Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund (WPHF)

Annual Project Narrative Progress Report

Rapid Response Window on Women's Participation in Peace Processes and the Implementation of Peace Agreements (RRW)

WPHF Secretariat – Rapid Response Window Unit

Reporting Period:
1 January – 31 December 2021

Project Title: Rapid Response Window on Women's Participation in Peace Processes and the Implementation of Peace Agreements (RRW) **Project Number:** 00122550	**PUNO(s):** UN Women Rapid Response Window Unit, WPHF Secretariat
Reporting Period: 1 January – 31 December 2021 **Report Submitted by:** UN Women as the Secretariat of the Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund Name: Ghita El Khyari Entity: UN Women Title: Head of the Secretariat, Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund Email: Ghita.khyari@unwomen.org	**Implementing Partners:** N/A
	Project Locations: Global
Project Description: The Rapid Response Window on women's participation in peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements is a funding mechanism that addresses a gap in urgent, practical support to increase women's participation in formal peace processes. It was established on the recommendation of the UNSG's October 2019 annual report on WPS (S/2019/800, p.37).	**Total Approved Budget:** $ 5,410,000 **Total budget transferred to RRW at the end of the reporting period:** $ 5,410,000 (2020: 2.6 million; 2021: 2.81 million)
	Project Start Date: May 15, 2020 **Project End Date:** December 31, 2022 **Total Duration (in months):** 19 months

WPHF Outcome the Project is contributing to: Outcome 4: Conflict Resolution

WPHF Secretariat/RRW Unit indicators:
1. Number/type of demand-driven requests supported by RRW (direct-support)
2. Number/type of short-term grants supported by RRW

WPHF indicator the Project is reporting on:
4.1. Number of women that participate in formal peace processes or negotiations
4.2. Existence of gender responsive elements/provisions in peace agreements, dialogues, and/or decision-making processes
4.3 Types of strategies used/implemented to participate in and contribute to the peace process and/or implementation of a peace agreement

Summary

During the reporting period, the WPHF Rapid Response Window on women's participation in peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements (RRW) has seen significant achievements in the the direct implementation of RRW support to civil society partners in four countries (Afghanistan, Liberia, Mali and South Sudan), the establishment of six INGO partnerships to support RRW implementation, including through the provision of quality technical and advisory support to RRW decision making, exceptional emergency evacuation support for 14 Afghan women and financial emergency support to 19 Afghan women (and their 25 dependents), who had been engaged with the formal peace process and at risk due to the Taliban takeover, engagement with key stakeholders through outreach and communications, an International Peace Day communications campaign, and an official launch event. In 2021, a mid-term operations review was commissioned following the RRW's inception phase.

WPHF held an official high-level launch event for the RRW on 14 January 2021, co-hosted with six government donors to the WPHF RRW – Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Norway and Sweden. The launch was opened by Her Excellency Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations Amina Mohammed, demonstrating the UN's high-level commitment to the successful implementation of the RRW. Key stakeholders shared video messages to demonstrate their support for the RRW, including CSO partners, INGO partners, WPHF Board members, and experts on women's participation in peace processes. The virtual launch event had over 700 attendees.

In 2021, the RRW supported eight civil society initiatives in Afghanistan, Liberia, Mali and South Sudan. In **Afghanistan**, the RRW supported three initiatives: a WHRD's direct participation in the Track 1 Leadership Committee of the High Council for National Reconciliation; the implementation of a participatory Track 2 Women's Peace Conference in Kabul; and an initiative documenting women's direct representation in the Doha negotiations. In **Liberia**, the RRW covered costs of a consultant for a civil society initiative to strengthen women's participation in monitoring the implementation of the 2009 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report recommendations which emerged from the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Together with INGO partner Conciliation Resources, the RRW provided support (ongoing) to two civil society projects in Liberia on women's participation in the 2009 TRC report recommendations, including for the establishment of a gender-responsive War Crimes Court. In **Mali**, the RRW covered the cost of an independent consultant to conduct a consultation-based research initiative (ongoing) on behalf of a CSO partner, on women's participation in monitoring the implementation of the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation. In **South Sudan**, together with INGO partner Inclusive Peace, the RRW supported the development of a technical document to strengthen civil society monitoring of the implementation of gender provisions in the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

Following 15 August 2021, WPHF mobilised the RRW to advocate jointly with UN Women, UN Women Afghanistan Country Office and UNAMA for the emergency evacuation of at risk Afghan women engaged in the peace talksprocess from Kabul. 14 women and their dependents received a visa and/or were evacuated by the Governments of Australia, Canada and Germany. From October-December 2021, the RRW provided one-off financial emergency support to 19 Afghan women engaged in the peace process, including 25 dependents, who relocated following their engagement with the Intra-Afghan Peace Negotiations and events of mid-August 2021. RRW emergency support to WHRDs recognizes that protection is a key consideration for women's meaningful participation, including in cases where a peace process has been unsuccessful or has resulted in adverse outcomes for women's rights and the safety of WHRDs. Financial support was transferred for immediate use by the women at their discretion, for costs related to their evacuation, settling safely into a new country, and where possibly continuing their advocacy work.

Support for a further two civil society initiatives was pending during this reporting period (Afghanistan: delayed as a result of changes to the Intra-Afghan Peace Negotiations in May/June and then the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021; Liberia: delayed due to operational setbacks in a procurement process).

In 2021, the RRW launched two new calls for proposals (CfPs): a 2nd CfP for INGO partner proposals in May 2021; and a rolling CfP for RRW Short-Term Grants. The RRW received a total of 395 proposals (119 under the Direct Support and 270 under the Short-Term Grants streams), with 87 proposals longlisted and 32 proposals shortlisted. 80% of proposals under the Short-term Grants stream were received from African nations, followed by 14% from Asia and Central Asia. Proposal templates were developed in five languages (English, French, Spanish, Russian and Arabic) and posted on the WPHF website. For the INGO partner CfP in 2021, six proposals were received and four longlisted, of which two INGOs were selected by the WPHF Funding Board as RRW partners bringing the total number of RRW INGO partners to seven.

