**UNITED NATIONS IN SOUTH SUDAN**

**PEACEBUILDING PLAN**

**DRAFT**

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# SECTION ONE: FRAMING THE PLAN

## 1.1 Objectives and Rational

1. The UN in South Sudan has developed this ‘UN-wide Peacebuilding Plan’ (2018-2021) to strategically channel its limited resources and guide activities into priority areas that: help address the root causes of conflict; facilitate the return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons; consolidate peace and prevent relapse of violence; and enhance complementarity and coordination between and among diverse actors engaged in peacebuilding processes.
2. This Plan emerges out of a consensus that collaborative and coordinated efforts by UN entities and partners in South Sudan would have greater impact. The UN joint programme on “Strengthening Dialogue for Peace and Reconciliation in South Sudan”, that is being implemented by UNDP, IOM, UNESCO, UNWOMEN and UNMISS with support from the Peacebuilding Fund, requested the development of a plan that will provide a coordinated framework from which priority peacebuilding actions can be developed and implemented. In this regard, the Plan is neither a project nor a programme. Rather, it is a menu of options and potential areas of engagement by the UN and other relevant partners. It only provides ideas, entry points and coordinated suggestions from which new projects can be extracted by UN and other partners (including CSOs) for possible support.
3. The Plan is aligned with outcome 3, ‘Peace and Governance Strengthened’, of the existing United Nations Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF 2016-18), UNMISS’s mandate (UNSCR 2406 - 2018) and the anticipated UN Cooperation Framework 2019-2021 priority area 1 “building peace and strengthening governance.” The Plan will also support the governance cluster of the emerging National Development Strategy (2019-2021) developed by the Government of South Sudan.
4. The priorities and areas of support articulated in the Plan are the outcome of consultations with citizens, local and national government authorities and international partners. In line with the multi-dimensional nature of peacebuilding, implementation of the Plan would be the responsibility of all stakeholders including South Sudanese and the international community.
5. The Plan draws from U.N. General Assembly and Security Council “peacebuilding resolutions” ([A/RES/70/262](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_262.pdf) and [S/RES/ 2282](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2282%282016%29)) that focus on sustaining peace “at all stages of conflict and in all its dimensions” and on the imperative to prevent “the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict”, in response to worrying trends such as the spike in violent conflict worldwide and unparalleled levels of forced displacement.
6. The Plan also draws inspiration from the outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit, and promotes “an integrated, strategic, and coherent approach to peacebuilding, noting that security, development and human rights are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing”. The Plan further recognizes the role women and other vulnerable people have played and will continue to play in community mobilization and peacebuilding in South Sudan. The Plan thus seeks to support the South Sudan National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and Related Resolutions[[1]](#footnote-1)

