B4.1 Causes of water scarcity

While about 2 000 year ago Yemen was known as Arabia Felix or Lucky Arabia<sup>xiii</sup>, due to its fertile soils, nowadays Yemen is one of the most severely water scarce countries in the world. In 2015, before the onset of the war, experts have estimated that 13 million Yemenis (50% of the population) “struggle daily to have clean water for basic necessities”<sup>xiv</sup>, while by 2018 this number rose to more than 19 million people.<sup>xv</sup>

The current water scarcity has a variety of causes and contextual drivers, which have been impacting the water environment of Yemen since the 1970s. While until that point in history the Yemeni communities depended mostly on rain water in their agricultural and livestock keeping activities, the start of the deep well drilling practice has changed considerably the agricultural practices. By the year 2000 irrigated agriculture accounted for 90% of the underground water use<sup>xvi</sup>, resulting in a yearly average water table falling of 6-7 meters.<sup>xvii</sup> The change in the agricultural methods has slowly coupled with a variety of governance, socio-economic, infrastructural, access, demography, etc. related factors, leading to a continuous decrease in water availability for the population, and a subsequent higher competition for the scarce resource. The ECC Platform<sup>xviii</sup> (Platform for Exchange on Environment, Conflict and Cooperation) offers a concise overview of the main causes of the water scarcity in the country:

Table 2 - Main causes of water scarcity in Yemen<sup>xix</sup>

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DRIVERS
“Water availability in Yemen is rapidly decreasing as a consequence of water mismanagement, the over exploitation of aquifers beyond recharge rates, and an increase of irrigated agriculture. Furthermore, deep well drilling has caused groundwater salinization and pollution of aquifers. Pressures on local water resources are further compounded by a fast growing population. Given that water disputes are often closely connected to land disputes, internal migration rises have led to competition for land and access to dwindling water resources between cohabiting tribes.”
CLIMATE CHANGE
“Due to the absence of perennial rivers, agriculture in Yemen is mainly rain-fed. However, Yemen is experiencing a notable reduction in its yearly average rainfall.”
ACCESS AND AVAILABILITY OF NATURAL RESOURCES
“Currently, nearly 14 out of 16 aquifers are depleted in Yemen. It is projected that Yemen will be among the 16 most water stressed countries of the world in 2040.”

##### B4.2 Water conflict drivers of Yemen

The thus induced heightened competition for water is manifesting in many localized conflicts, which often escalate into armed violence. In the majority of cases these conflicts appear in rural settings, occurring between individuals, but also among tribes and entire villages. In the worst cases the police are involved as well, to mitigate the conflict. The resulting violence from water conflicts affects people and infrastructure alike. While random or premeditated violence, revenge killings, etc. result in an average of 2 victims per week<sup>xx</sup>, the same violent efforts are directed towards the destruction of water infrastructure as well (digs, wells, pumps, etc.). The competition for water in itself would pose less threat to community cohesion and local peace if it weren’t coupled with a series of contextual factors that divide communities and drive tensions among community groups. The organization Small Arms Survey<sup>xxi</sup> offers a concise mapping of the key root causes and drivers of water conflicts in Yemen. The table on the next page is the summary of their mapping.

Table 3 - Water conflict drivers in Yemen<sup>xxii</sup>

	CONFLICT DRIVER	MANIFESTATION	EFFECT
GOVERNANCE	Water policies & strategies	Disconnect/ lack of cooperation between relevant ministries in charge of water management, like: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ministry of Water and Environment in charge of resource management, domestic water supply, sanitation; and</li> <li>Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation in charge of irrigation efficiency, dams and water shed management</li> </ul>	Lack of robust governmental strategies to mitigate water scarcity, and delay of important reforms.
		Government subsidies for water exploitation	Water exploitation made cheap and easily attainable, thus its mismanagement
	Service provision	Failure to provide services related to water and sanitation coupled with the limited presence of services/ institutions in many places	High levels of malnutrition, morbidity and mortality.
			The population blames the government for the lack of funding, the poor governance, and the lack of support for water projects.
	Traditional water management	Treating water as an unlimited resource despite evidence	Mismanagement of water supplies and faster depletion of the resource
Culture of governance	Corruption, partisanship, counter-productive decision making	A combination of the above effects, with a chronic lack of trust of the population in the authorities.	
SOCIAL	Demographic changes	The IDP influxes	Strains on the already scarce water resources
		Urbanization	Development projects taking over land and straining water resources
	Power dynamics	The political and economic elite accessing and using water in a disproportionate manner	Exploitation and access to water is equaled with political and economic power, which angers the general population.
Water discrimination by social classes	Poor people paying more for the water than rich people, as poor people get the water from water trucks, while rich people have access to subsidized water in their houses	Stressing even further the poor – rich, urban – rural divide	
GENDER	Water collecting roles	Women spend 4 to 5 hours daily to collect water for the family	Girls miss school in order to ensure the daily water supply for the family.
RESOURCES	Use of water	Weaponization of water through siege and blockades	Water as a symbol of power and control
		Water mismanagement	The plummet of the yearly average water table
		Large number of users	Exponentially decreasing ability to control the water resource.
	Lack of resource inputs	Fuel shortages of local water corporations	Dramatic increase in water trucking prices
			Lack of capacity of wastewater treatment plants to treat the public water supply in an adequate and safe manner
Access	Territorial/ upstream control over flow of water towards downstream users	Competition for ownership/ access to water resources	
	Tube wells dug mostly on private lands	Only certain segment of the population has direct access to water due to land ownership. In the same sense, water created land conflicts as well.	

		Dam constructions, channel improvements, changes to wadi morphology	Altering usual water access and water availability among different community groups
		The use of same aquifer among various community groups	Competition for the same limited resource among several community groups
		Rural water resource used for urban needs	Strengthening the rural-urban community divide and water competition
		Water trucks obtain water from non-renewable aquifers	Loss of water level, which couples with rising prices for water
INFRASTRUCTURE	Quality	Destroyed water and sanitation infrastructure	Worst health/ cholera epidemic in the history of Yemen
		Neglect: porous pipes, poorly constructed/ maintained dams	Loss of water (e.g. 60% of water lost through leaking pipes in Sana'a)
ENVIRONMENT	Water flow	The unpredictable nature of the water flow	The community cannot agree on water management, giving rise to tensions
EXTERNAL RELATIONS	Interferences	Supporting water management practices in a manner that is not sensitive to the context	Exacerbation of existing conflicts or generation of new ones.
SECURITY	Access to weapons and fire arms	Conflicting parties resolving disputes with the use of lethal weapons	Peaceful conflict resolution/ transformation may become a second option to violence
			The loss of lives reduces the number of people able to cultivate land and produce crops.
	Links to other types of conflict	Water conflicts can trigger or be an effect of other conflicts, such as the current political one.	Escalation/ protraction of the interlinked conflicts and tensions in the target location of the project.
	Nature of water conflicts	Water conflicts tend to be chronic, low-level	Less attention and importance given to this kind of conflict by decision makers, international actors, national/ local organizations.
	Access to the resource	Many water holes are in dangerous areas, controlled by various warring parties	Water-related casualties/ victims can become collateral victims of other types of conflict, such as political and territorial ones.