The RRW conducted proactive and responsive outreach efforts with UN Women and other UN agency country offices in the following contexts: Chad – ahead of a possible national dialogue process; Libya – following women's representation and participation in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum; Sudan – to strengthen implementation of the 2020 Juba Agreement for Peace and further national and sub-national negotiations; and Venezuela – ahead of a possible national dialogue process.

The RRW also underwent a mid-term operations review from September-November 2021, conducted by an independent consultant. The review included a desk review of RRW documentation and 24 semi-structured interviews with 26 stakeholders, including: WPHF Secretariat staff members and consultants; WPHF Board members; high-level UN Women Program Support Management staff; RRW INGO partners; RRW Technical Committee members beyond INGO partners; and civil society partners implementing initiatives supported by RRW in three countries (Afghanistan; Liberia; South Sudan). The review includes a summary of priority recommendations for consideration by the WPHF Secretariat and Board in the following areas: 1) communications and outreach; 2) CSO application and RRW review processes; 3) monitoring, evaluation, learning and reporting; 4) scope of the RRW; 5) configuration and content of the two RRW streams – Direct Support and Short-Term Grants; 6) INGO partnerships; 7) addressing bottlenecks and challenges within the UN system.

Overall challenges during the reporting period include: devising and implementing exceptional operations procedures to meet the needs for RRW implementation; adapting and/or delaying civil society initiatives in response to volatile peace negotiations in fragile contexts; attracting a consistent majority of eligible CSO applications for a new, targeted and specific mechanism (the RRW) via outreach and communications activities, including through key partners (UN agencies; INGO partners); poor internet connectivity for CSO partners which inhibited timely and frequent communications about project activities and outputs.

1. Results and Progress Achieved

Outcome 1: The Rapid Response Window on Women's Participation in Peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements is established and delivery of interventions from the window (under WPHF outcome 4) is ensured.

Output 1.1: Quality technical and advisory support to the RRW and its decision-making structures is provided
The RRW was officially launched at a high-level event on 14 January 2021, co-hosted at Ministerial level with six government donors to the WPHF RRW (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Norway and Sweden). The launch was opened by Her Excellency Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed, demonstrating

the UN's high-level commitment to the successful implementation of the RRW. Key stakeholders shared video messages to demonstrate their support for the RRW, including CSO partners, INGO partners, WPHF Board members, and experts on women's participation in peace processes. The virtual launch event – held via Zoom and live-streamed on Facebook – had over 700 attendees. The high attendance and strong engagement from key stakeholders demonstrate that the RRW addresses a vital gap in urgent, practical support to women to cover costs related to their meaningful participation in formal peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements.

Applications packages were available in five languages on the WPHF website. Application packages underwent minor revisions to improve the clarity and consistency of the application documents. Applicants from CSOs were accepted on a rolling basis and evaluated by the RRW Unit using the evaluation criteria.

The RRW Technical Committee continued to convene electronically and asynchronously, with its composition as appropriate to the country and conflict context of the shortlisted CSO proposal for RRW support.Technical Committee members received all relevant documents and provided detailed expert feedback within the requested timeframes to guide and inform RRW Unit decisions on progressing CSO applicants through the approval process.

The WPHF Funding Board Task Force convened to convene electronically and asynchronously to make the decision to approve or decline RRW support to shortlisted CSO applicants.

Output 1.2: Efficient, effective, and timely management of the Rapid Response Window and direct implementation of support is ensured
Under this output, the RRW coordinated and managed all day-to-day activities necessary for the smooth running of the Window. The RRW evaluated all proposals received and progressed shortlisted proposals to the Technical Committee – in line with the WPHF Operations Manual and the Terms of Reference for the RRW decision-making bodies (see above for involvement of the Tehnical Committee and WPHF Funding Board Task Force).

When necessary, the RRW Unit acted as an intermediary to request updates or revisions to proposals directly from CSOs at the following three stages:
i. *Before shortlisting the proposal* – this started as a common moment of intervention in early 2021 but was revised to only take place when absolutely necessary to ensure an appropriate use of a CSO applicant's time – for example in cases where the proposal narrative provided a strong justification but was missing information that would determine its eligibility for RRW support.
ii. *Following feedback from the Technical Committee* – in cases where the Technical Committee identified areas of a CSO proposal that should be revised in line with good practice, the CSO received a detailed summary of the feedback from the Technical Committee review of the proposal. The summary highlighted areas of that required revision before it could be progressed to the next stage of the decision-making process. Where appropriate, and in an effort to ensure an accessible and participatory application process, the RRW Unit engaged in a brief call with the CSO to elaborate on the feedback and answer questions.
iii. *Following feedback from the WPHF Board* – intervention at this stage was only required if the WPHF Funding Board raised redlines or had further questions for the CSO before they could formally approve the support – for example to avoid possible duplication of support.

The RRW Unit recorded and tracked all decisions made, informing all parties of decisions and making connections between actors that would be working together (e.g. an INGO partner and a CSO partner) or that should be informed of the work takingplace (e.g. a UN Women Country Office; DPPA). The RRW Unit stayed in regular contact with all actors for both direct and indirect implementation, ensuring that information about project implementation and compliance with WPHF procedures was accessible.

The RRW Unit monitored the WPHF-RRW@unwomen.org inbox daily, filing and evaluating CSO proposals, responding to a range of queries on the RRW, and where possible redirecting requests that were not specifically related to the RRW.

Direct Support stream
The RRW Unit ensured direct implementation of six CSO initiatives requesting a specific logistical or technical support to be purchased/arranged by WPHF on behalf of the CSO. Activities included liaising with UN Women procurement, using a Call-Off Order for a Long-Term Agreement held by UNOPS, complying with UN Women's Standard Operating Procedures for travel arrangements, and working with a RRW INGO partner to arrange technical support to a CSO partner.

