Final evaluation of the UN Peace Building Fund project ‘Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development’

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# Acronyms

EMG Evaluation Management Group

FGD Focus Group Discussion

GBV Gender Based Violence

GEWE Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment

IP Implementing Partner

JSC Joint Steering Committee

KII Key Informant Interview

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

PBF UN Peace Building Fund

PBSO UN Peace Building Support Office

PDA Peace and Development Adviser

RF Results Framework

RUNO Recipient UN Organisation

SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

UNEG United Nations Evaluation Group

UNCT United Nations Country Team

UNRCCA United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy

VFM Value For Money

WUA Water Users Association

# Executive Summary

This report sets out the final evaluation of the PBF project ‘Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development’. The evaluation was commissioned by the Evaluation Management Group (EMG) comprised of the ten agencies that implemented the project (five in Kyrgyzstan, 5 in Tajikistan). The Project was launched in December 2015 for an initial period of 18 months, funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) under its Immediate Response Facility (IRF) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). The project was conceived in response to an escalation of tensions and violence in the border regions between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2013-4. The project was designed for short-term stabilisation in preparation for longer-term sustainable peace. It aimed to contribute to the outcome ‘*cooperation and trust between communities increased towards mitigating risks of renewed violence*’ and was implemented in six cross-border village clusters.

The first phase of the project was reviewed in a mid-term review conducted by PeaceNexus. This review found broadly positive results and continued relevance for the project, given the continuing state of fragility in the cross-border areas.[[1]](#footnote-1) A follow-up phase for the project was approved and a revised project document developed for a second phase of 18 months from April 2018 to October 2019. During its second phase, the project came to face some major challenges. One of the project’s canal infrastructure interventions became problematic. Consequently, perceived further risks around infrastructure-related interventions led to a delay in the sign-off of the phase 2 work plan by the Government of Kyrgyzstan. This in turn brought delays and impacted on the ability of the project to strengthen cross-border dialogue platforms and implement in a cross-border manner. This was further hampered by a serious deterioration in the border context from the beginning of 2019. This evaluation assesses the project according to the standard OECD DAC criteria of effectiveness; efficiency; relevance and sustainability. The evaluation objectives set out in the ToR included a sentence that has been added as an impact-level question: the overall added value to peacebuilding in cross-border areas in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The evaluation faced some important constraints. The data collection process was affected by the lack of government permission to visit Khudjand and the project sites in Tajikistan due to heightened tensions in the border areas. It was not possible to interview many government officials or any border guards or other security providers. The project was unable to commission the planned end-line surveys due to the heightened tensions in the border areas – this is a key documentation gap for the evaluation. The time available for the evaluation was very limited for a project that has comprised two phases, two countries and ten UN agencies.

**Conclusions**

The combination of a lack of end survey data, the challenges faced by the project in phase 2 and the constraints faced by this evaluation means it has been difficult to draw many firm conclusions on the project’s final results and sustainability. The project’s objectives and strategies have been mostly relevant and project activities have been relevant to the needs and priorities of beneficiaries. The evaluation finds that the project was effective in working towards its outcome during the first phase, underpinned by strong conflict sensitive approaches and adaptation to difficult circumstances, good stakeholder consultations and generally good cooperation with government. Effectiveness has progressively weakened during phase 2, impacted by the fact that infrastructure interventions could not be jointly designed based on community consultations and ultimately could not be implemented; the strengthening of *Capacities for Peace* was no longer possible; and cross-border aspects of interventions were more difficult due to the deterioration of the context. Overall, robust efforts were made with regards to coordination between and within UNCTs. Some good efforts were made to mainstream gender throughout the project, although there was a lack of clarity with regards to who was responsible for the tracking of the gender mainstreaming plan. The evaluation investigated a limited set of efficiency related questions and found no major issues with staffing or external communications. The project had a robust M&E plan but this was not followed for phase 2 due to contextual circumstances.

This evaluation finds evidence that the project contributed to the outcome of *increased cooperation and trust between communities to mitigate risks of renewed violence* during phase 1 but it is not possible to draw the same conclusion for phase 2, or to assess how sustainable these results are. The project did contribute to a reduction of a specific type of conflict: those related to water, across both phases. This is likely to be sustainable. Despite its challenges, the project has added value to cross-border peace-building. Beyond its results, it has generated a number of important lessons learned on conflict sensitivity; cross-border coordination (mirroring) and the dilemma between supporting further independence of the communities to reduce immediate conflict through the strengthening of separate infrastructure, and longer-term trust building through the sharing of resources.

To enhance the impact of future cross-border peace building, it is important to continuously review whether working towards separate infrastructure on bother sides of the border is feasible in the long term and the impact of this on trust-building, cross-border linkages and longer-term peace building. Several interlocutors believed that peace building interventions cannot stop conflicts at the border altogether. This makes it even more important to ensure that future cross-border peace building by the UN include a further investigation as to how local level stabilisation efforts can assist efforts towards longer-term solutions for the border areas (see recommendation 9).

**Lessons Learned**

*1.Conflict sensitivity best practice: contextual understanding and alignment; ongoing monitoring*

Conflict sensitivity was mainstreamed as a central element of the project through a combination of measures. Robust and detailed conflict analysis underpinned the project design. The mirroring principle was adopted to ensure interventions on one side of the border were mirrored on the other. Further detailed conflict monitoring was set up to continue during the project through the TRACTION system. This included investments in community level conflict monitors: local community members who knew their communities well. As a result of these investments in ongoing and detailed contextual analysis, the project was able to adapt to changing circumstances on the ground. Despite these robust measures, a dispute ensued around the project’s intervention at the Kaerma canal and then escalated. **This shows the limits of joint decision-making, the crucial role of perceptions and the importance of ensuring ongoing monitoring, communication and transparency to ensure conflict sensitivity (see recommendation 5)**

*2.The mirroring principle: finding a balance between preventing grievances and alignment to context*

Coordination between UNCTs was based on the mirroring principle. As noted above, the aim was to place conflict sensitivity at the heart of the project by ensuring that interventions on one side of the border were mirrored on the other. This was to ensure that differences in interventions did not cause grievances between the communities or perceptions of unfairness or bias. The mirroring principle was mainly concerned with the hard components given the sensitivity of any infrastructure-related interventions. However, interviews for this evaluation as well as the mid-term review show that **a strict application of the mirroring principle can contradict another conflict sensitivity principle: the need to respond and align closely to the context (see recommendation 6)**

*3.Dilemma between conflict reduction and trust/peace building*

During phase 1, the project shifted from its original vision to increase the cooperation and interdependency of cross-border communities over the sharing of natural resources, to a focus on increasing independent and fair access, strengthening the independence of communities on the different sides of the border. This tension point had indeed been outlined in the 2015 conflict analysis. It found that ‘the way the communities propose to address the issues of contention is not through better resource sharing and improvement in ethnic relations, but through separation’.[[2]](#footnote-2) That assessment strongly urged that ‘infrastructure should serve the purpose of uniting people and not reward a drive towards segregation and isolation’.[[3]](#footnote-3) **This dilemma highlights a central tension between the aim of promoting longer-term sustainable peace, captured in the first half of the project outcome *to increase cooperation and trust between communities*, and the short term stabilisation, captured in the second half *to mitigate the risk of renewed violence.* This dilemma requires regular consideration to ensure the continuing relevance of cross-border peace building support** **(see recommendation 8).**

**Recommendations**

These recommendations are directed to PBF and UN agencies considering future cross-border peace building projects in the border areas between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

1. Revise Theories of Change and strategies to further clarify the logic of pathways with regards to changes in attitudes/behaviours and linkages/cooperation/trust building.
2. Clarify the outcome of cross-border peace building projects to detail which drivers of conflict they aim to address and therefore which types of conflict incidents they may reduce.
3. Ensure that the strengthening of *Capacities for Peace*, in addition to the addressing of conflict drivers, is central to cross-border peace building, and build on existing Capacities for Peace. Ensure that outcome statements clarify which Capacities for Peace the project aims to contribute to strengthening.
4. Ensure that strengthening of cross-border trade is based on a further in-depth analysis of the linkages between income generation/business support and cross-border trade, and between cross-border trade and peace building.
5. Further strengthen conflict sensitivity by ensuring close alignment of interventions with the conflict context; robust and ongoing local community level understanding of conflict dynamics; providing space for adaptation of interventions where needed; and ongoing joint monitoring of intervention implementation.
6. Bring further nuance to the mirroring principle so that local context is prioritised in the design of interventions.
7. Further strengthen coordination and M&E by appointing an overall cross-border coordinator.
8. Further strengthen peace building coordination between RUNOs by considering more implementation through the same implementing partner and complementarity in terms of beneficiary targeting.
9. Continuously consider the dilemma/trade-offs between the aim of short-term conflict reduction and longer-term trust building when considering the rehabilitation of infrastructure that discourages shared use.
10. Incorporate a review of potential entry points on policy/advocacy to support progress towards a solution in the border areas into the design of future cross-border peace building projects.

# Object of the evaluation

This report sets out the final evaluation of the PBF project ‘Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development’. The evaluation was commissioned by the Evaluation Management Group (EMG) comprised of the ten agencies that implemented the project (five in Kyrgyzstan, 5 in Tajikistan). The Project was launched in December 2015 for an initial period of 18 months, funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) under its Immediate Response Facility (IRF) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). It was the first cross-border project funded by PBF.

The project was conceived in response to an escalation of tensions and violence in the border regions between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2013-4. A joint scoping mission of the two UNDP offices and the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy (UNRCCA) was conducted and the project was further developed jointly with the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO) and the Swiss Development Cooperation.[[4]](#footnote-4) One project document was developed – with slight variations only in background sections – and signed off in both countries separately.

The project was designed for short-term stabilisation in preparation for longer-term sustainable peace.[[5]](#footnote-5) It aimed to contribute to the outcome ‘*cooperation and trust between communities increased towards mitigating risks of renewed violence*’. The original Theory of Change read: [[6]](#footnote-6)

**If** communities in pilot village clusters in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are supported to agree on and implement trust-building measures that address both communities’ needs and problems, **then** cross-border linkages and cooperation will be (re-) established and (re-) built, thereby increasing trust and reducing the risk of renewed violence **because** authorities and people along the border will work better together with security providers to prevent violence; communities will build ties around the restoration, use and maintenance of community infrastructure and cooperate to better access and manage natural resources; youth will be more tolerant and less likely to engage in violence; and women will more actively participate in cross-border cooperation initiatives.

The first phase of the project was reviewed in a mid-term review conducted by PeaceNexus. This review found broadly positive results and continued relevance for the project, given the continuing state of fragility in the cross-border areas.[[7]](#footnote-7) A follow-up phase for the project was approved and a revised project document developed for a second phase of 18 months from April 2018 to October 2019.

The total PBF allocation for the project was USD 5 million, with an additional contribution of USD 2.023.410 from SDC and USD 836.561 from the UNDP Bureau for Policy and Support. During the start of the second phase of the project, there were ongoing discussions for further support from SDC, but this did not eventuate. The project was implemented by five UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, FAO and UN Women) on both sides of the Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan border in order to build on the complementary strengths of the agencies. The UNICEF offices in both countries were already implementing UK Government funding to implement a cross-border peace building project. UNDP Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had previous experience working in the border regions, including a conflict prevention project in 2005 and a cross-border project aimed at enhancing dialogue and economic cooperation. WFP offices focused on food security, with prior experience in co-implementation with FAO in Kyrgyzstan in the implementation of previous IRF funded inter-ethnic reconciliation projects. UN Women had previous experience in supporting national and regional women support networks under the Women Peace and Security agenda. FAO offices were experienced in providing agriculture and associated irrigation-related support, including linkages to peace building outcomes in Kyrgyzstan.[[8]](#footnote-8)


Table 1 shows the project budgets:

Table 1: PBF project: budgets in phase 1 and 2 (USD) (source: Project Documents for phases 1 and 2)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Phase 1 (PBF allocation: 3 million) | | Phase 2 (PBF allocation: 2 million) | |
| PBF funding | WFP Kyrgyzstan | 300.000 | WFP Kyrgyzstan | 170.000 |
| FAO Kyrgyzstan | 100.000 | FAO Kyrgyzstan | 150.000 |
| UNDP Kyrgyzstan | 725.000 | UNDP Kyrgyzstan | 370.000 |
| UNICEF Kyrgyzstan | 275.000 | UNICEF Kyrgyzstan | 170.000 |
|  |  | UN Women Kyrgyzstan | 140.000 |
| WFP Tajikistan | 300.000 | WFP Tajikistan | 200.000 |
| FAO Tajikistan | 100.000 | FAO Tajikistan | 130.000 |
| UNDP Tajikistan | 725.000 | UNDP Tajikistan | 370.000 |
| UNICEF Tajikistan | 275.000 | UNICEF Tajikistan | 200.000 |
| UN Women Multi-Country Office for Central Asia | 200.000 | UN Women Tajikistan | 100.000 |
|  | Swiss Development Cooperation | 2.023.410 |  |  |
|  | UNDP Bureau for Policy Support | 836.561 |  |  |

The project focused on 6 clusters of villages on both sides of the border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Figure 1 shows the map of village clusters. These were the same in both phases of the project.

Figure 1: Priority cross-border village clusters



The population in these cluster areas is 64.000 in the Kyrgyz villages and 158.000 in the Tajik villages[[9]](#footnote-9). The project had a strong focus on women and youth as key beneficiary groups, but also included community and water-related infrastructure support that benefitted broader community populations. Specific government authorities that benefitted included water authorities, Water User Associations and Ombudsman Offices. WFP’s FFT/FFA support ensured the specific inclusion of vulnerable/marginalized groups as beneficiaries. The project’s stakeholder groups included the national government departments that co-chaired the project Steering Committees; further specialist government departments; regional and district level government departments; local authorities; state and border security services; women; youth and the general adult populations of the target communities.[[10]](#footnote-10)

In each country, the same five RUNOs implemented a set of interventions either through direct implementation or Implementing Partners.[[11]](#footnote-11) The aims of these sub-projects were designed in a coordinated manner so that each RUNO could contribute according to its specific expertise and mandate. Activities included so-called hard and soft components. Hard components comprised the rehabilitation of community and water-related infrastructure with the aim of strengthening ties and cooperation between communities. Soft components included interventions aiming to strengthen linkages between authorities, communities and border security providers; youth-focused trainings and associated activities aiming to increase tolerance; small income generation and business support to enhance economic cooperation and specific support for women to participate more actively in cross-border activities. Activities were implemented based on a mirroring approach between the two countries to ensure conflict sensitivity.

These activities were underpinned by a conflict monitoring system called ‘Trends for Action’ (TRACTION). This comprised of conflict monitors that were recruited in equal numbers on both sides of the border. The TRACTION system was established to monitor the cross-border context and the conflict monitors served as inter-community bridge builders. As such, they played a crucial role in facilitating dialogue and joint problem solving between communities through the identification and agreement on community infrastructure issues to be addressed through project interventions. Through this process and others, the project aimed to institutionalise cross-border dialogue platforms and trust building mechanisms as *Capacities for Peace*. Capacities for Peace are systems, processes and institutions that can enable peace building, for example Early Warning Early Response systems; dialogue platforms; peace building CSO networks; and mediator/conflict monitor networks.

During its second phase, the project came to face some major challenges. One of the project’s interventions at the Kaerma canal became problematic and impacted on the project implementation during phase 2. Consequently, perceived further risks around infrastructure-related interventions led to a delay in the sign-off of the phase 2 work plan by the Government of Kyrgyzstan. This in turn brought delays and impacted on the ability of the project to strengthen cross-border dialogue platforms and implement in a cross-border manner. This was further hampered by a serious deterioration in the border context from the beginning of 2019 – more information on this in the background section of this report.

# Purpose and scope of the evaluation

The evaluation was commissioned for both accountability and learning purposes and is intended for the implementing RUNOs and the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO). The evaluation determines to what extent stated outputs were achieved and whether the project made a contribution towards the stated project outcome. It documents key lessons learned and draws out recommendations that are directed towards potential follow-up TJ/KG cross-border peace building interventions. The evaluation will be shared with the RUNOs and the PBSO. The EMG will decide how to share the evaluation findings with the Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan government members of the project’s Steering Committees in both countries and with further stakeholders, e.g. implementing partners and other donors.

The evaluation is a summative evaluation of the project. It was planned at the start of the second phase of the project and briefly referred to in the phase 2 project document. The ToR refer to the 2018 Peacebuilding Fund Guidelines on Funds Application and Programming, which specify that every PBF project has to undertake an independent evaluation. Following three days of initial desk review, a draft inception report was discussed with the Evaluation Management Group at the start of the in-country data collection phase. Some adjustments were made and further details added to the inception report based on that discussion. The final inception report is in annex 3.

*Adjustments of the scope*

The ToR set out a large number of questions to be answered by the evaluation but stipulated limited resources: one evaluator for 30 days. The project was implemented by ten agencies across two phases. Each agency implemented its own sub-projects through implementing partners or directly, amounting to more than twenty sub-projects. During the initial three-day desk review period of the evaluation, the evaluator reviewed and condensed the ToR’s scope into the smaller set of Evaluation Questions that form the evaluation’s research framework. In particular, the evaluation has not assessed sub-project level details related to effectiveness, for example agency-specific M&E process or financial compliance. It has also not drawn conclusions at the level of the separate project sites but for the project overall.

# Methodology

This evaluation assesses the project according to the standard OECD DAC criteria of effectiveness; efficiency; relevance and sustainability. The evaluation objectives set out in the ToR included a sentence that spoke to the intended impact of the project: ‘the evaluation presents an excellent opportunity to assess the achievements of this project *and its overall added value to peacebuilding in cross-border areas in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’* (italics added). Insights into this broader impact level question are captured at the end of the report. The evaluation complies with the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Principles and UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation.

The evaluation objectives relate to both accountability and learning. To balance these, the evaluation has collected data as independently as possible (see further details below), but has included opportunities for discussion/testing of findings with key stakeholders, through:

* A debrief and discussion on data collected and preliminary findings with the Evaluation Management Group at the end of field work
* A remote skype call with the Evaluation Management Group to discuss findings of the draft report and provide comments. An elaborate set of comments were also provided in written form. The evaluation was adjusted and elaborated, addressing nearly all of the comments (as appropriate and feasible). Brief explanations of these adjustments were provided in the comment documents.

An analysis of attribution was outside the scope of this evaluation. The evaluation analyses whether and how the project interventions *contributed* to its stated outcome. It is a theory-based evaluation that investigates the project’s original Theory of Change:

**If** communities in pilot village clusters in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are supported to agree on and implement trust-building measures that address both communities’ needs and problems, **then** cross-border linkages and cooperation will be (re-) established and (re-) built, thereby increasing trust and reducing the risk of renewed violence **because** authorities and people along the border will work better together with security providers to prevent violence; communities will build ties around the restoration, use and maintenance of community infrastructure and cooperate to better access and manage natural resources; youth will be more tolerant and less likely to engage in violence; and women will more actively participate in cross-border cooperation initiatives.

The evaluation used qualitative methods, combining KIIs; a limited set of FGDs with larger groups of beneficiaries (see below for more detail); and a review of key documentation. Nine of the KIIs/FGDs were held on project locations, allowing for a limited degree of validation of sub-project results through observation. This evaluation uses the term ‘interviews’ to designate both KIIs and FGDs together.

*Drawing on the mid-term review: data collection and analysis across the two project phases*

Following the first phase of the project, a mid-term review was commissioned by the project and conducted by PeaceNexus. Due to the contextual shifts between the two project phases and the differences in implementation between the two phases, it was decided to treat that review as a key source. PeaceNexus is a reputable organisation with robust experience in international peace building. The inability of this evaluation to conduct field visits in Tajikistan further supported the utilisation of the mid-term review as a key source, because its author had been able to visit both sides of the border in 2017. In order to further substantiate this decision, the evaluator spoke with the author to discuss the mid-term review findings in some more detail. The mid-term review did not assess progress against the results framework in detail but comprises a robust analysis of progress against the different project outputs, including the validity of the strategies/Theories of Change. The evaluator tried to obtain the more detailed data set that formed the basis for the mid-term review, but this was not available.

Consequently, data collection and analysis has approached the two project phases and the mid-term review in the following manner:

* The focus of the document review has been on phase 2 documentation. Phase 1 documentation has been reviewed where appropriate/necessary
* The selection of Implementing Partners (IPs) to be interviewed has focused on those implementing in Phase 2. Where it was considered useful and feasible, IPs from phase 1 were added
* The selections of beneficiaries has included a mix of people benefiting from both phases and from phase 2 alone, with less focus on beneficiaries who benefitted only from phase 1
* The questions asked in the interviews have covered both phases of the project where appropriate, including a focus on comparing and contrasting phase 1 with phase 2

*KIIs and FGDs*

A list of KIIs and FGDs is included in annex 1. A total of 64 interviews were conducted of which 42 were KIIs. Ordinarily these are conducted with one person at a time, but time constraints did not always make this possible. In addition, agencies, IPs and Government department often brought in several staff with relevant information. Twelve interviews were held with larger groups of participants and structured as Focus Group Discussions. The evaluation spoke to a total of 202 stakeholders; 102 men and 100 women.

