**PROGRAMME ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT**

**Period: 2019**

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| **Project Name** | Operationalizing Somali National Strategy and Action Plan on Preventing and Countering of Violent Extremism |
| Gateway ID | 00112758 |
| Start date | 01 September 2018 |
| Planned end date (as per last approval) | 31 December 2019 |
| Focal Person(s) | (Name): Doel Mukerjee |
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| (Tel): 0619883848 |
| Participating UN Entities | UNDP, UNSOM |
| NDP Pillar | To achieve a stable and peaceful Federal Somalia through inclusive political processes, establishing unified, capable and accountable security institutions and establishing independent, accountable and efficient justice institution |
| UNSF Strategic Priority | Priority 3: All Somalis benefit from Peace, Security and the Rule of Law including Justice; Priority 4: Effective and accountable institutions that respond to needs and rights of all Somali |
| SDG(s) | SDG16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions  |
| Location | Benadir, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, Puntland, South-West |
| Gender Marker | 2 |

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| **Total Budget as per ProDoc**  | 2,056,791 USD |
| MPTF: | 1,702,579 USD |
| Non-MPTF sources: | PBF: |
| Trac:  |
| Other: |

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| **Total MPTF Funds Received** | **Total non-MPTF Funds Received** |
| **PUNO** | **Semi Annual 2019 (2)** | **Cumulative** | **Annual 2019** | **Semi Annual 2019 (2)** | **Cumulative** | **Annual 2019** |
| **UNDP** | 0 | 1,449,446.83 | 899,581.85 | 0 | 370,579.00 | 216,000 |
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| **JP Expenditure of MPTF Funds[[1]](#footnote-1)** | **JP Expenditure of non-MPTF Funds**  |
| **PUNO** | **Semi Annual 2019 (2)** | **Cumulative** | **Annual 2019** | **Semi Annual 2019 (2)** | **Cumulative** | **Annual 2019** |
| **UNDP** | 647,094.53 | 1,279,046.15 | 1,057,547.46 | 186,447.72 | 264,794.79 | 264,794.79 |

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| **ANNUAL HIGHLIGHTS**1. Consultations held with 353 traditional elders in 4 Federal Member States on their role in a potential peace process, creating a public demand for peace talks and socializing the idea.
2. 150 Religious Leaders engaged in the establishment of local networks of like-minded religious actors to promote Islam as a religion of tolerance and peace.
3. 13 PCVE Platforms held in 11 different locations in 4 Federal Member States and the Benadir Region, identifying 39 community grievances as root causes for violent extremism and taking steps to address them.
4. PCVE Communications Strategy finalized and PCVE Communications Task Force established, coordinating and harmonizing PCVE related communications products amongst FGS line ministries and FMS actors.
5. CAS Strand 4 evolved from a coordination platform to a forum of content-based exchange and collaboration between line ministries.
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| **HIGHLIGHTS OF KEY ACHIEVEMENTS**Consultations held with 353 traditional elders in 4 Federal Member States on their role in a potential peace process, creating a public demand for peace talks and socializing the idea. Traditional elders play a crucial role in Somalia’s clan-based electoral system and might still have a significant say in the next elections 2021. Al-Shabaab, in an attempt to influence the electoral system towards the group’s benefit, in 2019 reached out systematically to the elders to re-negotiate their allegiances. Aiming to address this emerging challenge, the OPM PCVE Coordination Unit together with the FMS PCVE Focal Points decided to launch nationwide consultations with Somalia’s traditional elders to counter al-Shabaab’s strategy. The consultations focused on reestablishing a trust relationship between traditional elders and government representatives, as well as receiving feedback on the potential role of traditional elders in a potential peace process, aiming at creating a public demand for peace as well as socializing the idea of bridging the gap between government and al-Shabaab for potential peace talks in the future. 1. 150 Religious Leaders engaged in the establishment of local networks of like-minded religious actors to promote Islam as a religion of tolerance and peace.

Religious leaders and actors have successfully been engaged in developing a manual on religious counter-narratives, addressing the misuse of a distorted version of Islam for political purposes by al-Shabaab. Furthermore, mosques and madrassas in one district of HirShabelle have been registered and a committee of religious leaders has been formed with the mandate to identify and address extremist views amongst religious actors through dialogue. 1. 13 PCVE Platforms held in 11 different locations in 4 Federal Member States and the Benadir Region, identifying 39 community grievances as root causes for violent extremism and taking steps to address them.

13 PCVE Platform meetings were organized in 11 selected at-risk locations in 4 FMS, as identified by the PCVE focal points in the states. Following structured guidelines of engagement with communities, the Platform meetings produced lists of a total of 39 community grievances as identified as drivers and root causes for violent extremism. The PCVE focal points subsequently reported directly to the respective PCVE Committees in the FMS, bringing to the attention of respective line ministries any PCVE-related challenges identified and prioritized by communities for further action. The focal points further shared these lists of priorities with the Office of the Prime Minister for knowledge sharing, trend identification and federal follow-up action where appropriate. 1. PCVE Communications Strategy finalized and PCVE Communications Task Force established, coordinating and harmonizing PCVE related communications products amongst FGS line ministries and FMS actors.

The OPM PCVE Coordination unit held consultations with all relevant federal line ministries to finalize the PCVE Communications Strategy. A PCVE Communications Task Force was established with terms of reference developed, detailing out responsibilities of different government actors to harmonize PCVE related messaging, and respond to al-Shabaab propaganda in a coordinated, structured and swift approach. 1. CAS Strand 4 evolved from a coordination platform to a forum of content-based exchange and collaboration between line ministries.