Emergency support to Afghan WHRDs
On 15 August 2021 the Taliban took over Kabul, ending attempts at reaching a political settlement through the Intra-Afghan Peace Negotiations and resulting in dangerous outcomes for women human rights defenders (WHRDs) who had been engaged in the peace process. The RRW requested an urgent exception from the WPHF Board, granted on 17 August 2021, to be able to support the protection of these women. The WPHF RRW:

- advocated jointly with UN Women, UNW Afghanistan Country Office and UNAMA for the emergency evacuation of Afghan WHRDs from Kabul
- provided one-off emergency cash support to WHRDs referred by UNW Afghanistan Country Office, UNAMA or a RRW INGO partner who met certain eligibility criteria regarding their engagement in the Intra-Afghan Peace Negotiations. Financial support was transferred via Western Union for immediate use by WHRDs at their discretion, for costs related to their evacuation, settling safely into a new country, and where possibly continuing their advocacy work.

From October 2021, the RRW provided one-off emergency support to 19 Afghan women engaged in the peace process and their 25 dependents with $158,576, who were evacuated to 10 different countries, following their engagement with the Intra-Afghan Peace Negotiations and events of mid-August 2021. The women were identified based on criteria and information shared by UNAMA and UN Women Country Office. RRW emergency support to Afghan women recognizes that protection is a key consideration for women's meaningful participation, including in cases where a peace process has been unsuccessful or has resulted in adverse outcomes for women's rights and the safety of women peacebuilders. Financial support was transferred via Western Union for immediate use by WHRDs at their discretion, for costs related to their evacuation, settling safely into a new country, and where possibly continuing their advocacy work.

Calls for Proposals (CfPs)
In 2021, the RRW launched a rolling CfP for RRW Short-Term Grants. Proposal templates were developed in four languages (English, French, Spanish and Arabic) and posted on the WPHF website. Direct Support applications continued to be accepted on a rolling basis.

For Direct Support and Short Term Grants, RRW received a total of 395 proposals (119 under Direct Support and 270 under the Short-Term Grants streams), with 87 proposals longlisted and 32 proposals

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shortlisted. 80% of proposals under the Short-term Grants stream were received from Africa nations, followed by 14% from Asia and Central Asia.

INGO Partnership CfP and Selection
In May 2021, The RRW selected further INGO partners through a second competitive call for proposals in May 2021. Six INGO six proposals were received and four longlisted, of which two INGOs were selected by the WPHF Funding Board as RRW partners, bringing the total number of planned RRW INGO partners to seven. Additional INGO partnerships strengthen the global reach and technical expertise in the implementation of RRW support to local and national CSOs. INGO partners are critical for rapidly identifying and providing support to organizations working to accelerate women's participation in peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements. INGOs support across both streams of the RRW, including support on grant management, rapid disbursement of funding, urgent financing of logistical services, and supporting protection requests for WHRDs and women peacebuilders. The formalization of INGO partnerships for grants in July 2021 enabled WPHF to open the RRW Short-Term Grants stream for CSO applications. Six INGO partnerships are currently active, one is pending formalization. For the INGO partner CfP in 2021, six proposals were received and four longlisted, of which two INGOs were selected by the WPHF Funding Board as RRW partners bringing the total number of RRW INGO partners to seven.

2021	CfPs launched	Proposals Received	Longlisted	Shortlisted	Selected
INGO Partners	1	6	4	3	2
Direct Support *(rolling applications)*	0	119	25	12	6
Short-Term Grants *(rolling applications)*	1	270	58	17	2
Total	**2**	**395**	**87**	**32**	

Cumulatively (since 2020), the RRW has received over 500 proposals through 4 calls.

2020-2021	CfPs launched	Proposals Received	Longlisted	Shortlisted	Selected[1]
INGO Partners	2	15	12	8	7
Direct Support *(rolling applications)*	1	234	41	16	9
Short-Term Grants *(rolling applications)*	1	270	58	17	2
Total	**4**	**519**	**111**	**41**	

> **Profile of Selected CSOs[2]**
>
> *Direct support*
> - **CSO 1_Afghanistan:** the RRW covered subsistence allowance costs to facilitate a woman peacebuilder's safe participation in high-level dialogues based in Kabul to guide the peace negotiations with the Taliban (March-July 2021)
> - **Community Youth for Development Aid (CYDA), South Sudan**: the RRW covered the costs for expert advisory/technical support provided to the CSO by RRW INGO partner Inclusive Peace. The CSO requested the development of a technical document to support civil society's monitoring of the implementation of gender provisions in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The technical document should include milestones and indicators to hold government actors accountable for R-ARCSS implementation, and would inform a series of consultations organized by a coalition of CSOs to raise awareness of the R-ARCSS gender provisions and to strengthen women's influence in their implementation.
> - **Liberia Future Trust (LiFT), Liberia**: the RRW covered costs for expert technical support – a consultant to design and carry out two workshops for women in Nimba and Montserrado counties, with a focus on the 2009 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Report recommendations (resulting from the 2003 peace agreement). The workshops raised

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[1] Does not include emergency support to individual evacuated Afghan WHRDs (more information on this initiative below)
[2] Please note that organization names in Afghanistan have been anonymized for protection and security reasons.

awareness of the TRC report, which was a recommendation of a November 2020 UN Women Liberia country office and Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR) meeting.

- **Disabled Children and Female Empowerment Network (DCFEN), Liberia**: the RRW approved a CSO request to cover Braille transcription costs for documents associated with the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Liberia to ensure that Blind and visually impaired women have the means to engage with the recommendations and provisions of the documents, and are supported to provide their inputs on their implementation.
- **CSO 2_Afghanistan:** the RRW approved a CSO request to cover travel, visa and daily subsistence allowance costs for a delegation of four community leaders and religious scholars to attend a Track 2 peace forum in Istanbul. This support was put on hold due to the situation in Afghanistan.