The inception report set out the following respondent categories for the interviews:

* Recipient UN Organisations (RUNOs) (national and local level staff)
* Implementing Partners (IPs) (national and local level staff)
* Steering Committee members (national level)
* Government authorities (national and local level)
* Beneficiaries (local community level)
* Third Parties (other donors/organisations) (national level)

Due to resource and data collection limitations (see below), the evaluation was not designed to interview a representative sample of project stakeholders. As stipulated in the evaluation Terms of Reference, the evaluator worked closely with the RUNOs to select the interviews and field visits. During the initial desk review, the evaluator collected a broad overview of the different IPs per RUNO for each of the project phases to help underpin the selection of interviews. KIIs were held with all RUNOs. A selection of further KIIs with IPs, Steering Committee members, Government authorities and Third Parties was discussed to aim for a spread of different respondent categories. The selection of beneficiary KIIs and FGDs were proposed by the RUNOs and set up by UNDP staff in Khudjand and Batken, in consultation with the RUNOs. These aimed for a spread across different types of sub-projects implemented by the different RUNOs, with a focus on those from phase 2; a geographic spread across the different implementation clusters; and in the inclusion of youth and women as these have been particular focus groups of the evaluation. These proposed schedules were reviewed by the evaluator and adjusted as appropriate (see below).

In Tajikistan, a limited number of remote phone-based interviews were held with beneficiaries who travelled to the UNDP office in Khudjand from five out of the six clusters (see constraints below). In Kyrgyzstan, interviews with beneficiaries were conducted in five different clusters over the course of four days. A fifth day of planned beneficiary/project site visits was changed to allow for additional time for local level IP and RUNO staff interviews in Batken. The evaluator was able to visit nine sub-project sites, allowing for the observation of the results of these sub-projects. More broadly, the visit to the cross-border community locations in Kyrgyzstan provided more in-depth impressions of the complexity of the conflict situation on the ground. The table in annex 1 lists the detailed locations and sub-project sites.

RUNO and/or IP staff transported and introduced the evaluator to the beneficiary interviews in project locations, but then stepped away from the actual interviews. KIIs and FGDs were semi-structured and used personalised interview questions and probing. The interviews drew on the data collection templates for different stakeholder groups that were drawn up in advance and appended to the inception report. All interviews were conducted by the evaluator. The evaluator did not speak any of the local languages and worked with an independent translator where necessary, including all interviews in the border areas of Kyrgyzstan.

*Conflict and gender sensitivity*

During the desk review phase of the evaluation, it became clear that it would not be possible to conduct field visits in Tajikistan. The potential conflict sensitivity risks of only conducting field visits in Kyrgyzstan were discussed during the discussion of the inception report. The Evaluation Management Group felt that this would not risk perceptions of bias from beneficiaries or other stakeholders. In addition, the situation in the border areas was tense following a number of serious recent incidents. During the field visits, the situation was carefully monitored, and potential further sensitivities discussed at the start of every day to ensure that the village visits and the focus and structure of the KIIs and FGDs took these into account.

Gender sensitivity was incorporated in the evaluation approach in the following ways: The evaluation includes a specific Evaluation Question on the gender sensitivity (and human rights approach) of the project, with findings discussed under the effectiveness criterion. It includes a review of data collected against the project’s gender mainstreaming plan. The selection of KIIs and FGDs ensured that women’s voices were represented (almost half of respondents were women). For each KII/FGD, the evaluator considered whether the specific circumstances allowed for women to participate, or whether it was better to interview them separately. Further specific sensitivities for women were also discussed with the female translator to ensure sensitive and appropriate formulation of questions. In this way, the evaluation goes some way to meet three out of the four criteria of the UN-SWAP Evaluation Scorecard.

At the start of each interview, the evaluator explained the purpose of the interview and that people would not be cited or quoted by name in the report, then asking whether participants were ok to proceed on that basis (informed consent). Data files and notes were stored securely by the evaluator. Interviews were not recorded.

*Desk review*

In addition to a detailed consideration of the mid-term review (see above), the desk review has comprised key project documentation, including the programme documents; lessons learned documents; project reports to PBF; a selection of Implementing Partner (IP) reports to the RUNOs; Joint Steering Committee (JSC) minutes; conflict analyses; and a limited set of further documentation (see annex 2 for a list of documents reviewed). The focus of the document review has been on phase 2 documentation. Phase 1 documentation has been reviewed where appropriate/necessary. A limited set of documents in Russian/Tajik/Kyrgyz was translated using google translate.

*Constraints and limitations*

* The data collection process was affected by the lack of Government permission to visit Khudjand and the project sites in Tajikistan due to heightened tensions in the border areas. This lack of Government permission became clear during the initial desk review phase of the evaluation. The potential conflict sensitivity implications were discussed between the evaluator and the key EMG contacts for the evaluation to ensure field level data collection in Kyrgyzstan could go ahead in a conflict sensitive manner. It also meant the evaluator had to change travel plans as it was not possible to travel over land between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Meetings schedules had to be adjusted as well to take this into account. This took substantial time during the desk review period, before the evaluator arrived in-country.
* As a consequence, the evaluation has only been able to collect face-to-face beneficiarydata in Kyrgyzstan. In Tajikistan, the UNDP office set up a series of skype calls with beneficiaries that travelled to the UNDP office, but there is nevertheless an imbalance in the data collected through KIIs/FGDs with beneficiaries (see annex 1). The report has tried to provide balanced evidence between the two countries where appropriate and as much as possible. The detailed footnotes have enabled a detailed review of the basis of analysis, including which country the interview/documentation data stems from. This has enabled the Evaluation Management Committee to review whether the disbalance in beneficiary data produced biased or one-sided analysis. The EMG was explicitly requested to pay attention to this during the reviews of the draft evaluation reports. This did not return any concerns regarding negative consequences of the data imbalance.
* The evaluation took place during a period of heightened tensions in the border areas and in election years in both countries. This helps explain why, despite best efforts, the evaluation was not able to interview many government officials, both at the national level and including the Ombudsman’s offices, as well as at the local level. The evaluation has also not been able to interview any border guards or other security providers.
* The project was unable to commission the planned end-line surveys due to the heightened tensions in the border areas – this is a key documentation gap for the evaluation.
* The time available for the evaluation (30 person days) was very limited for a project that has comprised two phases, two countries and ten UN agencies.

*Data analysis and strength of evidence*

The limited time available for this evaluation has impacted the way data was analyzed. Ordinarily, an evaluation returns data collected in a data collection matrix to underpin analysis. This was discussed during the inception report discussion, with the evaluator proposing there was not enough time available for this step. Instead the interview data was given an anonymous reference, then coded according to the different evaluation questions and then systematically reviewed and incorporated directly into the draft evaluation report evaluation in footnotes.

The constraints outlined, combined with the significant differences in project implementation between the two phases, poses limits to the level of detail of evidence and conclusions presented in this evaluation, in particular with regards to the project’s end results and sustainability at the end of phase 2.

# Background: Conflict drivers and peace building in the cross-border areas between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan

During the Soviet Socialist Republic era, the borders between the Kyrgyz and Tajik Union Republics were not drawn as the set border of independent states. Instead, they were constantly adjusted to population movements and changes in agricultural practices. Following independence, that legacy is at the heart of conflicting territorial claims between the two states, with each referring to different maps.[[12]](#footnote-12) It means that only 519 out of the total 908 km of the border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is delineated or demarcated. The lack of clarity and disagreements over the location of the border has created tensions between communities over access to land, natural resources and infrastructure. The re-enforcement of border security has added to these tensions, as have population pressures and the fact that agriculture has become the main source of income for communities. A high level of distrust remains between border area communities, which include mainly Kyrgyz and Tajik but also some Uzbek people. Stereotypes have worsened since independence due to the numerous disputes and conflicts.[[13]](#footnote-13)

Several drivers of conflict were identified in the conflict analysis underpinning the project.[[14]](#footnote-14) Access to water was contested, with conflicts about absolute shortages due to population growth and the allocation of resources. Technical improvements to transboundary water systems were impeded by distrust, stereotypes and conflicting territorial claims. The shortage of arable land leads to efforts to cultivate or build on contested areas, leading to conflicts. Many pastures were located on Kyrgyz territory and used by Tajik for a higher fee. The traverse of livestock and theft also led to conflict. Shortages of fuel and electricity on the Tajik side led to wood cutting on the Kyrgyz side. Roads criss-cross territories and attempts to build new infrastructure were highly contentious. Law enforcement measures were considered a key destabilising factor. The analysis also found that the main participants in incidents were often young men, frustrated by a lack of structured employment and limited social opportunities. Women did not play a great role in violent incidents or in peace building efforts. [[15]](#footnote-15)

The project was built on further detailed conflict analyses of its targeted pilot cluster areas. A summary was included in the phase 1 project document with key issues causing tensions in the different clusters – see table 2 below.

Table 2: Key issues causing tensions in the project clusters. Numbers refer to the map on in figure 1. Source: Project documents

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **№** | **Cluster** | **Jamoat, and Rayon in Tajikistan** | **AyilOkmotu and Rayon in Kyrgyzstan** | **Key issue areas causing tensions** | **Level of tensions** (high, medium, low) |
| **1** | Vorukh-Hojai Alo-AkSay-Kapchigai-UchDobo-TashTumshuk-AkTatyr | Vorukh, Chorkuh Isfara | AkSay, Ak-Tatyr- Batken rayon | RT-KR- Contested land and infrastructures, access to pastures, access and distribution of water, border management regime and border guards' treatment of local population, youth violence | High |
| **2** | Chorkyh, Somonien - Koktash, Samarkandek, Ortoboz, PaskyAryk | Chorkuh | AkSay, Samarkandek, Aktatyr-Batken rayon | RT-KR - Contested land and infrastructure, access to pastures, access and distribution of water, border management regime and border guards' treatment of local population, youth violence | high |
| **3** | Surkh-MinOruk (section of PaskyAryk village)-MinBulak (section of KokTash village) | Surkh Isfara | AkSay, Samarkandek | Access to pastures, water, contested land and infrastructures | medium |
| 4 | Lakkon - Kurgoncha-Karabak, ChonTaala, Dobo | Lakkon Isfara | Karabak, Tort-Gyl - Batken rayon | Access to pastures, contested land and infrastructures, and other problems | medium |
| **5** | Ovchi Kalacha, Sada - International, Kulundu, Razzakov, AkAryk, Maksat | B. Gafurovskiy Rayon | Kulundu, Leilek rayon | Access to pastures, illegal migration of people in cross-border areas, contested land | high |
| **6** | Kostakoz(Khistevarz) - Arka, Borborduk | B. Gafurovskiy Rayon | Jenijer, Leilek rayon | Access to pastures, people in cross-border areas, contested land | high |

Figures 2 and 3 below shows the trends in the n*umber* and *types* of conflict incidents and as they were recorded by the TRACTION system during the project. During phase 1 of the project, the situation in the cross-border areas improved, whilst during 2019 – the latter half of the second phase – it deteriorated. The TRACTION data does not show a great escalation in numbers, but the incidents resulted in people getting killed and included shoot-outs between the border guards from both countries. [[16]](#footnote-16) Almost all stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation referred to the seriousness of these recent conflict events. It brought challenges to the implementation of the project in the second phase that are described in more detail in this evaluation. The evaluation will also come back to the data presented in figures 2 and 3.

Figure 2: number of incidents during the first and second phase of the project (Jan 2016 – Dec 2019) (TRACTION database)

Figure 3: Trends in key types of conflict incidents – Dec 2015 – Dec 2019 (TRACTION database)

A second shift in context for the project specifically was caused by the escalation of a dispute over the project’s intervention at the Kaerma canal. Consequently, perceived further risks around infrastructure-related interventions by the Government of Kyrgyzstan led to a delay in the sign-off of the phase 2 work plan. This in turn brought delays and impacted on the ability of the project to strengthen cross-border dialogue platforms and implement in a cross-border manner.

*Capacities for Peace*

The delineation and demarcation of the border is the purview of the Inter-state Committee on Border Demarcation and Delimitation. At the start of the project, the underpinning analysis noted how there had been no real progress for more than ten years, with the two sides continuing to argue over which maps should form the legal ground for delimitation, although in 2013 the Commission’s status had been elevated to the level of deputy prime-ministers. Frequent changes to the Commission members present problems of institutional memory.[[17]](#footnote-17) The violent incidents in 2019 sparked a meeting between the countries Prime Ministers in September 2019 and the establishment of a joint working group to decide on demarcation that reportedly agreed on a 23 hectare land swap.[[18]](#footnote-18) The 2015 conflict analysis also found some further community level *Capacities for Peace*: a cooperation action plan between the districts on both sides and regular cooperation between key government services such as water utilities management and law enforcement, but it also noted how these were hampered by the differences in governance systems and bureaucracy. An existing system of twelve community based conflict monitors was highlighted and further work to strengthen this structure recommended. There have been international peace building interventions in the Ferghana valley since at least 2003.[[19]](#footnote-19) These have resulted in networks and structures of local NGOs, people and other organisations that have experience working on peace building.[[20]](#footnote-20)

# Relevance

*The evaluation has investigated five questions to assess the relevance of the project:*

* *Were the objectives of the project relevant to the peacebuilding process? Did they address the key drivers of conflict identified in the conflict analysis? (EQ1)*
* *Does the evaluation show peacebuilding gaps or missed opportunities? (EQ2)*
* *Were the strategies (Theories of Change – ToC) and activities underpinning the project relevant for the objectives? (EQ 3)*
* *Was the ToC of the project based on the valid assumptions? (EQ4)*
* *Were the interventions relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries (EQ5)*

*The section below looks at the relevance of the project’s objectives; whether it addressed key drivers of conflict; the relevance of the strategies; key activities; assumptions and peacebuilding gaps/missed opportunities. It is based on a review of project documentation and analysis presented elsewhere in this report, particularly under efficiency.*

The project’s objectives were not specifically listed in the phase 1 project documents, but the rationale for the project was clearly outlined. This was two-fold: to reduce the immediate risk of renewed violence, and to pilot risk-taking and catalytic interventions with PBF support. In the phase 2 project document, the project objective reads as follows:

Project objective (phase 2): The proposed project aims to build sustainable mechanisms to reduce the risks of violent conflict and to create a more conducive environment for the promotion of sustainable peace and development in cross-border areas. Peacebuilding and conflict prevention interventions are designed to contribute to short-term stabilisation, while preparing the ground for the promotion of longer-term sustainable peace.[[21]](#footnote-21)

The project was conceived in response to the escalation of tensions and violence that erupted in 2014 between Tajik and Kyrgyz villagers and border guards. It aimed at short-term stabilisation in preparation for longer-term sustainable peace. Within a context of continuing fragility – in the absence of progress on border demarcation and delimitation – this was a relevant peace building aim. Local conflicts can exacerbate distrust and potentially escalate up to higher levels of violence and a deterioration in the political relations between the two countries.[[22]](#footnote-22)

The project was designed to work towards 6 outputs:[[23]](#footnote-23)

0.1 Community leaders/ authorities in Kyrgyz-Tajik cross-border areas have access to reliable and balanced information about local conflict dynamics and trends and how they can be addressed

0.2 Cross-border communities along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border establish/strengthen mechanisms for dialogue, deliberation, and joint problem-solving

1.1. Improved linkages and cooperation between security providers, local authorities and communities to reduce violent incidents

1.2 Communities restore cross-border linkages and cooperation by jointly addressing interdependent needs/ challenges associated with community infrastructure and natural resources

1.3 At-risk youth have increased their level of inter-ethnic tolerance and are less likely to engage in violence

1.4 Women enhance cooperation and trust between communities through actively participating in the identification and implementation of cross-border initiatives

Outputs 0.1 and 0.2 responded to the underpinning conflict analysis (see background section for all references to the underpinning conflict analysis in this section) where it recommended a reviving of the existing UNDP Early Warning System and established the TRACTION system. Aiming to address the issues surrounding the border guards and other security structures in the contested border areas, the project worked towards the improvement of linkages and cooperation between security providers, local authorities and communities under output 1.1. This also responded to a specific request from local authorities at the time of the underlying conflict analysis/assessment.[[24]](#footnote-24) In order to address drivers of conflict associated with community infrastructure and natural resources, output 1.2 captured interventions that aimed to restore cross-border linkages and trust by jointly addressing interdependent needs/challenges associated with community infrastructure and natural resources. These were indeed identified as drivers of conflict in the conflict analysis. Outputs 1.3 and 1.4 designated specific targets groups that were considered to warrant special attention. Again, this responded to the underlying analysis.

The phase 1 project document did not set out detailed strategies for each of the outputs. One of the recommendations of the mid-term review was that such strategies would be clarified in a second phase. Following up this recommendation, the phase 2 project document clarified the strategies. It also streamlined outputs 3 and 4 into output 2, mainstreaming the focus on youth and women as cross-cutting issues. The relevance of these strategies for the project objectives is reviewed below.

*Strategies for output 1.1: Improved linkages and cooperation between security providers, local authorities and communities to reduce violent incidents*

The strategies employed by the project for this output included the strengthening of communication and dialogue platforms; the building of awareness on safe border crossings; and the strengthening of complaints and grievances mechanisms through the Ombudsman offices. The mid-term review concluded that these had been and remained valid strategies, even though the number of border-crossing related incidents had decreased (see figure 3). Given the 2019 flare up of border tensions, the focus on strengthening dialogue platforms between security providers, authorities and communities remained relevant. However the project was unable to implement these strategies on the Kyrgyz side of the border during phase 2, with limited progress on the Tajik side only.

*Strategies for output 1.2: Communities restore cross-border linkages and cooperation by jointly addressing interdependent needs/ challenges associated with community infrastructure and natural resources, as well as by establishing platforms of confidence building and cooperation*

The project employed six strategies towards this output: three related to natural resources and small-scale infrastructure; two related to strengthening Capacities for Peace; and one related to cross-border trade.

* Rehabilitate or build (through a community-led approach) small-scale social or natural resource-related infrastructure with a high potential for reducing tensions
* Enhance cooperation in natural resource management to prevent and better manage conflicts
* Increase the effectiveness and transparency of the use of the natural resources in order to reduce pressure on the resources

The mid-term review concluded that these strategies had been and remained relevant. They remained broadly relevant during phase 2. The reduction in water-related conflict by the end of phase 1 (see figure 3) suggest that a further fine-tuning of these strategies towards the drivers of conflict that remained most prevalent in phase 2 could have enhanced their relevance. As it was, challenging circumstances prevented the project from progressing any further work on infrastructure-related support during phase 2. Although the project set out to enhance cooperation as a part of its natural resource management strategies, it has only partially been able to do this. During phase 1, it became clear from community consultations that people felt that strengthening interdependent use of infrastructure was not the most effective way to reduce tensions. In fact, there was a sense that trying to make people share resources would lead to more tensions rather than reduce them. As a consequence, the project shifted away from this original vision, to interventions that worked to increase independent fair and transparent access to infrastructure – water-related in particular. It means that the second strategy became much less relevant.

* Enhance linkages and dialogue between women, youth and adolescent girls and boys, as well as other societal groups of two countries through joint cross-border activities
* Build capacities and competencies of community members and leaders on both sides of the border, especially adolescents, youth and women for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and participate in decision-making and mediation

The mid-term review noted the relevance of the phase 1 strategies that focused on enhancing mechanisms for dialogue, deliberation and joint problem solving and strategies focused on youth and women. These strategies continued to be relevant during phase 2, but many of the project’s activities were unable to work in a cross-border manner due to the deterioration in the conflict context in the border areas.

* Promote economic ties between cross-border communities and harness employment-related activities to build bridges between people, especially youth and women

The mid-term review noted the relevance of these strategies during phase 1 and recommended a stronger emphasis on business ties. It also noted the indirect nature of a link between a reduction of unemployment and a reduction in violence-prone behaviour. During phase 2, the strategy remained valid, even if cross-border trade was hampered by the deterioration of the conflict context. The evidence on the effectiveness of strengthening cross-border trade through income generation and business support interventions (see effectiveness section below) point to a need for a more nuanced approach to strengthen the relevance of income generation and business support for cross-border trade and therefore for peace building.

The overall Theory of Change for the project saw minor changes between phases 1 and 2. The **if** statement was elaborated and a sentence added to the **because** statement. Overall, the Theory of Change was closely aligned to the drivers of conflict prioritised by the project in accordance with the underlying conflict analysis (the original outputs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4). The level of precision in the logic of the project’s phase 2 Theory of Change and its strategies reviewed above could have been enhanced by a more precise usage of terms like ‘cross-border linkages’, ‘cooperation’, increasing ties’, ‘trust-building’, ‘reducing stereotypes’ and ‘increasing tolerance’. This would have helped bring further clarification to which strategies and pathways were aimed to which aspects of project’s aims.