## C. WADI HADHRAMAUT – THE WATER FOR PEACE PROJECT CONTEXT

### C1. General information

Wadi Hadhramaut is situated in the northern part of the Hadhramaut governorate of Yemen. The governorate itself is Yemen’s largest one. It occupies about 50% of the country’s border with Saudi Arabia, and extends till the Gulf of Aden over a total of 191 737 km<sup>2</sup>. According to the 2011 data, its total population was at that time 2 255 000 inhabitants, who are called Hadhramis. The capital city of the governorate is Mukalla. The governorate hosts a number of historical towns, such as Shibam, Sena, Seiyun, Tarim, and Ash Shihr.<sup>xxiii</sup>



Figure 2 - Hadhramaut governorate location in Yemen

The governorate has two major regions: a hilly coastal area in the south, and a valley area in the north (Wadi Hadhramaut). “At higher elevations in the region, there is alluvial soil that allows for an extensive agriculture, mainly of wheat and barley; other crops include fruits, dates, alfalfa, millet, and tobacco. [...] Fish products, honey, lime, and tobacco are exported from the region.”<sup>xxiv</sup> The most important natural resources are oil and gas, Hadhramaut having a critical oil handling infrastructure at Ash Shihr. Before the war Hadhramaut had ensured about 1/3<sup>rd</sup> of Yemen’s oil production.

“Wadi Hadhramaut is a deep valley incised into the Jol Plateau in southern Yemen. The valley, which runs west-east for 100 km, is approximately 300 m deep and up to 5 km wide. A number of tributary wadis drain the plateau, most significantly from the wetter, southern side. The plateau varies in elevation from approximately 960 meters above sea level rising to 1500 m at the watershed between Wadi Hadhramaut and the Indian Ocean.

The general geology of the Wadi Hadhramaut region is a series of thick flat-lying sedimentary units that have been deeply eroded into a complex pattern of wadis and mesas. The tops of the mesas form the Jol Plateau. The valley walls are formed by the sub-vertical walls of Umm er Radhuma, limestone above scree-covered steep walls of outcropping sandstone and presumably Sharwayn marl, although this has not been identified in the outcrops. In the valley, the layers above the Mukalla sandstone have been removed by erosion, but the valley is backfilled by a limestone conglomerate, overlain by Quaternary alluvium.”<sup>xxv</sup>

### C2. The governorate’s relationship dynamics impacting Wadi Hadhramaut

As integral part of the country, the governorate of Hadhramaut has been an active contributor to the various relationship dynamics playing out throughout Yemen’s history, being equally interested and impacted by the event unfolding in Yemen.

Before the 1990 unification, Hadhramaut was part of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Mirroring the various secessionist ideas of the south throughout the history, the governorate itself contains various groups with a wide array of secessionist aspirations. These range from the desire to achieve an independent south to gaining political autonomy for the governorate itself. As an example, in 2015 95 sheikhs from the Hadhramaut tribes signed a petition for being annexed to Saudi Arabia, along with Mahra and a part of Shabwa, citing historical claims.<sup>xxvi</sup> Two years later, in April 2017, during the Hadhramaut Conference, a declaration was issued related to the status of the governorate, saying that “Hadhramaut was a politically autonomous region, distinct from the rest of South Yemen within a federal framework”.<sup>xxvii</sup> Later on, the 2019 Mukalla protests over energy blackouts and other lacking public services were directed against the central government. These demonstrations represented a strong signal of the Hadhrami preference for local governance, and the strengthened popular support given to local governors.

Next to historical claims, there are a variety of contextual reasons for the Hadhrami secessionist aspirations, these becoming key drivers of tensions and conflicts within the governorate and between it and the central government.

The table below summarizes such contextual causes. Some of these are additional to the root causes of the Yemeni civil war, some are overlapping. The table details only the ones that are additional.

*Table 4 – Contributing factors to the current secessionist dynamics in Hadhramaut*

GOVERNANCE
<p><b>Territorial presence of central government:</b> The fragmentation of the country’s central political power and the development of various power polls that divide the country into influence spheres has led to the eroding of local power structures that were linked to the pre-war political order. In the void created by the lack of authority of the central government, local authorities are lacking the capacity to fill in all the roles needed to govern in an efficient manner. In the face of the mounting grievances the establishment of parallel non-state political and security actors was imminent and easy. Aggravating the situation is the chronic lack of public funding from Sana’s towards the governorate, which has left space for interested neighboring powers to gain further influence through financial means as well.</p> <p><b>Legitimacy and competency to govern:</b> There is a dual sovereignty playing out in Yemen: the internationally recognized government’s juridical sovereignty versus the local power holders’ empirical sovereignty. In the current context the latter is gaining more importance and traction. This has inevitably led to power struggles down to the local level. Despite the reduced territorial presence, the Hadi government still holds key attributions in Hadhramaut, related to the appointment of personnel, budgetary control, and project implementation. The government’s selection and appointment process of public servants is non-transparent, their qualification is poor. As a result, Hadhramis desire a greater autonomy in managing their own governance. There is also a lack of capacity of the local authorities to fill all roles left open by the degrading presence and authority of the central government, which contributes greatly to the development of parallel non-state political and security actors, promising to handle the existing grievances.</p> <p><b>Competition for power:</b> The coastal-Hadhramaut’s and the Wadi-Hadhramaut’s competition for politics and power means that different loyalties are playing out in the governorate, impacting the secessionist aspirations: some parts of the governorate are rooting for a unified Yemen, other areas have separatist aspirations. This competition also impacts the capacity of the governorate to ensure security in a coherent and efficient manner: Wadi-Hadhramaut hosts the Yemeni Army, while the coastal areas are under the protection of the Hadhrami Tribesmen.</p>
ECONOMY
Please see general economic issues <a href="#">here</a> .
SOCIAL
Please see general social issues <a href="#">here</a> .
SECURITY
<p><b>Competition:</b> There is a competition for supremacy between Hadhramaut’s two main military districts, situated in Seiyun and Mukalla. The competition leads to lack of cooperation, and a continuous degrading of the security of the citizens.</p> <p><b>Perceived corruption:</b> Yemeni army commanders present in Wadi Hadhramaut are considered to benefit from various contracts with national and international companies to provide the security of oil and gas facilities in the governorate. In the same time, there is a trend of military personnel taking over civilian administration roles, for which they do not possess the right competences.</p> <p><b>Componence of the security forces:</b> The security forces in the south of Yemen contain soldiers from the north as well. As a consequence many south-Hadhramis see these forces as occupying ones, especially those who favor an autonomous Hadhramaut.</p> <p><b>Non-state security actors:</b> The existing extremist groups (AQAP, IS) on the territory of Hadhramaut pose concern for the security of the local civilians. During the last 6 years the governorate was the scene of a series of assassinations and insurgencies, which could not be countered by the state’s security agencies. This led to the conclusion that the state agencies are weak and unable to protect the citizens.</p>