The RRW continued its support to the following three CSO initiatives under the RRW **Direct Support Stream**, approved in 2020:

- **CSO 3_Afghanistan:** the RRW covered equipment hire and crew costs to support an initiative to document the experiences and impact of the four women negotiators representing the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan at the Intra-Afghan Peace Negotiations. The outputs would contribute to the development of a multi-media toolkit to demonstrate the essential role of women in formal conflict resolution processes and to provide a roadmap for other processes.
- **CSO 4_Afghanistan:** the RRW covered costs of a project coordinator to organise a Track 2 women's peace conference in parallel to the Track 1 Intra-Afghan Peace Negotiations. The role of the project coordinator was to ensure an inclusive and participatory event for diverse Afghan women from across the country, and to produce an advocacy document as an output from the conference. The CSO initiative underwent some adaptations to respond to the changing context for the Afghan peace process in early 2021.
- **Alliance pour la Recherche et le Développement Intégré, Mali**: the RRW is covering costs of an expert consultant who will gather the perspectives of women, men and young people on approaches to and recommendations for women's increased participation in the implementation of the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (Algiers Accord). The consultant's research study will result in a publication to strengthen the CSO's advocacy for women's meaningful participation.

Short-Term Grants
- **Liberia Future Trust (LiFT), Liberia**: the RRW is supporting a civil society advocacy project to strengthen women's engagement with the monitoring, evaluation and implementation of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the 2009 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report. This project is directly linked to the CSO's support from the RRW Direct Support stream (above).
- **Women's NGO Secretariat of Liberia (WONGOSOL),** Liberia: the RRW is supporting a civil society engagement and advocacy project to strengthen women's participation in the implementation of recommendations from the 2009 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, in particular the establishment of a gender-responsive War Crimes Court.

Monitoring and Evaluation
A monitoring and evaluation strategy exists for the RRW Unit and for RRW-supported CSO initiatives. The RRW has a dedicated WPHF Indicator Tip Sheet to emphasise the specific nature of the RRW within WPHF Impact Area 4 on conflict resolution.

Risk Management
The RRW Unit continued to update, manage and apply its risk matrix. The risk matrix is elaborated in Appendix 3.

RRW Operational Review
In 2021, the RRW commissioned an in-depth internal review on its operations and processes from September-November 2021, contracted an expert independent consultant to present practical recommendations to improve the funding mechanism's efficiency, functioning and operations to strengthen its implementation as a funding mechanism for local and national CSOs. The review includes a summary of priority recommendations for consideration by the WPHF Secretariat and Board in the following areas: 1) communications and outreach; 2) CSO application and RRW review processes; 3) monitoring, evaluation, learning and reporting; 4) scope of the RRW; 5) configuration and content of the two RRW streams – Direct Support and Short-Term Grants; 6) INGO partnerships; 7) addressing bottlenecks and challenges within the UN system.

The review included a desk review of RRW documentation and 24 semi-structured interviews with 26 stakeholders, including: WPHF Secretariat staff members and consultants; WPHF Board members; high-level UN Women Program Support Management staff; RRW INGO partners; RRW Technical Committee members beyond INGO partners; and civil society partners implementing initiatives supported by RRW in three countries (Afghanistan; Liberia; South Sudan).

In addition to detailed analysis and recommendations for the review areas of enquiry, the review included an analysis of positive feedback, and a summary of 27 priority recommendations and 26 further recommendations, grouped thematically by area of enquiry which the RRW will provide a management response and being implementation of key recommendations starting in 2022.

Priority Recommendations of RRW Operational Review	
Communications	• Shorten, simplify, and clarify descriptions of the RRW on materials for prospective applicants • Further simplify and refine the CfP documents for each stream
Outreach	• Conduct outreach with feminist networks, regional mediator networks, regional organisations, donor governments • Build closer relationship with DDPA
Application Process	• Extend the review period to one week for non-urgent applications for both streams. • Pilot decision-making via weekly calls at both Board and Technical Committee levels, instead of written submissions via email. • Ensure more interaction within Board Membership and core members of the Technical Committee. • Add to the Technical Committee feminist civil society expertise an Operational Focal Point. • Share more data with the Board & core Technical Committee on the RRW (eg. percentage of successful/unsuccessful applications, from which regions, etc.)
Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting	• Review and refine overall MEL framework, processes, and individual tools through a feminist lens. Specifically, refine results frameworks, including qualitative indicators in the RRW results framework • Make means of verification more specific • Refine Short Term Grant annual reporting template for INGOs to be more user-friendly, simpler, shorter. Ensure it gathers a story, not fragments of information • RRW to be a platform for convening beneficiaries for the purposes of learning together.
Scope	• Broadly maintain current scope for 12 months. • Minor thematic expansions to include: i) political transitions; ii) responding in crisis situations where peace processes have broken down; iii) psychosocial support. • Increase recipient scope to include women mediator networks and UN Women agencies, but only to enable CSOs to participate in a peace process through covering relevant costs, not UN agency costs – pilot for 6 months. • Monitor the RRW's progress and impact over the next 12 months while explicitly acknowledging the flaws in the dominant peacemaking paradigm
INGO Partnerships	• Hold another call for INGO partners: specifically research and conduct outreach to relevant R/INGOs headquartered in the "global South". • UN to support promising CSO applications when INGO partners do not come forward to do so. • Facilitate monthly meetings with INGO partners for discussions on the RRW. • Consider holding an annual in-person one day workshop with RRW and INGOs as a forum for such discussions.

Output 1.3: Efficient, effective and timely management of INGO partnerships is ensured
The RRW Unit managed a second competitive call for proposals for INGO partners to enhance the geographic reach and technical/thematic expertise brought to the implementation of the RRW by INGOs. The CfP was published in May and the evaluation and selection took place in June 2021.

The RRW Unit worked with UN Women operations colleagues to agree and approve an exception to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) giving INGO partners the flexibility to on-grant their budget to CSO partners. The exception was approved given that the selection of CSO partners would still be managed by the RRW Unit. The RRW Unit developed documents for the partner agreement to align with UN Women

SOPs for partnerships with Responsible Parties. The RRW Unit signed partner agreements with the 5 INGO partners selected in 2020 and 1 INGO partner selected in 2021. Funds were transferred to INGO partners to be held on retainer and disbursed in line with CSO partner selection through the RRW selection process.