*Project Outcome level Theories of Change, phases 1 and 2*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Phase 1 | Phase 2 |
| **If** communities in pilot village clusters in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are supported to agree on and implement trust-building measures that address both communities’ needs and problems, **then** cross-border linkages and cooperation will be (re-) established and (re-) built, thereby increasing trust and reducing the risk of renewed violence **because** authorities and people along the border will work better together with security providers to prevent violence; communities will build ties around the restoration, use and maintenance of community infrastructure and cooperate to better access and manage natural resources; youth will be more tolerant and less likely to engage in violence; and women will more actively participate in cross-border cooperation initiatives. | **If** communities in pilot village clusters in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan solve their problems together and establish cross-border links through a diverse set of trust-building measures, including infrastructure and interest-based cooperation of societal groups like women and youth that address both communities’ needs and problems, **then** the risk of renewed violence is reduced. This is **because** through communication and cooperation authorities and people along the border increase trust, reduce stereotypes and perception of the neighbouring community as ‘others’, improve the transparency and fairness of the use natural resources, thereby deescalating tensions and preventing people from resorting to violent means of problem solution. In this context authorities and security providers will improve the protection of human rights and communication with citizens; communities will build ties around the restoration, use and maintenance of community infrastructure and cooperate to better access and manage natural resources; adolescents and youth will be more tolerant and less likely to engage in violence, with their agencies mobilized for building greater social cohesion; and, women will more actively participate in cross-border cooperation initiatives. |

Assumptions were not explicitly listed in the project documents, but the risks outlined give an indication of the preconditions that were assumed for the project to be able to achieve its goals. Two risks were listed in both phases and judged as having a high potential impact on the project:[[25]](#footnote-25)

* Escalation of tensions between local communities that interrupt project implementation
* Open conflict between border guards/armed forces

The assumptions that it would be difficult to implement the project if an escalation of tensions occurred or in case of open conflict between border guards and armed forces were highly relevant. In fact, these scenarios came to pass during the second phase of the project and disrupted the ability of the project to work towards it aims.

All beneficiaries interviewed expressed how the project activities were relevant to their needs. For example, female beneficiaries in Tajikistan noted how they were provided training on drying fruits and wood crafting and were now selling these products, including to Kyrgyz customers.[[26]](#footnote-26) In another example, beneficiaries of trainings in confectionary baking and sewing courses all agreed on how these activities had helped them raise their income.[[27]](#footnote-27) Government stakeholders confirmed the broad relevance of the project in interviews for this evaluation and in project steering committee meetings.

As noted in the background section, there have been peace building interventions in the cross-border regions for many years and the underpinning conflict analysis also found some further local existing *Capacities for Peace* in coordination and cooperation agreements and structures between the two countries. The project drew on these to a certain degree, e.g. the TRACTION system that was supported had been established by UNDP previously and drew on an Early Warning System that was first established in 2003.[[28]](#footnote-28) In another example, the cross-border cooperation between UNDP Implementing Partners FTI Kyrgyzstan and ASTI Tajikistan during the first phase drew on long-standing relations between these organisations as part of the Fergana Valley peacebuilding network.[[29]](#footnote-29) But some opportunities to build upon and link in with existing *Capacities for Peace* may have been missed. For example, In Tajikistan, a regional association of women peacebuilders was established, but it is not clear how it linked to an existing women peace building network in Kyrgyzstan.[[30]](#footnote-30)

*Conclusions on relevance*

The project’s objective was relevant to the context in the cross-border areas in 2014. It was designed to contribute to short term stabilisation, reducing the risk of violent conflict, whilst preparing the ground for the promotion of longer-term sustainable peace. Its 6 outputs were closely aligned to the drivers of conflict and capacities for peace identified in the underpinning conflict analysis. The strategies employed by the project have been mostly relevant, but the shift from interdependent to segregated access to water poses a dilemma in terms of relevance for peace building that requires ongoing consideration (see recommendation 8). The link between income generation/business support interventions and cross-border trade and its relevance for peace building also requires further investigation (see recommendation 4) . Project activities have been relevant to the needs and priorities of beneficiaries. The indications of good results in the decrease of border-crossing related incidents and water-related conflicts could have brought a further sharpening of the relevance of the strategies in phase 2 (see recommendation 2). Relevance could have been further enhanced by more explicitly building on and strengthening existing *Capacities for Peace* and by a more precise consideration of which strategies and pathways contribute to which aspects of the outcomes (see recommendations 1 and 3).

# Effectiveness

*The evaluation has investigated eight questions to assess the effectiveness of the project:*

* *What constraints (if any) (internal and external to the project) have affected the efficiency and effectiveness of project implementation? (EQ 16)*
* *To what extent have the envisaged outputs and outcomes of the programmes been achieved? Has the project contributed to a reduction of the drivers of conflict? (EQ 6)*
* *How flexible and adaptive was the project to the context? (EQ 9)*
* *How did the project integrate a conflict sensitivity lens? (EQ 11)*
* *How effective was the coordination and collaboration with the KG and TJ authorities? (EQ 8)*
* *How have stakeholders been involved in the project’s design and implementation? (EQ 12)*
* *How effective was the coordination and co-implementation between and within the United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) in KG and TJ, and between the RUNOs? (EQ 7)*
* *How did the project mainstream gender and human rights considerations? (EQ 10)*

This section start by setting out the extent to which the envisaged outcome and outputs of the project have been achieved by reviewing the evidence against the project’s results framework across the two project phases. It includes a focus on how the key constraints faced by the project – the deterioration of the conflict context, the suspension of infrastructure-related activities and delay in work plan approval in Kyrgyzstan – have impacted on results in phase 2. Next, it looks at how the project was flexible and has adapted, including to these challenges. Conflict sensitivity was an important aspect of this flexibility and the evaluation investigates how a conflict sensitivity lens was integrated. Next, the involvement of stakeholders and the coordination/collaboration with authorities is discussed, before setting out the coordination/co-implementation between and within the UN Country Teams. Finally, the cross-cutting issues of human rights and gender are considered.

Table 3 shows the outcome level Results Frameworks across the two phases.

Table 3: Project results framework – outcome level, phases 1 and 2

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Phase 1 |  | Phase 2 |  |
| Outcome: Cooperation and trust between communities increased to mitigate risks of renewed violence | 1.1 % of community members from the 6 pilot village clusters who indicate an improvement in cross-border relations/cooperation with community members in the same village cluster on the other side of the border (disaggregated by gender, age, village) | Outcome: Cooperation and trust between communities increased to mitigate risks of renewed violence | 1.1 % of community members from the 6 pilot village clusters who indicate an improvement in cross-border relations/cooperation with community members in the same village cluster on the other side of the border (disaggregated by gender, age, village) |
|  | 1.2 # of violent incidents in pilot cluster is decreased |  | 1.2 # of violent incidents in pilot cluster is decreased |
|  | 1.3 % of community members from the 6 pilot cross-border village clusters who would be ready to work together with community members in the same village cluster on the other side of the border to improve the lives of cross-border communities on both sides of the border |  | 1.3 % of community members from the 6 pilot cross-border village clusters who would be ready to work together with community members in the same village cluster on the other side of the border to improve the lives of cross-border communities on both sides of the border |
|  | 1.4 % of youth from the 6 cross-border village clusters who demonstrate inter-ethnic tolerance (data disaggregated by gender, age, village cluster, and country) |  |  |
|  | 1.5 % of women playing an active role in the local affairs |  |  |

*Discussion of phase 1 contribution to outcome according to indicators*

1.1: Baseline and target for this indicator were set at the start of phase 1, with pprogress measured by surveys that were conducted in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan at the end of phase 1 (in 2018)[[31]](#footnote-31). The mid-line surveys measured improvements across a number of indicative questions with the results showing an improvement in willingness to cooperate and attitudes towards each other among respondents.

1.2: The baseline was set at 58 incidents during 2014. During 2017, the final year of phase one, this decreased by more than 50% to 31 incidents, exceeding the set target of 20% decrease.

1.3: Baseline and target for this indicator were set at the start of phase 1, with pprogress measured by the surveys mentioned above. The mid-line surveys measured improvements across a number of indicative questions with the results showing an improvement in willingness to cooperate and attitudes towards each other among respondents.

1.4: Baseline and target for this indicator were set at the start of phase 1, with pprogress measured by the surveys mentioned.[[32]](#footnote-32) The comparison between baseline and mid-line surveys in Tajikistan shows a deterioration in this indicator by the end of phase 1 of the project. In Kyrgyzstan it showed some improvement.[[33]](#footnote-33)

1.5: Baseline and target for this indicator were set at the start of phase 1, with pprogress measured by the surveys mentioned.[[34]](#footnote-34) This indicator was not measured by the Tajikistan surveys. In Kyrgyzstan, the surveys showed a slight deterioration.[[35]](#footnote-35)

In conclusion, during phase 1, the project contributed to an improvement in willingness to cooperate and attitudes towards one another among the communities in the target clusters. This is evidenced by the changes captured in the mid-line survey against indicators 1.1 and 1.3. The mid-term review – conducted before the mid-line survey – came to the same conclusion. However, survey results for indicators 1.4 and 1.5 show that it is not clear to what extent there was a change in attitudes among youth and the role played by women in peace building at the end of phase 1.

*Phase 2 outcome discussion (including key challenges)*

In phase 2, key constraints impacted on the ability of the project to implement its planned interventions and work towards its aims. Although the project document was signed, the Kyrgyzstan approval of the subsequent work plan was delayed for a long time due to concerns over further infrastructure-related interventions (hard components).[[36]](#footnote-36) This meant no inter-community consultations were possible to underpin infrastructure-related interventions. The project’s conflict monitors stopped operating on the Kyrgyzstan side, further weakening platforms for confidence building and cooperation.[[37]](#footnote-37) Meanwhile, the situation on the border deteriorated which meant it became more challenging to implement interventions with a cross-border element, i.e. by bringing together beneficiaries from both sides of the border.[[38]](#footnote-38) It was ultimately not possible to implement any infrastructure-related projects as foreseen under output 2.[[39]](#footnote-39)

In terms of outcome indicators, there is no data for indicators 1.1 and 1.3 for phase 2 because the end line survey was not conducted. For indicator 1.2 on the number of conflict incidents, TRACTION data shows 35 incidents in 2019; a decrease compared to the 2014 baseline. When we look at the data for water-related conflicts only (figure 3), it shows a decrease in the number of conflict incidents related to water throughout the project. The mid-term review and interviews with project stakeholders confirm this decrease in water-related conflicts and the contribution made by the project to this (see output 2 below). [[40]](#footnote-40)

*Achievements of project outputs*

Table 4 below sets out the project outputs and output indicators during phases 1 and 2. Almost all indicators at the output level were quantitative, counting numbers of interventions. The figures reported over phase 1 (November 2017 report to PBF) and phase 2 (March 2020 report to PBF) are reproduced below in table 4.

During phase 1, outputs 0.1 and 0.2 were reported against to SDC as additional donor to the project. No indicators were set out in that documentation. Output 0.1 concerned the TRACTION mechanism. This continued to operate during phase 2 but its results were no longer explicitly captured in the Results Framework. The TRACTION mechanism is discussed as part of the project’s conflict sensitivity mechanisms on p.30 below. In phase 2, output 0.2 was added to the wording of output 1.2. Apart from that addition to output 1.2, the key projects outputs of 1.1 and 1.2 remained the same and are discussed each in turn below. Phase 1outputs 1.3 and 1.4 on youth and women turned into indicators for output 21.2

Table 4: Project results framework – output level, phases 1 and 2

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Phase 1 | |  | Phase 2 | |  |
| Output 0.1 (SDC funded): Community leaders and authorities in Kyrgyz-Tajik cross-border areas have access to reliable and balanced information about local conflict dynamics and trends and how they can be addressed | No indicators were reported against |  | No funding from SDC – output dropped |  |  |
| Output 0.2 (SDC funded): Cross-border communities along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border establish/strengthen mechanisms for dialogue, deliberation and joint problem solving | No indicators were reported against |  | No funding from SDC – output dropped |  |  |
| Output 1.1: Improved linkages and cooperation between security providers, local authorities and communities to reduce violent incidents | 1.1.1 # of activities, interventions and preventive actions jointly implemented by security providers, local authorities and communities on one side of the border in the 6 pilot cross-border village clusters to improve information exchange and prevent incident | Target: at least 8  94 reported | Output 1.1: Improved linkages and cooperation between security providers, local authorities and communities to reduce violent incidents | 1.1.1 # of activities, interventions and preventive actions that were implemented by security providers, local authorities and communities on one side of the border in the 6 pilot cross-border village clusters to improve information exchange and prevent incident | Target: 20  7 in Tajikistan only |
|  | 1.1.2 # of problem-solving and complaint mechanisms established/improved that bring security providers, local authorities and communities together to address community grievances and reduce the likelihood of security incidents | Target 4  4 reported |  | 1.1.2 # of problem-solving and complaint mechanisms established/improved that bring security providers, local authorities and communities together to address community grievances and reduce the likelihood of security incidents | Target: maintain and improve existing 4.  2 reported in Tajikistan only |
| Output 1.2: Ccommunities restore cross-border linkages and cooperation by jointly addressing interdependent needs/ challenges associated with community infrastructure and natural resources | 1.2.1 # of projects that were jointly agreed by communities from both sides of the pilot cross-border village clusters and benefit the both sides to address interdependent needs/ challenges associated with community infrastructure | Target: at least 10 34 reported | Output 1.2: Ccommunities restore cross-border linkages and cooperation by jointly addressing interdependent needs/ challenges associated with community infrastructure and natural resources, as well as by establishing platforms of confidence building and cooperation | 1.2.1 # of projects that were agreed by communities from both sides of the pilot cross-border village clusters and to address interdependent needs /challenges associated with community infrastructure | Target: 20  Project jointly agreed/implemented by communities from both sides  Reported:  TJ: 18 projects on purchasing equipment  KG: 6 projects on purchasing equipment and 7 asset creation infrastructure projects  Equipment purchased for 20 schools (more than 10K pupils) &17 kindergartens (8K childr)  134 WUA members (46% women) trained; 12 TJ farmers participated in KG trainings |
|  | 1.2.2. # of projects jointly agreed by communities from both sides of the pilot cross-border village clusters and improve efficiency and maintenance system of natural resources to address interdependent needs/ challenges associated with natural resources | Target at least 6  64 reported |  | 1.2.3 # of youth (disaggregated data for young men/ boys and young women/ girls) that benefitted from training/ support or participated in joint cross-border youth events in pilot cross-border village clusters | Target: XXX from TJ and 500 from KG) b) 800 (400 from TJ and 400 from KG) (segregated data for young men/ boys and young women/ girls) that benefitted from training/ support or participated in joint cross-border youth events in pilot cross-border village clusters  Reported:  TJ: a) 50 adolescents from TJ;  b) 2007 young boys and girls.  Out of above1174 adolescents improved their skills for 21st century through UPSHIFT social innovation programme (KG: 700, TJ: 747); 100 young people from KG overall 345 young people have participated in joint trainings.  About 641 you have benefited from short-term vocational skills trainings. The trainings were followed up by the four-day ILO training as well as wrap-up workshop. |
|  |  |  |  | 1.2.4 # Number of joint cross-border initiatives responding to specific gender equality and women’s empowerment (GEWE) issues that are implemented by women activists | Target: at least 4.  Reported: 19 women-led small-scale business initiatives to improve economic security of vulnerable women in four village clusters of TJ (72 women targeted), 17 small-scale initiatives in six village clusters of KG (80 women targeted)”. |
| Output 1.3: At-risk youth have increased their level of inter-ethnic tolerance and are less likely to engage in violence | 1.3.1 # of trust-building measures that have been implemented involving youth from both sides of pilot cross-border village clusters | Target: at least 8  132 reported |  |  |  |
|  | 1.3.3 # of youth (segregated data for young men/ boys and young women/ girls) that benefitted from training/ support or participated in joint cross-border youth events in pilot cross-border village clusters | Target: at least 1000  72993 reported |  |  |  |
| Output 1.4: Women enhance cooperation and trust between communities through actively participating in the identification and implementation of cross-border initiatives | 1.4.1 % of women and girls taking part in cross-border activities under project outputs 1-3 | Target: at least 35%  Minimum of 40% reported |  |  |  |
|  | 1.4.2 % of women and girls playing a leadership role in cross-border activities on trust building under project outputs 1-3 | Target: at least 15%  Minimum 15% reported |  |  |  |

*Output 1: Improved linkages and cooperation between security providers, local authorities and communities to reduce violent incidents*

Strategies employed by the project under this output

* Create communication and dialogue platforms between security providers, local authorities and communities.
* Build awareness and capacity of duty bearers (local authorities, security officials, border guards and custom service providers) on human rights and methods to protect rights of children on cross border using child friendly cross border procedures and for dealing with citizens (incl. children, youth, women) who violate border crossing rules and procedures.
* Strengthen complaints and grievances mechanisms which are put in place effectively in each country (through building capacity of the Ombudsman’s offices, State Border Services and Police and other institutions) and access to these institutions for all, including women and youth.

The mid-term review found evidence that during phase 1, results were achieved regarding increased communication, linkages and capacities to communicate regularly. It also found some evidence of increased awareness and knowledge on safe border crossings among young people but could not make conclusive statements about behavioural change of security providers. The mid-term review also found that complaints mechanisms through the Ombudsman offices were strengthened, including linkages between the Ombudsman, security providers and communities. The project strengthened the Ombudsman office on both sides and helped establish a specific Ombudsman’s office for children in Tajikistan.[[41]](#footnote-41) The project assisted the offices in travelling to the villages to sit down with people face to face. This way, people could voice their complaints and were heard. During the 2018 Steering Committee, the Tajik Ombudsman remarked on the active involvement of his office with the project.[[42]](#footnote-42)

During phase 2, due to the delays in workplan sign off, the project was unable to progress the work with the security providers in Kyrgyzstan – results for indicator 1.1.1 show no interventions were implemented. The work with the Ombudsman’s office in Kyrgyzstan was impacted by staff changes.[[43]](#footnote-43) Results for indicator 1.1.2 show no progress was made in phase 2. However, TRACTION data shows a decrease in border-crossing related conflict incidents (see figure 3).The mid-term review noted this and concluded that ‘many other factors will have contributed to this, but it seems fair to assume that the project has contributed to this outcome to some extent’. The decrease in border-crossing related incidents continued in phase 2 and dropped to 0 incidents, where it remained to the end of the project. However it is important to take into account the escalation in other border-related incidents during 2019, which made its more difficult for people to cross the border in the first place. This may also have contributed to fewer border-crossing related incidents. The evaluation was also unable to meet with border guards and no interviewees mentioned the decrease of border-crossing related conflicts as a specific contribution of the project. Therefore, this evaluation concludes there is not sufficient evidence to state that the project has contributed to a decrease in border-crossing related conflicts.