## TERRITORY & CULTURE

**Identity:** The Hadhramis have a very strong national sub-identity or tribal identity, which is regarded as a key in organizing and managing community life and relations. This identity extends to the overall governorate identity as well, which makes it difficult for many to accept the rule of any other authority; such as Aden for example.<sup>xxviii</sup>

**The two Hadhramauts:** The power struggle between the main political actors of southern Yemen is dividing the governorate in two. North of Hadhramaut is being influenced by the internationally recognized government of president Hadi, while the south of Hadhramaut is under the protection of the Hadhrami Elite Forces, who have been key in fighting AQAP, and are backing the Southern Transitional Council (STC). This political struggle can impact the territorial unity of the governorate, and contribute to protracted clashes.

### C3. The water conflicts of Wadi Hadhramaut

The water conflicts of Wadi Hadhramaut mirror the overall Yemeni reality. They are the results of the long-standing and severe water scarcity induced by [historical shifts in water management practices](#), various [socio-economic factors](#), the [climate change](#), and the [access to and availability of the natural resource](#), all presented in the earlier chapter of the report. The war and its effects on the various sectors of the state and society further exacerbate the factors contributing to water scarcity, becoming [key drivers](#) of community water tensions.

Based on the September 2019 FAO and IOM consultation with the Environment Protection Authority, the National Water Resources Authority (Ministry of Water and Environment), and the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation in Hadhramaut, the general water conflict trends in the governorate manifest in the following manner. “Due to water overexploitation and mismanagement, lands along Wadi Hadhramaut are becoming less fertile, while climate change creates more flooding and other natural disasters. The water catchment system in the valley is damaged and land plots suffer damage from the recurrent floods. Due to neglected water infrastructure, farmers resort to finding their own short-term solutions, such as digging their own wells, which in the long-run result in further water and land degradation as well as conflict. New wells often interfere with other existing wells causing tensions among water users. Villages also compete for water resources, with some villages diverting water and preventing other villages from accessing it. Along with these emergent conflicts, authorities also noted long-term, entrenched water conflicts rooted in history and tribal relations. Authorities also noted the lack of interventions to address these issues, as there is a limited number of humanitarian and development actors working in Hadhramaut compared to many other governorates in Yemen.”<sup>xxix</sup>

Concretizing these trends to the immediate implementation area of the “Water for Peace” project, the information presented in the rest of the sub-chapter draw on the findings of the project’s baseline survey, and conflict mapping session of its inception workshop.

#### C3.1 Community conflict lines around water resources in Wadi Hadhramaut

Honing in the geographical focus, at least four sites need to be taken into consideration for their potential of harboring water conflicts: Wadi Thabi, Wadi Edid, Wadi Dammoun, and the main stream adjacent to Tarim city. While only a small fraction of the baseline interlocutors have reported knowledge of water resource related conflicts in their areas (9.65%), the presented cases of the baseline and conflict-mapping workshop offer a good overview of the essence of the water conflicts in the Hadhramaut wadis. These represent the immediate community conflict lines around which community groups rally based on their competing or concurring needs and interest.

Table 5 - Community conflict lines around water resources in Wadi Hadhramaut

#### COMMUNITY CONFLICT LINES AROUND WATER RESOURCES IN WADI HADHRAMAUT

- Accessing and benefitting from flood water passing through the Wadi Thabi
- Maintaining and operating torrent pathways in an efficient manner in Wadi Edid
- Land cultivation related water usage in Wadi Edid
- Access to ground water versus torrent water in Wadi Dammoun farms
- Upstream and downstream population water access and usage rights
- The quality of water infrastructure

- The environmental, economic, social, etc. impact of mismanaged rain/ flood water
- Creation and impact of new water sources
- The quality of water available for agriculture and personal use
- The opportune timing to benefit and use torrent water

### *C3.2 Conflict drivers around water resources in Wadi Hadhramaut*

The development and maintenance of these community conflict lines around water resources are driven by two main sets of factors. On the one hand, there are a series of cultural, structural, attitudinal and behavioral factors that create and feed conflicts around water resources, on the other hand, there are the factors that obstruct the resolution of water conflicts.

*Table 6 - Conflict causes & drivers around water resources in Wadi Hadhramaut*

STRUCTURAL CAUSES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The lack of early warning systems for floods, which makes it impossible to anticipate heavy rains and prepare for heavy torrents</li> <li>• Infrastructural damage to large parts of the flood irrigation system</li> <li>• Torrent pathways obstructed or deepened randomly by construction work or vegetation (e.g. Sesbania trees)</li> <li>• Urban sprawl near the torrent pathways</li> <li>• Increased volume of flood water entering the valley from downstream</li> <li>• Reduced presence and duty performance of government authorities responsible for the management of the torrent pathways</li> <li>• Absence of laws relevant to the water sector (e.g. land tenants' rights are not guaranteed legally, interventions/ new work on torrent pathways are not regulated legally)</li> <li>• Weakness of the rule of law related to water resource issues</li> <li>• Rising prices for water extraction</li> </ul>
BEHAVIORAL DRIVERS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Landowners' lack of awareness of the public interest to access and benefit from the flood water</li> <li>• Landowners lack of awareness of the damages to flood irrigation systems</li> <li>• Resulting lack of rehabilitation/ consolidation work of irrigation systems</li> <li>• Misuse of water during cultivation of land due to seeking financial gains</li> <li>• Abandonment of farmlands by their owners</li> <li>• Dispute over lands near the torrent pathways</li> </ul>
ATTITUDINAL DRIVERS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The indifference, and consequent lack of position taking, of the community related to community-harming interventions</li> </ul>
HISTORICO-CULTURAL DRIVERS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The nationalization of farmlands and issuance of the Agricultural Reform Law, that replaced traditional torrent pathways regulating mechanisms</li> <li>• Negligence of relevant customs and traditions related to the regulation of the use of torrent pathways</li> </ul>