Over the course of 2019, the CAS Strand 4 platform evolved from a sporadic information sharing forum to a platform showcasing engagement and collaboration of different actors. The meeting regularly engaged PCVE actors from Federal Government line ministries, Federal Member states focal points, and civil society representatives. It shifted from actors sharing updates towards thematic areas and joint reporting by various stakeholders on collaborative efforts to mainstream PCVE into their respective work.  |
| **SITUATION UPDATE**Somalia continues to face ongoing threats of violent extremism from Al-Shabaab (AS) and the Islamic State (IS). Large parts of Somalia remain under the control of AS which has a network of an estimated 6-7,000 fighters spread throughout the country, particularly in southern and central Somalia, where it de facto governs, provides and justice and enforces taxation of local communities and business owners as well as toll collections at checkpoints along many of the main supply routes. AS operates within a clear and well-organized framework and structure, with well-functioning operational, ideological and administrative units. It continues to carry out regular attacks targeting Somali security forces, government entities, AMISOM and civilians, using mainly improvised explosive devices and complex attack tactics as well as targeted assassinations. The spread of IS-affiliated elements to Somalia – estimated at 200-400 active supporters based on a single sub-clan for now – has further complicated the already complex security landscape. AS and the IS are now in competition over extortion and business networks and revenue streams which has resulted in an increase in armed conflict between the two groups. During the reporting period, the overall security situation in Somalia, especially in the South-Central regions, remained unstable. General trends suggest that AS is increasing its attack capacity regarding the use of explosive devices. A recent decrease in combat effectiveness has been attributed to internal struggles over leadership within the organization. The attack against the commercial complex in Nairobi (January 2019) is said to be masterminded and conducted by AS. The group further continues to use its counter FGS messaging through their media outlets and from direct visits to settlements by senior AS leaders, and children receiving radicalization training. Such activities reached a highlight recently during the Eid festivities in Lower Shabelle where AS organized a PR campaign targeting primarily the local youth in an Eid celebration event. Several severe attacks took place in Mogadisu in the months of November and December 2019. On 28 December, a suicide truck bomber killed at least 85 people at the Ex-Control Afgoye police checkpoint in town, constituting the deadliest attack by al-Shabaab since the 14 October 2017 bombing. In revising the national PCVE strategy and action plan, and plans to establish the Risaala Centre for PCVE, the FGS has reiterated that the prevention and countering of violent extremism is a national priority. There is a consensus that the fight against violent extremist groups will not be won by hard security measures only but requires the complementary soft-power approach addressing root causes and drivers of violent extremism. An explicit focus of the government’s PCVE coordination structure is on exploring avenues towards peace negotiations with al-Shabaab, socializing the idea of talks whilst creating a public demand and learning from existing local peace arrangements between clans and the group. Various consultations with key stakeholders have resulted in a broad-based understanding that the demand for peace negotiations at community level exists, and that key groups such as elders and religious leaders are ready to contribute to such endeavor and bridge between the government and al-Shabaab for potential dialogue. In its attempt to influence traditional elders and delegates to subtly ensure protection of interests of al-Shabaab at the political level, the group has shown a shift from a violent extremist organization towards one that prioritizes business interests and operates along the lines of an organized criminal group, applying mafia-like structures. The keen interest al-Shabaab has taken in the upcoming elections can be seen as a window to identify some of the group’s political interests which can be of relevance for a long-term vision of peace talks and a political settlement.  |
| **QUARTERLY & ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT RESULTS MATRIX**