*Output 2: Communities restore cross-border linkages and trust by jointly addressing interdependent needs/challenges associated with community infrastructure and natural resources and by establishing platforms of confidence building and cooperation between various societal groups*

Strategies employed by the project under this output:

1. Rehabilitate or build (through a community-led approach) small-scale social or natural resource-related infrastructure with a high potential for reducing tensions
2. Enhance cooperation in natural resource management to prevent and better manage conflicts
3. Increase the effectiveness and transparency of the use of the natural resources in order to reduce pressure on the resources
4. Enhance linkages and dialogue between women, youth and adolescent girls and boys, as well as other societal groups of two countries through joint cross-border activities
5. Build capacities and competencies of community members and leaders on both sides of the border, especially adolescents, youth and women for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and participate in decision-making and mediation
6. Promote economic ties between cross-border communities and harness employment-related activities to build bridges between people, especially youth and women

1/2/3 The project set out to assist the cross-border communities to jointly address community infrastructure challenges through the support for community infrastructure that was jointly used, or to encourage joint usage. During phase 1, it became clear from community consultations that people felt this was not the most effective way to reduce tensions. In fact, there was a sense that trying to make people share resources would lead to more tensions rather than reduce them. As a consequence, the project shifted away from this original vision to interventions that supported infrastructure on either side of the border.[[44]](#footnote-44) During phase 1, the project far exceeded its set targets with regards to interventions that addressed challenges around community infrastructure and natural resources. In particular, water-related infrastructure was rehabilitated or expanded so that people on either side of the border had less need to share water from the other side.[[45]](#footnote-45) The mid-term review found that increased transparency through better measurement also helped reduce water-related conflict, especially where Tajik and Kyrgyz people jointly conducted such measurements. In phase 2, beneficiaries also noted how these interventions helped decrease conflicts between farmers but mostly within communities on either side of the border.[[46]](#footnote-46) In addition to the water measurement improvements, drip irrigation was introduced to increase the effectiveness of the use of water.[[47]](#footnote-47) This included some cross-border aspects where farmers from Tajikistan came to view the demonstration sites in Kyrgyzstan.[[48]](#footnote-48) TRACTION data shows a decrease in the number of conflict incidents related to water throughout the project (see figure 3). The mid-term review and interviews with project stakeholders confirm this decrease and the contribution made by the project to it. [[49]](#footnote-49) Other community infrastructure included sports yards, for example.[[50]](#footnote-50) Food For Asset assistance provided marginalised people with an extra motivation and opportunity to work on canal cleaning or construction.[[51]](#footnote-51) During phase 2, infrastructure-related interventions were initially delayed and ultimately not possible at all. During phase 1, an e-pasture management system was introduced in Kyrgyzstan, but the mid-term review found few results had been achieved. On the Tajik side, the project tried to identify opportunities to improve pastures, but this was considered too contentious.[[52]](#footnote-52) During phase 2, after pressure from the Tajik government, the project re-engaged on pasture management but in areas away from contested pastures.[[53]](#footnote-53)

4/5/6. During the first phase, with SDC funding, the project had a separate output on *Capacities for Peace.* The mid-term review noted that ‘cross-border dialogue is an essential component of diffusing tensions between communities […]’.[[54]](#footnote-54) And concluded that there was evidence that the results intended under that output were being achieved. Dialogue between the countries took place at different levels, including between district authorities, municipal authorities, the border services and the Ombudsman offices. A cross-border youth contact group was also established.[[55]](#footnote-55) The inter-community dialogues were an equally important element of these Capacities for Peace. Aided by the conflict monitors, these dialogues brought together the cross-border communities in each cluster to discuss proposed interventions on either side of the border. This way, possible misunderstandings or suspicions about project activities, in particular where it concerned water-related infrastructure, were diffused.[[56]](#footnote-56) The conflict monitors also worked as mediators/bridge builders to a degree.[[57]](#footnote-57) During phase 2, the conflict monitors were no longer working on the Kyrgyz side and it was no longer possible to organise the inter-community dialogues, also due to the deteriorating context. [[58]](#footnote-58) Support for cross-border activities of the youth contact groups was stopped.[[59]](#footnote-59) Cross-border implementation became challenging due to the contextual shift from early 2019 onwards, which made it more difficult to bring together people from both countries in trainings and other interventions.[[60]](#footnote-60) At times, government restrictions meant crossing the border was not possible. On other occasions, implementing partners and beneficiaries themselves felt it was unsafe to do so.[[61]](#footnote-61)

4/5/6 The project was designed with a specific output on youth. During phase 1, the project far exceeded the target number of trust building measures involving youth from both sides of the border, with a commensurate excess of number of youth involved. The mid-term review found that many youth built new friendships and observed significant changes in attitude among youth and adolescents, but the mid-line survey data did not confirm a change in tolerance among youth on both sides of the border (see outcome indicator 1.4 above). During phase 2 also, trainings, camps and associated small scale activities were aimed at changing the mindset of young people by bringing them together in trainings about tolerance/diplomacy/ negotiations. Beneficiaries again expressed how this had led to new friendships and changed attitudes, and this was also borne out by a small survey conducted by an implementing partner.[[62]](#footnote-62) Media trainings resulted in better capacity among youth to discern fake news, which was linked directly to peace building outcomes.[[63]](#footnote-63) The trans-border football league brought new friendships and tighter relationships between youth from the two sides of the border which continued during phase 2, even if the shift in context impeded the league from function across the border during that time.[[64]](#footnote-64)

4/5/6 The project was designed with a specific output for women: ‘Women enhance cooperation and trust between communities through actively participating in the identification and implementation of cross-border initiatives’. The mid-term review found that, during phase 1, the project was able to foster some economic collaboration between women on both sides of the border and project reporting showed that output indicator targets were met. However, the mid-line surveys’ data did not show a change in the role played by women in local affairs in Kyrgyzstan and no data for Tajikistan (see outcome indicator 1.5 above). Cross-border economic collaboration continued during phase 2, but became more constrained due to the deteriorating context on the border. The different implementation timelines that resulted from the Kyrgyzstan workplan approval delays in phase 2 also hampered this cross-border collaboration.[[65]](#footnote-65) In Kyrgyzstan, the project supported the integration of women’s voices into local development planning budgeting through a software tool that improves information on households and quality of services.[[66]](#footnote-66) In Tajikistan, a new Regional Peace Building association was established that helped raise the voices of women with local authorities and work on awareness raising on Gender Based Violence (GBV).[[67]](#footnote-67)

6 The project engaged in vocational training and support of business opportunities for youth and women. Small-scale income generation support and trainings helped raise the income of small existing businesses.[[68]](#footnote-68) Other interventions targeted marginalised groups with initial trainings in sewing handicrafts, carpenter works, gardening by using the greenhouse technologies, processing of fruit and vegetables, cattle breeding and gardening, including a strong focus on women and youth, after which participants were able to increase their income and generate further employment.[[69]](#footnote-69) Food For Training gave an additional incentive for marginalised people to access new knowledge and for families to make time for family members, women in particular, to attend such trainings.[[70]](#footnote-70) Vocational training and small business/income generation support interventions were linked to the strengthening of cross-border trade with the aim of contributing to peace building.[[71]](#footnote-71) The potential for trade to further contribute to peace building was also highlighted by the mid-term review. Some small business support interventions indeed helped increase trade interactions across the border.[[72]](#footnote-72) But for others, the reverse was the case: expanded business meant people could buy things in their own communities ‘instead of going to the bazar in Tajikistan’.[[73]](#footnote-73)

The project also purchased equipment, including tractors and materials to build green-houses; equipment for schools and provided food assistance to schools in Tajikistan. These interventions were decided upon towards the end of phase 2, when following a long delay in government approval, infrastructure-related activities turned out to be impossible. They do not easily fit within the strategies and theories of change of the project and the evaluation has not been able to establish whether they contributed to peace building related aims.[[74]](#footnote-74)

*Conflict sensitivity*

Conflict sensitivity was central to the project. It was integrated into the design, which was built on a robust conflict analysis[[75]](#footnote-75), further strengthened by separate contextual analyses of each of the target clusters. The project worked with a number of Implementing Partners with a good understanding of conflict sensitivity[[76]](#footnote-76) and one of the agencies developed a conflict sensitivity check list for its interventions.[[77]](#footnote-77)

The project included a focus on the revival of the cross-border Early Warning System. The TRACTION system was set up as a cross-border, community-based conflict monitoring system through the employment of community-based conflict monitors on both sides of the border. Assisted by UNDP project staff, these monitors provided monthly updates on key conflict incidents.[[78]](#footnote-78) During phase 2, the field monitors were no longer deployed on the Kyrgyzstan side. Instead, monitoring was conducted by UNDP staff in Batken as well as the Public Reception Centres of the State Agency for Local Self Government and Interethnic Relations.[[79]](#footnote-79) In 2019, weekly SitReps were issued observing the border situation and incidents and shared with UN RC/UNDP RR of both sides. The monitoring reports were not shared with all the RUNOs as some aspects were considered too sensitive.[[80]](#footnote-80) Perhaps equally important for conflict sensitivity was the contact between locally based project staff and the monitors, which helped provide relevant information at the project intervention level.[[81]](#footnote-81)

Conflict sensitivity considerations brought adaptions with regards to the choices of interventions to implement under the various sub-projects, as well as adjustments to planned interventions. For example, dates and locations of the matches in the cross-border football league were changed along with locations when there was an increase in tensions in particular areas. The same happened with the youth camps that were organised.[[82]](#footnote-82) To address the heightened conflict sensitivity risks during phase 2, agencies decided to implement away from the border areas. FAO was able to continue working on the installation of water level measurement devices, but had to adjust the location. Instead of working on cross-border canals, the emphasis was on smaller canals away from the border.[[83]](#footnote-83) WFP also shifted away from immediate cross-border locations in phase 2.[[84]](#footnote-84)

One of the main measures to further strengthen conflict sensitivity after the Kaerma canal dispute was the establishment of more elaborate SOPs for all infrastructure-related interventions. Seventeen different steps of approval processes, monitoring and reporting were set out in detail for future infrastructure projects, but the document was not formally signed by the Government of Kyrgyzstan.[[85]](#footnote-85) Along with this, the definition of what constituted infrastructure seems to have been broadened, with some agencies noting a disproportionality between the low risks of such interventions with technical components, and the efforts required to comply with the SoPs.[[86]](#footnote-86)

The 2017 internal lessons learned paper noted how the project was built upon a strong collaboration with national level government. Without this, such a sensitive project would not have been possible. Several hundred comments were provided on the initial project document proposal and it took a long time to negotiate a final version, but this exercise also helped to build trust.[[87]](#footnote-87) Joint monitoring visits also helped strengthen collaboration.[[88]](#footnote-88) Strong collaboration also underpinned difficult discussions around the balance between soft and hard components (with the government much preferring hard components) and the engagement on pastures in Tajikistan.[[89]](#footnote-89) In Tajikistan, government approvals took time because of the highly centralised governance system.[[90]](#footnote-90) In Kyrgyzstan, it took some time to set up collaboration with various state agencies like the border services and interior ministry.[[91]](#footnote-91)

The mid-term review found good collaboration with local level authorities. This evaluation finds some further examples of this. Beneficiaries described the involvement of local government in the announcement and selection of income generation support.[[92]](#footnote-92) Infrastructure-related projects were discussed with local authorities as part of the broader dialogue processes that underpinned them during phase 1.[[93]](#footnote-93) During phase 2, local authorities were the first point of contact for these discussions.[[94]](#footnote-94) However, the approval to work in a cross-border manner could be a lengthy process. At times, even when such approval had been granted by one authority, security agencies halted implementation, for example where they thought the gathering of youth from both sides of the border presented a security risk.[[95]](#footnote-95)

The evaluation found examples of stakeholder involvement: Stakeholder consultations underpinned the creation of self-help groups for women and the joint decisions on the activities to implement.[[96]](#footnote-96) Focus group discussions were held with youth to ensure business entrepreneur support was tailored to the different locations.[[97]](#footnote-97) Youth needs assessments underpinned income generation support for marginalised groups.[[98]](#footnote-98) In the first phase of the project, community consultations underpinned the detailed plans on specific infrastructure interventions.[[99]](#footnote-99) The cross-border inter-community consultation or dialogues were set up as a two-step process. First, community consultations were held in each site on each side of the border, including local authorities. Next, inter-community consultations were organised where the different sides would each put forward their proposed priorities for discussion.[[100]](#footnote-100) The conflict monitors played an important role in these inter-community consultations.[[101]](#footnote-101) Because the infrastructure related work started late in phase 2, the contextual shifts meant the project could not conduct community consultations and only discussed with local authorities.[[102]](#footnote-102)

*Coordination between UNCTs*

The project management and coordination structure was set out in the project document with the organogram reproduced below:

Figure 4: Project management and coordination structure

**

*Coordination between UNCTs*

The management structure envisaged bi-annual meetings involving the RUNOs from both countries. UNCT Heads of Agency level meetings were held in February 2016, November 2016, November 2017 and November 2018.[[103]](#footnote-103) At the technical level, face to face coordination meetings of the focal points group were held once a month initially, in either Batken or Khudjand. This was then adjusted during phase 1 to once every two to three months due to competing time pressures.[[104]](#footnote-104) During phase 2, face-to-face cross-border focal point meetings were held twice in 2018, face to face, then online three time in 2019.[[105]](#footnote-105) The meetings became much less frequent in phase 2 due to the lack of progress in the sign off of the work plan.[[106]](#footnote-106)

The PDAs have played a major role in the coordination and monitoring of the project. Whilst in place in both countries, PDAs worked together to organise the various coordination meetings, oversee the project level monitoring and evaluation and assist with advice on conflict sensitivity in particular. During phase 2, the UN in Kyrgyzstan struggled to fill the position of PDA. UNDP staff and the PBF Secretariat took over the PDA coordinating duties to fill this gap.[[107]](#footnote-107) Although the PDAs are well equipped for their coordinating roles, their briefs have included other tasks and they can often not work on PBF coordination full time.[[108]](#footnote-108) A central coordination position was considered during the first phase of the project, but discarded for fear of perceptions of bias from basing the position in one of the countries.[[109]](#footnote-109)

Coordination between UNCTs was based on the mirroring principle, which was established at the start of the project. The aim was to place conflict sensitivity at the heart of the project, by ensuring that interventions on one side of the border were mirrored on the other. This was to ensure that difference in interventions did not cause grievances between the communities or perceptions of unfairness or bias. The mirroring principle was mainly concerned with the hard components given the sensitivity of any infrastructure related interventions. Although many project stakeholders acknowledged the importance of the principle, it was also considered an impediment in practice with regards to timely implementation of sub-projects.[[110]](#footnote-110) The mid-term review also noted that it was not always appropriate, due to the differences in context, and recommended that context should outweigh exact mirroring when deciding on the interventions.[[111]](#footnote-111) The delay in work plan sign off in Kyrgyzstan put pressure on the mirroring principle. Because it was mainly concerned with hard components, some of the agencies whose interventions focused on soft components went ahead with implementation.[[112]](#footnote-112)

*Coordination within UNCTs*

On each side of the border, RUNOs set out to coordinate interventions under the four original outputs. To strengthen the linkages between security providers, local authorities and communities (output 1), UNICEF, UNDP and WFP planned interventions. To support communities in jointly addressing community infrastructure and natural resource challenges (output 2), FAO, UNDP and WFP coordinated water-related and other community infrastructure interventions. UNDP, UNICEF and WFP worked together towards the original output 3 focusing on youth (collapsed into output 2 during phase 2) and UN Women led on a fourth output focused on women participating in cross-border initiatives (collapsed into output 2 during phase 2).[[113]](#footnote-113)

The UNDP offices coordinated implementation within the separate country teams through their field offices in Batken and Khudjand, where positions were established. These field offices coordinated the field work of all agencies and were the focal points for cooperation with local authorities.[[114]](#footnote-114) The PDAs played a coordinating role within the UNCT at the national levels, including the coordination of M&E processes. The mid-term review found a higher degree of integration between the different components in Tajikistan than in Kyrgyzstan. This was ascribed to two factors. Firstly, in Tajikistan all agencies joined together in one mechanism of community consultation meetings, from which interventions were then decided. In Kyrgyzstan this was not the case. Second, Tajikistan has had a PDA with a coordinating role throughout the project, whereas in Kyrgyzstan there was a long gap. Despite the fact that UNDP Kyrgyzstan and the PBF Secretariat stepped in to help address this gap, the mid-term review noted the importance of having an individual who is not aligned with one particular agency fulfil a strategic coordinating role.[[115]](#footnote-115)

Following the consultations with communities and local authorities at the start of each phase, agencies essentially implemented their own projects. Synergies were enhanced where the same IPs were funded, for example both UNDP and UNICEF Kyrgyzstan funded Youth of Osh during phase 1[[116]](#footnote-116) and both FAO offices implemented through the Kyrgyzstan Scientific Research Institute for Irrigation in phase 2.[[117]](#footnote-117) There in anecdotal evidence of further synergies where WFP implemented FFW/FFA alongside other interventions. WFP’s focus on marginalised people helped interventions ensure more marginalised groups were included among the beneficiaries, for example through cooperation with UN Women’s work with women champions and with UNICEF’s work with high-achieving youth.[[118]](#footnote-118)

Agencies also found more ad-hoc ways to coordinate and complement interventions. For example, in Tajikistan, UNDP used the platform established by UN Women for some of their activities, whilst in Kyrgyzstan the Women, Peace and Security agenda was added to the joined summer camps that were organised among the Youth Contact Groups set up by UNDP in Kyrgyzstan.[[119]](#footnote-119) In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the project sites comprised villages where many of the young men have moved to Russia or elsewhere for work, leaving few young men behind. There were some reports of overlap between target beneficiaries.[[120]](#footnote-120)

*Gender mainstreaming*

All projects disaggregated beneficiary data according to gender, and considered gender balance in the writing up of case stories.[[121]](#footnote-121) A gender mainstreaming plans was drawn up for phase 1, but the mid-term review noted that it was unclear to what extent it had been used or monitored by all RUNOs.[[122]](#footnote-122) It included a recommendation pertaining to the need to clarify the responsibility on ensuring community women’s active involvement in dialogue at all levels. The phase 2 (renewed) gender mainstreaming plan lists several commitments related to this, but the plan was again not systematically monitored or used. However, gender was an agenda item during technical coordination meetings.[[123]](#footnote-123) Table 2 lists the gender mainstreaming commitments for the agencies as per the phase 2 gender mainstreaming plan.[[124]](#footnote-124) Due to time constraints, the evaluation has not been able to systematically collect data on all these commitments, but available data provides some insights into the extent to which these commitments were met. Project stakeholders noted how finding female participants for certain sub-projects activities could be challenging due to the cultural and religious constraints faced by women in the cross-border communities.[[125]](#footnote-125)

Table 5: Gender mainstreaming commitments in the Phase 2 gender mainstreaming plan

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Ensure gender equality in participatory planning, implementation, monitoring and decision-making to ensure that the PBF project benefits women and men (girls and boys) equally | The specific needs of women to bring them into discussions and dialogues were taken into account.[[126]](#footnote-126) Sub-projects aimed at different percentages (30%; 35%, 50%) of women, also taking into consideration the context.[[127]](#footnote-127) |
| Remove the social, cultural, economic and logistical barriers to women’s participation in decision-making processes, as well as peace and conflict dialogues | The mid-term review found some indications that women had participated quite effectively in the decision-making on the sub-projects.[[128]](#footnote-128) The project worked on strengthening the role of women in Water Users Associations (WUAs).[[129]](#footnote-129) |
| Capacitate the authorities, including actors in the security sector, to prevent and respond to violation of women’s rights in conflict-prone areas | There were specific trainings on the monitoring of human rights violations as part of the capacity building of women leaders, and the association that was established drew up a plan for this monitoring.[[130]](#footnote-130) |
| Foster initiatives to improve the status of women (self-esteem, confidence, empowerment, etc.) | Girls broadened their horizons in terms of potential job opportunities.[[131]](#footnote-131) Sewing courses enabled women to organise themselves collectively and increase their incomes[[132]](#footnote-132) Initiatives brought women out of their houses and into community life.[[133]](#footnote-133) |
| Support women’s access to essential resources, services and facilities. Allocate human and financial resources to gender activities, where possible, considering different needs of women and men, girls and boys | Many efforts were made to ensure that women benefited from the sub-projects. Specific women businesses were supported.[[134]](#footnote-134) At least one sub-project specifically targeted female-led households, households including members with disabilities, or widows.[[135]](#footnote-135) Women were involved in infrastructure projects by cooking for the workers, planting seedlings, collecting stones and filling nets.[[136]](#footnote-136) Female WUA members and farmers attended WUA trainings.[[137]](#footnote-137) The inclusion of female members in a WUA enabled better access for women to its services and participation in canal cleaning.[[138]](#footnote-138) Women came to learn about drip irrigation and one set up a smaller version for garden tomatoes.[[139]](#footnote-139) A sports yard was constructed with a specific part for children and women.[[140]](#footnote-140) |

*Human rights mainstreaming*

The project aimed to reduce human rights violations during border crossings because these were important drivers of conflict and can escalate to national levels.[[141]](#footnote-141) Human rights were addressed through the work with the Ombudsman’s offices in both countries.[[142]](#footnote-142) The mid-term review found that these interventions helped strengthen complaint mechanisms for border-related issues. There were also human rights aspects to the trainings and guidelines developed to ensure better safety of border crossings, in particular children.[[143]](#footnote-143) Specific trainings on the monitoring of human rights violations were provided as part of the capacity building of women leaders, and the association that was established drew up a plan for this monitoring.[[144]](#footnote-144) The awareness of youth and communities of official rules and procedures pertaining to border crossings was raised.[[145]](#footnote-145) However, the mid-term review was not able to independently verify whether the project had resulted in changes in attitudes and behaviours of border services as a result of trainings and their inclusion into community meetings. Because of the tense situation in the border areas at the time, this evaluation has not been able to gather additional data on this (see under effectiveness above). Although minority rights – in particular of the sizeable Uzbek population in Laakon – were not explicitly addressed in the project document due to sensitivities, there is anecdotal evidence that they were taken into account during project implementation.[[146]](#footnote-146) The UN due diligence policy on UN support to non-United Nations security forces does not apply to the project, because training or sensitization regarding international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law falls outside this policy.[[147]](#footnote-147)

*Conclusions on effectiveness*

Income level

This evaluation finds evidence that the project contributed to the outcome of *increased cooperation and trust between communities to mitigate risks of renewed violence* during phase 1. A lack of end survey data means it is not possible to draw the same firm conclusion on contribution to this outcome statement for phase 2. However, TRACTION data and beneficiary interviews shows that the project contributed to a reduction of a specific type of conflict: those related to water, across both phases. During its second phases, the project faced two key challenges that have impacted on its effectiveness. The delay in workplan sign off brought a delay in implementation of some activities. Infrastructure-related support was ultimately not possible. From 2019 onwards, a deterioration in the conflict context posed a further challenge to implementation.

Output level

At the output level, the mid-term review found evidence of results of *improved linkages and cooperation between security providers, local authorities and communities* during phase 1. Because this evaluation was unable to speak to security providers and due to the lack of results for this output in Kyrgyzstan in phase 2, the same conclusion cannot be drawn for phase 2.