*Table 7 - Conflict resolution blockers around water resources in Wadi Hadhramaut*

CONFLICT RESOLUTION BLOCKERS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of funding/ financial support to address the infrastructural issues causing conflicts around water resources</li> <li>• Lack of engagement and management from state sector representatives a) in addressing the infrastructural issues causing conflicts around water resources, and b) in mitigating the conflicts around water resources</li> <li>• Lack of support from law enforcement actors in managing conflicts around water resources</li> <li>• Lack of easily accessible water sources</li> <li>• Lack of interest in resolving the water conflicts through long-term, sustainable solutions</li> </ul>

- The persistent war that wears down the communities' capacity to engage in water conflict resolution in a constructive manner, due to the following contextual stressors:

#### STRESSORS

- The continuous presence of the threat of violence or violence itself
- Chronic shortage of natural resources and basic goods
- The rising prices in a country with dramatic loss of income and livelihood opportunities
- The subsequent food and water insecurity
- The absence of opportunities and public/ social services that contributes to the feeling of hopelessness
- The demographic changes experienced by certain communities due to the war

### *C3.3 Effects of water conflicts in Wadi Hadhramaut*

The delayed resolution of water conflicts in the project's implementation area bear direct implications on the livelihood of the Wadi Hadhramaut communities, and further exacerbate the existing negative relationship dynamics between and within communities. As some of the effects may become later the causes of new conflicts around water resources, their mitigation is equally relevant to the ones of the conflict drivers.

#### RELATIONSHIP DYNAMICS IMPACT

- The spread of tension to the wider community, including children
- Worsening relationship between rich farmers and farmers with less assets

#### SECTORAL IMPACT

##### Economic impact:

- Farm lands located in the proximity of damaged irrigation systems are not cultivated anymore, as they do not offer economic return
- Flood-induced soil erosion in farms contribute to the overall decrease in family income, as it prevents community members from working in the fields
- Due to the loss of torrent water, there is a decrease in the size of farm lands cultivated through this method
- The misuse of water weakens some farmers' agricultural production and income
- Switch from production to service delivery

##### Gender economics impact:

- Soil erosion reduces women farmers' opportunities to contribute to the family income
- Decrease of employment opportunities in the field of agriculture for women

##### Social impact:

- Flood affected areas are isolated from services, infrastructure and community life
- School attendance reduces as school children are isolated
- Decrease of income contributes to a decline in marriage numbers among the youth

##### Environmental impact:

- Vegetation damage (e.g. the Christ Thorn Jujube trees are dying out)
- A change of vegetation can be observed, economically useful plants being replaced by less valuable ones
- Flood induced soil erosion

##### Infrastructural impact:

- Torrents encountering blocked pathways destroy private and public property
- The Dammoun valley's topside deepening to increase groundwater volume has contributed to the deprivation of farm lands from torrent irrigation

##### Livestock impact:

- Decrease in animal wealth and increase in the price of livestock feed

##### Health impact:

- Stagnant water puddles increase the risk of diseases for the community
- Malnutrition as food security is compromised

#### C4. Water conflict resolution in Wadi Hadhramaut

Understanding the resolution of water conflicts in Wadi Hadhramaut needs to take into consideration several layers: a) the overall practice of water conflict resolution in Yemen, b) the potential particularities of water conflict resolution in Wadi Hadhramaut, and c) the role of women and youth in these resolution processes.

##### C4.1 The overall practice of water conflict resolution in Yemen

“The absence/weakness of official governing bodies in many geographical locations has led to the absence of the rule of law. In many rural regions of the state, communities are either self-ruling or dependent on social/tribal structures to govern their matters. The tribal system works as follows; tribe delegates their sheik, and the sheiks meet to resolve the conflict. If the conflict is simple, both sheiks decide on the common acceptable resolution, which is binding to both tribes. However, when the conflict had bloodshed, in most of these cases it is highly unlikely a resolution is reached. With the weak to non-existent presence of local authorities in some remote locations, governance is left to the most influential individuals.”<sup>xxx</sup>

In what water conflict resolution is concerned the overall picture is as follows:

Table 8 – Yemeni water conflict resolution and its limitations

OVERALL WATER CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN YEMEN
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A number of statutory laws and customary rules, some founded on the Islamic law, others on modern, secular law</li> <li>• In the majority of the cases local, traditional mechanisms are preferred to the formal ones</li> <li>• The customary mediators/ arbitrators are sheiks</li> </ul>
LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING WATER CONFLICT RESOLUTION PRACTICES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of codification/ documentation of management practices;</li> <li>• The weak presence or absence of rule of law makes it difficult to enforce modern/ secular laws</li> <li>• Influential stakeholders may easily interfere in the resolution to achieve a favorable outcome</li> <li>• Formal water conflict resolution mechanisms linked to the may be considered inefficient, as communities often consider them to lack knowledge of local customs and relationship dynamics</li> <li>• As customary water conflict mediators/ arbitrators (sheiks) are also the biggest water users and are paid for their services, the impartiality of their rulings cannot be guaranteed.</li> </ul>

##### C4.2. Potential particularities of water conflict resolution in Wadi Hadhramaut

Honing in on the implementation area of the “Water for Peace” projects, four conflict resolution mechanisms are recommended to be taken into consideration in case of water resources. The below table is based on the findings from the conflict mapping session of the project’s inception workshop. It highlights the most common water conflict resolution mechanisms, along with their participatory nature, frequency of use, the opposability of their rulings, and their ability to restore community harmony.