##  The Peacebuilding Challenge

1. South Sudan made significant gains in peacebuilding since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005; even though focus was on restoration and extension of state authority, establishment of state institutions and expansion of services delivery.[[2]](#footnote-2) The conflict of December 2013 reversed many of these gains and, as the conflict is protracted, peacebuilding remains a severe challenge. South Sudan remains one of the most fragile nations in the world.[[3]](#footnote-3) The conflict in South Sudan is primarily driven by elite interests. While local level conflicts exist and predate the civil war. Conflicts at the local are also exploited by elite interests/Indeed, 46.2% of the South Sudanese feel that inter-communal disputes and conflicts have increased since independence.[[4]](#footnote-4)
2. The Peace Agreement signed in 2015 has stalled and trust deficit between warring parties has widened. A UNDP-commissioned perception survey found that citizens' confidence in peace and security has fallen 5% (from 52.5per cent (2015) to 47.4per cent (2017)) due to increased political instability and sporadic attacks experienced across the country. Seven million people (60 per cent of the total population) need humanitarian assistance, whilst 5.3 million (48 per cent of the population) are estimated to be facing crisis and acute food insecurity[[5]](#footnote-5).
3. The conflict has weakened traditional conflict prevention, mediation and resolution structures, and the ability of institutions to withstand political and security shocks. Weak rule of law institutions translates into total impunity of perpetrators of violence, fuels vigilantism and human rights violations. Discriminatory social norms and unequal gender relationships have entrenched the vulnerabilities of women during the crisis. A recent study revealed that 58.5 per cent of the population view sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) as a major problem in South Sudan.[[6]](#footnote-6)
4. There economy is in dire strait. There is spiralling inflation (125 per cent in January 2018)[[7]](#footnote-7), precipitously falling exchange (US$1: SSP253 in April 2018 from US$1: SSP 3.1 in 2015), fiscal deficit (23 per cent in 2016, and expected to grow in 2018[[8]](#footnote-8)) and a contracting economy (10.8 per cent in 2016 and 11.2 per cent in 2017[[9]](#footnote-9)). Poverty has also worsened, from 44.7 per cent in 2011 to 65.9 per cent in 2015[[10]](#footnote-10). Female-headed households (48.6 per cent of all households) experience more severe depth of poverty due to detrimental social norms, limited access to education, productive assets and resources.
5. South Sudan’s peacebuilding challenge is complex and multifaceted. At the heart of this challenge, is a governance crisis that has failed to regulate and manage elite competition over access to and control of the state apparatus; and, by extension, the mechanisms of resource accumulation and redistribution.[[11]](#footnote-11)
6. Amongst others, obstacles to peace include:
	1. The conflict and political crisis has created new incentives and opportunities for rent seeking and corruption.[[12]](#footnote-12) Moreover, against the backdrop of poverty, lack of job opportunities, high levels of illiteracy, inadequate life skills, drug addiction and rampant crime, violence has become a viable enterprise and opportunity to sustain a living.[[13]](#footnote-13) Whereas, in 2015 the conflict was defined by two dominant factions, fragmentation of the opposition has since been observed. Roaming armed elements lacking in resources and under no central command are sustaining themselves with banditry which in turn poses a real threat to communities and their recovery.
	2. Grievances and the politicization of ethnicity: Real and perceived grievances have been ethnicised and are being used for political gain. This has eroded social cohesion and led to a general climate of fear, mistrust and revenge attacks and killings between communities. As a result, 45.6 % of the population feel that disputes and grievances between members of the same community (intra-communal) that lead to armed violence have increased since independence. Also, 46.2% of the South Sudan population feel that inter-communal disputes and conflicts have increased since independence.[[14]](#footnote-14)
	3. Poverty and weak systems to manage shared resources: Against the backdrop of deep mistrust and tension, lack of rule of law, economic and environmental change, contamination from explosive remnants of war, and population migrations have increased pressure on land and competition over access to resources and in the process sparked violent conflicts. For example, in Jonglei, Lakes and Warrap, cattle raiding is a manifestation of inter-tribal and inter-clan rivalry and retaliation as well as of economic gain. Competition over shared resources is further compounded by the presence of displaced people in camps/camp-like settings/settlements, and that host community/ displaced community tensions also present a peacebuilding challenge especially as there is presence of militarised elements in camps/settlements/camp-like settings.
	4. Weak community relationships: The deteriorating relationship among personal and group has undermine community co-existence. In many areas, conflict has replaced cooperation. However it should be noted that in other areas, established linkages fostered through trade, intermarriage, migration routes, linguistic commonalties, networks of mutual responsibilities has strengthen social cohesion.
	5. The culture of intolerance and revenge is further entrenched by trauma. To leave the trauma unaddressed is to invite a virulent repeat of cycles of violence, which has marked the painful history of South Sudan. According to a survey undertaken by South Sudan Law Society, 41 per cent of respondents endorsed symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of PTSD.[[15]](#footnote-15) This level of impact is comparable to rates documented after the genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia.[[16]](#footnote-16).
	6. Proliferation of small arms: According a perception survey, South Sudan has an estimated 720,000 to 3 million guns. The estimated rate of private gun ownership (both licit and illicit) is 28.23 firearms per 100 people. 55.3 per cent of deaths in South Sudan have been attributed to firearms.[[17]](#footnote-17)
	7. Sexual and gender-based violence: While sexual and gender based violence in conflict may not from the onset be a driver to local level conflict, the use of sexual violence as a tool of war during conflict is rampant. Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) continues to be a key feature of the conflicts in South Sudan.[[18]](#footnote-18) According to the UNDP perceptions survey findings, high levels of household poverty, drug and alcohol abuse, post-traumatic stress disorder (PSTD) and increase in conflict and insecurity coupled with proliferation of small arms (35.7%) are major factors contributing to SGBV. SGBV is also associated with structural violence. There has been deliberate targeting of women and children to undermine and destabilize communities to weaken the support base for the armed groups. [[19]](#footnote-19)
	8. The absence of a unified strong common position from the international community against the backdrop of divergent regional interest has inhibited international efforts aimed at stemming the conflict.
7. Peacebuilding and conflict prevention have received relatively little attention. While international actors focused primarily on delivering a “peace dividend” at the national level through state building, capacity building and social services provision since the 2005 peace agreement, there hasn’t been commensurate support provided to facilitate and strengthen peace and political dialogue at the sub-national level. Even at the national level the various initiatives to launch reconciliation and dialogue initiatives attracted very limited support.
8. The protracted political crisis in South Sudan has resulted in severe decrease in donor funding be it for national building and development assistance. This has led to an unpredictable funding environment that makes longer term programming difficult. With humanitarian needs exceeding well over 1 billion USD a year in an ongoing conflict, it is important to develop and invest in initiatives that: facilitate the return of IDPs and refugees; break the cycle of vulnerability and strengthen individual coping mechanisms and community resilience.

