

## Preparatory Assistance Document

### A. COVER PAGE

- 1. Joint programme title:** Conflict Transformation in areas affected by armed conflict in BARMM through area-based community driven development
- 2. Short title:** Conflict Transformation in BARMM
- 3. Country and region:** Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao Philippines
- 4. Resident Coordinator:** Gustavo Gonzalez
- 5. Government Joint Programme focal point:** Chief Minister, Bangsamoro Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao, Al Haj Ahod Balawag Ebrahim

#### **6. Short description:**

The ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) in 2019, led to the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), and ended 40 years of conflict in the region. The Bangsamoro Transitional Authority (BTA) is currently leading the BARMM through a three-year transition due to end in 2025. However, with less than a year remaining, the BARMM faces significant development challenges as well as conflict and climate risks that could destabilize the fragile peace in the region. The BTA requires urgent support over the next 6-12 months to leverage peace dividends for communities across the region, with an emphasis on demonstrating the benefits of peace and stability to former combatants, many of whom have not been demobilized, and other vulnerable groups such as indigenous people, women and youth.

Although the BTA has made headway with the political track of the transition, key provisions in the BOL remain incomplete. COVID-19 has contributed to setting back the timetable for the implementation of the government's programmes under the normalization track. Delays have caused growing frustration with the peace process in some quarters which if not properly managed, could bolster the appeal of militant groups among disgruntled constituencies. The Joint Programme seeks to re-energize hope in the peace process by providing socio-economic and peacebuilding investments, and accelerate access to sustainable livelihoods, food security and community security, ahead of crucial elections in 2022. The UN Joint Programme will contribute to peaceful and inclusive communities, in line with the sustainable development efforts set out by the Philippine Development Plan, the Bangsamoro Regional Development Plan, and the UN Socioeconomic and Peacebuilding Framework for COVID-19 Recovery in the Philippines 2020-2023.

## 7. Overview of budget

<b>Fund contribution</b>	
Co-funding (PUNOs)	130,000
Co-funding (MPTF)	14,708,664
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>14,838,664</b>

## 8. Timeframe:

<b>Start date</b>	<b>End date</b>	<b>Duration (in months)</b>
1 January 2022	31 December 2023	24

## 9. Target groups *(including groups left behind or at risk of being left behind)*

<b>List of marginalized and vulnerable groups</b>	<b>Direct influence</b>	<b>Indirect influence</b>
Women	X	
Children		X
Girls		X
Youth	X	
Minorities (incl. ethnic, religious, linguistic...)	X	
Indigenous peoples	X	
Rural workers	X	
Human rights defenders (incl. NGOs, journalists, union leaders, whistleblowers...)		X
Internally displaced persons	X	
Other groups: Ex Combatants	X	

## 10. Human Rights Mechanisms related to the Joint Programme

- Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (E/C.12/PHL/CO/5-6)
- Committed on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW/C/PHL/CO/7-8)
- Human Rights Committee (CCPR/C/PH/CO/1)
- Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD/C/PHL/CO/1)
- Committee against Torture (CAT/C/PHL/CO/3)
- Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD/C/PHL/CO/20)

## 11. PUNO and Partners:

### 11.1 PUNO

- Food and Agriculture Organisation
- International Organisation for Migration
- United Nations Development Programme
- World Food Programme

## **11.2 Partners**

### BARMM Regional authorities:

- a. Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM)
- b. Bangsamoro Human Rights Commission (BHRC)
- c. Barangay Peace and Order Council (BOPC)
- d. Bangsamoro Development and Planning Authority (BDPA)
- e. Bangsamoro Women's Commission (BWC)
- f. Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)
- g. Ministry of Public Order and Safety (MPOS)
- h. Municipal Peace and Order Council (MPOC)
- i. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Agrarian Reform (MAFAR)
- j. Ministry of Interior and Local Government (MILG)
- k. Ministry of Indigenous Peoples' Affairs (MIPA)
- l. Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Energy (MENRE)
- m. Ministry of Trade, Investments and Tourism (MTIT)

### National Authorities

- a. Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP)
- b. Intergovernmental Relations Body






### Civil society organizations

- a. Faith-based Leaders Group (FBL)
- b. Maher Foundation

### Private sector

- a. Amanah Bank

**SIGNATURE PAGE**

<p><b>Resident Coordinator</b></p>  <p>Gustavo González United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator 17 December 2021</p>	<p><b>National Coordinating Authority</b></p> <p>Bangsamoro Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao Chief Minister, Al Haj Ahod Balawag Ebrahim</p>
<p><b>Participating UN Organization</b></p>  <p>Food and Agricultural organisation (FAO) Kati Hannele Tanninen Representative 20 December 2021</p>	
<p><b>Participating UN Organization</b></p>  <p>International Organisation for Migration (IOM) Kristin Dadey Chief of Mission 17 December 2021</p>	
<p><b>Participating UN Organization</b></p>  <p>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Dr. Selva Ramachandran Resident Representative 17 December 2021</p>	
<p><b>Participating UN Organization</b></p>  <p>World Food Programme (WFP) Brenda Barton Representative and Country Director 17 December 2021</p>	

## B. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

### 1. Overview of the Joint Programme Results

#### 1.1 Outcomes

- Outcome 1: Local capacities for leveraging the humanitarian-development-peace nexus enhanced through effective participatory development and community inclusion in the design of relevant plans and strategies.
- Outcome 2: Resilience capacities of conflict-affected communities enhanced through improved livelihood security and reduced social tensions, demonstrating the benefits of the peace process.
- Outcome 3: Strengthened local capacities for conflict transformation, transitional justice and reconciliation.

#### 1.2 Outputs

Outcome	Related Outputs
<b>Outcome 1</b>	<b>Output 1.1:</b> Target LGUs capacitated to design and implement plans, including EOCs, that address risks to community resilience from the combined and overlapping impacts of conflict, climate change, and pandemics.
	<b>Output 1.2:</b> Food security and social cohesion considerations integrated into the development plans of target LGUs through participatory planning processes.
	<b>Output 1.3:</b> Target LGUs assisted to develop and apply early-warning-and-response platforms for violent conflicts, including the participation of the security sector and local security formations such as BPATs.
<b>Outcome 2</b>	<b>Output 2.1:</b> Target Communities' mapped and "build-back better" initiatives identified for improved food security, decent work and access to markets and business opportunities.
	<b>Output 2.2:</b> Ex-combatants and conflict-affected communities provided access to sustainable and green socio-economic development opportunities.
	<b>Output 2.3:</b> Durable partnerships between conflict-affected communities and public and private sector operators established, including the systematic provision of Islamic micro-financing.