Table 9 – Water conflict resolution mechanisms and their limitations in Wadi Hadhramaut

MECHANISMS	PARTICIPATORY NATURE	FREQUENCY OF USE	OPPOSABILITY OF RULING	ABILITY TO RESTORE COMMUNITY HARMONY
Community-based negotiations	Community participates in decision making	Repeatedly	Non-binding	Community harmony restored, conflict deescalated, community income increased
Community-based negotiation with the help of a Multi-lateral Committee	Community participates in decision making	Repeatedly	Non-binding	Community harmony restored, conflict deescalated, community income increased

Common law arbitration through Community Leaders Committee. (community-based)	Community is informed of the decision	One time	Binding	Community harmony restored, conflict deescalated, community income increased
Judiciary (official)	Community is informed of the decision	One time	Binding	Community harmony restored, conflict deescalated, community income increased
<b>LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING WATER CONFLICT RESOLUTION PRACTICES</b>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contradictions from Table 8</li> <li>• The community-based practices, with a wide participation margin and non-binding ruling, require multiple sessions to reach an agreement that could restore community harmony over water resources. These are time-consuming processes that do not offer rapid resolution. Thus the conflicts may linger for a longer period, opening up the possibility of escalation due to needs and interests being met at a slower pace.</li> <li>• The official mechanisms, which generate legally binding rulings in a shorter time, are less integrative of the community, thus their rulings may be less community-centered, and less accepted by the community as customized solutions to their needs.</li> </ul>				

As for what these water conflict resolution mechanisms should focus on technically in the project's implementation area next to the rehabilitation of peaceful community relationships, the project's baseline survey shows the following findings:

*Table 10 - Sustainable resolution of water conflicts in Wadi Hadhramaut require*

SUSTAINABLE RESOLUTION OF WATER CONFLICTS IN WADI HADHRAMAUT REQUIRE	% OF RESPONDENTS
Rehabilitation of canals	25
Provision of safe drinking water	17
Drilling new wells	14
Protection of land	12
Ensuring water reaches farm lands	10
Financial aid	8
The establishment of solar pumps	5
Land reform	5
Prevention of farm robbery	2
Supporting Water User Associations	2

#### *C4.3 The role of women and youth in water conflict resolution in Wadi Hadhramaut*

"Women and youth represent 60% of the agriculture workforce. [...] under the current conflict, the role of women and youth has increased in supporting the household needs and livelihoods for the typical Yemeni family. More women are becoming their family's primary earners, as men are working less due to the conflict, leading to increased income-earning opportunities for women. In addition, the engagement of men in conflicts has increased the number of female-headed households."<sup>xxxi</sup> Also prior, but especially after this slow and subtle change of role in their families' livelihood generation, women and youth have been and are directly impacted by water-related conflicts in their communities, and thus, directly interested in their resolution. In addition, as community-based, participatory conflict resolution mechanisms are the most preferred by the community, it is important to explore the possible role of women and youth in such fora in order to boost the sustainability of water conflict resolution results.

While traditionally women in Yemen are less involved in conflict resolution due to their restricted public roles, the tribal areas provide examples of avenues through which they can contribute to the de-escalation of tensions. As reported by UNWOMEN, some of these roles are:

- Direct actions: education of children to handle conflicts peacefully, advising family towards mediation instead of revenge, relief work, accompanying one or the other conflict party by making use of the weakness principle and impulse to protect women, taking away weapons, invoking *tadreek* (suspension of hostilities) to ask for arbitration, asking the opponents for *tahkeem* (arbitration);
- Symbolic actions: cutting their hair off, taking off the veil and placing it with the opponent.<sup>xxxii</sup>

For the implementation area of the “Water for Peace” project, its baseline survey explored the extent to which women and youth should and could be part of water conflict resolution in their communities. The gathered data show that there is a general positive attitude of the respondents towards the idea of involving women and youth in their water conflict resolution processes. The survey also confirms the validity of the overall conflict resolution roles of Yemeni women to Wadi Hadhramaut.

Table 11 - Public opinion about the role of women and youth in water conflict resolution processes

KEY CONSIDERATIONS	YES	NO
The community would accept the involvement of women and youth in the water conflict resolution processes	72%	28%
Women’s and youth’s voices are heard and decisions accepted by the community	69%	31%
Women and youth could have a variation of roles in water conflict resolution processes	66%	34%
Women and youth would be willing to engage in water conflict resolution	74%	26%
There is a possibility of involving women and youth in training for water conflict resolution	76%	24%
ROLES WOMEN AND YOUTH COULD HOLD IN WATER CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESSES		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community awareness raising during conflict resolution processes</li> <li>• Educating the community through seminars in schools and mosques</li> <li>• Positively influencing their immediate and extended families</li> <li>• Forming associations/ circles in support of conflict resolution</li> <li>• Instilling constructive values in the community</li> <li>• Supporting and advocating for peaceful coexistence</li> <li>• Dialoging with the elders on the best solutions for water conflicts</li> <li>• Acting as a calming factor in a tensed situations</li> </ul>		

While the majority of the respondents were in favor of the involvement of women and youth in the water conflict resolution processes, on the average a quarter of the respondents were expressing their negative view on the matter. Understanding the factors that contribute to community resistance to such possibility allows for the development of awareness raising activities and mitigation measures that would result in an improved community acceptance of women and youth in water conflict resolution processes.

Table 12 - Challenges to women and youth engagement in water conflict resolution

CHALLENGES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Unequal legal standing and unequal access to the formal legal system and customary law</li> <li>• Gender segregation [...] contribute[s] to women’s low level of political participation in community and national public life</li> <li>• Women’s heavy burden of reproductive responsibilities [...] as well as productive roles</li> <li>• Destructive practices [...] and forms of violence against women</li> <li>• Cultural concepts: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ <i>Du’afa</i> (weak) – female opinions, ideas and voices do not carry the same weight as those of a man</li> <li>◦ <i>Jahl</i> (ignorance) – female ideas and opinions being perceived as not well-reasoned and thus not listened to</li> </ul> </li> </ul>



- *Honor* – translates into a loss of mobility, employment and educational opportunities for women and girls<sup>xxxiii</sup>
- <<Historical and traditional community governance norms and customs that lead to community opposition to the engagement of women/ youth in water conflict resolution
- The reduced public space for women and youth to engage in conflict resolution work
- Low level of literacy and education, that make it even more difficult to engage in such work
- Traditionally accepted gender roles
- Traditional prejudices and lack of trust in women and their leadership/ decision making capabilities>><sup>xxxiv</sup>