## 1.3 Lessons Learnt

1. Implementation should draw from and build on the achievements and lessons learnt from existing support.[[20]](#footnote-20) As part of the process to define the strategic approach and content of this Plan, the UN undertook a mapping and assessment of existing local peacebuilding efforts. The Plan also benefits from numerous evaluation of local peacebuilding programmes/projects. Amongst others the lessons learnt include:
	1. Whilst there is consensus that strong investment in local peacebuilding efforts reduces the probability of conflict, development’s (peace dividend) contribution to peacebuilding is not a given nor is it a linear process.[[21]](#footnote-21) However, when UN peacebuilding support is integrated and aligned to a common political strategy, transformative results are achievable. The following are some emerging joint UN initiatives with very good potential: The Joint UN (UNMISS, UNDP, UNHCR, UNESCO, UNWomen, IOM) approach to support the National Dialogue; UNMISS collaboration with UNDP and CSOs on regulating cattle migration; ongoing joint effort in Yambio to reintegrate former rebels; and UNHR, IOM and UNDP joint efforts to facilitate the return and reintegration of IDPs in Bentiu[[22]](#footnote-22) and UN system-wide approach to protection of civilians which is being developed under the leadership of the HC/RC
	2. Immediate needs for humanitarian support, civilian protection and mediated conflict resolution remain high on the peacebuilding agenda. However linking these to longer-term structural reform and development is necessary to complement, consolidate and make the impact of humanitarian assistance more sustainable.
	3. Working directly with people and communities delivers swifter and more effective impact. This is especially so as resources available to government are severely limited (under $300m FY 2017/18) and the capacity to deliver public services is extremely weak and discredited. In addition, third party implementation and monitoring arrangement have the potential to overcome some of the challenges around trust, independence, impartiality and accountability that have dogged public service systems.
	4. At the moment, peacebuilding support follows the programming patterns of concerned actors. Identification of location for support and investment is not informed by an overall strategy but rather it is driven by programme rationalities. Current peacebuilding and reconciliation activities would benefit from improved coordination as mechanisms at the community level have only limited impact on the national peacebuilding process. Without an overall strategy, the link between national and local peacebuilding initiatives will not be optimised.[[23]](#footnote-23) It is also important to have a long-term orientation grounded in certain scenarios, for example, a one year intervention might not suffice to resolve all relevant root causes in case violence escalate in the community.[[24]](#footnote-24) Furthermore, it is important to recognize the influence and build partnerships with key stakeholders in communities to lead and mobilize people to facilitate dialogue.