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| **OUTCOME STATEMENT****PCVE Coordination by national authorities is functional at federal and FMS levels, and** **consultation mechanisms are established** |
| **Output 1: OPM Coordination Office and PCVE focal points in FMS are staffed and capacitated to coordinate on PCVE and commence implementation of priority issues from their respective PCVE action plans**  |
| **INDICATOR** | **TARGET** | **PROGRESS ON OUTPUT INDICATOR[[2]](#footnote-2)** |
| **Reporting Period (2019)** | **CUMULATIVE** |
| No. of qualified & experienced persons for PCVE in Somalia identified, and their capacity further developed; regular CAS Strand 4 meetings held | Support provided to 6 Strand 4 meetings 6 OPM and 6 FMS focal points | 6 OPM and 6 FMS focal point identified and appointed by federal and respective state governments. 4 technical preparatory meeting and 4 strand 4 meeting held. | 6 OPM and 6 FMS focal point identified and appointed by federal and respective state governments. 4 technical preparatory meeting and 4 strand 4 meeting held.  |
| Preparation of institutional development and capacity building plan  | Institutional development and capacity building plan prepared | Regular needs assessments conducted by PCVE Technical Specialist. Based on findings, 20 capacity building trainings provided to FMS and OPM PCVE staff.  | Regular needs assessments conducted by PCVE Technical Specialist. Based on findings, 20 capacity building trainings provided to FMS and OPM PCVE staff.  |
| 1 research work undertaken on PCVE in Somalia  | 1 research work undertaken  | PCVE action plan priorities selected by PCVE focal points in the FMS, based on this selection, 6 research projects developed; locations and target groups selected, baseline data collected and intervention commenced. | PCVE action plan priorities selected by PCVE focal points in the FMS, based on this selection, 6 research projects developed; locations and target groups selected, baseline data collected and intervention commenced.  |
| UNDP ONLY: sources of evidence (as per current QPR) |
| **Output 2: Stakeholder consultations and research undertaken to inform development of phase 2 PCVE support** |
| Number of trainings, workshops and consultations provided on PCVE to strategic groups to expand to the communities at FMS  | More than 400 people identified from FMS and communities to become PCVE advocates  | 4 PCVE consultations held for 198 participants from local state authorities, civil society and community representatives in 4 FMS: Jubaland, Galmudug, South West State and Hirshabelle.4 PCVE committee meetings for 54 participants from line ministries and civil society held in 4 FMS: Puntland, Galmudug, South West State and Hirshabelle. | 4 PCVE consultations held for 198 participants from local state authorities, civil society and community representatives in 4 FMS: Jubaland, Galmudug, South West State and Hirshabelle.4 PCVE committee meetings for 54 participants from line ministries and civil society held in 4 FMS: Puntland, Galmudug, South West State and Hirshabelle. |
| Number of elders and religious leaders consulted/sensitized  | 100 elders / religious leaders consulted/sensitized | International Religious leaders conference organized in Mogadishu with 404 participants.150 Religious Leaders engaged in the establishment of local networks of like-minded religious actors to promote Islam as a religion of tolerance and peace in HirShabelle State.  | International Religious leaders conference organized in Mogadishu with 404 participants. 150 Religious Leaders engaged in the establishment of local networks of like-minded religious actors to promote Islam as a religion of tolerance and peace in HirShabelle state.  |
| Number of PCVE dialogue platforms established in FMS  | 6 workshops undertaken on PCVE in FMS  | PCVE Committee & Platform ToRs developed and adopted; community engagement guidelines developed; 13 PCVE Platform meetings held in 11 hot spot locations: Jowhar, Balc'ad, Baidoa, Hudur, Dhusamareb, Cadaado, Guriel, Ceel Daahir, Tasjiic, Mogadisu, Daynile District. 39 community grievances as root causes for violent extremism and taking steps to address them.  | PCVE Committee & Platform ToRs developed and adopted; community engagement guidelines developed; 13 PCVE Platform meetings were held in 11 hot spot locations: Jowhar, Balc'ad, Baidoa, Hudur, Dhusamareb, Cadaado, Guriel, Ceel Daahir, Tasjiic, Mogadisu, Daynile District. 39 community grievances as root causes for violent extremism and taking steps to address them.s |
| Research work undertaken on PCVE in Somalia  | 2 research studies completed  | M&E tools for measuring PCVE programming impact on degree of violent extremist actions, attitudes and social networks developed. Research projects commenced. | M&E tools for measuring PCVE programming impact on degree of violent extremist actions, attitudes and social networks developed. Research projects commenced.s |
| Number of communications products/strategies produced and disseminated  | 1communications/advocacy strategy produced  | 1 Communications Strategy developed by the OPM PCVE Coordination Unit in consultation with FMS and key line ministries. | 1 Communications Strategy developed by the OPM PCVE Coordination Unit in consultation with FMS and key line ministries. |