INGO partners were encouraged to be active participants in the Technical Committee. Where necessary, the RRW Unit provided guidance and informational support to ensure that all INGO partners had the capacity to provide their expert assessmsent of CSO proposals. The RRW Unit worked with the INGOs to agree suitable partnerships between INGOs supporting the implementation of the RRW and CSOs selected for RRW support. For both RRW streams – Direct Supprt and Short-Term Grants – the RRW Unit was a focal point for addressing matters arising, adjusting timelines, coordinating communications and making connections between actors.

INGO partner quarterly coordination meetings commenced in November 2021 to ensure all INGO partners were informed of updates from the RRW Unit, provide an opportunity for INGO partners to share recent activities, lessons learned, and future plans for the RRW partnerships, and discuss and provide feedback on what has and has not worked, provide clarifications on the partnerships, and to identify opportunities and priorities for thematic or country-specific outreach about opportunities through the RRW.

Output 1.4: Communications, capacity building and Knowledge Management is provided to the Rapid Response Window
The RRW Unit, with support from the WPHF Communications team, produced a variety of communications, capacity building and knowledge products to support the functions and enhance the visibility of the RRW among a wide range of stakeholders. The RRW brochure – along with a dedicated section in the WPHF advocacy brochure - was designed and updated toprovide topline insights into the background, processes, and efforts of the RRW, helping to inform both current and prospective donors of RRW activities and impact to help further mobilize resources. (Appendix 1).

The WPHF website was updated to include dedicated and accesible landing pages for each RRW stream (Direct Support; Short-Term Grants). The webpage language was revised to provide more clarity and guidance to prospective CSO applicants, supporting their self-selection and the development of their proposals to the RRW: https://wphfund.org/rrw/

In addition, the RRW INGO partner induction package was disseminated to INGO partners providing a range of introductory, technical and practical documents relevant to RRW INGO partners that collaborate in delivering RRW support to CSO partners. The document is designed to support RRW INGO partners to be well-informed at all stages of the RRW partnership, including how to effectively facilitate ongoing engagement with the RRW Technical Committee, support selected CSO partners, and contribute to annual and quarterly reporting to WPHF.

A series of informational webinars for prospective applicants of both RRW streams and INGOs were also conducted in 2021. In total, 25 webinars were held in various languages with approximately 577 CSO and INGO representatives. In addition, as part of the WPHF Global Community of Practice (CoP) and capacity building programme, four online capacity building webinars were held in June 2021 to provide information on the RRW and encourage current and previous WPHF grantees to apply for direct support and short-term grants and share the opportunity among their networks. Moreover, RRW short-term grant partners have been invited to attend WPHF CoP capacity building and knowledge exchange initiatives and have joined the WPHF CoP Facebook group and email distribution list, enabling them to share their experience with other CSO peers. The RRW also works through its INGO partners to share information with

prospective CSOs eligible for RRW support. The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy held an informational webinar for its CSO partners based in Latin America, hosted jointly with the RRW Unit.

International Peace Day Campaign
In September 2021, the RRW Unit produced an awareness raising and visibility campaign on its Direct Support stream in commemoration of International Peace Day (21 September). The campaign leveraged engaging and informative illustration and design to artfully and clearly demonstrate the myriad ways in which the RRW Direct Support stream can support CSO initiatives for women to participate meaningfully in peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements. The campaign aimed to raise awareness of the RRW with prospective CSO applicants and to increase the proportion of proposals that would be eligible for the RRW. Social media and illustration examples include:

https://twitter.com/wphfund/status/1439944612085440515   https://twitter.com/wphfund/status/1440313710367498244
https://twitter.com/wphfund/status/1443676880700416007   https://twitter.com/wphfund/status/1442518083424325643
https://twitter.com/wphfund/status/1441703442087612416   https://twitter.com/wphfund/status/1441024994709020674

Social Media
RRW stakeholder social media packages were produced and disseminated for various audiences including CSO partners, INGO partners, WPHF Board members and donors – to support engaging and informed social media outputs about the WPHF RRW. The document includes draft social media messaging for a range of platforms, including images, hastags and other social assets. These social media outputs raised awareness of the RRW's existence, promoted the RRW's purpose, provided guidance to prospective applicants, and illustrated the direct impact of RRW-supported initiatives. Coupled with this, communication guidelines for CSO and INGO partners were developed as a reference guide for communications outputs related to their initiatives. The guidelines include information on good practice for collecting content, and on engagement with the RRW Unit to amplify the communications outputs of RRW partners from around the world.

In addition to RRW Unit social media activities, CSO partners supported by both direct support and short-term grants were extremely active with various visibility documents and posts launched in 2021[3] :

- ***Community Youth for Development Aid (CYDA):*** Technical document produced by RRW INGO partner Inclusive Peace – "Monitoring and Advocacy Strategies for CSOs During the Implementation of Peace Agreements".
- ***Liberia Future Trust (LiFT) – RRW Direct Support:***
  3 November 2021 article in All Africa: The New Dawn – "LFT, WPHF, Partners Brainstorm On TRC Recommendations": https://allafrica.com/stories/202111030676.html and 5 Novemebr 2021 article in News Public Trust – "Dialogue On TRC Recommendations Ends In Monrovia": https://newspublictrust.com/dialogue-on-trc-recommendations-ends-in-monrovia/

2. Impact and Results of CSOs supported through the RRW

WPHF Impact Area 4: Increased representation and leadership of women in formal peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements
During this reporting period, the WPHF Rapid Response Window on women's participation in peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements (RRW) increased women's representation, leadership and engagement by: supporting the direct representation of women peacebuilders at the Track 1 and Track 2 levels; facilitating expert advisory/technical support to strengthen women's participation in

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[3] Documents and posts for Afghanistan CSOs have been removed for protection and security reasons.

peace agreement implementation; providing grants for projects to engage women in the monitoring and evaluation of peace agreement implementation; and covering urgent logistical and practical costs related to equipment and travel, including cash support to WHRDs directly engaged in the Afghan peace process.