## Scope of the Plan

1. There is an overwhelming depiction that South Sudan as a whole is insecure and no place has enjoyed a certain level of stability and the security institutions cannot be properly controlled or managed. However, there are pockets of relative stability and security.[[25]](#footnote-25) Cognisant that the national peace process is highly politicized, investing more on local peacebuilding will secure some transformational results. While less political space at the national level exists, more opportunities lie at the community level. Political settlement at the national level will also not guarantee that it translates automatically into peace at the local level.[[26]](#footnote-26) The ultimate test of peace is community security and social cohesion.
2. For the purposes of this Plan, peacebuilding entails: activities to prevent and immediately halt violent conflict among parties; activities to formulate policies and guidelines to strengthen state institutions; activities that contribute to stability, building political, economic and social foundations to achieve peace; activities contributing to reconciliation, trust-building and dealing with the past; and activities to change attitudes and behaviors of people to re-establish social fabric once torn during a war as well as healing trauma and psychological wounds of war.

# SECTION TWO: STRATEGY AND APPROACH

## Strategy

1. The Plan is built around the following strategies:
	1. The community security strategy: Focus on supporting communities to identify and address the drivers and causes of conflicts. This will be done through identifying local actors, displaced communities and supporting local structures to strengthen and work with local partners, developing their capacity, acknowledging and enhancing their role as active actors in peacebuilding.
	2. The social cohesion strategy: Focus will be on promoting equal opportunities and reducing disparities and divisions within a community. This also includes aspect of social exclusion and strengthening social relations, community interactions and ties and embraces all aspects which are generally considered as the social capital of a society.
	3. Linking local peacebuilding support to national political priorities: Through the leadership of senior UN management, efforts will be made to ensure where necessary, that there is positive alignment between local peacebuilding efforts and wider national peace process.
2. The strategies are all geared towards achieving longer term impact that is sustainable. This is achieved by meaningful participation of women and youth, building, building local capacity and empowering communities to sustain peace and prevent conflict without relying on extensive outside assistance. The theory of change dictates, based on lessons learnt, that by engaging at the local level in areas where there is some form of stability, development partners are able to circumvent national political rifts and the national level conflict and focus instead on reducing local conflicts through holistic and comprehensive support that addresses security, justice and livelihoods.

## Geographical Approach

1. Implementation of the Plan should prioritize the cluster/conflict system approach. Rather than implement everywhere, high impact areas should be prioritised. Communal conflicts are triggered, driven and sustained by interlocking interest and actors that sometimes cut across administrative boundaries. Thus, implementation should be designed around conflict systems/dynamics, not administrative boundaries. The target groups and stakeholders should be selected based on conflict clusters which look at the interconnectedness of the conflict actors, causes and issues in the respective cluster.[[27]](#footnote-27)