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| **NARRATIVE****Output 1: OPM Coordination Office and PCVE focal points in FMS are staffed and capacitated to coordinate on PCVE and commence implementation of priority issues from their respective PCVE action plans****Institutional Capacity Building:**The project continued to support the staffing budget of PCVE at national and FMS level for key positions identified, carrying forward the incentive for qualified staff to work on PCVE, and reducing the turnover of government personnel. The Office of the Prime Minister’s PCVE Coordination Unit (OPM-PCVE-CU) was supported in establishing and positioning itself strategically as the custodian of the national PCVE strategy and action plan, the national knowledge hub on PCVE, and the coordination entity on PCVE amongst federal ministries as well as between FGS and FMS. The OPM-PCVE-CU took ownership of these responsibilities by starting to map and coordinate planned and ongoing PCVE-related and PCVE-specific activities of relevant ministries. The OPM-PCVE-CU further made sure to include a PCVE component into the Security and Justice Road Map and requested respective federal ministries to submit their workplans, including PCVE milestones and activities, contributing to the PCVE-related road map goals. The OPM-PCVE-CU through the PCVE-FMS-FP was further in the lead of coordinating the replication of the Security and Justice Road Map developed in South West and Hirshabelle states, ensuring that these documents equally reflected PCVE. The PCVE FMS-FP and PCVE Benadir region FP were supported in fulfilling their roles as lead PCVE experts in their respective states more proactively, by working closely with the OPM-PCVE-CU as well as coordinating amongst all relevant state line ministries on PCVE. In their monthly reports, the PCVE- FMS-FP provided regular situational analyses. The PCVE- FMS-FP further invested into identifying civil society organizations working on PCVE-specific and PCVE-relevant topics in their respective states, and were guided towards developing necessary local networks. **Individual Capacity Building:**All PCVE-FMS-FP and PCVE counterpart in FGS and FMS underwent a series of trainings, technical mentoring and needs-based capacity building support. These actions included trainings on designing, programming, monitoring and evaluating PCVE interventions, on report-writing, improved coordination and information sharing, on PCVE research methodologies, linkages between PCVE and human rights, on technical input towards developing training material and on delivering trainings on PCVE for Rule of Law and Security Sector institutions, as well as on launching PCVE outreach material, including the development and dissemination of counter-narratives. The trainings resulted in an increase in staffs’ ability to design PCVE programming interventions as well as research tools to measure programming impact. These further resulted in an increased capacity of the PCVE-FMS-FP to coordinate PCVE, including responding to various requests from state counterparts both at FGS and FMS level to provide information and training on PCVE. This included various meetings with government line departments in which FMS focal points informed colleagues about PCVE, as well as specific requests to provide PCVE input to overall training for prison management staff in Puntland. **Coordination Achievements:** The overall institutional and individual capacity building support on PCVE to improve coordination structures resulted in tangible improvements of the overall performance of both federal and state governments to coordinate on PCVE: **> Establishment of PCVE coordination mechanisms at FGS level:** The OPM PCVE Coordination Unit organized inter-ministerial coordination meetings on PCVE at the federal government level. With the input of the OPM, the FGS Security and Justice Road Map was developed and adopted with a significant focus on PCVE. All relevant federal Ministries were subsequently requested to nominate PCVE focal points and submit their PCVE work plans (milestones and activities) to the OPM Coordination Unit. The inter-ministerial coordination meetings on PCVE subsequently served as a forum for the PCVE Coordination Unit to request updates from the relevant federal ministries on progress made against the PCVE activities and milestones of all ministries to realize the PCVE objectives of the National Security and Justice Road Map. **> Establishment of PCVE coordination at FMS level:** Under the leadership of the PCVE Focal Points in the FMS, the federal coordination structure was mirrored at state level. All FMS focal points requested state line ministries to nominate ministerial counterparts responsible for PCVE. The PCVE Coordination Unit of the OPM and the PCVE focal points of the FMS and the Benadir region jointly developed and adopted the Terms of Reference of the PCVE Committees and Platforms. Subsequently, PCVE Committees for inter-ministerial coordination were established, serving as a forum for the focal points to provide strategic guidance on PCVE, and improve government responsiveness to challenges related to violent extremism, as identified at community level across the respective states. All PCVE focal points convened these meetings, informing line ministries about PCVE and the platform outreach to communities. As a next step, the PCVE experts further developed a discussion guide structuring the engagement between government and community representatives. These guidelines allowed for PCVE platform interactions to follow a structured communication approach in order to manage community expectations, help communities identify issues related to PCVE, assist communities to prioritize the most important challenges first, and for the government representatives to have a mutually agreed-upon response if a community is of the opinion that certain challenges related to local grievances and basic service delivery could potentially be better addressed by violent extremist groups than by the government itself. Subsequently, 13 PCVE Platform meetings were organized in 11 selected at-risk locations in the FMS (Jowhar, Balc'ad, Baidoa, Hudur, Dhusamareb, Cadaado, Guriel, Ceel Daahir, Tasjiic, Mogadisu, Daynile District). Following the structured guideline of engagement with communities, the Platform meetings produced lists of 39 community grievances / root causes and drivers for violent extremism. The PCVE focal points subsequently reported directly to the respective PCVE Committees in the FMS, bringing to the Committees' attention any PCVE-related challenges identified and prioritized by communities for further action. The PCVE focal points further shared these lists of priorities with the PCVE Coordination Unit under the Office of the Prime Minister for federal follow-up action where appropriate. **> Establishment of PCVE coordination mechanisms on PCVE between FGS and FMS:** One government co-led CAS Strand 4 meeting was organized during the reporting period, establishing the Strand 4 as a successful coordination platform with attendance and content-driven input from the FMS focal points. Under the leadership of the OPM PCVE Coordinator, two FMS (Hirshabelle and South-West) developed state Security and Justice Road Maps mirroring the national road map's PCVE focus. PCVE consultations with civil society and community representatives in the FMS were attended by staff from the OPM. Equally, the OPM participated in different PCVE platform meetings organized at FMS level. OPM staff also attended all capacity building trainings and mentoring sessions organized to target specific capacity building needs of the PCVE focal points from the states. In turn, the PCVE focal points from the states were invited to participate in the international religious leaders’ conference organized by the OPM in Mogadishu, as well as the subsequent OIC conference on countering violent extremism and religion in Somalia. **Output 2: Stakeholder consultations and research undertaken to inform development of phase 2 PCVE support****Stakeholders Consultations:** The OPM PCVE Coordination Unit, in close collaboration with the Federal Ministry for Religious Affairs, organized an international religious leaders conference on PCVE in Mogadishu in 2019. The Consultation with religious leaders and actors in Mogadishu was attended by 404 participants and resulted in the issuance of a communique as well as the recording of numerous statements of religious leaders demanding and explaining a correct interpretation of Islam as a religion of tolerance and peace. Both the president and the prime minister attended the conference, and the president in his speech encouraged religious leaders to play a role as mediators between Al-Shabaab and the population in the overall forgiveness and reconciliation process, which was widely reported and commented on in the media. The statements of the religious leaders were recorded and are currently developed into counter-narrative clips to be used by the OPM for wider dissemination. The overall positioning and feedback of religious leaders and actors on PCVE informed and fed into the revision of the