A total of 259 people (76% women) and four community based organisations (CBOs) directly beneficited from interventions and direct support from CSOs. A total of 25 were indirect beneficiaries.

Overall, the support provided by the RRW saw achievements and progress across all three impact indicators for WPHF Impact Area 4, as follows:

Indicator	Result
4.1. Number of women that participate in formal peace processes or negotiations	The RRW supported atotal of 104 women to participate in formal peace processes, negotiations or peace agreement implementation. -Subsistence allowance costs for 1 woman peacebuilder at the Track 1 level to ensure her safe participation in peace process decision-making in Kabul -Costs for a conference organizer to ensure an inclusive, participatory and impactful Track 2 event attended in Kabul by 100 women. -In Liberia, 3 women from the CSO participated in dialogues for recommendations for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
4.2. Existence of gender-responsive elements/provisions in peace agreements, dialogues, and/or decision-making processes	Track 1 level to ensure her safe participation in peace process decision-making in Kabul, and by covering costs for a conference organizer to ensure an inclusive, participatory and impactful Track 2 event attended in Kabul by 100 women. The RRW supported three CSO initiatives (two in Afghanistan, one in South Sudan) that resulted in the existence of gender-responsive elements in peace dialogues (Track 1) and in the Track 2 advocacy literature associated with specific peace processes or peace agreement implementation processes. Types of gender-responsive elements as follows:Increasing women's political participation at all levels (local and national), including in transitional governments • Increasing women's participation in decision-making for peace and security, including in ceasefires, transitional security arrangements, and in the monitoring and evaluation of peace agreement implementation • Safeguarding women's rights in a final settlement or peace agreement text, specifically safeguarding (recent) gains in women's rights that may be undermined by the content of the peace negotiations • Explicit reference to and recognition of international, regional and national frameworks that formalize (legal) commitments to gender equality and women's rights, such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) • Gender-responsive constitutional reform • Gender-responsive reintegration and rehabilitation efforts • Gender-responsive and victim-centred transitional justice, reconstruction and trauma healing • The safety and protection of WHRDs, both in terms of practical measures at the national level (such as shelters) and in terms of affirmation of the importance of protecting and supporting WHRDs from the international community • Support and resources to women's civil society organizations
4.3. Types of strategies used/implemented to participate in and contribute to the peace process and/or	All CSO initiatives supported by the RRW employed strategies to increase women's participation in and contribution to a peace process and/or implementation of a peace agreement. A summary of the types of strategies used in 2021 as follows: • Direct representation • Formal media documentation of women's participation • Network-building with key advocacy targets

Indicator	Result
implementation of a peace agreement	- Track 2 consultations and participatory workshops to develop recommendations for Track 1 processes, including specific recommendations to increase women's participation - Coalition-building among CSOs to strengthen collective impact - Publication of a formal declaration from women's CSOs, advocating for gender-responsive peace - Development of technical monitoring and evaluation documents to support civil society's effective monitoring and evaluation of gender provisions in peace agreements - Rapid cash transfers to support the urgent protection needs of WHRDs whose safety is adversely affected by engaging with a formal peace process

A Specific Story/CSO Profile

In February 2021, RRW received a request from a CSO for urgent logistical support for a woman peacebuilder's participation in a track 1 peace process in Kabul, Afghanistan. A total funding amount of 20,500 USD was disbursed in five monthly tranches of 4,100 USD to cover subsistence allowance costs including transport and accommodation. This support facilitated her safe participation in high-level dialogues to guide the peace negotiations with the Taliban, with the following expected outcomes as a result of her participation and advocacy:

1. To increase women's representation and leadership in the Afghan peace process at all tracks
2. To increase solidarity among the Leadership Committee members of the High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR) regarding women's meaningful participation in the Afghan peace process
3. To increase coordination among donor agencies to support Afghan women's achievements of the past 2 decades

The proposal was approved in 5 business days through the RRW Technical Committee and Task Force (made up of WPHF Funding Board members). The first tranche of support was allocated in 15 business days following formal approval.

Key achievements resulting from RRW logistical support include:
- Peacebuilder attended over 16 formal events and advocacy meetings related to increasing women's meaningful participation, representation and leadership in the Intra-Afghan Peace Negotiations, including:
  - attended and spoke at a 2021 International Women's Day event – "Women and Peace" – held by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (jointly organized by the HCNR and the Commission for Human Rights, Civil Society and Women's Affairs)
  - participated in 9 meetings with Special Envoys and government representatives and delegations of Belgium, the EU, Norway and the United States to share analysis, concerns and recommendations regarding the status of women's participation in the peace process, including for:
    - the protection of WHRDs
    - the importance of diplomatic solidarity with Afghan women
    - continued support to women's civil society organizations following the US withdrawal
    - demands for a face-to-face meeting with Taliban representatives regarding the protection of women's rights under Islam
  - participated in 6 meetings of the HCNR and/or Women's Advocacy Committee that focused on advocacy for women's participation with key government actors in Afghanistan such as: President Ashraf Ghani; representatives of the Parliamentary Commission for Human Rights, Civil Society and Women's Affairs; other Afghan Parliamentarians. This included being the Chair of various Women, Peace and Security working group meetings.

The peacebuilder shared the following quotes with WPHF on the impact of RRW support at both the individual and project level:
- *"My recommendation [in the peace dialogue meeting] was about urgent ceasefire and decrease of violence, because in case of no ceasefire, no one can talk about protection of women's rights and achievement."*
- *"I asked from all [High Council for National Reconciliation Leadership Committee] members that they should advocate for women's rights and achievements in the negotiation. If they do this, women's rights and demands will be safe in the peace agreement. Now, lots of the leadership members agree with this."*
- *"Your support with me is one of the causes of my recent role and achievements."*

This example demonstrates the success of the RRW in providing an alternative rapid funding stream – complementary to regular or longer-term project support – that addresses specific and immediate barriers to women's participation in formal peace processes, ensuring that women's knowledge, experiences, and expertise inform contemporaneous decision-making on peace and security.