## 2.3 Principles/Enablers of Success

1. The Plan is guided by the following principles:
	1. Conflict sensitivity: All actions/activities will adopt a conflict sensitive approach, that is, adopt an approach that seeks to reduce existing or potential tensions among communities in targeted areas.
	2. Human Rights-based Approach (HRBA): The Plan will integrate the four components of HRBA principles: non-discriminatory, transparency, participation and accountability in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation processes.
	3. Accountability of all stakeholders and Centrality of Protection.
	4. Inclusive implementation: Its implementation of activities should be rooted in extensive consultation with men, women, boys and girls of South Sudan – especially in communities where activities are implemented.
	5. Coherence: The Plan is designed to provide a platform and a coherent mechanism for support and complementarity to the existing peacebuilding efforts through other areas such as humanitarian assistance, livelihood and services.
	6. Transparent, timely and predictable use of support: The Plan rests on the commitment of the UN to ensure the transparent, timely and predictable use of aid to support these priorities through information-sharing and regular policy dialogue.
	7. Gender equality and women’s empowerment: Gender equality and the empowerment of women are central to the mandate of UN and intrinsic to its development approach.

## Partnerships

1. The major added value of the approach taken in the Plan is anchored in partnerships. The UN system, that includes agencies with comparative mandates and UNMISS and its vast footprint, and working with development partners, government, NGOs and civil society offers a unique opportunity to make a stronger impact when pulled together as it helps to leverage limited resources.

# SECTION THREE: PRIORITY AREAS AND ACTIONS

1. Based on the current circumstances in South Sudan, in the short to medium term, success will constitute improvement and strengthening of social cohesion and the expansion and consolidation of peace and stability. To do this, the UN will focus on two sets of priorities: Trust Building and Peace Sustainability.

## 3.1 Trust Building Entry Point

### 3.2 Priority Actions

#### 3.2.1 Safety and Security

* + Support community policing in bringing together the police, CSOs and local communities to jointly take responsibility for and develop solutions to local safety and security issues.
	+ Provide support for confidence-building measures, including awareness raising and policy dialogue with local government officials and security forces, including police, civil authorities, army, militia and rebels.
	+ Support reform to ensure the professional conduct of the police, the national security and the national army.

#### 3.2.2 Rule of Law

* + Promote access to justice to displaced, vulnerable and marginalized people.
	+ Establish the needed legal procedures to ensure case management to prevent prolonged and arbitrary detention.
	+ Juvenile justice should be also taken seriously and national accountability mechanisms especially for conflict related sexual violence should be strengthened.

#### 3.2.3 Psychosocial Support and Trauma Healing

* + Scale up psychosocial support for victims of war especially victims of gender-based violence.
	+ Establish psychosocial support and trauma healing facilities in different areas to clean and cure the memories of the war and alleviate their associated pain.
	+ Support traditional approaches to justice and reconciliation.

#### 3.2.4 Enhancing Local Peace Mechanisms

* + Support existing groups and unions and build capacities of local peace committees, women, youth and traditional leaders to resolve conflicts peacefully.[[28]](#footnote-28)
	+ Support local and traditional mechanisms to address issue of child abduction. Work with all relevant parties to develop a policy on child abduction.
	+ Support local and traditional mechanisms to regulate cattle migration and cattle rustling.
	+ Undertake timely diplomatic initiatives to resolve local conflicts e.g. local peace conferences/agreements.
	+ Support the development of cooperatives and self-help groups across different groups around economic and livelihood services and initiatives. They might be used to foster social capital, cooperation across divides, and the foundation for reintegration and reconciliatory processes.

#### 3.2.5 Consensus Building

* + The power to improve trust amongst all parties and local communities doesn’t just reside in the UN brand, but rather in the relationship it builds. UN needs to facilitate intra and inter-party dialogue to build consensus on issues of reconciliation; facilitate national and local dialogue to promote infrastructure for peace and discussion on a social contract.

#### 3.2.6 Mainstreaming Conflict Sensitivity

* + There is a need to assess and to reflect on the causes behind the low level of trust prevailing in South Sudan. Develop a mechanism to monitor and assess progress on social cohesion and reconciliation in South Sudan. The mechanism will help in better programming, targeting areas and issues that will improve confidence.

## Peace Sustainability/consolidation Priority

1. In addition to the trust building which is needed in the short term, there is a need for long term entry points to sustain the envisaged peace. These entry points make the peacebuilding plan more comprehensive and explore different opportunities in different subjects which will be discussed in the below sections.