#### D. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS – WADI HADHRAUT<sup>xxxv</sup>

STAKEHOLDER	DESCRIPTION	IMPACT/ INTEREST	POWER/ INFLUENCE	WHAT DO WE NEED FROM THEM?	PERCEIVED ATTITUDES/ RISKS	STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Water User Associations (WUA) + and Women Water User Groups (WWUG) + NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Local associations working in integrated water resource management projects and who serve as community representatives in all water-related matters</li> <li>Implementation of the ten-year strategic plans of the societies and executive plans</li> </ul>	High	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commitment to support the implementation of project activities</li> <li>Maintaining a neutral and unbiased stance in beneficiary selection</li> <li>Acting as a link between the women of the neighborhood and the committee/ women's advisor.</li> <li>Focus on solving issues concerning women, children, and vulnerable people, organizing traditional events, supervision of children, and participating in the distribution of social support.</li> <li>Sustaining the project's activities</li> <li>Adhering to the project's guidelines</li> <li>Ensuring representation of women and youth</li> <li>Ensuring sustainability after project activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The willingness/ lack of willingness of some of the WUA members to implement the association's decisions because of personal interests.</li> <li>Community resistance to women's engagement in project activities</li> <li>Weak women representative participation</li> <li>Inactivity of the association</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monthly meetings with WUA members</li> <li>Technical and administrative capacity-building</li> <li>Appropriate registration and vetting of WUA members</li> <li>Conducting awareness sessions targeted towards community representatives on the importance of women participation throughout the project</li> <li>Empowering women representatives through specific capacity-building efforts</li> </ul>

<p>Female WUA members + Senior women counselors/ female assistants to women's advisor.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Women are the main actors in agriculture and are integral to the production side, though have been less involved in marketing and processing. The planned establishment of Water Users Associations (WUAs) with a women's quota, recognizes the higher number of female headed households (FHH) in the targeted area while affording a community role in the management of irrigation water. It is also acknowledged that women have a particular role in the resolution of local disputes. Indirectly, women have separate networks than men, discuss community issues and are able to access the wives of prominent decision-makers who are able to make a change and resolve disputes. Directly, women who are "literate and active in the community" could actively participate in WUA decision-making processes, making a change at the local institutional level.</li> <li>• Women are culturally afforded protection from any physical violence or intimidation, which is also a contributing factor to their role in the project. This particular protection or status has not been undermined by the ongoing conflict.</li> </ul>	<p>High</p>	<p>High</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Play an influential role within integrated water resources management</li> <li>• Facilitate dialogue between various partners</li> <li>• Ensure sustainability after project activities</li> <li>• Responsibilities of women regarding the water metering, tariffs and services will be stipulated in their contracts with the Water User Associations in the targeted areas.</li> <li>• Play a role in the project by building the capacity of local women to monitor sub-project impacts.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social barriers by some male members</li> <li>• Cultural barriers and hesitation to participate in some of the activities</li> <li>• Interest in livelihood and sources of income</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Setting a specific ratio of WUA board members that must be comprised of women</li> <li>• Hiring female field staff to engage actively with women</li> <li>• Training targeted female beneficiaries on water management and improved agriculture practices</li> <li>• Adapting project activities so as to respect cultural aspects within local communities involved in informing women about official notices and information.</li> </ul>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pivotal beneficiaries and influential members within WUAs. Influence and flexibility in the facilitation of the project's activities</li> <li>• Senior women counselors are selected by the households of the territory together with the local committee from those local women who are the most respected, active and educated.</li> </ul>					
Youth WUA members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Youth have few economic or livelihood options beyond labor and local trading concerns that are family-owned. However, the absence of livelihood opportunities increases the likelihood of recruitment into armed groups. Traditionally outside patriarchal decision-making institutions, engaging youth in cash activities and in the management of water would likely reduce a sense of marginalization.</li> <li>• Pivotal beneficiaries with the capacity and capability to set in motion the project's activities on the field</li> </ul>	High	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Take a leading role along with other WUA members to roll out the project's activities</li> <li>• Responsibilities of youth regarding the water metering, tariffs and services will be stipulated in their contracts with the Water User Associations in the targeted areas.</li> <li>• Play a role in the project by building the capacity of local youth to monitor sub-project impacts.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of interest in the project</li> <li>• Inability to be engaged due to suppression by older individuals within the community</li> <li>• Engagement in other activities Such as engaging in armed conflict</li> <li>• They do not have sufficient experience in water resources management and monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Setting a specific ratio of WUA board members that must be comprised of youth</li> <li>• The training targeted youth beneficiaries on integrated water resources management and improved agriculture practices</li> <li>• Providing youth with livelihood support through hiring them as casual labor within the project and cash for work activities</li> </ul>
Farmers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct beneficiaries of the project through cash for work interventions and the</li> </ul>	High	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commitment to follow through the project's activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of interest in the project by some farmers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Active engagement in the project's activities</li> </ul>

	rehabilitation of water infrastructure			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adhering to the project's guidelines</li> <li>• Active participation within WUAs</li> <li>• Provision of feedback</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The dominance of large-scale farmers and resistance to change</li> <li>• Lack of trust and confidence in WUAs due to past experience of WUA members acting based on personal interest rather than public.</li> <li>• Lack of commitment to operation and maintenance of water harvesting facilities after project completion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appointing farmers in the board of the WUAs</li> <li>• Ensuring that both small- and large-scale farmers are part of the WUA</li> <li>• The training of targeted farmer beneficiaries on integrated water resources management, improved agriculture practices and operation and maintenance of water harvesting facilities.</li> </ul>
Powerful sheikhs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Believe that they have the right to control natural resources as part of their status (self-interest and afraid to lose power)</li> <li>• Ignorance of technical solutions and belief that the current system is the only way</li> </ul>	High	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Play an influential role in water resources management</li> <li>• Facilitate dialogue between various parties</li> <li>• Take a leading role along with other WUA members to roll out the project's activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have control/influence over the local community</li> <li>• Can halt project activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Involve sheikhs in consultative committees. Empower WUAs from local communities. Engage local committees and higher authorities</li> <li>• Provide the same benefits to sheikhs through the project through the provision of advanced technology in</li> </ul>