Outcome	Related Outputs
<b>Outcome 3</b>	<b>Output 3.1:</b> Regional and Community-level transitional justice and reconciliation initiatives advanced, with a particular focus on land issues, and resolution or mitigation of specific conflicts identified in collaboration with stakeholders
	<b>Output 3.2:</b> Fragile communities’ access to community-based healing initiatives for conflict prevention and resolution improved.
	<b>Output 3.3:</b> Former members of violent extremist and private armed groups rehabilitated and reintegrated into their community

## 2. SDG Targets directly addressed by the Joint Programme

Relevant goal	Target
Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere	1.5 By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters
Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture	2.3 By 2030, double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, in particular women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment
Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls	5.5 Ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life
Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all	8.3 Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services
Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels	16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere
	16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels

### **3. Relevant objective/s from the national framework**

#### **3.1 Bangsamoro Development Plan 2020-2022**

**Overall Goal: Upliftment of the lives of the Bangsamoro and establishment of the foundations of self-governance through moral governance**

#### **Development Goals**

- Establish the foundations for inclusive, transparent, accountable, and efficient governance
- Uphold peace, security, public order and safety, and respect for human rights
- Create a favorable enabling environment for inclusive and sustainable economic development
- Promote Bangsamoro identity, cultures, and diversity
- Ensure access to and delivery of quality services for human capital development
- Harness technology and innovations to increase socio-economic opportunities and improve government services
- Increase strategic and climate-resilient infrastructure to support sustainable socioeconomic development in the Bangsamoro region
- Improve ecological integrity, and promote and enhance climate change adaptation, and disaster risk reduction to sustain resilience of communities in Bangsamoro.

#### **3.2 UN Socioeconomic and Peacebuilding Framework for COVID-19 Recovery in the Philippines 2020-2023 (SEPF)**

#### **Peace Pillar Outcome**

Through inclusive and accountable governance, decent employment generation and essential services of health, education, security, justice, protection and recovery systems reach the most vulnerable in Mindanao, resulting in socially cohesive and resilient communities.

#### **Peace Pillar Focus Areas**

- a) Respond to COVID-19 and accelerate inclusive development for peace in Mindanao
- b) Support normalization and political tracks of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro.
- c) Reduce community-based conflicts, address community security and strengthen community economic empowerment.

#### 4. Brief overview of the Theory of Change of the Joint programme

##### **Overarching theory of change**

**If** community driven socioeconomic and peacebuilding investments can leverage tangible peace dividends which positively impact the welling and livelihoods of conflict-affected communities in BARMM, including women, non-Moro indigenous peoples, youth, former-combatants and soon to be decommissioned combatants, **Then** the immediate challenges of building and sustaining peace amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2022 elections will be mitigated and lay the ground for conflict transformation outcomes that can drive forward the region’s transition process, **Because** communities will be able to implement locally developed and locally owned resilience strategies that strengthen vertical and horizontal social cohesion.



## C. JOINT PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

### 1. Situation Analysis

#### 1.1 Overall context

The ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) in 2019, led to the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), and marked the end of a 4-decade long conflict between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). In 2014 the GPH and the MILF signed the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Annex on Normalization which includes components such as the demobilization of MILF combatants, transitional security measures, camp transformation, transitional justice and reconciliation, and confidence-building initiatives. The MILF-led Bangsamoro Transitional Authority (BTA) assumed its role as the interim governing body and is currently leading the BARMM through a three-year transition due to end with the 2022 elections at the national, local and regional levels. However, with less than a year remaining, the BARMM faces significant development challenges as well as conflict and climate risks that could weaken the fragile peace in the region in the coming 12 months.

Although the BTA has made headway with the political track of the transition, namely establishing the new entity's institutions and passing key legislation, key provisions in the BOL remain incomplete. A complex transition process has been further exacerbated by COVID19-induced delays. The broader normalization track started well with the decommissioning of 12,145 MILF combatants (out of 40,000) by March 2020. However, with the COVID-19 pandemic, the timetable for the implementation of the government's programmes under the normalization track was pushed back due to travel restrictions and budget reallocation. Lessons learned from other similar peacebuilding processes have demonstrated that delays in the implementation of important phases of the peace agreement, particularly those related to peace dividends, risk generating frustration amongst signatories, former combatants and communities, increasing the likelihood that the credibility of the peace process is undermined. The resulting social discontent is frequently translated into rearmament and the adoption of negative coping strategies by individuals and conflicted-affected communities. In this context, the Joint Normalization Committee (JNC) has called on government partners and other stakeholders to accelerate efforts to dispel growing frustration among combatants and MILF communities due to perceived lack of progress in implementation.

The challenges of transition are exacerbated by severe underdevelopment, with 2018 data showing that 61.3 per cent of citizens live in poverty<sup>1</sup>. More than 8 out of every

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<sup>1</sup> UN Common Country Assessment Update for the Philippines, Philippine Institute for Development studies and United Nations Philippines, December 2020

10 households are vulnerable to poverty, with 35 per cent being 'highly vulnerable'<sup>2</sup>. The COVID-19 crisis has further exposed these underlying multidimensional vulnerabilities and further setback the local economy. Young people have been particularly affected, with many losing their jobs and experiencing a downturn in their incomes, due to movement restrictions and business closures. In over 500 barangays surveyed across BARMM, a lack of livelihood, particularly among youth, was found to be a main driver of instability<sup>3</sup>. The pandemic and its effects on poverty, unemployment and insecurity could make at-risk youth susceptible to violent extremism.

Renewed violence by opponents of the peace process is evidence of the influence of armed extremist groups affiliated with Islamic-State. These include the Sulu-based Abu Sayaf Group (ASG), the Maguindanao-based Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and Lanao Del Sur-based Maute group. Resurgent violence by the BIFF in the so-called SPMS Box and the Maute group, leading to the displacement of thousands in the past 6 months, indicates that these groups still pose significant threats to peace and development.

## 1.2 Problem statement

**The urgency of strengthening community resilience and cohesion in areas at risk over the next 6 months in locations such as the SPMS Box and South Upi cannot be overstated. Delays in peace process implementation, the risk of resurgent violence during the 2022 elections, and the deterioration of the socioeconomic situation in hot spots demand accelerated efforts to implement localized conflict transformation initiatives, which are critical to sustain confidence in peace dividends, transform recurring cycles of local conflict, and prevent election-related violence in the months ahead.**

Expectations for the Bangsamoro peace process are high and if unfulfilled, could contribute to instability and rearmament. In addition to the activities of the above-mentioned armed extremist groups, communities in BARMM remain vulnerable to

ongoing conflict drivers that go beyond the peace agreement's initial scope. Long-standing horizontal conflicts, including unresolved land disputes, compound the fragility of the current peace process, often leading to recurrent displacement. In this regard, the region's nascent steps towards stability continue to be impacted by conflict between various ethnic identity groups, disputes between clans and factions, contentious political contests between status quo and new political actors in the run-up to the 2022 elections, as well as the potent threat of violent extremism. Drug trafficking activities and other shadow economies operating in BARMM sustain a complex and multi-faceted conflict map, underpinned by the availability of small

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<sup>2</sup> Vulnerability to Poverty in the Philippines: An examination of Trends 2003 to 2015, Philippine Institute for Development Studies

<sup>3</sup> International Organization for Migration (2020). Community Assessment and Profiling (CAP).

arms. Congress recently ratified amended legislation to extend the transition by postponing the BARMM parliamentary elections to 2025 which when enacted into law would have a net positive effect on the current political uncertainty. However, the risk of electoral violence in 2022 remains and the need for robust conflict prevention is approaches is widely recognised.