national PCVE strategy. As per their mandate to establish coordination structures and networks on PCVE in the FMS, the PCVE focal points organized four consultative meetings with state-level government counterparts, civil society and community representatives, including youth, religious leaders, traditional elders and minority clan representatives, to talk about PCVE. Meetings under the leadership of the respective state PCVE focal points, and with attendance of OPM PCVE Coordination staff, took place in Jowhar, Kismayo, Baidoa and Dusamareb and reached a total of 198 participants. In the meetings, the PCVE focal points informed participants about the overall PCVE agenda, the government mandate and capacities to work on it, as well as the plans to implement small action projects on PCVE in selected at-risk areas. The consultations not only increased knowledge of the participants on PCVE aims, objectives and approaches, but also provided dedicated feedback sessions in which participants informed the PCVE focal points about violent extremism-related challenges they face in their day to day life, and how government support to tackle them could look like. Lastly, these sessions were used to develop further the PCVE questionnaire to measure the degree of violent extremist actions, attitudes and networks which the PCVE experts developed in order to measure the programming impact of their small action research pilots. Aiming to address this emerging challenge of al-Shabaab trying to influence traditional elders across the country through a so-called call for repentance, the OPM PCVE Coordination Unit together with the FMS PCVE Focal Points decided to launch nationwide consultations with Somalia’s traditional elders to counter al-Shabaab’s strategy. The consultations focused on reestablishing a trust relationship between traditional elders and government representatives, as well as receiving feedback on the potential role of traditional elders in a potential peace process, aiming at creating a public demand for peace as well as socializing the idea of bridging the gap between government and al-Shabaab for potential peace talks in the future. 353 traditional elders participated in the consultations, amongst which were also those who attended al-Shabaab’s call for repentance. The consultations resulted in detailed reports and will be the basis for the OPM PCVE unit to develop guidelines for the government on how to further engage with the elders to counter their radicalization and ideological as well as political alliances with al-Shabaab in light of the upcoming elections 2021.**PCVE Committees and Platforms**A two-tiered PCVE coordination structure was developed in the FMS and the Benadir region, establishing PCVE Platforms and PCVE Committees. The objective of the PCVE platforms is to offer a forum for exchange on community concerns, conditions and grievances that either contribute to the development of an environment conducive to radicalization or pose actual motivations for communities and/or individuals to sympathize with and support violent extremist groups. The PCVE platforms offer civil society and community representatives a forum to raise these issues with government representatives. The government subsequently, through district, regional and federal level coordination structures, such as PCVE Committee meetings at state capital level, aims to address these challenges with community-based solutions, prioritizing issues identified by communities as most pressing. The PCVE Unit of the OPM together with the PCVE focal points of the FMS and the Benadir region developed and adopted the Terms of Reference of the PCVE Committees and Platforms. The PCVE experts further developed a discussion guide structuring the engagement between government and community representatives. These guidelines allowed for the PCVE platform interactions to follow a structured communication approach in order to manage community expectations, help communities identify issues related to PCVE, help communities to prioritize the most important challenges first, and for the government representatives to have an agreed-upon response if a community is of the opinion that certain challenges related to local grievances and basic service delivery could potentially be better addressed by violent extremist groups than by the government itself. As a first step, PCVE Committees with representatives of the respective state line ministries were established in all FMS. The PCVE focal points convened these meetings informing line ministries about PCVE and the platform outreach to communities. Subsequently, PCVE Platform meetings were organized in selected locations (Puntland, Galmudug, South West State, Hirshabelle and BRA). Following the structured guideline of engagement with communities, the PCVE Platform meetings produced lists of 39 community priorities summarizing the PCVE-related challenges. The PCVE focal point subsequently reported directly to the respective PCVE Committee in the FMS, bringing to Committees' attention PCVE-related challenges identified and prioritized by communities for further action. The PCVE focal points further shared these lists of priorities with the PCVE Coordination Unit under the Office of the Prime Minister. The government took steps to address these root causes identified. Some of them were within the mandate of the PCVE structures and could be addressed directly by the FMS focal points on the ground. Others required the involvement and sensitization of relevant local and state authorities mandated to respond. Some of the challenges raised were too broad and encompassing to develop a quick solution and will require continuous engagement with the respective communities. The experience of PCVE platform implementation showed that knowledge of the PCVE push and pull factors at community level is limited to non-existent. Through interventions by the government focal points, however, local experiences with the challenge of violent extremism can be easily linked to a more systematic approach of identifying and clustering challenges related to violent extremism. Having understood the concept of PCVE, community members are both willing and able to provide detailed information about motivations and triggering factors for local support to violent extremist groups. The PCVE focal points were able to address some of the challenges identified through relatively simple measures within the government mandate and capacity. Others do require a lengthier thought process that might entail continued dialogue between government and community representatives to develop and test solutions. In most circumstances, both community and government representatives do require additional support to come up with locally owned solutions, as well as capacity building and resources to be able to realize them. Once the exchange between government and at-risk communities is started, it has proven to be of utmost importance to guarantee its continuation on a regular basis, showcasing government responsiveness towards local grievances, establishing and strengthening a trust-based relationship. **PCVE Research**The project supported the OPM PCVE Coordination Unit in collaboration with the PCVE Focal Point for the Benadir Regional Administration in developing and commencing the implementation of a set of small action research pilot interventions. The PCVE experts received guidance on how to select project locations and target groups, and how to design PCVE projects with a community-based research approach to test the effectiveness of those interventions. Six Small Scale Action Research Projects in all FMS and the Benadir Region were developed: * For Puntland, the pilot to be implemented in the outskirts of Bosasso under the influence of AS and IS focuses on community outreach and government responsiveness to local grievances.
* For Hirshabelle, the pilot to be located in Jowhar focuses onteaching the correct interpretation of Islam to students of a madrassa known for radical preachings.
* In South-West, the pilot to be implemented in Baidoa focuses on peace education for high school students prone to radicalization.
* In Galmudug, the pilot to be implemented in Caadado focuses onteaching inter-clan harmony and tolerance to children sent away by their clans from AS-held areas to protect them from forced recruitment.
* In the Benadir region, the pilot focuses on developing, launching and analyzing the impact of different counter-narratives through radio and social media. This research aims to analyze the degree to which different counter-narratives impact public opinion and receive positive responses. To this end, the government identified different messengers and developed varying messages to prevent and counter violent extremism, including stories of defectors/survivors, and victims of terror attacks, messages of women, religious leaders and youth representatives, as well as a clip produced by a group of comedians. Many of these messages developed out of the broad consultative process with key stakeholders undertaken in the course of the project, including the women's consultations and the religious leaders’ conference.