						<p>order to gain their acceptance/buy-in</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Raise awareness among sheikhs and other community members of the benefits of new technologies. Work with local leaders/sheikhs to explain the project to the communities</li> </ul>
Private sector enterprises and businesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In the project, there is a range of privately-owned businesses that rely on a regular supply of good quality agriculture productions for their activities and products. The private sector will be positively impacted by the program and improved water management will directly contribute to the growth and improved profitability of these businesses.</li> </ul>	High	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide facilities for farmers to purchase water-use upgrading methods (modern irrigation systems, solar power pumps)</li> <li>• Play an influential role in water resources management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide poor quality materials</li> <li>• Lack of interest in the project</li> <li>• Lack of trust and confidence in WUAs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Raise awareness among private sector members of the benefits of new technologies</li> <li>• Regular meetings to ensure they are updated and well-informed of the project's activities</li> </ul>

## E. CONFLICT SENSITIVITY CONSIDERATIONS: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As conflict sensitive practices require the understanding and working with the mutual reinforcing relationship between the “Water for Peace” project and its implementation context, it is important to highlight two main sets of conflict sensitivity considerations:

- a) Context-related conflict sensitivity considerations – for ensuring an external work environment which supports the relevance and efficiency of project activities, its positive impact, and the sustainability of project results;
- b) Project activities-related conflict sensitivity considerations – which reduce the possibility of implementing activities that may have the potential to generate unintended negative impacts in the implementation context of the project itself.

*Table 13 - Conflict sensitivity considerations related to the project implementation context*

CONTEXTUAL CONFLICT DRIVERS	CONFLICT SENSITIVITY CONSIDERATIONS
<b>GENERAL - COUNTRY CONTEXT</b>	
Political corruption and exclusion, with inequitable government service delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ensure that project stakeholders/ partners/ service deliverers with active role in the project have legitimacy and good reputation in the served communities (vetting processes).</li> <li>• Involve in the project’s decision-making processes community representatives who offer voice to the people experiencing water conflicts and related hardships, and marginalized communities.</li> <li>• Ensure that the project’s MEAL framework monitors the promises made to project stakeholders and beneficiaries in the frame of the project, and actively follow up on their implementation.</li> <li>• Monitor the stakeholders’ / beneficiaries’ satisfaction rate with project activities, results and staff.</li> <li>• Explore how to visibly reinforce the project’s adherence to the principle of transparency, and its zero-tolerance policy towards favoritism, nepotism and corruption.</li> </ul>
Inequitable economic development, poverty and rising prices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify any possible negative market effects the project activities may have and put in place mitigation mechanisms for it.</li> <li>• Ensure equality of distribution/ allocation in Cash for Work activities and other project tasks.</li> </ul>
Youth alienation and vulnerability to recruitment into violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Understand which are the major impediments of the youth for participating in project activities (community perspective and youth perspective).</li> <li>• Develop measures to reduce these impediments with the participation of youth and the community.</li> <li>• Raise awareness of direct project benefits to youth in long term, and resulting community benefits.</li> </ul>
Poor-quality education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Explore and understand what are the community training needs characteristic to the project (what exists, what are the gaps).</li> <li>• Ensure that trainers and training materials employed and used in the project respect standard competency criteria and curricula for each chosen topic.</li> <li>• When and where possible prioritize the employment of legitimate, professionally respected local, IDP and returnee professionals.</li> </ul>
Sexual and gender-based violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Explore whether project activities might affect gender roles in a manner that may trigger negative reactions towards women.</li> <li>• In cases where abuse is remotely possible, adjust activities.</li> </ul>

Poor natural resource management and ensuing disputes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Explore with the community which would be the best practices and lessons learned on water management in the implementation area, and how could they be used efficiently as conflict prevention mechanisms.</li> </ul>
<b>GENERAL - GOVERNORATE CONTEXT</b>	
Power fragmentation and the resulting governance void	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinate with relevant governmental authorities, non-governmental entities, formal and informal community leaders and religious figures, while ensuring also community contribution to decision making.</li> </ul>
Legitimacy and competency to govern	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Engage the local communities and consult them before implementing any kind of activities in their respective areas.</li> <li>Utilize competent local experts/ community members that are familiar with local customs and needs.</li> </ul>
Competition for power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Emphasize to all members of the community and target beneficiaries that the project was launched for the sole benefit of the people.</li> <li>Identify if there is the possibility that the project takes over local roles or replaces local efforts (substitution effect) through its activities.</li> <li>In case there is a remote chance of this happening, change strategy, in order to cooperate with the existing efforts, boosting their capacity for success.</li> </ul>
Strong national sub-identity/ tribal identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify and understand which are the major identity lines in the project's implementation area, and in which way they may influence community perception over the project, and the implementation of project activities.</li> <li>Ensure that project targeting, selection, distribution, hiring and procurement criteria do not overlap with any conflicting identity lines in the community.</li> </ul>
The political struggle of two Hadhramauts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify if project activities might unintendedly confer legitimacy to or support any political entity or agenda involved in local, governorate-wide or national power struggles (legitimization effect).</li> <li>In case there is a remote chance of that happening, explore how to reinforce the project's respect for the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence.</li> </ul>
<b>SPECIFIC - WATER RESOURCES</b>	
Disconnect and lack of cooperation between water authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implement the project activities in cooperation with relevant governmental authorities, non-governmental entities, formal and informal community leaders and religious figures who have a role in water resource management.</li> <li>Involve the residents of the targeted areas in the implementation of project activities.</li> </ul>
Lack of management of water supplies and water ways (torrent pathways)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Check if project activities offer a negative or positive example on water supply management. In case negative practices are found, explore how to transform them, so that no negative impact will be generated on the water supply.</li> <li>Consider what will happen to materials/ equipment/ garbage/ debris left over from project activities, how and where will they be stored, how they will be disposed of.</li> </ul>
Demographic changes and their impact of the water resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure that project targeting, selection, distribution, hiring and procurement criteria are not status-based but vulnerability-based.</li> </ul>
Power and class dynamics related to water access and usage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify if project activities might unintendedly confer legitimacy to or support any negative power or class dynamics, agenda, structures, policies, or practices in local, governorate-wide or national power struggles (legitimization effect).</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In case there is a remote chance of that happening, explore how to reinforce the project's respect for the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence.</li> </ul>
The water usage rights of upstream and downstream communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document secular/ tribal laws and structures related to water management and the upstream/ downstream water users rights.</li> </ul>
The access to ground water versus torrent water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify what were previous interventions on the water infrastructure in the project implementation area, what are the community's grievances over these interventions, what they consider as successful.</li> <li>Give space for the community to express their point of view on what quality water infrastructure rehabilitation means and what would be useful for them.</li> </ul>
Quality of water infrastructure and related existing inputs	
Creation and impact of new water sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure that water infrastructure rehabilitation or creation work would not obstruct or reduce the access to water resources to any part of the community (target or non-target community groups).</li> <li>Ensure that the rehabilitated or newly created water infrastructures would not obstruct or reduce the access to water resources to any part of the community (target or non-target community groups).</li> </ul>
External interferences without contextual knowledge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure that project staff are informed of the findings of the current context and conflict analysis.</li> <li>Implement a project team-wide conflict-sensitivity program clinic, in order to explore the conflict sensitivity implications of the project activities, jointly realigning the project plans and developing mitigation strategies if and where needed in the project.</li> <li>Develop a short Conflict Sensitivity Code of Conduct, outlining the key principles and minimum standards by which project staff, partners and service providers need to abide.</li> </ul>
<b>SPECIFIC – WATER CONFLICT RESOLUTION</b>	
Lack of codification/ documentation of water management practices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document secular/ tribal laws and structures related to water management and the upstream/ downstream water users rights.</li> <li>Ensure that capacity building/ training programs for water conflict resolution include information on the provisions of both sets of laws, in order to raise community awareness on the rights of upstream and downstream users.</li> </ul>
Lack of rule of law and resulting lack of reinforcement of secular law	Not applicable for the project
The interference of influential figures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify if project activities might unintendedly confer legitimacy to or support any local, governorate-wide or national influential figure who can and would be interested to influence water conflict resolution in their own favor during the project's implementation (legitimization effect).</li> <li>In case there is a remote chance of that happening, explore how to reinforce the project's respect for the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence.</li> <li>Ensure that all members who join the WUAs and the WWUGs as a result of this project are seen and accepted by the community as unbiased, honest and accountable, with no hidden agenda in resolving water conflicts.</li> </ul>
The lack of contextual/ localized knowledge water conflict resolution actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Make sure that all members of the WAU and WWUGs who will be trained through the project to be involved in water conflict resolution are local or have a good understanding of the local community dynamics and relations, traditions and customs, political and religious sensitivities.</li> </ul>