### 3.3 Priority Actions

#### 3.3.1 Peace Education and peace Journalism

* + Scale up existing gender and age sensitive programmes targeting, training for teachers and policy makers, pastoralist communities and IDPs, and mobilize local volunteers to work as teachers in addition to establishing peace youth clubs for vocational training and peace ideas.
	+ Establish schools with mixed ethnic background of students so that they learn to live together from childhood.
	+ Disseminate peace culture through peace messages building on the already existing community peace and media networks. Utilizing interactive communication mechanism among and within communities.
	+ Provide training and support packages to community radio stations to produce peace related content and integrating a programme for youth by youth speaking on issues related to peace building.
	+ Support network of existing South Sudanese CSO, institutions working on peace initiatives (as part of UN capacity building role to strengthen local peace building initiatives that can complement UN support).

#### 3.3.2 Addressing Land Conflicts through Peaceful Means

* + Land conflicts should be addressed with traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and it should enjoy fair legal attention and efforts. E.g. setting up land conflict resolution mechanisms for both host communities and IDPs/refugees. While traditional dispute resolution mechanisms may be at the forefront, legal mechanisms will also be required to peacefully resolve such disputes.
	+ Provide support to ensure displaced and returnee populations and women in particular are not victims of discrimination in relation to access to land.

#### 3.3.3 Women and Youth Empowerment

* + Provide livelihood opportunities including technical and vocational training to youth who have voluntarily left militia.
	+ Support mentorship of youth innovators e.g. graduation programme which also includes trauma healing, new masculinities, transformational leadership.
	+ Work with all relevant parties to prevent the recruitment and secure the release and integration of child soldiers into society.
	+ Provide legal aid to sexual and gender-based violence victims, including capacity building of lawyers’ network, judges, prosecutors and police to identify and promptly address sexual and gender-based violence through existing law-enforcement and court system.
	+ Raise awareness and train youth and women on the issue of climate change, sustainable consumption and production patterns to increase their capacity on sustainable use of natural resources.[[29]](#footnote-29)

#### 3.3.4 Peace and development Nexus

* + Early economic revitalisation with immediate stabilisation and employment through income generation and emergency job creation for host communities.
	+ Utilising food distribution as a catalyst to promote people to organise in groups/associations to produce and market collectively ensuring food security and increase income through access to markets (organisational and entrepreneurial capacity of association/producer.
	+ Protect and rehabilitate productive assets to enhance self-reliance. This will entail empowering vulnerable communities to move away from dependency on assistance and lead in the creation of assets that increase their resilience to future shocks.
	+ Promote the safe and sustainable return and integration of ex–combatant, IDPs and returning refugees with local communities and ensure their integration into local/area recovery and development plans and interventions.

#### 3.3.5 Democratic institution building – in accordance with applicable UN guidelines and procedures

In line with international standards, benchmarks and UN guidelines support the democratic reform process/institution articulated in the peace agreement and the outcomes of the other peace processes such as the High Level Revitalization Forum -HLRF. Such support is contingent on strong improvement of the political process, including the outcome of the HLRF and other nationally owned peace processes

* + Support the Permanent Constitutional review process.
	+ Support the Electoral process in line with UN guidelines
	+ Support the reform of the accountability and participation institutions e.g. anti-Corruption Commission, Human Rights Institution and Parliament.
	+ Improve social accountability at the local level through participatory development planning