3. Delays and Adaptations

Operational
There were internal operational delays for the RRW exceptional/emergency support to evacuated Afghan WHRDs regarding appropriate procedures for engaging Western Union given the unique and challenging circumstances, including:

- Ongoing nature of evacuations: the exact total number of WHRDs could not be determined ahead of engaging Western Union as evacuations to transit countries and destination countries were ongoing and at short notice. UN Women provided a solution in the form of an exceptional prepaid authorization to Western Union based on an estimate of likely support.
- Security concerns: Some WHRDs requested that WPHF RRW could verify it was a legitimate actor, with justified security concerns regarding sensitive biodata and information on current location. Where WHRDs expressed concern and requested further identification, WPHF used its connections with UNAMA, UN Women Afghanistan CO, and RRW INGO partners to reassure the WHRDs that the offer of support and request for information were genuine. WPHF secured the data information with password protected files and anonymization of data.
- National photo identification requirements for WHRDs based on country of current location – this documentation has not yet been provided to some evacuated WHRDs, preventing them from being able to pick up the cash support.
- Limits to daily cash transfers for some WU offices, particularly smaller offices.

Country Level
CSO 1_Afghanistan: The CSO applied for an extension to the support by 1 month, which would have brought the total amount of support to 24 600 USD. While the extension to the support was approved by the WPHF Funding Board on 16 July 2021, the final transfer of the monthly subsistence allowance did not go ahead because of the Taliban takeover of Kabul on 15 August 2021. Instead, the peacebuilder was referred to the WPHF RRW exceptional/emergency support to evacuated Afghan WHRDs, following her evacuation to a third country (see below and elsewhere in this report).

CSO 4_Afghanistan: The CSO made two formal revisions to its initiative following changes and delays to the Intra-Afghan Peace Negotiations. The first revision followed the formal decision to temporarily move the Intra-Afghan Peace Negotiations location from Doha to Istanbul. In early April 2021, following further delays and breakdowns in the formal negotiations between the Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the CSO pivoted rapidly to make a second revision to its initiative with a location change from Istanbul to Kabul. The purpose of the conference remained the same – to convene women civil society representatives at the Track 2 level to increase women's influence on the outcomes of the Track 1 peace process. RRW Direct Support costs remained the same – to cover the cost of the consultant (see section 4b above). The delays and adaptations/revisions undertaken by the CSO are a concrete examples of the ways in which women's CSOs are forced to respond at short notice to high-level decisions that make major changes to the format, geography and parameters of Track 1 peace processes. RRW was pleased to provide the CSO with flexible and practical support that ensured the CSO could move ahead with an adapted initiative at short notice.

South Sudan – Community Youth for Development Aid (CYDA): a 1-month no-cost extension (until 15 October 2021) to the CSO request for support was approved on 30 August 2021. The extension request was submitted by RRW INGO partner Inclusive Peace responsible for delivering the requested support, together with the CSO. The justification for the request was to ensure that Inclusive Peace, CYDA and all project partners could contribute to the development of the technical document in a way that maximises participatory and inclusive approaches, ensuring multiple rounds of feedback and inputs from the CSO

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and its consortium partners to inform the development of the technical document and to verify the final output.

Liberia – Liberia Future Trust (LiFT) – RRW Direct Support: the CSO requested a delay to the implementation of RRW Direct Support to allow for time to mobilize additional resources required for the successful implementation of the CSO project. This resulted in a delay of 8 months to the start date of the planned CSO initiative.

Mali – Alliance pour la recherche et le développement intégré (ARDI): RRW support to this CSO initiative faced a 10-monoth operational delay while identifying and engaging the appropriate service provider to deploy an expert consultant. The CSO initiative was approved for support in December 2020, and the third-party contract with the consultant was signed in October 2021.

CSO 2_Afghanistan: RRW support to WILPF Afghanistan was scheduled to take place in April 2021, during a planned Track 2 peace conference in Istanbul, Turkey. Following significant changes to the Intra-Afghan Peace Negotiations during April 2021 and the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021, the CSO initiative underwent revisions and was eventually placed on hold. The CSO and the RRW Unit remain in contact to determine the next steps for the support.

Liberia – Disabled Children and Female Empowerment Network (DCFEN): the RRW Unit has faced operational delays in identifying a suitable service provider for this CSO initiative. The support was requested through the RRW Direct Support stream, meaning that WPHF covers the cost directly (for example by paying a service provider) rather than disbursing a grant to the CSO. The RRW continues to identify a suitable way forward in 2022.

CSO 5_Afghanistan: after the RRW approved the CSO request for support, the planned initiative faced delays at the visa approval stage for an Afghan woman travelling to the UN in New York. Due to the long delay to the travel plans, the CSO request for RRW support for the initiative was withdrawn.

4. Planned 2022 Priorities

In 2022, the RRW Unit will prioritize the following:

- RRW midterm review management response finalization and implementation. Throughout 2022 the RRW will implement a management response to the independent mid-term review carried out in 2021, guided by the WPHF Funding Board
- The RRW will explore the creation of an online encrypted application platform for each stream in 4 languages (FR, EN, ES, RU, AR)
- The RRW will tailor its outreach and number of organizations supported through the short term grant funding stream
- The RRW will work towards including INGO partner(s) from the South

5. Appendices
- Appendix 1: RRW Brochure
- Appendix 2: RRW Risk Matrix
- Appendix 3: Technical document produced by RRW INGO partner Inclusive Peace – "Monitoring and Advocacy Strategies for CSOs During the Implementation of Peace Agreements"