The seriousness of the situation unfolding in the region prompted the UN and its partners to undertake the Mindanao Context and Scenario Planning Analysis. Held on 10 September 2021 and facilitated by OCHA and the UNRCO the workshop brought together 33 organisations from the UN system and NGOs based in BARMM. The best-case scenario envisaged the extension of the BTA, with the effect of postponing parliamentary elections, while local elections proceed as planned. In this scenario negotiations would take place to re-constitute the BTA for government appointees and sectoral representation. Despite the political risks and external pressures, such as the impact of COVID-19, there was a consensus that the national government and MILF would be able to manage the situation. A worst-case scenario foresaw the continuation of horizontal conflict in BARMM, resulting in increased fragility and displacement. Election-related violence would increase in hotspots, while BIFF and other IS-linked armed groups would continue to be active, with the potential to ignite similar incidents such as the Marawi siege. In parallel, climate crisis-related events and the COVID-19 pandemic will increase the vulnerability of marginalized communities to food insecurity and poverty, especially the indigenous communities.

## 2. Programme Strategy

### 2.1. Overall Strategy

Community resilience in the face of social and economic adversities needs urgent support. Within the framework of the Bangsamoro Development Plan, the approach to conflict transformation is anchored in strengthening community resilience and social cohesion in areas at risk, such as the SPMS Box and South Upi. The delivery of material assets and the implementation of initiatives which build individual and community livelihood capacities is critical to demonstrating the immediate impact of peace dividends.

**Prevention.** The UN Joint Program will contribute to peaceful and inclusive societies, in line with the sustainable development efforts set out by the Philippine Development Plan, the Bangsamoro Regional Development Plan, and the UN Socioeconomic and Peacebuilding Framework for COVID-19 Recovery 2020-2023 (SEPF). The programme is anchored in the Secretary-General's vision on conflict prevention and speaks directly to the current UN reform agenda<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Peacebuilding and sustaining peace, Report of the Secretary-General, A/74/976-S/2020/773, 13 July 2020

**Conflict-sensitive programme design and monitoring.** The Joint Programme will apply a conflict-sensitive programme design and monitoring to identify drivers of conflict and specific areas for intervention. The approach will include conflict analysis to understand the structural causes of conflict and its dynamics and triggers, as well as the interests of conflict actors and influencers. The approach will incorporate a needs analysis of institutional actors, which will help identify those missing institutional capacities required for preventing, managing and mediating conflicts. This will provide strategic opportunities for the project to support necessary complex processes such as transitional justice, law enforcement and human rights-related institutions as well as local peacemakers. The programme design will incorporate regular conflict-sensitive monitoring of community-related disputes, incidents and political developments to anticipate potential conflict escalation and take preventive measures.

**Area-based development approach.** UN and other experiences have clearly established that recurring localized cycles of violence are best addressed by area-based programmes which are developed and implemented with the full participation of the concerned communities. Where perceptions of alienation, marginalization and corruption are part of the narratives driving violence, empowerment through decision-making, or community driven development, becomes almost as critical as material benefits provided through the programmes. Developing and applying a conflict-sensitive multi-dimensional programme of this nature will require a focus on “hotspots” that have borne the brunt of the resurgence of localized violence over the past twelve months.

**Community driven and locally owned.** The Joint Programme will utilize a hybrid implementation strategy that will harness the relationships between the participating UN agencies and the Bangsamoro authorities. It will utilize local civil society networks and community-knowledge to support interventions aimed at conflict-affected communities. This community-based approach, which will be supported by partners with strong community track records, will engage women and youth from different conflict areas in the BARMM and ensure that the intervention is timely and relevant. The Programme will centre all activities around duty bearers and rights-holders, and ensure women and youth participation and inclusion, in order to effectively drive conflict prevention, mediation and resolution at all levels of governance.

The backbone of this community-driven approach will be the creation of inclusive Community Working Groups (CWG) which will represent the community’s real role in decision-making and ownership of programme implementation. The CWG structure will build on existing platforms such as the Barangay Peace and Order Councils (BPOCs), and will involve political leaders, traditional leaders, religious leaders and other influential community stakeholders. As appropriate a line of communication will be established between CWGs and the Technical Working Groups (TWGs) at the Municipal and Provincial level, to ensure transparency, intergovernmental coordination, awareness of the project implementation process and budgetary support.

**Programme impact.** Local ownership of programme results will be instrumental in assuring impact and the achievement of conflict transformation goals. While key programme outputs can be identified in broad outline by participating UN agencies, the details will be provided by the communities in the target areas through extensive local consultations. For this reason programme activities will build upon existing project activities where participating UN agencies have already established strong partnerships with local stakeholders. The fact that UN agencies will be operating in communities where they have a pre-existing presence will help ensure the quick mobilization of programme assets, furnishing accelerated programme impact.

Impact will be witnessed through the effectiveness of the participatory planning platforms which will guide and ensure the relevance of community-driven livelihood interventions. The programme is expected to lay the foundation for durable results through augmented capacity building, skills development, technology upgrading, value chain creation and in-kind support for community-based organizations and local cooperatives by government, the private sector and civil society. The approach will actively promote affirmative action for marginalized women, youth, indigenous, and socially excluded community members as well as integrate soon-to-be and decommissioned combatants. This means that CWGs will fully embrace and embed the participation of community members who can genuinely represent the interests of these groups, while guaranteeing the space for women's voices and concerns. These integrated CWG platforms will serve as a foundation for sustained results beyond the project cycle. The UN Joint Programme will be implemented over a two-year period to achieve the following strategic outcomes.

Outcome 1: Local capacities for leveraging the humanitarian-development-peace nexus enhanced through effective participatory development and community inclusion in the design of relevant plans and strategies.

This component of the Joint Programme builds upon, and seeks to strengthen, existing community decision-making platforms, while serving as the strategic framework for facilitating community-driven development. It will mobilize local community and government stakeholders around inclusive planning processes that ensure the integration of the humanitarian, development and peace nexus (HDPN), ensuring the complementarity of planning processes that strengthen the coordination capacities of BARRM stakeholders to anticipate and respond to the proximate and root causes of conflict.

Activities under this outcome will seek to strengthen local governance structures, including the Barangay Development Council (BDC) and Barangay Peace and Order Committee (BPOC), as well as promote inclusive decision-making and planning for development outcomes. The approach is intended to ensure local ownership of programme implementation and provide opportunities for government to mobilize local communities and their institutions in participatory decision-making processes and programme oversight. This process will entail building the planning and implementation capacity of municipalities and barangays that are prone to conflict.