# SECTION FOUR: GOING FORWARD

1. Considering the Plan is not a project or a programme, no new coordination structures will be created. Existing UN coordination structures (Outcome Group One of the UNCF), will be used to facilitate implementation and monitor progress and to support improved harmonization and coordination of (joint) efforts among relevant stakeholders. Also the articulated Outcome One results framework in the UNCF will be used to evaluate progress against the objective and expectation of the Plan.
2. Drawing from the Plan, new projects can be developed by UN and other partners (including CSOs) for possible support.
3. Considering the need for coordination and integration, joint programmes are encouraged.
1. The inclusion of women into the peacebuilding processes is also in line with the South Sudan National Action Plan 2015-2020 on United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and Related Resolutions. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor Evaluation of Support toConflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005–2010 Final report – December 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2017/05/14/fsi-2017-factionalization-and-group-grievance-fuel-rise-in-instability/> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. End-line Study on Peace, Security and Sexual & Gender Based Violence in South Sudan, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, South Sudan (January – July 2018) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. End-line Study on Peace, Security and Sexual & Gender Based Violence in South Sudan, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. [National](https://tradingeconomics.com/south-sudan/inflation-cpi) Bureau of Statistic, 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. South Sudan Economic Snapshot H2, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/112071516734556800/pdf/IDA-R2017-0340-11172017.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. see The Conflict in South Sudan *The UN Joint Policy Advisory Team in South Sudan*15 November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. See War Crimes Shouldn’t Pay Stopping the looting and destruction in South Sudan September 2016 https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Sentry\_WCSP\_Finalx.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. More than half (51%) of South Sudanese population is below age 18 and 72 percent of South Sudanese are younger than age 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. End-line Study on Peace, Security and Sexual & Gender Based Violence in South Sudan, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. South Sudan Law Society and UNDP 2015, Search for a New Beginning: Perceptions of Truth, Justice, Reconciliation and Healing in South Sudan [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See Phuong N. Pham, Harvey M. Weinstein and Timothy Longman, Trauma and PTSD symptoms in Rwanda: implications for attitudes toward justice and reconciliation, 292 JAMA 602 (4 Aug. 2004), available at http://jama. jamanetwork.com. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms and UNDP 2016 “National Small Arms Assessment in South Sudan” [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. See South Sudan National Action Plan 2015-2020 on UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and Related Resolutions [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Observations on the Mandate of South Sudan’s Commission on Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), Intersections of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in South Sudan, David K. Deng & Rens Willems April 2016 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. See Mapping of Community-based Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Mechanisms in South Sudan commissioned by the UN [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor Evaluation of Support toConflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005–2010 Final report – December 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. It should be noted that Southern and Central UNITY are experiencing high levels of insecurity/ongoing clashes and grave rights violations. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Mapping of Community-based Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Mechanisms in South Sudan commissioned by the UN [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. The experienced from the 2013 and 2016 violence shows that there are certain trends to consider when there is an escalation in violence which normally presents itself as a shock that is limited in scope, i.e. not country wide, but rather confined to particular pockets with some tension at the national stage. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. As recent intensification of hostilities in Western Equatoria shows, the situation is highly fluid and hotspots can change across the country. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Notwithstanding the often considerable human and material resources invested in post-conflict reconstruction, the empirical record is mixed to say the least with an often-touted (although controversial) figure according to which 85% of peace agreements do not survive the five-year mark. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. The conflict clusters will be identified collectively by participating agencies. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. According to the mapping and assessment report, the need for such committees is so high and the available ones definitely cannot accommodate the continuously increasing local issues. Furthermore, there are other forms of local peace mechanisms that might be useful to explore in order to be used in South Sudan. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Having weak knowledge on environmental issues and sustainable development principles mainly sustainable management of natural resources on which majority of south Sudanese livelihoods depend , the pressure on ecosystems will be high, compromising the sustainable development goals and the attainment of the 2030 and 2063 agendas in South Sudan. In addition, while promoting women and youth activities that do not take into account the principles of natural resource management and environmental sustainability, the likelihood of rapid natural resources deterioration and depletion, accelerated land degradation and climate change, increased environmental pollutions resulting in high children and youth mortality and morbidity thus compromising expected results on education, health and income generation, with a high risk of fueling conflicts and humanitarian challenges in South Sudan [↑](#footnote-ref-29)