The projects are designed in a way that they will be accompanied by a qualitative analysis of the impact of these interventions on the degree of radical attitudes, beliefs and actions of the respective target groups. For this purpose, the PCVE focal points and OPM staff developed a dedicated questionnaire to measure the degree of violent extremism of the target groups to collect comparative data over the project intervention period. The findings and knowledge products developed throughout the different interventions will be shared with concerned line ministries for further distribution and project replication. For example, the South West State focal point developed, through various consultative sessions with key stakeholders, a peace education curriculum which, after testing its impact, will be shared with the ministries of education at state and federal level. The PCVE focal point for Hirshabelle developed a manual on religious counter-narratives and the correct interpretation of Islam in response to the verses and hadiths typically used by violent extremist groups. Once the manual has been tested, as part of the intervention with madrassa students, it will be shared with the ministries of religious affairs at state and federal level for replication and expansion.In addition, it was decided to include measuring the impact of PCVE platforms on the degree of violent extremism – measured inter alia through the level of trust between local communities and government authorities – into the scope of the research. Several platform locations were selected to be included into the research design.  |
| **Other Key Achievements** *<bullet points on additional achievements arising out of your interventions; maximum 2 bullet points per PUNO>*n/a |
| **Challenges (incl: Delays or Deviations) and Lessons Learnt:** <*if any, briefly describe the delays or changes in focus, approach or targets, and provide a short justification for the change (1-2 paragraphs*)>The PCVE focal point for Jubaland was nominated to become the new Auditor General in early 2019. Due to the current political tensions between FGS and the state of Jubaland, the nomination of a new PCVE-FMS-FP in Jubaland only materialized in November 2019, despite efforts by the OPM-PCVE- Coordinator to speed up the nomination process. Due to the internal political tensions in Galmudug, project staff were so far unable to visit the project site for the small action research in the state, having to rely solely on the reporting provided by the focal point.  |
| **Peacebuilding impact** *(****for Joint Programmes receiving PBF funding only*** *–**The project does not receive PBF funds, but the project has a substantial Peace Building impact.* All small action research pilots apply a theory of change accompanied by a set of tools designed to measure specifically the programming impact on the evolution of violent extremist beliefs (and activities) of target groups. Taking into account the challenges of measuring the impact of PCVE programming, the project has – with the input of key stakeholders and the PCVE-FMS-FP – developed a methodology to collect and analyze qualitative data on violent extremism and de/radicalization, assessing related actions, attitudes and social networks with questions tailored to the context and history of Somalia, which will be applied both before and after the pilot interventions. This will allow the project to directly assess the programming impact on violent extremism, being directly linked to stability, community resilience, and human security, and to the broader peacebuilding efforts in Somalia. Testing existing theories about root causes and how to address them is not only supporting the government in fulfilling its responsibilities towards its citizens but is at the same time also part of the whole capacity building endeavor for the OPM-PCVE-CU and the PCVE-FMS-FP. It will help the coordination structure to build a knowledge base and expertise on what kind of interventions work for the Somali context, and in systematically sharing these insights and this expertise with key line ministries both at federal and regional level in a coordinated manner. A crucial part of this capacity and coordination work is the establishment of linkages between the PCVE knowledge hub and the ongoing rule of law and security sector reform efforts by guiding PCVE interventions, such as specific trainings on human rights and PCVE, towards police, corrections, military and intelligence institutions and personnel. Systematically linking PCVE interventions with SSR and RoL contributes to the overall peacebuilding and stabilization efforts.  |
| **Catalytic effects** *(****for Joint Programmes receiving PBF funding only*** *- Were there catalytic effects from the project during 2019, including additional funding commitments or unleashing/unblocking of any peace relevant processes?) For additional information on reporting on catalytic effects, please refer to PBF Guidance note 5.2 ‘How to Programme Catalytic Effects’.* [*Link*](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwi-g8DYlOjMAhUEph4KHfuvAAAQFggdMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.unpbf.org%2Fdocs%2FPART-V-Guidance-Note-5.2-How-to-program-for-catalytic-effects-FINAL-April-2014.doc&usg=AFQjCNF6vkEHrhOQ7OCja_aME_Y7qazgWQ) *(1-2 paragraphs*)n/a |
| **Gender** ***(For ALL Joint Programmes)*** *Narrative on activities undertaken and* ***impacts*** *achieved during the reporting period (2019) in which the Joint Programme directly contributed to promoting Gender Equality & Women’s Empowerment. One paragraph per PUNO.*Under its output 2, tailored to specifically gather inputs and feedback from key stakeholders on the prevention and countering of violent extremism in Somalia, the project acknowledges the crucial role women play in PCVE, peacebuilding and reconciliation. The key stakeholders’ consultative process focused specifically on women, using a community-based approach gathering women for consultations in all FMS lasted, leading to a joint Peace Forum held in the capital Mogadishu. This consultative process proactively included and empowered women across Somalia to raise their voices and ensure their roles and responsibilities in the peace process are taken into account at the highest political decision-making levels. The project activity was undertaken in close collaboration and jointly with the senior gender advisors to the UN,. Findings from these consultations informed the revision of the national PCVE strategy to become more gender sensitive, responsive and actionable with inputs from the grassroots level. Furthermore, statements from the women on countering and preventing violent extremism were used as counter-narratives by the OPM-PCVE-CU and the Benadir PCVE FP. In all PCVE consultations with community and civil society representatives, women were invited and participated actively. The network of women activated through the country-wide consultative process was also tapped into to attend PCVE coordination meetings at FMS capital level, and to participate in PCVE platform meetings in at risk-areas. |