A second output aimed at the *restoration of cross-border linkages and trust by jointly addressing interdependent needs/challenges associated with community infrastructure and natural resources and by establishing platforms of confidence building and cooperation between various societal groups.*

The project set out to assist the cross-border communities *to jointly address community infrastructure challenges* through the support for *interdependent* community infrastructure but found that trying to make people share resources could lead to more tensions rather than reduce them. As a consequence, the project shifted away from this original vision to interventions that supported independent infrastructure on either side of the border. During both phases, water measurement improvements helped increase transparency in water usage and take away suspicions about manual water measurements. As noted above, the project contributed to a reduction of water-related conflict across both phases, but because this mostly concerned the strengthening of independent rather than interdependent infrastructure, it is unclear to what extent this contributed to a restoration of cross-border linkages and trust. The mid-term review found few results on pasture-related interventions and the evaluation did not collect enough data on the pasture related interventions to draw conclusions regarding their results. Food For Asset assistance provided marginalised people with an extra motivation and opportunity to work on canal cleaning or construction, enhancing the inclusiveness of the project.

The mid-term review found results with regards to the *strengthening of cross-border capacities for peace*, noting the importance of the conflict monitors and their bridge-building role between the communities. The contextual challenges during phase 2 weakened the ability of the project to continue strengthening cross-border capacities for peace, which means the evaluation cannot draw conclusions about these results across both phases of the project. The evidence reviewed by the evaluation is inconclusive on how and to what extent the project – across both phases – has contributed to a change in attitudes/tolerance amongst youth or a strengthening of women’s contributions to enhancing cross-border linkages and trust. The project has emphasised income generation and small business support interventions to promote cross-border trade. The evaluation finds evidence that these interventions have helped beneficiaries increase their income, but it is not clear to what extent this has led to the strengthening of cross-border trade, or how cross-border trade contributes to peace building (see recommendation 4).

Overall, the evaluation finds that the project was effective in working towards its outcome during the first phase, underpinned by strong conflict sensitive approaches, good stakeholder consultations and generally good cooperation with government. Effectiveness has progressively weakened during phase two. Effectiveness was impacted by the fact that phase two infrastructure interventions could not be jointly designed based on community consultations and ultimately could not be implemented; the strengthening of Capacities for Peace was no longer possible to the same extent; and cross-border aspects of sub-interventions were more difficult due to the deterioration of the context. Coordination between the UNCTs was based on the mirroring principle, but the project has found that this can impede the timely delivery of interventions and is not always appropriate due to the different contexts in both countries (see recommendation 6). The mid-term review found stronger coordination within the UNCT in Tajikistan than in Kyrgyzstan and partially ascribed this to the lack of a PDA in Kyrgyzstan for much of the project duration (see recommendation 7). Overall, coordination within UNCTs was enhanced when agencies co-implemented through the same implementing partner or complemented each other in terms of beneficiary targeting (see recommendation 8). Some good efforts were made to mainstream gender throughout the project, although the mid-term review as well as the evaluation found a lack of clarity with regards to who was responsible for the tracking of the gender mainstreaming plan. Human rights were mainstreamed as appropriate to the project focus.

# Efficiency

*The evaluation has investigated a selection of questions pertaining to efficiency. These focus on the role of the Project Steering Committee (EQ13); staffing (EQ 17); external communications (EQ 18); reporting (EQ 14) and M&E (EQ 15). Evidence is presented below to each of these questions in turn, followed by a concluding section.*

The Project was directed by two Steering Committees, one in each country. These facilitated government approval and provided oversight of the project. The mid-term review found that this oversight was generally good during phase 1of the project.[[148]](#footnote-148) In Tajikistan, the Steering Committee was co-chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in both phases. It comprised representatives of the UN agencies, as well as various relevant government bodies (youth, women, ombudsman office and others).[[149]](#footnote-149) Good oversight continued in phase 2. For example, the May 2018 Steering Committee meetings discussed the progress made in phase 1 and re-confirmed the approval of the Annual Work plan.[[150]](#footnote-150) Additional technical level meetings were held between UN agencies and MFA technical staff and a joint monitoring visit was undertaken.[[151]](#footnote-151)

In Kyrgyzstan, Steering Committee oversight of the project was provided as part of a wider portfolio of PBF funded projects. This Joint Steering Committee discussed the project during the first phase, under the guidance of the department of ethnic, religious policy and interaction with civil society of the Office of the President.[[152]](#footnote-152) The Special Office on Demarcation and Delineation (part of the Prime Minister’s Office) was a direct counter-part for the project. During the second phase, the implications of the Kaerma canal project brought a change in oversight to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a long period of detailed scrutiny of the proposed phase 2 infrastructure-related activities.[[153]](#footnote-153) The project was not put on the agenda of the PBF Joint Steering Committee until November 2019, when the workplan was approved.[[154]](#footnote-154)

The majority of agencies did not report major issues with their staffing for the project. Not all were able to deploy field level staff, even if there was an understanding that dedicated staff at the field is important for conflict sensitivity risk management.[[155]](#footnote-155) Some agencies had staff with specific peace building peacebuilding backgrounds and mandates. For example, UNICEF Kyrgyzstan developed an agency specific Theory of Change to cross-border peace building and WFP Kyrgyzstan developed a conflict sensitivity check list.[[156]](#footnote-156)

The external communication of activities and results took on special importance for this project conflict sensitivity risks are related as much to perceptions as to facts. This includes communication to local stakeholders on why things are not happening or why interventions are halted.[[157]](#footnote-157) In Tajikistan, the project created a website with details on each infrastructure interventions.[[158]](#footnote-158) The evaluation found some examples where external communications was used in project interventions to strengthen peace building impacts, for example the teaching and use of one-minute videos on social media on cooperation and friendship between youth, and the festivities the UN day of peace in September 2019.[[159]](#footnote-159)

The mid-term review commented on the robust nature of the M&E plan for phase 1. The same plan was adopted, with slight modifications, for phase 2. It set out detailed thinking on the questions to be asked by surveys to gather qualitative data on the qualitative outcome indicators. The project commissioned baseline and end-line surveys at the end of the first phase. No end-line survey was commissioned at the end of the project. It was not considered feasible given the tense border context at the time, which would have made a survey challenging and the likeliness of receiving government approval remote.[[160]](#footnote-160) The phase 1 end-line surveys generated data that has helped provide evidence of progress against key outcome level indicators. Some agencies have also commissioned separate survey data related to specific interventions.[[161]](#footnote-161)

The PDAs played a coordinating role in the overall project M&E. They organised a number of reflection exercises: a lessons learned paper in August 2017[[162]](#footnote-162)and a lessons learned exercise linked to the mid-term review in November 2017. As a result of the mid-term review, the project set out more detailed strategies for each output and tried to increase synergies by streamlining the Results Framework. The project document for phase 2 sets out responses to lessons learned and indicated how these would inform activities during phase 2. Despite the challenges that then followed during phase 2, the project has included a strong element of learning as the project adjusted to findings on what worked and didn’t work, for example the shift from interdependent to independent infrastructure support. The project further adapted to shifts in context and the constraints posed by the Kyrgyzstan approval delays in phase 2 (see under effectiveness).

For the first phase of the project, the mid-term review noted how reporting on project performance and progress was limited to the bi-monthly coordination meetings, where agencies updated each other on progress under each output, plus the ‘rather minimal’ bi-annual progress reports. Taken together, the review judged this reporting as weak. These reporting requirements did not change during the second phase. Agencies themselves noted how the bi-annual PBF reporting to template provides limited space, which is especially difficult for a project involving ten UN agencies across two countries.[[163]](#footnote-163) A review of phase 2 reporting shows these contained relevant information on the challenges faced during implementation, but limited information on evidence of progress. Narratives reported mainly on interventions with less focus on evidence of results.[[164]](#footnote-164)

*Conclusions on efficiency*

The evaluation investigated a limited set of efficiency related questions. The majority of agencies did not report major issues with their staffing for the project. The evaluation found some examples where external communications was used in project interventions to strengthen peace building impacts. Overall, the project benefited from good M&E, coordinated by the PDAs. The project had a robust M&E plan. It commissioned base- and mid-line surveys and a series of lessons learned exercises, including a mid-term review, but was unable to commission an end-line survey. The project has not benefitted from strong reporting. The project has included a strong element of learning.

# Sustainability

The project documents include a section on sustainability, which outlined how different interventions (sub-projects) planned to be sustainable. The phase 2 project document also refers to some of the recommendations on sustainability from the mid-term review. There is no mention of an explicit exit strategy for the project. This section reviews the evidence on sustainability for each of the project’s key components below.

*Output 1: Improved linkages and cooperation between security providers, local authorities and communities to reduce violent incidents*

The strengthening of complaints mechanisms through the capacity building of the Ombudsman’s offices were judged to be likely sustainable by the mid-term review, although it pointed to the need for more effort in Kyrgyzstan, where the project was unable to make progress during phase two. The work continued in Tajikistan, where the evaluation was unable to speak to the Ombudsman’s office. One interviewee pointed out that the need for ongoing budgets to visit communities may hamper the sustainability of the complaints mechanisms beyond the life of the project.[[165]](#footnote-165) The mid-term review considered that the knowledge building on border crossing rules was likely to be sustainable. The evaluation has not been able to assess this, or whether the improved linkages and cooperation that were found at the end of phase 1 continued in phase 2 and are likely to be sustainable.

*Output 2: Communities restore cross-border linkages and trust by jointly addressing interdependent needs/challenges associated with community infrastructure and natural resources and by establishing platforms of confidence building and cooperation between various societal groups*

The sustainability of community and water-related infrastructure depends on the capacity of local actors to take on their maintenance. The project ensured that local actors took on the future maintenance, but the general capacity and financial resilience of these water governance mechanisms is considered an ongoing problem.[[166]](#footnote-166) Beneficiaries noted the sustainability of water measurement technology, although WUAs and the authorities may require some further support with problem shooting.[[167]](#footnote-167)

Because the project was unable to progress work towards the strengthening of *Capacities for Peace* during phase 2, the sustainability of the confidence building and dialogue platforms between the communities is not clear. Trainings, camps, cross-border youth groups and associated small scale activities were aimed at changing the mindset of young people. Although the mid-term review and the evaluation found evidence of changed mindsets, this is not supported by the mid-line survey for Tajikistan. Although the mid-term review rightly noted that it is hard to predict the sustainability of changed attitudes, youth and women interviewed for this evaluation noted the friendships that were built and how they remained, even if the current situation made seeing each other difficult:[[168]](#footnote-168) ‘We tried to organise a [cross-border] camp last year but students could not come because government did not give permission. Sometimes we see each other individually but with little real interaction. But our relationship is still good’.[[169]](#footnote-169) The youth contact groups and the trans-border football league is still running in some places, but have stopped in others. Project stakeholders ascribed this to the recent deterioration in the cross-border context but also to the fact that many youth leave for (seasonal) work in Russia and elsewhere.[[170]](#footnote-170)

The support to businesses and income generation activities – in kind and through training – generally show a good level of sustainability, even if there may be practical challenges, for example where a better harvest went to waste because there were no storage facilities, electricity shortages hampered a workshop[[171]](#footnote-171), and tensions in the border areas hampered cross-border trade.[[172]](#footnote-172)As noted under effectiveness, it is not clear to what extent this translates into stronger cross-border trade and in strengthened peace building.

*Conclusions on sustainability*

There is evidence pointing to the sustainability of the water-related infrastructure that was rehabilitated and the small business/income generation that was supported. In addition, it is likely that the decrease in water-related conflict will be sustained. It is more difficult to draw conclusions about the sustainability of the *Capacities for Peace* that were supported by the project. The inconclusive evidence on changed attitudes of youth and lack of end-line survey means it is also not possible to draw conclusions on the sustainability of changes in attitudes, levels of cooperation and trust building between the communities.

# Value for Money

Value For Money is assessed by judging the Economy, Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Equity of an intervention. Given the limitations of this evaluation as set out in the methodology section, it is not possible to assess the Value for Money of the project in a detailed manner. For example, the evaluation has not been able to review financial data to make an assessment on the Economy of the project. Instead, the evaluation offers a broad, light-touch qualitative assessment based mainly on a reflection of the Efficiency, Effectiveness and Equity aspects of value for money. These reflections are based on the analysis presented in this evaluation.

* For Efficiency, the question is how well the project has converted inputs into outputs. The evaluation has no sight of the financial details of the interventions that were implemented by the ten RUNOs and their implementing partners across two phases. At the project output level, the question is how well these separate interventions have converted into the achievement of the outputs. As noted under EQ 6, the project has had some good results achieving its stated outputs during phase 1. During phase 2, circumstances have constrained project achievements.
* For Effectiveness, the question is how well these outputs have achieved a contribution to the intended outcome. Here too, the project has had results during phase 1. During phase 2, circumstances have constrained further progress towards outcome level contributions and there is not enough data available to judge such progress. This phase also included a relatively large expenditure on purchases with a much weaker link to peace building outcomes when infrastructure-related interventions could not proceed. Overall, the project has generated a lot of learning, some of it through difficult challenges, on conflict sensitivity, peace building and UN cooperation (see section below on added value to cross-border peace building). Although this is not listed as a project outcome, it is nevertheless important and can be added to the Value for Money assessment.
* Finally, given the strong mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity and the strong focus on inclusion of women and youth, the Equity aspect of the project – how fairly the benefits were distributed – can be assessed as good.

In conclusion, this evaluation assess the project to have had value for money during phase 1. This is less clear for phase 2.

# To what extent has the project added value to peacebuilding in cross-border areas in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan? (impact level question)

*The ToR for this evaluation posed an impact level question as part of the evaluation’s objectives: to what extent has the project added value to peacebuilding in cross-border areas in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan? This section reviews the evidence and conclusions presented in the evaluation to answer this question.*

The project design was relevant to peace building in the absence of progress on border demarcation and delimitation. That design explicitly excluded contributing to more permanent solutions to the border situation. The project has added value to cross-border peace building as understood in this manner. It has contributed to an overall decrease in tensions during its first phase. It has also contributed to a decrease in water-related conflicts that has continued across both phases and is likely to be sustainable. During phase 2, further impact of the project was hampered by the two key challenges reviewed throughout this evaluation. The impact-level question on ‘added value’ also allows reflection on the broader impacts on cross-border peace building as a practice. As outlined in more detail below, the project has generated a number of lessons on conflict sensitivity; on mirroring and on the dilemma between conflict reduction and trust building. Put another way, this third lesson points to a broader dilemma and impact level question about the potential tensions *between short term stabilisation and creating the conditions for longer-term peace buildin*g.

A number of project stakeholders pointed out that as long as the borders are not settled, conflict incidents will continue to happen, and questioned what international interventions could do about this.[[173]](#footnote-173) One of the former conflict monitors said: ‘For this question I have a very firm answer. The project did good work and had successful activities. Those conflicts are because of border issues that the project cannot resolve. They are not related to project activities.’[[174]](#footnote-174) But there is a question on how long the status quo can be maintained. The former Tajikistan PDA noted that ‘achieving policy change on cross-border security, natural resources management, or economic matters is more important that delivering specific infrastructure or business development projects’ and that ‘special attention at the policy level should be paid to high level advocacy measures aimed at communicating the risks of maintaining the status quo in terms of border non-delimitation (…)’. Equally, this evaluation concludes that a shift to an inclusion of policy change is important to enhance the impact of future cross-border peace building, because the status quo is not tenable in the mid- to long term. Current governmental efforts towards demarcation and potential land swaps make this even more pressing.

The project has tried to explore entry points to work with the national level governments on these matters. For example, during the May 2018 Steering Committee meeting in Tajikistan, the UN RC made explicit reference to the support the UN could provide to demarcation and delineation, and how the Steering Committee or other project mechanisms could play a role in supporting dialogue between the countries, but such efforts were deflected to the Inter-state Committee on Border Demarcation and Delimitation.[[175]](#footnote-175) Nevertheless, the coordination structures established by the project could have played a role, even if indirect, towards ‘leveraging up’ local level peace building gains. Some examples of relevant coordination structures are as follows: In Tajikistan, the project Steering Committee included technical experts working on the demarcation and delimitation of the borders.[[176]](#footnote-176) Project monitoring visits also included such technical experts.[[177]](#footnote-177) The joint monitoring visits where staff were brought to the field provided government with more detailed insights into the issues on the border.[[178]](#footnote-178) In Kyrgyzstan, the Special Office on Demarcation and Delineation (part of the Prime Minister’s Office) was a direct counterpart for the project during phase 1.[[179]](#footnote-179)

# Conclusions

The combination of a lack of end survey data, the challenges faced by the project in phase 2 and the constraints faced by this evaluation means it has been difficult to draw many firm conclusions on the project’s final results and sustainability. The project’s objectives and strategies have been mostly relevant and project activities have been relevant to the needs and priorities of beneficiaries. The evaluation finds that the project was effective in working towards its outcome during the first phase, underpinned by strong conflict sensitive approaches and adaptation to difficult circumstances, good stakeholder consultations and generally good cooperation with government. Effectiveness has progressively weakened during phase 2, impacted by the fact that infrastructure interventions could not be jointly designed based on community consultations and ultimately could not be implemented; the strengthening of *Capacities for Peace* was no longer possible; and cross-border aspects of interventions were more difficult due to the deterioration of the context. Overall, robust efforts were made with regards to coordination between and within UNCTs. Some good efforts were made to mainstream gender throughout the project, although there was a lack of clarity with regards to who was responsible for the tracking of the gender mainstreaming plan. The evaluation investigated a limited set of efficiency related questions and found no major issues with staffing or external communications. The project had a robust M&E plan but this was not followed for phase 2 due to contextual circumstances.

This evaluation finds evidence that the project contributed to the outcome of *increased cooperation and trust between communities to mitigate risks of renewed violence* during phase 1 but it is not possible to draw the same conclusion for phase 2, or to assess how sustainable these results are. The project did contribute to a reduction of a specific type of conflict: those related to water, across both phases. This is likely to be sustainable. At the output level, the mid-term review found evidence of results of improved linkages and cooperation between security providers, local authorities and communities during phase 1 but there is not enough evidence to conclude that this contributed to a reduction of border-crossing related incidents. Under output 2, the project set out to assist the cross-border communities to jointly address community infrastructure challenges through the support for *interdependent* community infrastructure, but found that trying to make people share resources could lead to more tensions rather than reduce them. As noted above, the project contributed to a reduction of water-related conflict across both phases, but because this mostly concerned the strengthening of *independent* rather than *interdependent* infrastructure, it is unclear to what extent this contributed to a restoration of cross-border linkages and trust.The mid-term review found results with regards to the strengthening of cross-border *Capacities for Peace* during phase 1, but the contextual challenges during phase 2 weakened the ability of the project to continue this work. The evidence reviewed by the evaluation is inconclusive on whether the project – across both phases – has contributed to a change in attitudes/tolerance amongst youth or a strengthening of women’s contributions to enhancing cross-border linkages. The evaluation finds evidence that income generation and small business support interventions have helped beneficiaries increase their income and that such results are likely to be sustainable, but it is not clear to what extent this has led to the strengthening of cross-border trade, or how cross-border trade contributes to peace building. Despite its challenges, the project has added value to cross-border peace-building. Beyond its results, it has generated a number of important lessons learned on conflict sensitivity; cross-border coordination (mirroring) and the dilemma between supporting further independence of the communities to reduce immediate conflict and longer-term trust building and sharing of resources.

To enhance the impact of future cross-border peace building, it is important to continuously review whether working towards separate infrastructure on bother sides of the border is feasible in the long term and the impact of this on trust-building, cross-border linkages and longer-term peace building. Several interlocutors believed that peace building interventions cannot stop conflicts at the border altogether. This makes it even more important to ensure that future cross-border peace building by the UN include a further investigation as to how local level stabilisation efforts can assist efforts towards longer-term solutions for the border areas (see recommendation 9).