It will support the development of key governance plans, such as the Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP), the Peace and Order and Public Safety Plan (POPS) and the Local Climate Change Action Plan (LCCAP).

The outcome envisages the creation of Community Working Group structures and ensures their linkage to barangay and municipal decision-making processes. These structures represent participatory planning exercises that will guide and ensure the relevance of community-driven livelihood interventions, which will be accompanied by the most appropriate capacity building support mechanisms required to leverage impact. Finally, the outcome will also ensure that the Emergency Operations Centers established by the BARMM government at the regional and provincial levels are fully capacitated to help municipal and local governments respond to contingencies. These early warning platforms will connect local security sector actors and help integrate early warning and early response into local level HDPN planning and budgeting.

Outcome 2: Resilience capacities of conflict-affected communities enhanced through improved livelihood security and reduced social tensions, demonstrating the benefits of the peace process.

The outcome responds to inextricable link between poverty reduction, livelihood security and stability. Demonstrating to decommissioned and soon to be decommissioned combatants that the peace process will deliver tangible socio-economic benefits serves as a grounded strategy for conflict prevention and provides evidence that the aspirations of local communities can be realized. It will provide socio-economic alternatives to recruitment into armed non-state groups. The approach seeks to mobilise “hope” as currency for dissuading vulnerable individuals and groups from returning to violence, making communities more resilient in the face of structural development deficits.

Activities will support cooperatives, community-based organizations, social enterprises, and MSMEs, including newly established enterprises whose membership is primarily composed of former combatants and other vulnerable or marginalized sectors in the community. This will include support to the BARMM government’s Food Security Convergence Framework (FSCF), which established in 2020, aims at achieving food security, sustainable livelihoods and restoring BARMM’s biodiversity.

PUNOs will integrate their efforts to establish an “ecosystems” approach to sustainable livelihoods. This will include cooperating with local and regional governments to jointly identify priority communities requiring support. Assessments will be made of existing initiatives which optimize opportunities for deepening capacities for sustainable livelihoods and food security. Results from the assessment phase will be used to make decisions about extending support to cooperatives and other enterprises which carry the potential to provide ex-combatants and conflict-affected communities access to sustainable and green socio-economic development. In parallel, the institutional capacities of local governments, civil society, and the local private sector will be strengthened to provide livelihood-enabling services to conflict-affected communities through access to credit (through Islamic micro-

financing where feasible), capital, and markets. Success will be validated through the creation of supply chains that promote durable partnerships between target communities and the ecosystem of livelihood providers. While individual agencies might support different aspects of the ecosystem (credit, microfinance, capital, markets, supply chain development, value chain assessment), these will all be assessed, developed and applied in an integrated manner across programme implementation modalities.

### Outcome 3: Strengthened local capacities for conflict transformation, transitional justice and reconciliation.

Outcome 3 is aimed at addressing the local drivers of recurring violence that keep BARMM destabilized. UN agency collaboration will help local communities address the root causes of conflict drivers, such as unresolved land disputes. Activities under this outcome will build local mediation capacities and credible dispute resolution mechanisms, vested in rule of law institutions, municipal governments and civic actors. Technical assistance will be provided to different BARMM government entities to address transitional justice and reconciliation (TJR) processes in response to historic and current grievances, including violations of the rule of law and human rights abuses.

The Joint Programme will support efforts to strengthen community justice systems, community-level dialogue and mediation platforms and broader TJR policies. Efforts will also be made to establish capacities that help communities identify and mitigate disputed land claims and long-standing land conflicts.

Technical support will be provided to various BARMM government entities to allow them to establish TJR mechanisms such as listening processes that help identify the points of community grievance. Formal listening processes supported by regional TJR authorities will build on existing evidence of land issues, violence and human rights violations and provide entry points for supporting restitution and administrative justice. This will be supported by the provision of technical assets and training that will help BARMM authorities to identify and monitor long-standing land conflicts, including the documentation of their respective case histories. Establishing a credible map of ongoing land disputes will be followed by the application of conflict resolution and dispute resolution mechanisms, involving as necessary local authorities and faith-based, traditional, and civic leaders.

Community-based healing initiatives will be institutionalized by establishing a cadre of psychosocial support (PSS) services. This will involve the creation of guidelines for community-based healing and the deployment of counselors who will provide direct support to communities requiring specialized trauma support. Capacities established for community-based healing and conflict resolution will be used to support the reintegration of former members of private armed groups and violent extremist entities into their communities. A special focus will be placed on building community capacities to provide accompaniment, psychosocial support, and livelihoods assistance for former combatants.

## 2.2 Theory of Change

The next 12 months are a critical period for the peace process given the conflict trends and political dynamics. The Joint Programme will leverage urgently needed peace dividends, which can instill renewed hope in the peace process, and prevent conflict by strengthening community resilience and cohesion in areas vulnerable to violence. The success of conflict prevention during the election period will help lay the ground for conflict transformation outcomes that reach beyond the 2022 elections and support a successful transition in BARMM.

### **Overarching Theory of Change**

***If*** community driven socioeconomic and peacebuilding investments can leverage tangible peace dividends which positively impact the welling and livelihoods of conflict-affected communities in BARMM, including women, non-Moro indigenous peoples, youth, former-combatants and soon to be decommissioned combatants, ***Then*** the immediate challenges of building and sustaining peace amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2022 elections will be mitigated and lay the ground for conflict transformation outcomes that can drive forward the region’s transition process, ***Because*** communities will be able to implement locally developed and locally owned resilience strategies that strengthen vertical and horizontal social cohesion.

	<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Theory of Change</b>
1	Local capacities for leveraging the humanitarian-development-peace nexus enhanced through effective participatory development and community inclusion in the design of relevant plans and strategies.	<b>If</b> participatory mechanisms are established allowing local communities to influence key decisions regarding programme design and implementation, <b>Then</b> the management and prevention of horizontal conflicts and the ability of local stakeholders to transform conflict dynamics will be strengthened, <b>Because</b> groups who are most vulnerable to radicalization and returning to armed violence will be empowered to design and implement strategies for socio-political change which respond effectively to community priorities and result in visible peace dividends that reinforce faith in the peace process.
2	Resilience capacities of conflict-affected communities enhanced through improved livelihood security and reduced social tensions, demonstrating the benefits of the peace process.	<b>If</b> local communities, soon-to-be and decommissioned combatants, indigenous people, women, youth, and local authorities are afforded accelerated and targeted socioeconomic investments, and effective support is given to local institutions responsible for expanding livelihood opportunities, <b>Then</b> BARMM’s conflict-affected communities will be more resilient to internal



	Outcome	Theory of Change
		and external drivers of violent conflict and better positioned to manage the expectations of individuals and groups who may otherwise mobilize to violence, <b>Because</b> the ecosystem of food security partners (local government units, the private sector and development partners) and community influencers will be able to work together to demonstrate the tangible benefits of the peace process in the form of improved food security, green jobs and climate-mitigation measures.
3	Strengthened local capacities for conflict transformation, transitional justice and reconciliation	<b>If</b> conflict-affected communities and duty-bearers are provided the tools and capacities to initiate a process of transitional justice and develop effective conflict resolution and peacebuilding approaches, <b>Then</b> the ability of local stakeholders to prevent pre-existing and unresolved horizontal conflicts triggering communal violence, especially during the 2022 elections, will be progressively strengthened, <b>Because</b> communities and governing institutions will grow and integrate their joint knowledge of reconciliation processes and be better prepared to implement actions that leverage restorative justice and community healing.