| Proportion of gender specific outputs in Joint Programme[[3]](#footnote-3) | **Total no. of Outputs** | **Total no. of gender specific Outputs** |
| 2 | 1 |
| Proportion of Joint Programme staff with responsibility for gender issues *(as of end of 2019)*[[4]](#footnote-4) | **Total no. of Staff** | **Total no. of staff with responsibility for gender issues**  |
| 3 | 3 |
| **Human Rights**The project applies a human-rights based approach throughout all activities by ensuring they include those members of society who are most marginalized, giving voice to the most excluded, using UN’s convening power to bring them together to ensure they are heard and that their rights are respected and promoted by State Institutions and service providers. It also capacitates the latest mentioned, state counterparts, to strengthen their ability to understand and meet their human rights obligations and remain accountable towards society. The project specifically includes activities to empower civil society. It strengthens human rights as a key component to successful PCVE approaches in trainings and workshops. By applying a bottom-up approach to policy development, commencing at the lowest tiers of governance, the project aims to include the voices of marginalized communities. As particularly related Human rights abuses perpetrated by duty bearers grievances of the population that are systematically being used by violent extremist groups to mobilize support. Therefore, the project includes a dedicated capacity building component for state institutions to make duty bearers more responsive to existing concerns.Specifically, the project ensured the active participation of minority clan members in PCVE consultations and platform meetings at the local level. The guidelines for PCVE-FMS-FP to engage with communities encompass a dedicated section on how exclusion in itself constitutes a root cause for radicalization, and how PCVE-FMS-FP can prevent similar mechanisms when engaging with communities into prioritizing grievances that require government responses. The project coordinates closely with the UNSOM human rights section and included questions on marginalization and exclusion as triggering factors for violent extremism into the research on the degree of violent extremism in target communities. When developing their pilot projects, the PCVE-FMS-FP received a dedicated training session on the human rights-based approach to programming, and specifically on the do no harm principle, with a specific view on the risk of stigmatization when labelling community members “at risk” for radicalization. Lastly, PCVE has proven to be an entry point for the development of training to state security providers on the relationship between human rights abuses and the triggering of people to join Al-Shabaab. |
| Has the Joint Programme included a protection risk assessment in its context analysis, including on gender issues, and taken measures to mitigate these risks to ensure they are not exacerbated, or new risks created? | **Result (Yes/No)** |
| *Yes* |
| No. of Joint Programme outputs specifically designed to address specific protection concerns. | **Result (No.)** |
| *0* |
| No. of Joint Programme outputs designed to build capacity of duty bearers to fulfil their human rights obligations towards rights holders. | **Result (Number)** |
| *2* |
| **Other** |
| Does the Joint Programmes have a national cost-sharing component (i.e. funds and/or other resources provided by the FGS and/or FMS (including in-kind contributions)? (if ‘Yes’, describe below). | **Results (Yes/No)** |
| *No* |
| Have FMS(s) been engaged in one or more of the following: design, planning, implementation, coordination and/or monitoring of the Joint Programme. | **Results (Yes/No)** |
| *Yes* |
| **Describe nature of cost sharing:**A government cost-sharing contribution has been agreed upon for the continuation of the project in 2020. |
| **Communications & Visibility** *– Highlight communication activities/products (press releases/conferences, media missions, pictures/videos, social media, website, brochures/newsletters, banners) and donor visibility (in addition to any visibility measures on the mentioned communication activities/products, visibility on training curricula, equipment and office facilities). If applicable, provide additional explanation on limitations to communication and visibility measures, e.g. security risks or no opportunities for communication and visibility. (1-2 paragraphs*)PCVE programming is a highly sensitive endeavour and any communication and visibility of activities in Somalia needs to undergo a dedicated analysis of the related risks, not only for UN staff members and partners implementing the activities but most importantly for people participating and attending events. Nevertheless, programme activities have been actively shared through the communications department of the OPM-PCVE-CU, as well as through the UNDP and UNSOM communications channels. Particularly, the religious leaders’ conference held in Mogadishu was covered widely in the local media and across social media platforms in addition to the UN outreach channels. The FMS level consultations with traditional elders were also covered widely in the media, including state TV. Furthermore, the OPM-PCVE-CU and the PCVE FP for the Benadir region are currently jointly developing a set of outreach messages countering arguments and narratives violent extremist groups use to radicalize and recruit people, that will be distributed widely through radio channels and social media platforms.  |
| **Looking ahead** The project will focus on expanding the PCVE platform structures into the newly recovered areas, with the possibility to apply a flexible funding mechanism in order to address VE-related grievances identified by communities. The project will further focus on continuing to work with the traditional elders in order to counter the challenges of al-Shabaab influencing the 2021 elections. Emphasis will be placed on continuing to work with religious leaders, establishing local networks of like-minded religious actors to promote Islam as a religion of tolerance and peace, foster inter-faith dialogue, and develop concrete steps to address and counter radical views. The overall vision for PCVE in Somalia has been narrowed down through stakeholders’ consultations to strengthen the creation of an environment conducive to peace talks between al-Shabaab and the government. Emphasis will therefore be placed on socializing the idea of peace talks, creating a public demand for it, engaging communities in understanding forgiveness, healing and transitional justice mechanisms feasible for the context of Somalia, as well as learning from existing local peace arrangements between clans and the group. The PCVE Coordination structure will be supported by UNOCT in collaboration with UNSOM and UNDP to further revise the National PCVE Strategy, aiming to capture the coordination structures as they have emerged, highlight a clearer vision for inter-ministerial collaboration and PCVE mainstreaming into the work of state actors, as well as factor in the results of the key stakeholders’ consultations held so far to make the strategy more actionable. |