# Lessons Learned

*1.Conflict sensitivity best practice: contextual understanding and alignment; ongoing monitoring*

Conflict sensitivity was mainstreamed as a central element of the project through a combination of measures. Robust and detailed conflict analysis underpinned the project design. The mirroring principle was adopted to ensure interventions on one side of the border were mirrored on the other. Further detailed conflict monitoring was set up to continue during the project through the TRACTION system. This included investments in community level conflict monitors: local community members who knew their communities well. As a result of these investments in ongoing and detailed contextual analysis, the project was able to adapt to changing circumstances on the ground. Despite these robust measures, a dispute ensued around the project’s intervention at the Kaerma canal and then escalated. **This shows the limits of joint decision-making, the crucial role of perceptions and the importance of ensuring ongoing monitoring, communication and transparency to ensure conflict sensitivity (see recommendation 5)**

*2.The mirroring principle: finding a balance between preventing grievances and alignment to context*

Coordination between UNCTs was based on the mirroring principle. As noted above, the aim was to place conflict sensitivity at the heart of the project by ensuring that interventions on one side of the border were mirrored on the other. This was to ensure that differences in interventions did not cause grievances between the communities or perceptions of unfairness or bias. The mirroring principle was mainly concerned with the hard components given the sensitivity of any infrastructure-related interventions. However, interviews for this evaluation as well as the mid-term review show that **a strict application of the mirroring principle can contradict another conflict sensitivity principle: the need to respond and align closely to the context (see recommendation 6)**

*3.Dilemma between conflict reduction and trust/peace building*

During phase 1, the project shifted from its original vision to increase the cooperation and interdependency of cross-border communities over the sharing of natural resources, to a focus on increasing independent and fair access, strengthening the independence of communities on the different sides of the border. This tension point had indeed been outlined in the 2015 conflict analysis. It found that ‘the way the communities propose to address the issues of contention is not through better resource sharing and improvement in ethnic relations, but through separation’.[[180]](#footnote-180) That assessment strongly urged that ‘infrastructure should serve the purpose of uniting people and not reward a drive towards segregation and isolation’.[[181]](#footnote-181) **This dilemma highlights a central tension between the aim of promoting longer-term sustainable peace, captured in the first half of the project outcome *to increase cooperation and trust between communities*, and the short term stabilisation, captured in the second half *to mitigate the risk of renewed violence* that requires regular consideration to ensure the continuing relevance of cross-border peace building support** **(see recommendation 8).**

# Recommendations

These recommendations are directed to PBF and UN agencies considering future cross-border peace building projects in the border areas between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

1. Revise Theories of Change and strategies to further clarify the logic of pathways with regards to changes in attitudes/behaviours and linkages/cooperation/trust building.
2. Clarify the outcome of cross-border peace building projects to detail which drivers of conflict they aim to address and therefore which types of conflict incidents they may reduce.
3. Ensure that the strengthening of Capacities for Peace, in addition to the addressing of conflict drivers, is central to cross-border peace building, and build on existing Capacities for Peace. Ensure that outcome statements clarify which Capacities for Peace the project aims to contribute to strengthening.
4. Ensure that strengthening of cross-border trade is based on a further in-depth analysis of the linkages between income generation/business support and cross-border trade, and between cross-border trade and peace building.
5. Further strengthen conflict sensitivity by ensuring close alignment of interventions with the conflict context; robust and ongoing local community level understanding of conflict dynamics; providing space for adaptation of interventions where needed; and ongoing joint monitoring of intervention implementation.
6. Bring further nuance to the mirroring principle so that local context is prioritised in the design of interventions
7. Further strengthen coordination and M&E by appointing an overall cross-border coordinator.
8. Further strengthen peace building coordination between RUNOs by considering more implementation through the same implementing partner and complementarity in terms of beneficiary targeting
9. Continuously consider the dilemma/trade-offs between the aim of short-term conflict reduction and longer-term trust building when considering the rehabilitation of infrastructure that discourages shared use.
10. Incorporate a review of potential entry points on policy/advocacy to support progress towards a solution in the border areas into the design of future cross-border peace building projects.

# Annex 1: List of KIIs and FGDs

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **KIIs/FGD Tajikistan** | **Male** | **Female** | **Location/project site** |
| RUNO KII TJ 5 | KII PDA TJ | 1 |  | Dushanbe |
| RUNO KII TJ 4 | KII UNDP TJ | 2 | 1 | Dushanbe |
| RUNO KII TJ 3 | KII UN RR/RC TJ |  | 1 | Dushanbe |
| RUNO KII TJ 2 | KII UNICEF TJ | 1 | 2 | Dushanbe |
| RUNO KII TJ 1 | KII FAO TJ | 2 |  | Dushanbe |
| Government KII TJ 2 | KII Ministry of Foreign Affairs TJ | 2 |  | Dushanbe |
| RUNO KII TJ 6 | KII UNDP and UNICEF TJ field staff | 1 | 2 | Skype with Khudjand (UNDP office) |
| RUNO KII TJ 8 | KII UN Women TJ |  | 3 | Dushanbe |
| RUNO KII TJ 7 | KII WFP TJ | 2 |  | Dushanbe |
| Third Party KI TJ 1 | KII OSCE TJ | 2 | 2 | Dushanbe |
| Government KII TJ 7 (from Ben 7 TJ( | KII Local authority and conflict monitor TJ | 1 | 1 | Skype with Khudjand (UNDP office) |
| IP TJ KII 3 | KII IP Kyrgyz Research Institute on Irrigation (KRII) TJ/KG | 1 | 1 | Skype with office in Bishkek |
| IP KII 4 | KII IP UNICEF Eurasia Foundation Central Asia TJ | 1 | 1 | Dushanbe |
| IP KII TJ 2 | KII IP UN Women Ehyo - Farhang va Taraqqiyot TJ |  | 2 | Skype with Khudjand (UNDP office) |
| Beneficiaries KII TJ 5 | KII Beneficiaries UN Women dried fruit training, greenhouses TJ |  | 2 | Skype with Khudjand (UNDP office) – beneficiaries from of B. Gafurov district, villages of Khistevarz and Isfara district municipality of Lakkon |
| IP TJ KII 1 | KII IP UNDP MIR TJ | 1 | 1 | Skype with Khudjand (UNDP office) |
| Third Party KII TJ 2 | KII Aga Khan Foundation TJ | 1 | 1 | Skype with Aga Khan office in TJ |
| Beneficiaries KII TJ 4 | KII Beneficiaries small economic activities TJ | 1 | 3 | Skype with Khudjand (UNDP office) beneficiaries from of B. Gafurov district villages of Khistevarz and Ovchi Kalacha |
| Beneficiaries FGD TJ 3 | FGD Beneficiaries water infrastructure support FAO TJ | 7 |  | Skype with Khudjand (UNDP office) Beneficairies from Isfara district; Isfara district municipalities Vorukh and Chorku; B. Gafurov district municipalities of Khistevarz and Ovchi Kalacha |
| Beneficiaries FGD TJ 2 | FGD Beneficiaries Upshift and peacebuilding competencies training TJ | 1 | 4 | Skype with Khudjand (UNDP office). Beneficiaries from B. Gafurov district municipality of Khistevarz |
| Beneficiaries FGD TJ 1 | FGD Beneficiaries Youth Contact Group members TJ | 4 |  | Skype with Khudjand (UNDP office) Beneficiaries from B. Gafurov district municipalities of Khistevarz and Ovchi Kalacha |
| Beneficiaries KII TJ 6 | KII Beneficiaries greenhouses TJ | 1 |  | Skype with Khudjand (UNDP office). Beneficiary from Isfara district municipality of Lakkon |
|  | **Total interviews TJ** | **22** |  |  |
|  | **Total people interviewed TJ** | **32** | **27** | **59** |
|  |  | | | |
|  | **KIIs/FGDs Kyrgyzstan** | **M** | **F** | **Location** |
| RUNO KII KG 1 | KII UNDP KG (Bishkek) | 1 | 1 | Bishkek |
| RUNO KII KG 2 | KII UN Women KG (Bishkek) |  | 2 | Bishkek |
| RUNO KII KG 3 | KII UNICEF KG (Bishkek and Osh) | 3 | 1 | Bishkek |
| RUNO KII KG 4 | KII FAO KG (Bishkek/Batken) | 1 | 1 | Bishkek |
| RUNO KII KG 5 | KII WFP KG (Bishkek) |  | 1 | Bishkek |
| IP KII KG 6 | KII IP KG UNDP/UNICEF FTI | 1 | 1 | Bishkek |
| Government KII KG 1 | KII Department of Local Self Governance and Inter-ethnic Affairs KG | 1 | 2 | Bishkek |
| RUNO KII KG 7 | KII PBF Secretariat KG (including temporary PDA) | 3 |  | Bishkek |
| IP KII KG 1 | KII UN Women KG Community Mobiliser |  | 1 | Bishkek |
| RUNO KII KG 8 | KII WFP KG Head of Office and WFP TJ former deputy Head of Office | 1 |  | Bishkek |
| Third Party KII KG 1 | KII Third Party KG Saferworld |  | 1 | Bishkek |
| Third Party KII KG 2 | KII Former donor KG SDC | 1 |  | Bishkek |
| Third Party KII KG 3 | KII Third Party KG DFID | 1 |  | Bishkek |
| RUNO KII KG 9 | KII UNDP KG (Batken) | 1 |  | Batken |
| RUNO KII KG 10 | KII WFP KG (Batken) | 1 |  | Batken |
| IP KII KG 2 | KII IP UNDP and UNICEF Youth of Osh (Batken/Osh) | 1 | 1 | Batken plus Skype to Osh office |
| IP KII KG 3 | KII IP UNDP and UNCEF FTI (Batken) | 3 |  | Batken |
| Government KII KG 1 (from Ben KG 1) | KII Local authorities Deputy Governor Batken Oblast KG | 1 |  | Batken |
| Government KII KG 2 (from Ben KH 2) | KII Deputy head local authority and former conflict monitor KG | 2 |  | Samarkandek municipality |
| Beneficiaries FGD KG 3 | FGD Beneficiaries of weaving and gardening training KG | 3 | 15 | Samarkandek municipality – Paski Aryk |
| Beneficiaries KII KG 4 | KII Beneficiaries of Diplomacy School and Upshift KG | 1 | 2 | Samarkandek municipality – Samarkandek village |
| Beneficiaries KII KG 5 | KII Beneficiaries of shoe making materials and training KG | 1 | 2 | Samarkandek municipality - Samarkandek village – project site |
| Beneficiaries KII KG 6 | KII Beneficiaries of water infrastructure support KG | 3 |  | Batken |
| Beneficiaries KII KG 7 | KII Beneficiaries of water infrastructure support KG | 2 |  | Batken – project site |
| Beneficiaries KII KG 8 | KII Beneficiaries of water infrastructure support KG | 2 |  | Kara-bak municipality – project site |
| Beneficiaries FGD KG 9 | FGD Beneficiaries of sports yard KG | 4 |  | Tort-gul municipality – Chon-taala village – project site |
| Beneficiaries FGD KG 10 | FGD Beneficiaries of sewing and confectionary training KG |  | 7 | Tort-gul municipality - Chon-taala village – project site |
| Beneficiaries KII KG 11 | KII Beneficiaries of water infrastructure support KG | 1 | 1 | Tort-gul municipality - Chon-taala village – project site |
| Beneficiaries KII KG 12 | KII Beneficiaries of Diplomacy School, media camp and Upshift (plus teacher) KG | 2 | 2 | Tort-gul municipality - Chon-taala village |
| Government KII KG 13 | KII Local authority secretary KG |  | 1 | Tort-gul municipality - Chon-taala village |
| Beneficiaries KII KG 14 | KII Former conflict monitor and beneficiaries of poultry farm support KG | 2 | 1 | Aksay municipality – Aksai village – project site |
| Beneficiaries FGD KG 15 | FGD Beneficiaries of veterinary, sewing and gardening training KG | 5 | 7 | Aksay municipality - Aksai village |
| Beneficiaries KII KG 16 | KII Beneficiaries of media camp and Upshift KG | 2 | 1 | Aksay municipality - Aksai village |
| Beneficiaries KII KG 17 | KII Beneficiary of kindergarten support KG |  | 2 | Aksay municipality – Kok-tash village |
| Beneficiaries FGD KG 18 | FGD Beneficiaries of sewing workshop support KG |  | 4 | Aksay municipality – Kok-Tash village – project site |
| Beneficiaries KII KG 19 | KII Beneficiaries of health centre support KG |  | 2 | Aksay municipality – Ortoboz village – project site |
| Beneficiaries FGD KG 20 | FGD Beneficiaries of water infrastructure support KG | 4 |  | Aksay municipality – Ortoboz village – project site |
| Beneficiaries FGD KG 21 | FGD Beneficiaries of water infrastructure support KG | 4 | 1 | Kulundu municipality - Kulundu village |
| Government KII KG 22 (from Ben KG 22) | KII Local authority deputy head and secretary (former conflict monitor) KG | 2 |  | Kulundu municipality – Kulundu village |
| Beneficiary FGD KG 23 | FGD Beneficiaries of youth contact group (one now local authority deputy head) and media literacy training KG | 4 | 1 | Kulundu municipality – Kulundu village |
| Beneficiaries FGD KG 24 | FGD Beneficiaries of sewing and confectionary training and 2 local authority (local authority males left the room after some specific questions for them) KG | 2 | 11 | Kulundu municipality – Kulundu village – project site |
| Beneficiaries KII KG 25 | KII Beneficiaries of Upshift, Diplomacy School plus youth centre representatives KG | 4 | 1 | Kulundu municipality – Kulundu village |
|  | **Total number of interviews KG** | **42** | |  |
|  | **Total number of people interviewed KG** | **70** | **73** | **143** |

# Annex 2: List of documents reviewed

Agenda of the coordination meeting of UN agencies’ focal points within the cross-border cooperation for sustainable peace and development project, 16 April 2018

Crisisgroup Crisiswatch database, January 2019 – February 2020

Cross-border cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for sustainable peace and development (2017) Revised Management Arrangements (new special algorithm) to be applied in course of implementation of the project

Gender Mainstreaming Strategy phase 2, April 2018

Kyrgyzstan PBF Joint Steering Committee meeting minutes, March 2015

Kyrgyzstan Research Institute of Irrigation (2019) Sub-project report on the capacity building of WUAs and installation of remote sensors for measuring water flow

Letters from the SG addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council on the human rights due diligence policy on UN support to non-UN security forces, 25 February 2013

LNGO Ehe-Farhang wa Tarakkiyot (Tajikistan) (2019) Final Report on the project Cross-Border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development

LNGO Eurasia Foundation Central Asia (Tajikistan) (2019) Final report on the sub-project Youth peace building for social development in cross-border areas of Tajikistan

LNGO Eurasia Foundation Central Asia (Tajikistan) (2019) Assessment report on peace building competencies training

LNGO Eurasia Foundation Central Asia (Tajikistan) (2019) Consultation Process Assessment Report

LNGO MIR (Tajikistan) (2019) Final report of the sub-project “Strengthening the potential of youth of the border communities of the Sughd Region, the Republic of Tajikistan”

LNGO Network of Cross-border youth (Kyrgyzstan) (2019) Final report of the sub-project to improve youth media literacy in the border areas

Anna Matveeva (2015) UNDP Cross-Border Situation Assessment

Anna Matveeva (2016) Divided we fall…or rise? Tajikistan – Kyrgyzstan border dilemma

Minutes of Joint UNCT meeting, November 2018

Minutes of UNDP cross border working team meeting in Batken, March 2019

Minutes UNCT TJ technical level coordination meeting, September 2019

Minutes UNDP TJ KG Skype meeting, August 2019

Minutes UNDP TJ KG Skype meeting, August 2019

Minutes UNDP TJ KG Skype meeting, June 2019

Minutes UNCT TJ technical level coordination meeting, June 2019

Minutes Skype call between UNDP Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, September 2019

Minutes Skype call between UNDP Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, August 2019

Minutes Skype call between UNDP Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, June 2019

Minutes UNCT Tajikistan technical focal point meeting August 2019

Minutes UNCT Tajikistan technical focal point meeting August 2019

Natalia Mirimanova (2018) Cross-Border cooperation project lessons learned workshop for SDC, phase 2, July 2018

N-Vector, Cross-Border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development – Comparative Analysis of Baseline and End line Surveys, April 2018

PBF Final Report March 2020

PBF Annual Progress Report November 2019

PBF Semi-Annual Progress Report August 2019

PBF Annual Progress Report November 2018

PBF Semi-Annual Progress Report June 2018

PBF Cross-border peace building project document Tajikistan phase 2

PBF Cross-border peace building project document Kyrgyzstan phase 2

PBF Cross-border peace building project document Tajikistan phase 1

PBF Cross-border peace building project document Kyrgyzstan phase 1

PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017

Project Completion Report to the Swiss Development Cooperation (2017) Cross-Border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development 2016-2017

Project M&E plan for phase 1, 2015

Project M&E plan for phase 2, 2018

Project Monitoring System TRACTION (2019) Update on Situation in Target Cross-Border Area

Project Monitoring System TRACTION (2018) Quarterly project conflict monitoring brief

Project stakeholder analysis

Oleh Protsyk (former PDA Tajikistan) (2017) Cross-border cooperation for sustainable peace and development (Kyrgyz-Tajik project supported by PBF and SDC): handover note

Oleh Protsyk (former PDA Tajikistan) (2017) Working on conflict prevention across state boundaries: experiences and lessons from Kyrgyz-Tajik border area

SIPRI and WFP (2019) The World Food Programme’s contribution to improving the prospects for peace in Kyrgyzstan

Strengthening capacity to prevent and mitigate conflicts in the border zones of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – Opinion Poll – Comparative report of the results of base and intermediate studies in the Republic of Tajikistan, 2018

Tajikistan Steering Committee meeting minutes, May 2018

Tajikistan Governmental Monitoring Group visit, September 2018

UN (2011) Guiding Principles on business and HR

UN Terms of Reference (Scope of Work) Cross-border cooperation for sustainable peace and development – final project evaluation

UNDP note to file on the Kaerma canal, September 2017

UNDP Tajikistan (2019) List of infrastructure projects phases 1 and 2

UNICEF Tajikistan (2017) Peacebuilding Fund – UNICEF Theory of Change, results and lessons learned – Tajikistan

UN PBF Secretariat Kyrgyzstan, Internal Lessons Learned brief on the cross-border project

UN Women Multi-country office Kazakhstan (2017) Women’s human insecurities across the Tajik-Kyrgyz borders: an assessment and recommendations by women activists

UN Women Kyrgyzstan (2019) Consultant on Community Mobilisation Terms of Reference

WFP Kyrgyzstan (2019) Narrative report on Cross-Border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development, Phase 2

WFP Kyrgyzstan, Guidance Note for the conflict sensitivity, gender and environmental risk screening checklist

WFP Kyrgyzstan, Conflict sensitivity, gender and environmental risk screening checklist

# Annex 3: Inception report

**Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development   
FINAL PROJECT EVALUATION**

**Inception report February 2020**

**By Iris Wielders, evaluation expert, 12 February 2020**

**This is the inception report for the final project evaluation of the PBF project Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development. A draft version of this document was discussed with the evaluation management group on 12 February 2020 at the start of the in-countries visit by the evaluation expert.**

The UN has commissioned an independent evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) project ‘Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan)’ (‘the Project’).

The Project was launched in December 2015, for an initial period of 18 months, funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and extended by the Peacebuilding Fund for 18 months in April 2018 with a completion date in October 2019. The Project is implemented by five UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, FAO and UN Women) on both sides of the Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan border, with the aim to enhance cooperation and trust between communities in pilot Tajik-Kyrgyz village clusters, in order to mitigate immediate risks of renewed cross-border violence.

The PBF project was implemented by 5 Recipient UN Organisations (RUNOs): UNDP, UNICEF; WFP; FAO; UN Women. It focused on 6 clusters of villages on both sides of the border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The project was designed as two programmes, one in Kyrgyzstan and one in Tajikistan. In each country, the same 5 RUNOs implemented the project either through direct implementation or Implementing Partners. The envisaged outcome of the project was ‘cooperation and trust between communities increased to mitigate risks of renewed violence’.

This inception report sets out the following aspects of the evaluation:

1. Objectives
2. Methodology
3. Scope and parameters
4. Resources and management
5. Tentative work plan
6. Outputs
7. Draft outline of final report

Annex 1: Research framework

Annex 2: Interview templates

1. **Objectives**

The ToR specifies that the objectives of the evaluation are both learning and accountability. Another objective is to contribute to future PBF decision-making regarding potential further engagement.

The ToR also states that ‘the evaluation presents an excellent opportunity to assess [the achievements of this project and] its overall added value to peacebuilding in cross-border areas in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’. This objective adds an impact level question to the evaluation framework: to what extent has the project added value to peacebuilding in cross-border areas in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?’(see table 1 under scope and parameters).

1. **Methodology**

This evaluation will assess the PBF project according to the standard OECD DAC criteria and in line with the OECD DAC Guidelines on Evaluating Peacebuilding in Settings of Conflict and Fragility and the United Nations Evaluation Group norms and principles. The evaluation expert will collect data independently, but include opportunities for discussion/testing of findings with key stakeholders, through:

* A debrief on data collected and preliminary findings with RUNOs at the end of field work
* A remote skype call with relevant stakeholders to discuss findings of the draft report
* Opportunity to provide written feedback on the draft report (from a limited number of stakeholders)

Although the evaluation is a final evaluation of both phases of the project, it will build upon the mid-term review (Lessons Learned Exercise – LLE) that was conducted at the end of phase 1 of the project. It will do so in the following ways:

* The focus of the document review will be on phase 2 documentation, as phase 1 documentation has already been reviewed for the Lessons Learned Exercise (LLE) that was conducted at the end phase 1. The evaluator will go back to phase 1 documentation where appropriate
* The selection of Implementing Partners (IPs) to be interviewed will focus first on those implementing in Phase 2. Where it is considered useful and feasible, IPs from phase 1 will be added
* The interviews (KIIs and FGD) will cover both phases of the project, but include a focus on comparing and contrasting phase with phase 2
* Beneficiaries to be interviewed will include a mix of people benefiting from both phases and from phase 2 alone, with less focus on beneficiaries who benefited only from phase 1

The evaluation will use a mixed method approach, combining the following data collection methods to triangulate evidence.

Desk review

The desk review will comprise key project documentation, including the programme documents; project reports to PBF; IP reports to the RUNOs; Steering Committee minutes; conflict analyses; and a limited set of further documentation. Where appropriate, the evaluation will draw on the LLE and assess new data on phase 2 against the conclusions drawn in that review.

A limited set of key documents in other languages than English can be incorporated through translation by google translate, at the discretion of the evaluation expert, for example, the final phase 2 reports from Implementing Partners. If other documents in other languages than English are considered key evidence, the evaluation expert will work with the relevant RUNO to facilitate translation.