### 2.3 Financing

The overall cost of implementing the UN Joint Programme is USD14,838,664. A total of USD130,000 will be contributions by PUNOs. The remaining amount of USD14,708,664 will be mobilized using a pass-through mechanism with the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO) appointed as Administrative Agent (AA) to establish a pooled fund account.

Resource partners will be strongly encouraged to opt for the pooled funding mechanism to ensure effective partner coordination and programme consistency, and to commit multi-year funding to ensure financial predictability of the programme.

Following standard practice, resource partners contributing to the UN Joint Programme will be represented at the UNJP Steering Committee, which is the main oversight body of the programme. A partnership recognition policy will be established to ensure adequate visibility of partners supporting the funding mechanism.

At least 10% of the budget shall be allocated to ensure inclusiveness of the approach such as gender-responsive activities and representation. Funds will also be allocated to support a joint communications plan, as well as joint regular Monitoring and Evaluation by the UN and BARMM, an annual Stakeholders' Meeting, and an independent End-of-Programme Evaluation.

The Joint Programme will leverage existing project activities where participating UN agencies have already established strong partnerships with local stakeholders, and also link and coordinate with BARMM, LGUs and development partners ongoing programs and parallel funding initiatives such as the Bangsamoro Normalisation Trust Fund and additional resources from Mandanas ruling.

## **2.4 Partnerships and stakeholder engagement**

The interventions of the joint program will require strategic partnerships with the BARMM government, in coordination with National Government line agencies. Through the Chief Minister' Office, the joint programme will establish partnerships with the BARMM Transition government led by the Chief Minister. The programme will partner with the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) and the Intergovernmental Relations Body as the main mechanism for coordinating and resolving issues between the national government and the Bangsamoro government. The Office of the UN resident Coordinator will provide good offices to ensure national and local "duty-bearer" stakeholders are coordinating their efforts in support of programme implementation. Periodic high-level meetings of the OPAPP, the IGRB, the BARMM Chief Minister and the UN Resident Coordinator will be convened to assess programme progress and impact. It is expected that the UN and the BARMM and its key ministries will sign a Memorandum of Agreement.

Humanitarian and DRRM NGOs and CSOs will also be engaged through formal coordination mechanisms which will be established as part of the joint programme. As part of the process, capacities of target groups will be strengthened to focus on building their confidence to participate and engage both at the technical working group level and policy level. Their contributions to the process will be invaluable as their experiences and potential solutions at the community-level are based on actual scenarios of shocks they face on a regular basis. Partnerships will be established as the joint programme evolves during the programmes inception phase.

The Joint Programme will ensure close coordination and cooperation with international development partners through the quarterly development partner briefings, as well as one extensive annual meeting to review progress, develop workplans and discuss strategies for overcoming challenges or adjusting implementation. This will include engaging IFIs and the private sector, both locally and internationally as relevant. Formal meetings to engage international development partners will provide opportunities to demonstrate programme results and show how the return on investment is advancing conflict transformation through

better peace and development outcomes. Programme results will be used to drive interest in additional donor and private sector contributions to scaling the programme after its initial 24-month implementation cycle.

South-South and triangular cooperation will be a main innovative strategy that the Joint Programme will seek to apply and promote. This will be achieved through knowledge-sharing and engagement in activities spanning all outcome areas. The Joint Programme will hold development partners event aimed at sharing knowledge and lessons, increasing visibility and supporting resource mobilization initiative at the country, regional and global levels.

### 3. Programme implementation

#### 3.1 Governance and implementation arrangements

The UN Joint Programme follows the guidance provided by the United Nations Development Group<sup>5</sup> on joint initiatives. The design of this UNJP has been discussed extensively among the participating UN organisations (PUNOs) and used this process to define the parameters of greater UN system-wide coherence that support national priorities and needs. The establishment of a Joint Programme is driven by the country situation and context. The structure of the programme is anchored in the objectives of the Philippine Development Plan, the Bangsamoro Regional Development Plan, the SEPF and the Secretary-General's vision on prevention. The PUNOs will mobilize their global community of practice and knowledge as well as national expertise to ensure the success of the UNJP. As a result, the design of this UNJP ensures components build on each other, while providing clarity on the roles and responsibilities of each partner. The programme's M&E framework and the joint steering committee (see below) are intended to guarantee mutual accountability on the delivery of development results.

**Convening Agent (CA).** The World Food Programme (WFP) will serve as the CA which will host a **dedicated Joint Programme Coordinator**, jointly selected and supervised by the PUNOs, that will be responsible for ensuring the overall delivery of programme results. The JP Coordinator will ensure the strategic direction of the programme, ensuring technical leadership in regard programme consistency and coherence, jointness and coherence, coordinate monitoring and reporting requirements and provide secretariat support functions to the Programme Steering Committee. S/he will share results and briefings with the UN Resident Coordinator, the heads of the PUNOs, the UN Country Team and senior government officials. Specifically, the JP Coordinator will: (a) advise the Steering Committee (see below) on strategic priorities, programmatic and financial allocations; (b) curate programme results and analyse programme progress for adaptive programming; (c) ensure the monitoring of the operational risks and Fund performance; (d) facilitate visibility of UN work and explore opportunities for new collaboration/expansion including

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<sup>5</sup> <https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/Guidance-Note-on-Joint-Programmes.pdf>

resource mobilization; (e) consolidate annual and final narrative reports; (f) facilitate communication amongst the PUNOs and with the Steering Committee, and visibility of the Joint Programme; (g) provide logistical and operational support to the Steering Committee; and (h) serve as a focal point for the coordination with the national counterparts of the UNJP, and (i) liaise with Administrative Agent on fund administration issues. The JPC will be supported by the required technical and administrative expertise.

The **UN Joint Programme Steering Committee** is the overarching high-level mechanism that will provide leadership, vision and strategic direction, make resource allocation decisions, endorse the annual workplan and monitor the UN Joint Programme's progress towards achieving transformative change and desired objectives. The Steering Committee provides a platform for high-level dialogue, coordination, communication and advocacy among stakeholders, ensuring adaptation of the UN Joint Programme and its Fund architecture based on evolving priorities.