The perceived partiality of traditional water conflict mediators/ arbitrators.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Similar to the section “<a href="#">The interference of influential figures</a>”</li> </ul>
Lack of resources, interest and support to resolve the root causes of water conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Explore the expectations of the project stakeholders and beneficiaries related to the project and its benefits to the community are concerned.</li> <li>• Clarify with the project stakeholders, direct and indirect beneficiaries and their communities the purpose of the project and the extent to which it can bring support and benefits to the community, in order not to create false expectations.</li> </ul>
<b>SPECIFIC – GENDER</b>	
Water collecting roles that impede women from having education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Involve the feedback and recommendations of a gender specialist with experience in Yemen, in order to ensure that project activities do not create unintended negative gender and family dynamics in the targeted communities.</li> </ul> <p>Recommendations from the conflict mapping session of the project inception workshop:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Respect and adhere to customs and traditions.</li> <li>• Ensure the work related to project implementation which involve activities with women are at suitable times and in areas that can be accessed by women.</li> <li>• Make sure that the activities planned for women are culturally appropriate</li> <li>• Assign female staff to project activities engaging women from the community.</li> </ul>
Unequal legal standing and access to formal/ customary legal system	
Gender segregation leading to low community and civic participation	
Destructive roles and practices against women	
Perceptions of women weakness, ignorance and honorability	
Historical/ traditional community governance norms and customs	
Low level of literacy and education rate	

Table 14 - Conflict sensitivity considerations related to the project activities

PROJECT ACTIVITIES	CONFLICT SENSITIVITY CONSIDERATIONS
Stakeholders meetings to identify conflicts' history and, consequences.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implement a project team-wide conflict-sensitivity program clinic, in order to explore the conflict sensitivity implications of the project activities, jointly realigning the project plans and developing mitigation strategies if and where needed in the project.</li> </ul>
In close cooperation with beneficiaries propose and discuss the proper solution, through individuals and group meetings.	
Formulate the negotiated agreement with the community	
Meetings on the impact of conflict over water bodies.	
Key Informant Meetings on the importance of women's and youth participation: to be held with the influential actors in each area.	
Focus group discussion to identify the most suitable mitigation measures.	
Provide pertaining consolation service through mobile, WhatsApp, etc.	
Carry out mitigation measures such as forestation and afforestation.	
Creation/reactivation of WUAs.	
Formulating Conflict Resolution Committees (CRCs).	

On-going strengthening on WUA operational issues: natural resources manage, conflict resolution process, economic self-reliance and enhancing social cohesion.	
Gender analysis report including level of operations, constraints, and challenges.	
Identify women community leaders.	
Formulation/activation of WWUGs in each WUA.	
Build the capacity of women on problem analysis and communication skills.	
Support WWUGs to apply good governance practices.	
Awareness campaign on women role in conflict resolution.	
Conduct women accessibly and empowerment training program.	
Recruiting cash for work casual labor.	
Remove sediments and trees out of channels.	
Rehabilitation of sub-channels' gates.	
Rehabilitation of main channels.	
Protecting the land from erosion and securing villages behind them using gabions.	

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- <sup>iii</sup> AQUASTAT, Country fact Sheet Yemen, FAO, [https://storage.googleapis.com/fao-aquastat.appspot.com/countries\\_regions/factsheets/summary\\_statistics/en/YEM-CF.pdf](https://storage.googleapis.com/fao-aquastat.appspot.com/countries_regions/factsheets/summary_statistics/en/YEM-CF.pdf), accessed on 28.01.2020.
- <sup>iv</sup> Encyclopedia of the Nations, Yemen, <https://tinyurl.com/tkkaa7e>, accessed on 28.01.2020.
- <sup>v</sup> UNHCR, “Operation Yemen. 2020 Planning Summary” in “UNHCR Global Focus”, p. 4, <https://tinyurl.com/twhmh4l>, accessed on 28.01.2020.
- <sup>vi</sup> FAOSTAT, Yemen, FAO, <https://tinyurl.com/qowoe2k>, accessed in 28.01.2020.
- <sup>vii</sup> World Bank, <https://tinyurl.com/gqwwvsv>, accessed on 28.01.2020.
- <sup>viii</sup> Colloquially called al-Hirak, the Southern Movement is a political movement in Southern Yemen. It was established in 2007, with the aim of restoring the independent state of South Yemen to its 1994 internationally recognized borders.
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- <sup>xviii</sup> <https://www.ecc-platform.org/about-ecc>
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