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

A schedule of KIIs and FGDs has been put together by the UNCTs in consultation with the evaluation expert. Within the limited time available, the aim is to speak to a mix of stakeholder groups (see list below) across the work of the different RUNOs. KIIs and FGDs will be semi-structured, using the interview templates (annex 2) as a guide. Exact formulation and order of questions will be decided in more detail at the start of every day, to account for potential cultural and other sensitivities specific to location or stakeholder group (conflict sensitivity) and to ensure the KII/FGD prioritises the appropriate set of questions.

Gender sensitivity will be incorporated in the evaluation approach in several ways:

* There is a specific Evaluation Question on the gender sensitivity (and human rights approach) of the project
* The set of KIIs and FGDs will ensure that women’s voices are represented
* Ensuring the gender sensitivity of KIIs and FGDs through careful preparation of each KIIs and FGD, in consultation with accompanying RUNO or IP staff, and considering whether the specific circumstances allow for women to participate, or whether it is better to interview them separately. Further specific sensitivities for women will also be discussed in order to ensure sensitive and appropriate formulation of questions (also in consultation with the translator).

KIIs and FGDs are held on a basis of confidentiality. RUNOs/IPs can accompany the evaluation expert for introductions to beneficiaries, but the interviews will be conducted by the evaluation expert alone (accompanied by the translator where needed). Likewise, RUNOs many accompany the evaluator for introductions to IPs if necessary, but interviews with IPs will be conducted by the evaluation expert alone. Since all KIIs and FGDs are conducted on a confidential basis, interview notes will not be shared with the client but held confidential by the evaluation expert.

The evaluation expert will be accompanied by a translator, provided by the UNCT, if KIIs/FGDs are to be conducted in a language other than English. The evaluation expert will explain the purpose of the evaluation to the participants and provide contact details of the commissioning UNCT for further questions about the interview. The evaluation expert will explain that the KIIs/FGDs are held confidential and that the report will not cite or quote any interviewee or his/her organisation by name. The evaluation expert will explain that the results of the evaluation will be captured in an internal report for the UNCTs in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and that the dissemination of that report is at the discretion of the UN.

List of stakeholder groups to be interviewed (KIIs or FGDs as appropriate)

* Recipient UN Organisations (RUNOs)
* Implementing Partners (IPs)
* Steering Committee members
* Government authorities (in some instances these are IPs)
* Beneficiaries – as noted in the ToR, in-person KIIs or FGDs with beneficiaries depends on permission from government authorities. There is no permission to visit the target villages on the Tajikistan side of the border, so a more limited set of KIIs/FGDs will be conducted by Skype.
* Third Parties (other donors or NGOs)

Geographic locations of KIIs/FGDs/field visits

The original plan was for the evaluation expert to fly into Dushanbe for interview, then travel to Khudjand and to a selection of target villages on the Tajikistan side of the border, then cross the border to a selection of target villages in Kyrgyzstan, before travel to Osh and Bishkek. Because no permission for village visits has been received by MFA Tajikistan, visits to the villages on the Tajikistan side of the border cannot go ahead and a decision has been taken that the expert will not travel overland into Kyrgyzstan. Instead, she will fly from Dushanbe to Bishkek and then travel to Osh and the villages on the Kyrgyzstan side of the border.

The potential conflict sensitivity implications of this have been discussed during the discussion of this inception report. The evaluation management committee felt that village visits on the Kyrgyzstan side of the border only would not risk perceptions of bias from beneficiaries or other stakeholders. However, given the current context, where border delineation efforts have seen some progress in recent times, it will be important to carefully monitor the situation to ensure that the village visits and the focus of the KIIs and FGDs take into account these potential sensitivities as well.

A preliminary schedule of meetings and remote Skype interviews for Dushanbe (12-18 February) and a preliminary further travel and interview schedule for Kyrgyzstan have been drawn up. These will be further refined and amended during the in-countries visit.

Data collection and analysis process

Data will be collected according to the research framework in annex 1. Due to the time and resources available, the evaluation expert will not produce an evaluation matrix with all evidence logged. However, the evaluation report will incorporate footnotes of sources to clarify the evidence behind findings.

Testing of evaluation findings

At the end of the field work, the evaluation expert will present preliminary findings in a debrief to the UNCTs for discussion. The outcomes of this discussion will be fed into the final report.

The evaluation expert will facilitate a remote Skype discussion with appropriate RUNO staff on the draft report. Next, the draft evaluation report will be sent through for comments from a limited number of people, to be determined by the UNCTs in consultation with the evaluation expert. Comments will be collated by the evaluation management team before being sent to the expert. The outcomes of the Skype discussion and responses to written comments will be fed into the final report.

Constraints

The evaluation takes place within a certain timespan and with limited resources. This will pose constraints to the amount of data that can be collected through interviews; the amount of documentation that can be incorporated; and the scope of the evaluation (see below for further discussion on scope).

The fact that village visits can take place only on one side of the border raises the potential of imbalance in data collected from the two countries. This will be mitigated in the following ways:

* Skype calls with IPs and beneficiaries have been organised from Dushanbe, to ensure inclusion of these stakeholder groups in the data collection process
* The evaluation expert has reached out to the mid-term review (LLE) expert to incorporate a more detailed understanding of what data was collected where for that exercise
* A more detailed review of documentation on the Tajikistan side to compensate can be considered where appropriate and feasible

The evaluation expert will take into account this potential imbalance in data and clarify this where appropriate in the evaluation report.

1. **Scope and parameters**

His evaluation will be a summative evaluation, reviewing both phases of the project. This inception report has reviewed the questions listed in the ToR and distilled these into 21 Evaluation Questions. These reflect the key questions to be investigated according to the OECD DAC criteria. Table 1 below lists the original ToR questions, alongside comments from the evaluator and the Evaluation Questions. This sets out the scope and parameters of the evaluation as feasible within the 30 days available, and taking into account the number of sub-projects (five RUNOs in two countries over two phases).

**Table 1: Evaluation scope**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Questions listed in the draft ToR** | **Evaluator comments** | **Proposed final questions** |
| **Relevance** | | |
| 1.The degree to which the objectives are (and continue to be) relevant vis-à-vis the peacebuilding process, i.e. whether they address the key drivers of conflict identified in the conflict analysis |  | Q1. Were the objectives of the programmes relevant to the peacebuilding process? Did they address the key drivers of conflict identified in the conflict analysis |
| 2. Whether important peacebuilding gaps exist or opportunities are being missed? | Very broad question, suggest limiting the sources of evidence | Q2. Does the evaluation show peacebuilding gaps or missed opportunities? |
| 3. Did the activities and strategies fit the objectives, i.e. is there internal coherence between what the programme is doing and what it is trying to achieve? |  | Q3. Were the strategies (Theories of Change – ToC) and activities underpinning the programmes relevant for the objectives? |
|  | Moved from 7 | Q4. Was the ToC of the programmes based on the valid assumptions? |
| 4. To what extent were the interventions relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries? |  | Q5. Were the interventions relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries? |
| 5. To what extent have gender and human rights considerations been integrated into the programme design and implementation | Effectiveness Q. Combined with 11 below plus added CS in Qs 10 and 11 |  |
| **Effectiveness** | | |
| 6. To assess the degree to which envisaged outputs and outcomes have been achieved and reported achievements, and whether the project has contributed to a reduction of the drivers of the conflict |  | Q6. To what extent have the envisaged outputs and outcomes of the programmes been achieved? Has the project contributed to a reduction of the drivers of the conflict? |
| 7.Was the theory of change based on valid assumptions? | Relevance question - moved to Q4 |  |
| 8. The effectiveness of coordination and co-implementation between the UNCTs on both sides of the border |  | Q7. How effective was the coordination and co-implementation between the UNCTs in KG and TJ, and between the RUNOs. |
| 9.The degree of coordination and collaboration with the authorities on both sides of the border |  | Q8. How effective was the coordination and collaboration with the KG and TJ authorities |
| 10.Assess the degree to which project implementation was flexible and adaptive to the context. |  | Q9. How flexible and adaptive was the project to the context? |
| 11.To what extend did the PBF Project mainstream a gender dimension and support gender-responsive peacebuilding? | Combined with relevance 5 from above | Q10. How did the project mainstream gender and human rights considerations? |
|  | added | Q11. How did the project integrate a conflict sensitivity lens? |
| 12.To what extent did the PBF Project complement work with different entities and have a strategic coherence of approach? | Undefined ‘different entities’- very broad Q, suggest outside of scope |  |
| 13.How have stakeholders have been involved in the programme’s design and implementation? |  | Q12. How have stakeholders been involved in the programme’s design and implementation? How has the project aligned to local government priorities? |
| **Efficiency** | | |
| 14.Assess whether the Project has utilized Project funding as per the agreed work plan to achieve the projected targets. | This requires a detailed audit of all financial documentation. Suggest outside scope. |  |
| 15.Analyze the role of the Project Steering Committee (PSC) and whether this forum is optimally being used for decision making. |  | Q13. How has the role of the Project Steering Committee contributed to the efficiency of the intervention? |
| 16.Assess the timeline and quality of the reporting followed by the Project. |  | Q14. How has the reporting of the project (timeline and quality) contributed to the efficiency of the intervention? |
| 17.Analyze the performance of the M&E mechanism of the Project and the use of var ious M&E tools (any socio-economic data available to the project etc.). |  | Q15. How has the use of M&E (framework; M&E tools; data; communication of progress) contributed to the efficiency of the intervention? How were the recommendations from the mid-term review followed up? |
| 18.Assess the qualitative and quantitative aspects of management and other inputs (such as equipment, monitoring and review and other technical assistance and budgetary inputs) provided by the project vis-à-vis achievement of outputs and targets. | Requires very detailed data collection at input level. Suggest outside scope. |  |
| 19.Identify factors and constraints, which have affected Project implementation including technical, managerial, organizational, institutional and socio-economic policy issues in addition to other external factors unforeseen during the Project design. | Relevant for efficiency and effectiveness | Q16. What constraints (if any) (internal and external to the project) have affected the efficiency and effectiveness of project implementation? |
| 20.To what extent did PBF project support achieve the results in its proposed timeline | Same as Q6 |  |
| 21.How efficient was the overall staffing, planning and coordination within the project (including between the two implementing agencies and with stakeholders? Have project funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner? | Second Q same as Q6. First Q on planning and coordination already captured under Q7, Q8 and Q13. | Q17. How has the staffing of the project contributed to its efficiency? |
| 22.How efficient and successful was the project’s implementation approach, including procurement and other activities? | ‘Implementation approach’ very broad. Suggest detailed evaluation of procurement practices outside scope |  |
| 23.How efficiently did the project use the project board? | Same as Q13 |  |
| 24.How well did the project collect and use data to monitor results? How well did it communicate with stakeholders and project beneficiaries on its progress? Did it use data to inform its implementation strategy? | Use of data and communication of progress falls under M&E – captured under Q15 |  |
| 25.How well did the project communicate on its implementation and results? | Communication within project captured under M&E. Specified to be communication to PBF and other external communication. Rephrased to link to efficiency: communication of peacebuilding needs to take into account potential sensitivities | Q18. How did external communication of implementation and results (including to PBF) contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of the intervention? |
| 26.Overall, did the PBF project provide value for money? Have resources been used efficiently? | Second Q is included in VFM assessment | Q19. Did the project provide Value for Money (VFM) (light touch assessment) |
| **Sustainability and impact** | | |
| 27.Assess preliminary indications of the degree to which the Project results are likely to be sustainable beyond the Project’s lifetime (both at the community and government level) and provide recommendations for strengthening sustainability. |  | Q20. Did the intervention include an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy? How sustainable are the results of the project, both at the community and government level? How could sustainability be strengthened? |
| 28.Did the intervention design include an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy? | Added to Q20 |  |
| 29.How strong is the commitment of the Government and other stakeholders to sustaining the results of PBF support and continuing initiatives? | Captured under Q20 |  |
| 30.How has the project enhanced and contributed to the development of national capacity? | Captured under Q20 |  |
| **National ownership** | | |
| 31.Assess the degree of involvement of national partners, and aligning to existing priorities of the local government in targeted areas | Added to Q12 |  |
| **Impact** | | |
|  | Added impact question from the objective of the evaluation | Q21. To what extent has the project added value to peacebuilding in cross-border areas in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan? |
| **Lessons learned/conclusions** | | |
| 32. An analysis of the main lessons learnt in relation to the effectiveness of foreseen strategies and theories of change to achieve a peacebuilding impact | Not an evaluation question, but final part of the report |  |
| 33.An analysis of the main lessons learnt in relation to the effectiveness of implementation modalities | Not an evaluation question, but final part of the report |  |

1. **Resources and management**

The evaluation will be conducted by one evaluation expert in the space of 30 days. The evaluation is managed by the evaluation management committee, which comprises representatives from each RUNO in each country. The ToR foresees 3 days desk review, 14 days in-countries visit and 13 days analysis and report writing.

1. **Tentative work plan**

Due to additional travel time needed to visit Kyrgyzstan because no overland crossing of the border is possible, the in-countries visit has been extended by a few days.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Desk review | 3 days between 1 Feb – 9 Feb |
| Field work | 17 days from 12 Feb – 2 March |
| Reporting drafting | 7 days between 2 – 12 March |
| Final report writing | 3 days between 23 – 27 March |

1. **Outputs**

The deliverables for this evaluation are:

This inception report

The evaluation report (first in draft, then final version)

Whether or not the evaluation report will be made public – in its entirety or in abbreviated format – will be at the discretion of the UN after the completion of the report.

1. **Draft outline of final report**

Executive Summary

Introduction

Conflict drivers and peace building in the cross-border areas between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan

Evaluation findings: Relevance

Evaluation findings: Impact

Evaluation findings: Effectiveness

Evaluation findings: Efficiency

Evaluation findings: Sustainability

Conclusions

Lessons Learned

Annex 1: List of documents reviewed

Annex 2: list of people/organisations spoken to

Annex 3: Research framework

**Annex 1: Research framework (Evaluation Questions with sources of evidence)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Questions (EQs)** | | **Documentation** | **Beneficiaries** | **IPs** | **RUNOs** | **Authorities** | **Third Parties** | **Steering Committee Members** |
| **Relevance** | | | | | | | | |
| Q1. Were the objectives of the programmes relevant to the peacebuilding process? Did they address the key drivers of conflict identified in the conflict analysis? | | Prodocs; conflict analysis; stakeholder analysis |  |  | x |  | x | x |
| Q2. Does the evaluation show peacebuilding gaps or missed opportunities? | | beneficiaries; IPs | x | x | x | x | x |  |
| Q3. Were the strategies (Theories of Change – ToC) and activities underpinning the programmes relevant for the objectives? | | Prodocs; conflict analysis; stakeholder analysis |  | x | x |  |  |  |
| Q4. Was the ToC of the programmes based on the valid assumptions? | | Prodocs; conflict analysis; stakeholder analysis |  | x | x | x | x | x |
| Q5. Were the interventions relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries? | |  | x | x |  | x |  |  |
|  | **Effectiveness** | | | | | | | |
| Q6. To what extent have the envisaged outputs and outcomes of the programmes been achieved? Has the project contributed to a reduction of the drivers of the conflict? | | Project reporting | x | x | x | x |  |  |
| Q7. How effective was the coordination and co-implementation between the UNCTs in KG and TJ | | Project reporting; SC minutes; coordination meeting minutes |  | x | x |  |  |  |
| Q8. How effective was the coordination and collaboration with the KG and TJ authorities | | Project reporting |  | x | x | x |  |  |
| Q9. How flexible and adaptive was the project to the context? | | Project reporting | x | x | x | x |  |  |
| Q10. How did the project mainstream gender and human rights considerations? | | Project reporting | x | x | x | x |  |  |
| Q11. How did the project integrate a conflict sensitivity lens? | | Project reporting | x | x | x | x |  | x |
| Q12. How have stakeholders been involved in the programme’s design and implementation? How has the project aligned to local government priorities? | |  | x | x | x | x |  |  |
|  | **Efficiency** | | | | | | | |
| Q13. How has the role of the Project Steering Committee contributed to the efficiency of the intervention? | |  |  |  | x |  |  | x |
| Q14. How has the reporting of the project (timeline and quality) contributed to the efficiency of the intervention? | | Project reporting |  |  | x |  |  |  |
| Q15. How has the use of M&E (framework; M&E tools; data; communication of progress) contributed to the efficiency of the intervention? How were the recommendations from the mid-term review followed up? | | M&E framework |  | x | x |  |  | x |
| Q16. What constraints (if any) (internal and external to the project) have affected the efficiency and effectiveness of project implementation? | | Project reporting | x | x | x |  |  |  |
| Q17. How has the staffing of the project contributed to its efficiency? | |  |  | x | x |  |  | x |
| Q18. How did external communication of implementation and results (including to PBF) contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of the intervention? | | PBF call |  | x | x |  |  | x |
| Q19. Did the project provide Value for Money (VFM) (light touch assessment) | | VFM assessment interview with procurement staff instead of detailed review of financial documentation |  |  | x |  |  |  |
|  | **Sustainability** | | | | | | | |
| Q20. Did the intervention include an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy? How sustainable are the results of the project, both at the community and government level? How could sustainability be strengthened? | |  | x | x | x | x |  | x |
|  | **Impact** | | | | | | | |
| Q21. To what extent has the project added value to peacebuilding in cross-border areas in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan? | |  |  | x | x | x | x | x |

**Annex 4: Interview templates**

The interview templates re-organise the Evaluation Questions for each beneficiary group and will be used by the evaluator as a check list to ensure data is gathered systematically. The Evaluation Questions will not be asked literally as they are listed here but adapted to the interviewees and circumstances. The order may change, and if time is short some questions may be prioritised with some left out. The questions will be further detailed according to the sub-project/location the interview is focused on, and where appropriate further questions will be asked to compare/contrast against phase 1 of the Project (drawing on the LLE).

All interviews will end with the following question: “Is there anything else you would like to add, or ask, or anything you think I forget to ask?” This allows for feedback on the interview and provides space for any further unintended/unforeseen results or consequences of the intervention.

**For beneficiaries**

Q5. Were the interventions relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries?

*What kind of changes have you seen as a result of the project? Were these important to address your needs and priorities?*

Q12 How have stakeholders been involved in the programme’s design and implementation? How has the project aligned to local government priorities?

*Did the project align to the priorities of local government? How were you involved in the design of the project and its implementation?*

Q6. To what extent have the envisaged outputs and outcomes of the programmes been achieved? Has the project contributed to a reduction of the drivers of the conflict?

*Did the project achieve X [Check on outputs of relevant sub-project]*

*Have the results of the project helped address some of the causes or drivers of cross-border conflict? How?*

Q16. What constraints (if any) (internal and external to the project) have affected the efficiency and effectiveness of project implementation?

*What were the key challenges or obstacles to the project? Internal challenges related to project management or implementation? External challenges?*

Q10. How did the project mainstream gender and human rights considerations?

*How did the project take into account human rights? How did the project benefit women as well as men?*

Q11. How did the project integrate a conflict sensitivity lens?

*Did the project have any unintended consequences, negative or positive?*

Q9. How flexible and adaptive was the project to the context?

*Were there any important changes in the context during the project? Did the project adapt to these changes?*

Q20. Did the intervention include an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy? How sustainable are the results of the project, both at the community and government level? How could sustainability be strengthened?

*What has happened since the project ended? [Check on continuation of relevant structures, institutions, etc].*

Q2. Does the evaluation show peacebuilding gaps or missed opportunities?

*Are there other things that could have been done to help build peace between cross-border communities?*

**For IPs**

Q5. Were the interventions relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries?

Q12 How have stakeholders been involved in the programme’s design and implementation? How has the project aligned to local government priorities?

Q6. To what extent have the envisaged outputs and outcomes of the programmes been achieved? Has the project contributed to a reduction of the drivers of the conflict?

*Did the project achieve X [Check on outputs of relevant sub-project]*

*Have the results of the project helped address some of the causes or drivers of cross-border conflict? How?*

Q7. How effective was the coordination and co-implementation between the UNCTs in KG and TJ?

Q8. How effective was the coordination and collaboration with the KG and TJ authorities?

Q16. What constraints (if any) (internal and external to the project) have affected the efficiency and effectiveness of project implementation?

*What were the key challenges or obstacles to the project? Internal challenges related to project management or implementation? External challenges?*

Q10. How did the project mainstream gender and human rights considerations?

*How did the project take into account human rights? How did the project benefit women as well as men?*

Q11. How did the project integrate a conflict sensitivity lens?

*Did the project have any unintended consequences, negative or positive?*

Q9. How flexible and adaptive was the project to the context?

*Were there any important changes in your community during the project? Did the project adapt to these changes?*

Q20. Did the intervention include an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy? How sustainable are the results of the project, both at the community and government level? How could sustainability be strengthened?

*What has happened since the project ended? [Check on continuation of relevant structures, institutions, etc].*

Q15. How has the use of M&E (framework; M&E tools; data; communication of progress) contributed to the efficiency of the intervention? How were the recommendations from the mid-term review followed up? *[if the IPs implemented in both phases]*

Q17. How has the staffing of the project contributed to its efficiency?