The responsibilities of the UN Joint Programme Steering Committee include agreeing on the overall strategic direction of the UN Joint Programme; approving documented arrangements for management and coordination; reviewing and revising the theory of change and expected results over the life-cycle of the fund; reviewing annual workplans and budgets, and making necessary adjustments; approving fund allocations based on agreed workplan; reviewing reports; identifying and recommending corrective action to emerging strategic and implementation problems; leading efforts to capitalize the Fund, through advocacy and mobilization of investments; ensuring coherence and seeking agreement on similar programs and projects by other donors; and approving communication and public information plans.

The UN Joint Programme Steering Committee will be co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator and the BARMM Chief Minister. Its membership will include:

- One senior representative from each of the PUNOs (FAO, IOM, UNDP and WFP);
- One senior representative from each of the selected BARMM Ministries
- Two representatives from resource partners contributing to the UN Joint Programme;
- Selected representative/s from civil society and/or academia (engaged in peacebuilding but who are not members of the implementing partner organizations), as deemed necessary.

Efforts will be made to ensure gender balance in the composition of the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee will meet every six months or, exceptionally, at the request of the co-chairs.

**Technical Working Groups** (TWGs) will be convened for each of the outcome areas, and will be co-chaired by a relevant Government agency and the lead UN entity in the respective area. The TWG will lead and oversee programme implementation and monitoring and shall be responsible for the following functions: i) provide regular technical advice, monitor progress, and report to key stakeholders; ii) analyzes programme bottlenecks, emerging risks or concerns, identifies actions to be taken,

and recommends strategies and innovative approaches to joint programming and in addressing risks and operational issues, elevating issues to the Steering Committee. Membership of the TWGs will include relevant mid-level BARMM Officials, UN technical staff, representatives of CSOs and target groups who will contribute to the technical and operational aspects of implementation. At its inception meeting, it will determine a core group and may invite others as resource persons or observers. Lead UN and BARMM agencies in each of the areas will co-convene monthly meetings of core members, or as the need arises.

**Resident Coordinator Office Support.** The Resident Coordinator's Office will work closely with the Joint Programme Coordinator and provide strategic guidance and good offices support to the programme. This will involve input from the Resident Coordinator, the Peace and Development Adviser, Senior Human Rights Adviser, the Area Coordinator in Bangsamoro and expert advice relating to resource mobilization, communications, partnerships and M&E.

### **3.2 Monitoring, reporting, and evaluation**

Reporting on this Joint Programme will be results-oriented, and evidence based. Each PUNO will provide the WFP/Convening Agent narrative reports prepared in accordance with harmonized UNSDG reporting formats and the 2019 MoU between the PUNOs and MPTFO regarding the Operational Aspects of this JP.

The PMU will monitor the implementation of the Joint Programme and work closely with the PUNOs to ensure the timely submission of data and information relating to results and delivery. As a minimum, the PMU will prepare and submit 6-month monitoring updates to all stakeholders in the Philippines and internationally. The joint programme will be subjected to a joint final independent evaluation for which funds will be earmarked under the M&E budget line of the Joint Programme budget. The evaluations will follow the United Nations Evaluation Group's (UNEG) Norms and Standards for Evaluation in the UN System, using the guidance on Joint Evaluation and relevant UNDG guidance on evaluations. A joint management response will be produced upon completion of the evaluation process and made publicly available.

### **3.3 Accountability, financial management, and public disclosure**

A pass-through fund management modality will be used, where funds will be channeled for the Joint Programme through the designated Administrative Agent. The Administrative Agent will be entitled to allocate a standard UN administrative fee of 1% of the amount contributed by each donor, to meet the costs of performing the Administrative Agent's standard functions as described in the MOU.

Each Participating UN Organization (PUNO) receiving funds through the pass-through has signed a standard Memorandum of Understanding with the Administrative Agent. By signing the MOU, they take full programmatic and financial accountability for the

funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each UN Agency, Fund, and Programme in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures. Each PUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent.

Funding will be provided on annual basis, upon successful performance of the Joint Programme.

Indirect costs of the Participating Organizations recovered through programme support costs will be 7%, with exception of WFP at 6.5%. All other costs incurred by each PUNO in carrying out the activities for which it is responsible under the Fund will be recovered as direct costs.

PUNOs and partners must comply with Fund brand guidelines, which includes information on donor visibility requirements.

Each PUNO will take appropriate measures to publicize the Fund and give due credit to the other PUNOs. All related publicity material, official notices, reports and publications, provided to the press or Fund beneficiaries, will acknowledge the partnership between the national counterpart of the project, resource partners and the United Nations.

**Transfer of cash to national Implementing Partners:** Cash transfer modalities, the size and frequency of disbursements, and the scope and frequency of monitoring, reporting, assurance and audit will be agreed prior to programme implementation, taking into consideration the capacity of implementing partners, and can be adjusted in its course in accordance with applicable policies, processes and procedures of the participating UN organizations. For the Funds and Programmes, the provisions required under the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) or in other agreements covering cash transfers will apply.

### 3.4 Legal context

**Agency name: FAO**

Agreement title: Agreement for the opening of the FAO Representation in the Philippines signed by both parties by Exchange of Letters

Agreement date: 2 November 1977 and 14 November 1977, respectively.

**Agency name: IOM**

Agreement title: Cooperation Agreement signed for by the Government by the Department of Foreign Affairs

Agreement date: 13 March 2003

**Agency name: UNDP**

Agreement title: Standard Basic Assistance Agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the United Nations Development Programme; Country Programme Document 2019-2023  
Agreement date: 21 July 1977

**Agency name: WFP**

Agreement title: Basic Agreement concerning assistance from the World Food Programme  
Agreement date: 2 July 1968

## ANNEXES

### Annex 1. List of related initiatives

Name of initiative/project	Key expected results	Links to the joint programme	Lead UN agency	Other partners	Budget & funding source	Contact person
Joint Programme on Promoting conflict prevention, social cohesion and community resilience in BARMM in the time of COVID-19	<p>Women former combatants are empowered to engage in and support peacebuilding in communities in the process of reintegration.</p> <p>Gender-responsive, locally-inclusive and culturally sensitive approaches to conflict prevention are mainstreamed into BARMM legislation, policies and programmes.</p> <p>BARMM communities that are beset by horizontal conflict are more resilient to the internal and external drivers of violence.</p>	Beneficiaries, project focus and implementation strategy/approach	IOM	UNFPA, UN Women	USD 3 million UN Peace building Fund	<p>Melina Nathan (<a href="mailto:melina.nathan@un.org">melina.nathan@un.org</a>)</p> <p>Hwahyun Kim (<a href="mailto:hwakim@iom.int">hwakim@iom.int</a>)</p>
Joint SDG Fund Joint Programme on Ensuring inclusive and risk-informed shock-responsive social protection	Build the resilience of households in BARMM, with special attention to poor and vulnerable households, through timely and effective	Beneficiaries, enhancing the synergies between social protection and sustainable food systems and green jobs	FAO	UNICEF	USD1.96 million Joint SDG Fund	Ma.Ruzella Quilla ( <a href="mailto:Maria.Quilla@fao.org">Maria.Quilla@fao.org</a> )