# ANNEX 1. RISK MANAGEMENT

*This section can be used to update or use the risk logs developed during the project development stage and provide any mitigation measures being undertaken by the project. (State whether the risk is from the ProDoc or is new, whether the Joint Programme was exposed during the reporting period (2019) and what specific mitigation measures were applied.*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Risk [[5]](#footnote-5)** | **Description of Risk**  | **Mitigating Measures** |
| Risk of Increased internal political divisions | An increase in internal political divisions will have detrimental effect on all activities and interventions under the project. Internal political divisions are likely to further deepen the communication gap between the FMS and FGS | The project will work to create preconditions for building strong relationships at the technical levels with all local,FMS and FGS partners, with a focus to support a harmonized approach to the development of the security architecture in the country. |
| Lack of Inclusiveness of all groups in the dialogue platforms | Inclusiveness of all groups especially women would be important for this project. Lack of inclusiveness is likely leading to actions taken and policy framework developed being based on a “false” baseline undermining a whole of society approach. | Ensure coordination with MoWHRD and MoIFA to ensure all groups especially women’s participation is ensured. Relevant groups are identified in the project and women’s groups are included in the discussions on PCVE at the FMS. SNWO, specifically aiming at capturing women’s perspective on PCVE, to inform the national policy framework and action plans.  |
| Limited engagement with FMS | A limited engagement with FMS may undermine the overall objective of the project | Ensure that the project activities are well coordinated with other programme interventions especially on rule of law. Coordination meetings to be well recorded. |
| Evidence based research may not be completed during the timeframe of the project, due to lack of skilled interviewers and willingness of respondents to answer sensitive questions | Lack of evidence-based research to inform policy development and action plans will likely lead to actions taken and policy framework developed not leading to the intended aim of reducing drivers and push-factors for radicalization and recruitment to violent extremist organisations. | * Ensure coordination with all PCVE focal points from all member states through the PCVE Unit at OPM.
* Develop clear TORs on the skills required for interviewers and provide briefing/training to them prior to starting the research
* Ensure confidentiality of sensitive information with clear indication on the purpose and how the information is managed.
 |
| Varying level of commitment of Federal Government and FMS to coordinate with stakeholders and engage in PCVE activities | Variance in commitment to PCVE objectives can be caused due to political dynamics, capacity of the PCVE experts, resulting to unequal levels of implementation among states | * Ensure national ownership and leadership in undertaking PCVE related activities
* Set up and monitor coordinating mechanisms with all the related groups (youth, elders, communities and state authorities)
* Constant ongoing engagement and encouragement to address challenges encountered at different states;
* Support capacity development and results-based approach.
 |
| Lack of donor commitment to support implementation of a full-fledged project on PCVE | There may be a possibility that the project may not be fully funded, leading to partial implementation of the programme objectives. | * Resource mobilization strategy to be developed;
* Regular engagement with bilateral and multilateral stakeholders;
* Ensure successful delivery of the results under Project, visibility and reporting on results
* Regular engagement with government stakeholders, pillar working group and other development partners.
 |

#  ANNEX 2. MONITORING AND OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES <list here the monitoring and oversight activities undertaken during reporting period (2019). Precise and specific, the table should not exceed one page>

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Monitoring Activity**  | **Date**  | **Description & Comments** | **Key Findings / Recommendations** |
| Meeting with PCVE focal points  | 30 Jan 2019 | Meeting on measuring PCVE programming in Somalia  | * 5 small action research projeject identified for submission to Task Force
* Reporting writing format for PCVE regional focal points
 |
| Stakeholder reviews  | 13 Feb 2019 | Two stakeholder reviews were undertaken through a Task Force during the reporting period. | 13th February Task Force meeting identified the following:* To add a column for indicators/timeframe in the TOR of the Task force. The TOR should then be circulated virtually to all participants.
* Annual work plan has been approved by Sweden and Netherlands and implementation of the work plan should commence.
 |
| Audit  | July 2019 | UNDP Audit  | Detailed feedback sessions with FMS focal points and OPM PCVE unit |
| Project Steering Committee  | 28 August 2019 | PSC meeting  | Project review and key decision making |
| Cross-Strand Coordination Meeting  | 21 October 2019 | Strand 2c, 3 and 4 | Review collaboration and coordination mechanisms; develop steps for improved working together |
| Project Steering Committee | 19 November 2019 | PSC meeting  | Project review, key decision making, sustainability plan  |
| PCVE Platform – Review Meeting | Dec 2019  | FMS Focal Points and OPM | Review of results from the platform meetings, and strategy revision to improve addressing grievances |
| Field Monitoring Visits  | 2019 - continuous  | Various field trips by OPM M&E and UNDP Technical Specialist  | Project oversight and monitoring progress on the ground; interviews with key stakeholders / beneficiaries  |

**ANNEX 3. TRAINING DATA** <list here details of training activities undertaken during the reporting period (2019); should not exceed one page>

| **#** | **Target Group** | **Dates** | **# of participants** | **Title of the training** | **Location of training** | **Training provider** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Ministry. District or UN staff** | **Others** |
| **M** | **F** | **Total** |
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| **Totals:** |  |  |  |  |  |  |

1. **Uncertified expenditures**. Certified annual expenditures can be found in the Annual Financial Report of MPTF Office (<http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/4SO00> ) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Fill in only the numbers or yes/no; no explanations to be given here. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Gender Specific Outputs are those that are specifically designed to directly and explicitly contribute to the promotion of Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Staff members are those contracted to undertaken work for the Joint Programme including full time staff, consultants, advisors, interns, etc. Staff members with responsibility for gender issues are those who have gender related activities included in their Terms of Reference. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Environmental; Financial; Operational; Organizational; Political; Regulatory; Security; Strategic; Other. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)