Q18. How did external communication of implementation and results (including to PBF) contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of the intervention?

Q2. Does the evaluation show peacebuilding gaps or missed opportunities?

*Are there other things that could have been done to help build peace between cross-border communities?*

Q21. To what extent has the project added value to peacebuilding in cross-border areas in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?

Q3. Were the strategies (Theories of Change – ToC) and activities underpinning the programmes relevant for the objectives?

Q4. Was the ToC of the programmes based on the valid assumptions?

**For RUNOs**

Q6. To what extent have the envisaged outputs and outcomes of the programmes been achieved? Has the project contributed to a reduction of the drivers of the conflict?

*Did the project achieve X [Check on outputs of relevant sub-project]*

*Have the results of the project helped address some of the causes or drivers of cross-border conflict? How?*

Q1. Were the objectives of the programmes relevant to the peacebuilding process? Did they address the key drivers of conflict identified in the conflict analysis?

*[specify relevant aspects of the peace building process and/or drivers of conflict]*

Q12 How have stakeholders been involved in the programme’s design and implementation? How has the project aligned to local government priorities?

Q13. How has the role of the Project Steering Committee contributed to the efficiency of the intervention?

Q7. How effective was the coordination and co-implementation between the UNCTs in KG and TJ?

Q8. How effective was the coordination and collaboration with the KG and TJ authorities?

Q16. What constraints (if any) (internal and external to the project) have affected the efficiency and effectiveness of project implementation?

*What were the key challenges or obstacles to the project? Internal challenges related to project management or implementation? External challenges?*

Q10. How did the project mainstream gender and human rights considerations?

*How did the project take into account human rights? How did the project benefit women as well as men?*

Q11. How did the project integrate a conflict sensitivity lens?

*Did the project have any unintended consequences, negative or positive?*

Q9. How flexible and adaptive was the project to the context?

*Were there any important changes in your community during the project? Did the project adapt to these changes?*

Q20. Did the intervention include an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy? How sustainable are the results of the project, both at the community and government level? How could sustainability be strengthened?

*What has happened since the project ended? [Check on continuation of relevant structures, institutions, etc].*

Q15. How has the use of M&E (framework; M&E tools; data; communication of progress) contributed to the efficiency of the intervention? How were the recommendations from the mid-term review followed up?

Q14. How has the reporting of the project (timeline and quality) contributed to the efficiency of the intervention?

Q17. How has the staffing of the project contributed to its efficiency?

Q18. How did external communication of implementation and results (including to PBF) contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of the intervention?

Q2. Does the evaluation show peacebuilding gaps or missed opportunities?

*Are there other things that could have been done to help build peace between cross-border communities?*

Q21. To what extent has the project added value to peacebuilding in cross-border areas in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?

Q3. Were the strategies (Theories of Change – ToC) and activities underpinning the programmes relevant for the objectives?

Q4. Was the ToC of the programmes based on the valid assumptions?

**For authorities**

Q6. To what extent have the envisaged outputs and outcomes of the programmes been achieved? Has the project contributed to a reduction of the drivers of the conflict?

*Did the project achieve X [Check on outputs of relevant sub-project]*

*Have the results of the project helped address some of the causes or drivers of cross-border conflict? How?*

Q12 How have stakeholders been involved in the programme’s design and implementation? How has the project aligned to local government priorities?

Q5. Were the interventions relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries?

Q8. How effective was the coordination and collaboration with the KG and TJ authorities?

Q10. How did the project mainstream gender and human rights considerations?

*How did the project take into account human rights? How did the project benefit women as well as men?*

Q11. How did the project integrate a conflict sensitivity lens?

*Did the project have any unintended consequences, negative or positive?*

Q9. How flexible and adaptive was the project to the context?

*Were there any important changes in your community during the project? Did the project adapt to these changes?*

Q20. Did the intervention include an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy? How sustainable are the results of the project, both at the community and government level? How could sustainability be strengthened?

*What has happened since the project ended? [Check on continuation of relevant structures, institutions, etc].*

Q2. Does the evaluation show peacebuilding gaps or missed opportunities?

*Are there other things that could have been done to help build peace between cross-border communities?*

Q21. To what extent has the project added value to peacebuilding in cross-border areas in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?

Q4. Was the ToC of the programmes based on the valid assumptions?

**For third parties**

Q1. Were the objectives of the programmes relevant to the peacebuilding process? Did they address the key drivers of conflict identified in the conflict analysis?

*[specify relevant aspects of the peace building process and/or drivers of conflict]*

Q2. Does the evaluation show peacebuilding gaps or missed opportunities?

*Are there other things that could have been done to help build peace between cross-border communities?*

Q4. Was the ToC of the programmes based on the valid assumptions?

*[specific relevant assumptions to check]*

Q21. To what extent has the project added value to peacebuilding in cross-border areas in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?

**For steering committee members**

Q1. Were the objectives of the programmes relevant to the peacebuilding process? Did they address the key drivers of conflict identified in the conflict analysis?

*[specify relevant aspects of the peace building process and/or drivers of conflict]*

Q4. Was the ToC of the programmes based on the valid assumptions?

*[specific relevant assumptions to check]*

Q11. How did the project integrate a conflict sensitivity lens?

*Did the project have any unintended consequences, negative or positive?*

Q13. How has the role of the Project Steering Committee contributed to the efficiency of the intervention?

Q15. How has the use of M&E (framework; M&E tools; data; communication of progress) contributed to the efficiency of the intervention? How were the recommendations from the mid-term review followed up?

Q17. How has the staffing of the project contributed to its efficiency?

Q18. How did external communication of implementation and results (including to PBF) contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of the intervention?

Q20. Did the intervention include an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy? How sustainable are the results of the project, both at the community and government level? How could sustainability be strengthened?

Q21. To what extent has the project added value to peacebuilding in cross-border areas in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?

1. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Anna Matveeva (2015) UNDP Cross-Border Situation Assessment, p.10 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Anna Matveeva (2015) UNDP Cross-Border Situation Assessment, p.84 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. RUNO interview TJ 2; PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017; Project Completion Report to the Swiss Development Cooperation (2017) Cross-Border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development 2016-2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. PBF Cross-border peace building project documents phase 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. PBF Cross-border peace building project documents phase 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. PBF Cross-border peace building project documents phase 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Oleh Protsyk (former PDA Tajikistan) (2017) Working on conflict prevention across state boundaries: experiences and lessons from Kyrgyz-Tajik border area [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. PBF Cross-border peace building project documents; Project stakeholder analysis [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. During phase 1, UN Women implemented its interventions from its Tajikistan office only. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Anna Matveeva (2016) Divided we fall…or rise? Tajikistan – Kyrgyzstan border dilemma [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Anna Matveeva (2015) UNDP Cross-Border Situation Assessment [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Anna Matveeva (2015) UNDP Cross-Border Situation Assessment [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Anna Matveeva (2015) UNDP Cross-Border Situation Assessment [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Crisisgroup Crisiswatch database for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, January 2019 – February 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Anna Matveeva (2015) UNDP Cross-Border Situation Assessment [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Crisisgroup Crisiswatch database, January 2019 – February 2020 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Anna Matveeva (2015) UNDP Cross-Border Situation Assessment [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. The evaluation interviewed a number of these organisations under the ‘third party’ category of interviewees [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. PBF Cross-border peace building project documents phase 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. See also PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. The first two outputs were funded by the Swiss Development Cooperation. They were not included in the results frameworks as listed in the phase 1 PBF project documents, but nevertheless formed an important part of the project. They were reviewed as such in the mid-term review. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Anna Matveeva (2015) UNDP Cross-Border Situation Assessment [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Cross-border project documents phases 1 and 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Beneficiary KII TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Beneficiary KII KG 24 [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Anna Matveeva (2015) UNDP Cross-Border Situation Assessment [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. IP interview KG [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. RUNO KII TJ 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. N-Vector, Cross-Border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development – Comparative Analysis of Baseline and End line Surveys, April 2018; Strengthening capacity to prevent and mitigate conflicts in the border zones of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – Opinion Poll – Comparative report of the results of base and intermediate studies in the Republic of Tajikistan, 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. N-Vector, Cross-Border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development – Comparative Analysis of Baseline and End line Surveys, April 2018; Strengthening capacity to prevent and mitigate conflicts in the border zones of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – Opinion Poll – Comparative report of the results of base and intermediate studies in the Republic of Tajikistan, 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. N-Vector, Cross-Border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development – Comparative Analysis of Baseline and End line Surveys, April 2018; Strengthening capacity to prevent and mitigate conflicts in the border zones of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – Opinion Poll – Comparative report of the results of base and intermediate studies in the Republic of Tajikistan, 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. N-Vector, Cross-Border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development – Comparative Analysis of Baseline and End line Surveys, April 2018; Strengthening capacity to prevent and mitigate conflicts in the border zones of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – Opinion Poll – Comparative report of the results of base and intermediate studies in the Republic of Tajikistan, 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. N-Vector, Cross-Border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development – Comparative Analysis of Baseline and End line Surveys, April 2018; Strengthening capacity to prevent and mitigate conflicts in the border zones of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – Opinion Poll – Comparative report of the results of base and intermediate studies in the Republic of Tajikistan, 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. PBF Semi-Annual Progress Report August 2019; RUNO KII TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. RUNO KII KG 9; RUNO KII TJ 5; RUNO KII TJ 4 [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. RUNO KII KG 2; RUNO KII TJ 6 [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. PBF Final Report March 2020; RUNO KII TJ 5; RUNO KII KG 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Beneficiary KIIs KG 6; 7; 8; 11; 14; government KII KG 13; RUNO KII KG 9; Beneficiary FGD TJ 3; [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Tajikistan Steering Committee meeting minutes, May 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. RUNO KII KG 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017; Oleh Protsyk (2017) Working on conflict prevention across state boundaries: experiences and lessons from Kyrgyz-Tajik border area; PBF Cross-border peace building project documents [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Beneficiary KII KG 6; 7; 8; 11; 14; government KII KG 13; RUNO KII KG 9; beneficiary FGD TJ 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Beneficiary KIIs KG 6; beneficiary FGD KG 21 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017; RUNO FGD TJ 1; RUNO KII KG 4 [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Beneficiary KIIs KG 11; beneficiary FGD KG 20 [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Beneficiary KII KG 6; 7; 8; 11; government KII KG 13; beneficiary KII 14; RUNO KII KG 9; Beneficiary FGD TJ 3; PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. UNDP Tajikistan (2019) List of infrastructure sub-projects phases 1 and 2. The evaluator also observed one of these sports yards in Kyrgyzstan. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Beneficiary FGDs KG 2; KG 3; KG 15 beneficiary KII KG 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. RUNO KII TJ 1; RUNO KII TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017, p.9 [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. RUNO FGD KG 9; Beneficiary FGD KG 23; beneficiary FGD TJ 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Beneficiary KIIs KG 14; government KII KG 22; RUNO KII TJ 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Anecdotal evidence in PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017; beneficiary KII KG 14; beneficiary FGD KG 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. RUNO KII KG 9; RUNO KII TJ 5; RUNO KII TJ 4 [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. RUNO FGD KG 9; Beneficiary FGD KG 23; Beneficiary FGD TJ 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. RUNO KII KG 2; RUNO KII TJ 6 [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. RUNO KII TJ 8; IP KII TJ 1; Beneficiary FGD TJ 1; beneficiary KII TJ 4 [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. RUNO KII TJ 2; Beneficiary KII KG 4; KG 12; KG 16; LNGO Eurasia Foundation Central Asia (Tajikistan) (2019) Assessment report on peace building competencies training [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Beneficiary KII KG 16; 23; RUNO KII KG 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Beneficiary KII KG 4; beneficiary FGD KG 9 [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. RUNO KII KG 2; RUNO KII TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. RUNO KII KG 2; PBF Final Report March 2020; Government KII KG 13 [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Beneficiary KII TJ 4; RUNO KII TJ 8; RUNO KII KG 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Beneficiary KII KG 5; beneficiary FGD TJ 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Beneficiary KII TJ 5; beneficiary FGD KG 10; LNGO Ehe-Farhang wa Tarakkiyot (Tajikstan) (2019) Final Report on the project Cross-Border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Government KII KG 2; Beneficiary FGD KG 3; Beneficiary KII KG 7; Beneficiary FGD KG 15 [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. RUNO KII KG 2; Beneficiary FGD KG 3; Government KII KG 13 [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Beneficiary KII KG 14; KG 19; TJ 6 [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Beneficiary FGD KG 18; see also beneficiary KII KG 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. PBF Final Report March 2020; RUNO KIIs TJ 5; TJ 3; KG 10; KG 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Anna Matveeva (2015) UNDP Cross-Border Situation Assessment [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. See for example LNGO Eurasia Foundation Central Asia (Tajikistan) (2019) Consultation Process Assessment Report. KG IP KIIs 3; 6 [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. WFP was a case study in a global effort by WFP to enhance its conflict sensitivity and peace building approaches. WFP Kyrgyzstan had access to specific expertise and drew up a conflict sensitivity check list for its interventions. SIPRI and WFP (2019) The World Food Programme’s contribution to improving the prospects for peace in Kyrgyzstan [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017. Although the original purpose was to work towards the establishment of an Early Warning System that included government authorities, the project did not make much progress towards this. Local authorities considered the TRACTION system to be for internal project monitoring. The mid-term review concluded that the establishment of an Early Warning Early Response System that is institutionalised and aims to enhance government responses requires a different design. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. 2 RUNO KIIs [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. RUNO KII KG 9; KG 10 [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. RUNO KII KG 1; KG 9. The project document for phase 2 contains further examples of such adaptations. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. IP KII TJ 3; RUNO KII KG 9; Beneficiary KII KG 6; Kyrgyzstan Research Institute of Irrigation (2019) Sub-project report on the capacity building of WUAs and installation of remote sensors for measuring water flow [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. 2 RUNO KIIs [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. RUNO KII TJ 1; Cross-border cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for sustainable peace and development (2017) Revised Management Arrangements (new special algorithm) to be applied in course of implementation of the project [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. 3 RUNO KIIs [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Oleh Protsyk (2017) Working on conflict prevention across state boundaries: experiences and lessons from Kyrgyz-Tajik border area [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. RUNO KII TJ 7; TJ 5; Tajikistan Governmental Monitoring Group visit, September 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. RUNO KII TJ 5; Oleh Protsyk (2017) Working on conflict prevention across state boundaries: experiences and lessons from Kyrgyz-Tajik border area [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. RUNO KII TJ 1; 4; 5; PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. UN PBF Secretariat Kyrgyzstan, Internal Lessons Learned brief on the cross-border project [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Beneficiary FGD KG 10; KG 15 [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Beneficiary KII KG 6, RUNO KII KG 9; KG 10 RUNO KII TJ 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. RUNO KII KG 10; RUNO KII TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. IP KII TJ 4; Beneficiary KII TJ 5; LNGO Eurasia Foundation Central Asia (Tajikistan) (2019) Final report on the sub-project Youth peace building for social development in cross-border areas of Tajikistan [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. RUNO KII KG 2; Beneficiary KII TJ 5; IP KII TJ 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. IP KII TJ 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. RUNO KII KG 10 [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. RUNO KII TJ 2; KG 10 [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. RUNO KIIs KG 1; KG 10; RUNO KII TJ 7; Beneficiary KII KG 14; Beneficiary FGD KG 20 [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Beneficiary KIIs KG 2; KG 14 [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. RUNO KIIs TJ 5; KG 9; KG 10 [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Additional coordination data provided by UNDP Kyrgyzstan, UNDP Tajikistan and PDA, April 2020 [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Oleh Protsyk (2017) Working on conflict prevention across state boundaries: experiences and lessons from Kyrgyz-Tajik border area [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Additional coordination data provided by UNDP Kyrgyzstan, UNDP Tajikistan and PDA, April 2020 [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Minutes Joint UNCT meeting, November 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. RUNO KII TJ 3; TJ 5; TJ 8; KG 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. RUNO KII TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Oleh Protsyk (2017) Working on conflict prevention across state boundaries: experiences and lessons from Kyrgyz-Tajik border area [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. RUNO KII TJ 5; TJ 3: KG 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Also RUNO KII TJ 4; TJ 6 [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. RUNO KII TJ 3; Minutes UN TJ technical level meeting September 2019 [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. PBF Cross-border peace building project documents phase 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. PBF Cross-border peace building project documents [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. RUNO KIIs; IP KII TJ 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. 1 RUNO KII KG [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. 1 RUNO KII KG 2; 1RUNO KII TJ [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. IP KII KG 6; IP KII KG 2; Beneficiary FGD KG 24 [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. RUNO KII TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. 2 RUNO KII KG; Agenda of the coordination meeting of UN agencies’ focal points within the cross-border cooperation for sustainable peace and development project, 16 April 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Gender Mainstreaming Strategy phase 2, April 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. RUNO KII KG 5; IP KII KG 2; IP KII TJ 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. RUNO KII TJ 4 [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Beneficiary FGD TJ 1; TJ 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Also beneficiary FGD KG 21 [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. Beneficiary FGD KG 21; TJ 3; RUNO KII TJ 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. RUNO KII TJ 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Beneficiary KII KG 4 [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Beneficiary FGD KG 10; Beneficiary KII KG 14 [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Beneficiary FGD KG 19 [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Beneficiary FGD TJ 1; RUNO KII TJ 8; Beneficiary FGD KG 3; KG 10; KG 15; KG 18; KG 24 [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Beneficiary KII TJ 6 [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Government KII KG 2; Beneficiary KII KG 7; KG 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Beneficiary KII KG 6; beneficiary FGD TJ 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Beneficiary FGD KG 21 [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. Beneficiary KII KG 11 [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. Beneficiary FGD KG 9 [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. PBF Cross-border peace building project document Tajikistan phase 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. RUNO KII TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. RUNO KII KG 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. RUNO KII TJ 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017; Beneficiary KII TJ 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. RUNO KII TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. Letters from the SG addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council on the human rights due diligence policy on UN support to non-UN security forces, 25 February 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. Tajikistan Steering Committee meeting minutes, May 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. Tajikistan Steering Committee meeting minutes, May 2018; RUNO KII TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. RUNO KII TJ 4; TJ 5; Tajikistan Governmental Monitoring Group visit report, September 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. Kyrgyzstan PBF Joint Steering Committee meeting minutes, March 2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. RUNO KII KG 1; RUNO KII TJ 3; TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. RUNO KII KG 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. RUNO KII KG 1; KG 3; KG 5 RUNO KII TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. 2 RUNO KII KG; UNICEF Tajikistan (2017) Peacebuilding Fund – UNICEF Theory of Change, results and lessons learned – Tajikistan; WFP Kyrgyzstan, Conflict sensitivity, gender and environmental risk screening checklist [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. RUNO KII TJ 1; Beneficiary FGD KG 23 [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. Oleh Protsyk (2017) Working on conflict prevention across state boundaries: experiences and lessons from Kyrgyz-Tajik border area [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. RUNO KII KG 3; RUNO KII KG 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. RUNO KII TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. For example, a before – and – after survey of participants in a dialogue platform. See Oleh Protsyk (2017) Working on conflict prevention across state boundaries: experiences and lessons from Kyrgyz-Tajik border area. See also LNGO Eurasia Foundation Central Asia (Tajikistan) (2019) Assessment report on peace building competencies training [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. Oleh Protsyk (2017) Working on conflict prevention across state boundaries: experiences and lessons from Kyrgyz-Tajik border area [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. RUNO KII KG 1, RUNO KII KG 5. The mid-term review also considered PBF reporting ‘inadequate’ [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. PBF final report; PBF Annual Progress Report November 2019; PBF Semi-Annual Progress Report August 2019; PBF Annual Progress Report November 2018; PBF Annual Progress Report June 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017; 1 RUNO KII TJ [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. PeaceNexus Foundation, Review of PBF Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. IP KII TJ 3; Beneficiary KII KG 6; observations of water measurement technology on two sites [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. RUNO KII TJ 2; TJ 4; Government KII TJ 7; Beneficiary KII KG 4; KG 12; KG 16 [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. Beneficiary FGD KG 23 [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. RUNO KII KG 9; Beneficiary FGD KG 9; Government KII TJ 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
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172. Ehe-Farhang wa Tarakkiyot (Tajikstan) (2019) Final Report on the project Cross-Border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development; Beneficiary FGD KG 3; Beneficiary KII KG 4; IP KII KG 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
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174. Beneficiary KII KG 14 [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. Tajikistan Steering Committee meeting minutes, May 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. RUNO KII TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. Tajikistan Governmental Monitoring Group visit, September 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. RUNO KII TJ 4; Government KII TJ. The work of the project with the Ombudsman Offices in both countries also played a role in this. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. RUNO KII KG 1; RUNO KII TJ 3; RUNO KII TJ 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. Anna Matveeva (2015) UNDP Cross-Border Situation Assessment, p.10 [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. Anna Matveeva (2015) UNDP Cross-Border Situation Assessment, p.84 [↑](#footnote-ref-181)