Name of initiative/project	Key expected results	Links to the joint programme	Lead UN agency	Other partners	Budget & funding source	Contact person
resulting in more resilient communities in the BARM	responses to risks and shocks					
Advancing Women's Rights and Influence through Socio-Economic Empowerment of BIWAB (Jun - Dec 2020)		Under this project, IOM and UNFPA focus on different clusters of the BIWAB for socio-economic empowerment. The project capacitated the BIWAB leaders on leadership and governance while 5 cooperatives received livelihood support with its 75 members oriented on women's rights and GBV prevention to become gender advocates. Building on the ongoing intervention, IOM and UNFPA aim to reach the wider group of BIWAB cooperatives and CBAs. The proposed PBF project may engage some members of the 5 cooperatives in Localized Mediation and Peace Promotion Training Programme based on the results of needs assessments and community profiling	IOM	UNFPA	USD 325,000 jointly Royal Norwegian Embassy	
Support to Agriculture-based livelihoods and Agribusiness Enterprise for Sustainable Peace		IOM and FAO agreed to coordinate needs and market assessments, core beneficiary selection criteria and refer potential BIWAB cooperatives that intend to engage in each	FAO		USD 2,583,000 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign	

Name of initiative/project	Key expected results	Links to the joint programme	Lead UN agency	Other partners	Budget & funding source	Contact person
and Development in Maguindanao and Cotabato (Nov 2019 - March 2022)		agency's focus livelihood area (FAO: agri-business, IOM: broader range of socioeconomic activities)			Affairs and Trade	
School for Peace and Democracy (SPD) and Women's Rapid Action and Mobilization Platform (RAMP)		Based on the assessments, IOM, UNFPA, UN Women and UNDP will closely coordinate best ways to engage the 12 BIWAB members trained under UNDP's SPD in PBF project in terms of training, mentoring or peer support. The four agencies will also ensure that leadership and conflict management training is not duplicated for the same BIWAB members. Members of Women's RAMP will coordinate to better assist local mediation and conflict resolution efforts that will be supported through the PBF project. Conversely, individuals trained under the PBF project will also support the RAMP and participate in its local mediation and conflict resolution activities. The 4 agencies agreed to avoid duplication of training and seek to achieve complementarity between projects through constant coordination.	UNDP			

## Annex 2. Joint Programme Results Framework

Result / Indicators	Baseline	2022 Target	2023 Target	Means of Verification	Responsible partner
<b>Outcome 1: Local capacities for leveraging the humanitarian-development-peace nexus enhanced through effective participatory development and community inclusion in the design of relevant plans and strategies.</b>					
<b>Outcome 1 indicator</b>					
To be determined					
<b>Output 1.1: Target LGUs capacitated to design and implement plans, including EOCs, that address risks to community resilience from the combined and overlapping impacts of conflict, climate change, and pandemics.</b>					
<b>Output indicator 1.1.1</b> % of target LGUs with developed plans (LCCAP,POPS, CDP)	0	70	NA	Project reports	IOM
<b>Output indicator 1.1.2</b> Number of EOCs (one regional and five provincial) equipped to provide effective and integrated responses.	0	3	3	Project reports	UNDP
<b>Output 1.2: Food security and social cohesion considerations integrated into the development plans of target LGUs through participatory planning processes.</b>					
<b>Output 1.2.1 indicator</b> Number of sectoral groups formed and engaged in participatory planning processes.	0	30	60	Masterlist of beneficiaries, Progress/Annual Report, Terminal Report	WFP, FAO, IOM
<b>Output 1.3: Target LGUs assisted to develop and apply early-warning-and-response platforms for violent conflicts, including the participation of the security sector and local security formations such as BPATs.</b>					
<b>Output 1.3.1 indicator</b> Number of municipalities able to design and implement functioning EWER platforms	0	10	10	Training Reports, Progress/Annual Report, Terminal Report	UNDP, IOM

Result / Indicators	Baseline	2022 Target	2023 Target	Means of Verification	Responsible partner
<b>Outcome 2: Resilience capacities of conflict-affected communities enhanced through improved livelihood security and reduced social tensions, demonstrating the benefits of the peace process.</b>					
<b>Outcome 2 indicator</b>					
To be determined					
<b>Output 2.1: Target Communities' mapped and "build-back better" initiatives identified for improved food security, decent work and access to markets and business opportunities.</b>					
<b>Output 2.1.1 indicator</b>	0	2	2	Progress/Annual Report, Terminal Report	FAO, WFP, IOM, UNDP
Number of targeted assessment reports discussed with government and community stakeholders					
<b>Output 2.2: Ex-combatants and conflict-affected communities provided access to sustainable and green socio-economic development opportunities.</b>					
<b>Output 2.2.1 indicator</b>	0	1000	2000	Progress/Annual Report, Terminal Report	FAO, WFP, IOM
Number of individual business enterprises linked to markets					
<b>Output 2.3: Durable partnerships between conflict-affected communities and public and private sector operators established, including the systematic provision of Islamic micro-financing.</b>					
<b>Output 2.3.1 indicator</b>	0	50%	90%	KIIs, FGDs, Perception Survey, ME reports, Baseline and Endline Assessment	FAO, WFP, IOM
% of community members reporting increased possession and control over livelihoods					
<b>Output 2.3.2 indicator</b>	0	10 vulnerable communities provided with	At least 5000 individuals and 500 micro-enterprises	KIIs, FGDs, Perception Survey, ME reports, Baseline	UNDP
Number of beneficiaries (communities and individuals) accessing micro					

Result / Indicators	Baseline	2022 Target	2023 Target	Means of Verification	Responsible partner
<b>Outcome 2: Resilience capacities of conflict-affected communities enhanced through improved livelihood security and reduced social tensions, demonstrating the benefits of the peace process.</b>					
finance services and products		Islamic micro-financing	access credit through an Islamic micro-financing system	and Endline Assessment	

Result / Indicators	Baseline	2022 Target	2023 Target	Means of Verification	Responsible partner
<b>Outcome 3: Strengthened local capacities for conflict transformation, transitional justice and reconciliation</b>					
<b>Outcome 3 indicator</b>					
To be determined					
<b>Output 3.1: Regional and Community-level transitional justice and reconciliation initiatives advanced, with a particular focus on land issues, and resolution or mitigation of specific conflicts identified in collaboration with stakeholders</b>					
<b>Output 3.1.1 indicator</b> % of knowledge increase on TJR mechanisms in the community	0	NA	70	KIIs, FGDs, Perception Survey, Pre-/Post-tests, ME reports, policy reports, Baseline and End line Assessment	IOM, UNDP
<b>Output 3.2: Fragile communities' access to community-based healing initiatives for conflict prevention and resolution improved.</b>					
<b>Output 3.2.1 indicator</b> Number of psychosocial support (PSS) focal points mobilized to provide PSS services	0	20	30	Progress/Annual Report, Terminal Report	IOM

Result / Indicators	Baseline	2022 Target	2023 Target	Means of Verification	Responsible partner
<b>Outcome 3: Strengthened local capacities for conflict transformation, transitional justice and reconciliation</b>					
<b>Output 3.2.2 indicator</b> Number of conflicts resolved or mitigated through multi-stakeholder action	0	5	10	Progress/Annual Report, Terminal Report	IOM, UNDP
<b>Output 3.3: Former members of violent extremist and private armed groups rehabilitated and reintegrated into their community</b>					
<b>Output 3.3 indicator</b> Number of communities capacitated to reintegrate former fighters	0	4	5	AFP, Municipal governments, BARMM government agencies	UNDP

### [Annex 3. Gender marker matrix](#)

The Gender marker matrix will be added when all programme elements are agreed. Gender equality principles have been integrated into programme design and targeting of beneficiaries. However, the programme will undertake a full gender analysis with partners at the start of the JP to ensure gender equality principles are sufficiently integrated in programme implementation.

### [Annex 4. Budget and Work Plan](#)

Please see budget separate attachment

## 4.1 Budget per UNDG categories

UNDG BUDGET CATEGORIES	WFP		FAO		IOM		UNDP		TOTAL	
	MPTF (USD)	PUNO Contribution (USD)	MPTF (USD)	PUNO Contribution (USD)	MPTF (USD)	PUNO Contribution (USD)	MPTF (USD)	PUNO Contribution (USD)	MPTF (USD)	PUNO Contribution (USD)
1. Staff and other personnel	327,823		291,835		653,201		461,744		1,734,603	
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	7,670		910,096		15,283		10,803		943,852	
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	83,634		382,804		166,645		117,800		750,883	
4. Contractual services	373,750				744,713		526,432		1,644,895	
5. Travel	127,896		75,000		213,888		180,144		596,928	
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	1,004,250		137,120		2,001,011		1,414,501		4,556,882	
7. General Operating and other Direct Costs	511,759		331,511		1,019,702		720,820		2,583,792	
<b>Total Direct Costs</b>	<b>2,436,782</b>		<b>2,128,366</b>		<b>4,814,443</b>		<b>3,432,244</b>		<b>12,811,835</b>	
8. Indirect Support Costs (Max. 7%)	158,391		148,986		337,011		240,257		896,828	
<b>TOTAL Costs</b>	<b>2,595,173</b>		<b>2,277,352</b>		<b>5,151,454</b>		<b>3,672,501</b>		<b>13,708,664</b>	<b>130,000</b>
<b>PMU Cost</b>									<b>1,000,000</b>	
<b>TOTAL BUDGET</b>									<b>14,708,664</b>	<b>130,000</b>

## Annex 5. Risk Management Plan

Project specific risk	Risk level	Mitigation strategy (including Do No Harm considerations)
<b>Security situation:</b> the deterioration of the security situation might result in safety risks and temporary reduced access to communities.	Medium	Agencies will prioritize safety of staff, partners and communities and will constantly coordinate with the security sector and envisage temporary refocusing of activities until security is restored.
<b>Health situation:</b> government mobility restrictions in response to COVID-19, or other pandemics might reduce access to communities.	High	Project team will harness its experience in conducting operations under enhanced community quarantine in Mindanao to develop alternative and innovative arrangements to meet project objectives.

Project specific risk	Risk level	Mitigation strategy (including Do No Harm considerations)
<p><b>Aggravation of conflict:</b> Conflict actors or identity groups not included in project activities or displeased with project activities might be aggrieved leading to conflict.</p>	Medium	<p>The project will mitigate conflict escalation in 3 ways: 1) the project’s CDD design includes dialogue involving all stakeholders to address and mediate disputes arising from project activities; 2) the project’s conflict sensitive approach including the mapping of all conflict actors and influencers in the location, project monitoring of conflict triggers as well as selection of local implementing partners with good local networks constitute effective early warning indicators and entry points for intervention and prevention; 3) Continued active engagement with all stakeholders involved in the political and peace processes to ensure widespread awareness and overall support to the project’s activities throughout the 2-year project cycle.</p>
<p><b>Engagement:</b> some of the parties involved in the project might decide not to continue participating in project activities.</p>	Medium	<p>Project team will ensure strong parties’ commitment by fostering both communities’, LGUs’ and leaders’ ownership of project activities.</p>
<p><b>Non-acceptance:</b> some community members might not accept the roles and perspectives of project beneficiaries.</p>	Medium	<p>Project team will ensure all relevant groups are informed about the capacitation and support to project beneficiaries to minimize reactive behavior.</p>
<p><b>Participation:</b> traditional approaches and prejudice may prevent minorities, women and youth from fully participating in project activities.</p>	Medium	<p>Project team will conduct thorough project orientations that promote safe participation of minorities, women and youth, grounded by Do No Harm principles.</p>
<p><b>Discontinuity/delays of financial resources</b></p>	Low	<p>To minimize project disruptions, the project’s workplan and budget will be synchronized with the project’s fund flow to ensure that all activities are funded. The RCO and PUNOs will report and liaise regularly with donors to anticipate and address funding shortfalls or delays.</p>



Project specific risk	Risk level	Mitigation strategy (including Do No Harm considerations)
<b>Lack of supply:</b> limited supplies in the market, including due to logistical complications, might delay delivery of materials needed for project activities	Medium	Needed items will be procured through an adaptive procurement apparatus that will shift from local, nationwide or international tenders as applicable.
<b>Misuse of funds:</b> service providers might use funds in a non-transparent and -accountable manner or for purposes unrelated to the project.	Low	Project team will capacitate engaged service providers on resource management, impose rigorous financial standards and dilute disbursements in multiple installments. M&E of beneficiary driven initiatives will be constant throughout the project.
<b>Political situation:</b> change in the political landscape might result in the need to engage new government counterparts and pitch the project anew.	Medium	Continued active engagement with all stakeholders involved in the political and peace processes to ensure widespread awareness and overall support to the project's activities throughout the 2-year project cycle.
<b>Gender discrimination:</b> Government actors discriminate against women and girls and refuse to receive inputs on gender-responsive priorities to peace and security.	Medium	Programme approach and methodology for implementation will include eliminating gender discriminatory attitudes. Project team will also prioritize engagement of political actors who can be advocates of women's rights.
<b>GBV:</b> Empowerment of women included in project activities in both community and decision-making settings exposes them to gender based violence	Medium	Project team will seek support of LGUs and barangays for community-based activities and engage male community leaders as champions of the programme. Project team will also carefully craft public communication messages to frame interventions in a way that will not result in backlash against beneficiaries.
<b>Natural disaster:</b> a significant natural disaster may affect project implementation	Low	Agencies will ensure emergency preparedness and response capacities of target are considered in the planning of key activities with stakeholders and alternatives are available in the event.