6. Indicator Based Performance Assessment

Results	Indicators	Progress Achieved against Targets	Reason for Variance	Source of Verification
Project Outcome The Rapid Response Window on Women's Participation in Peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements is established and delivery of interventions from the window (under WPHF outcome 4) is ensured.	1. Number/type of demand-driven requests supported by RRW (direct-support) Baseline: 11 (as of December 2021) Target: Dependent on funding available; at least 50 supported directly by RRW unit by December 2023 2. Number/type of short-term grants supported by RRW Baseline: 2 (as of December 2021) Target: Dependent on funding available; at least 24 supported by RRW unit by December 2023	In 2021, 8 civil society initiatives supported in four countries for direct support funding. In addition, 14 Afghan WHRDs were evacuated in coordination with UNAMA and UNW, 19 Afghan WHRDs, including 25 dependents supported through the RRW. 2 short-term grants were supported in Liberia focused on strengthening women's engagement in peace process implementation.	N/A – In Progress N/A - In Progress	Review of project documents/Management Information System Internal review WPHF external evaluation
Output 1.1. Quality technical and advisory support to the Rapid Response Window and its decision-making structures is provided	1. Existence of RRW decision-making documents and packages for selection and review of requests Baseline: 0 Target: December 2020	Decision making documents including application packages accepted on an a rolling basis in five languages developed and available on WPHF website.	N/A	Emails Project documents Annual reports
	2. Percentage of decisions implemented within the timeframe Baseline: N/A Target: December 2023: 100%	The RRW continues to evaluate proposals on an ongoing basis within a few days, prioritizing most urgent requests. All shortlisted proposals are forwarded to the technical committee immediately after for their technical input.	In Progress	Emails Project documents Annual reports
Output 1.2. Efficient, effective, and timely management of the Rapid Response Window and direct implementation of support is ensured	1. Existence of a M&E Strategy and bank of indicators for the RRW Baseline: 0 Target: December 2020	M&E strategy in existence with indicator tip sheets developed in five languages (English, Spanish, French, Arabic and Russian) providing guidance to applicants.	N/A	M&E Strategy/Documents
	2. CfP and proposal templates available online. Baseline: 0 Target: December 2023	CfP and proposal templates for both direct support and short-terms grants developed and available online on WPHF call for proposal webage.	N/A	Risk management matrix
	3. Availability of an Internal review of the RRW and set of recommendations Baseline: 0 Target: December 2021	An internal review was conducted on the RRW process and operations and final report available in October 2021. Presentation of findings and recommendations carried out INGO partners, Donors and Funding Board	N/A	Internal RRW Review Document
	4. Availability of RRW annual report Baseline: 0 Target: 3 annual reports before December 2023	To date, two annual reports have been produced outlining the results and progress of the RRW.	On target with two additional reports by 2023.	RRW annual report

Results	Indicators	Progress Achieved against Targets	Reason for Variance	Source of Verification
Output 1.3. Efficient, effective and timely management of INGO partnerships is ensured	1. Pool of INGO implementing partners selected Baseline: 0 Target: December 2020	Partner agreements signed with 5 INGO partners in 2020 and one additional partner in 2021	N/A	Emails from FB with selected INGOs
	2. INGO partners have funds on retainer Baseline: 0 Target: At least 6 by end June 2021	6 INGO partners have received funds on retainer in 2021 totalling $1,253,464.	N/A	Emails from FB with selected INGOs
	3. Number of CSO initiatives supported by INGOs across both RRW streams Baseline: 0 Target: At least 24 in total by December 2023	A total of 3 initiatives were supported by INGO partners, including 1 direct support and 2 short-term grants. The remaining 6 direct support recipients were managed by the RRW Unit.	In Progress	Financial reports INGO reports
Output 1.4. Communications, capacity building and Knowledge Management is provided for the Rapid Response Window	1.Types of communications tools and knowledge products developed and disseminated on the RRW in at least 4 languages Baseline: 0 Target: December 2023 : at least 4	4 communication products developed by the end of 2021, including a RRW brochure, INGO partner induction package, series of infographics for direct support stream, social media packages.	N/A	Community of Practice Knowledge products
	2.Number/types of information, and/or exchange of best practices sessions organized for RRW partners Baseline: 0 Target: 40 by December 2023	25 information webinars conducted for propestive applicants with approximately 577 CSO and INGO representatives participating.	In Progress	Mid-term review/evaluations

THE WPHF RAPID RESPONSE WINDOW

on women's participation in peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements

January 1 – December 31, 2021

Women's Peace & Humanitarian Fund
A United Nations & Civil Society Partnership

Background

Twenty years after the adoption of the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1325, women's meaningful participation in peace processes remains one of the most stalled areas in the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. This is despite evidence of the value of women's meaningful participation in reaching peace agreements, broadening the issues discussed in negotiations, and implementing agreements and sustaining peace.

The Rapid Response Window on women's participation in peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements is a new funding mechanism that addresses urgent funding gaps with rapid, short-term support. It was established on the recommendation of the UNSG's October 2019 annual report on WPS (S/2019/800, p.37).

The Rapid Response Window (RRW) opened for applications for pilot initiatives in September 2020. It was officially launched at a high-level event in January 2021.

2021 Progress and Results

During the reporting period, the WPHF Rapid Response Window on women's participation in peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements (RRW) has seen significant achievements in the following areas: direct implementation of RRW support to civil society partners in four countries (Afghanistan, Liberia, Mali and South Sudan); establishing INGO partnerships to support RRW implementation, including through the provision of quality technical and advisory support to RRW decision making; rapid response exceptional support for individual evacuated Afghan WHRDs engaged with the formal peace process at the time; engagement with key stakeholders through an official launch event, implementing the outreach and communications strategy and a communications campaign; a mid-term process and operations review following the RRW's inception phase.

WPHF held an official **high-level launch event** for the RRW on 14 January 2021, co-hosted with six government donors – Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Norway and Sweden. The launch was opened by Her Excellency Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed, demonstrating the UN's high-level commitment to the successful implementation of the RRW. Key stakeholders shared video messages to demonstrate their support for the RRW, including CSO partners, INGO partners, WPHF Board members, and experts on women's participation in peace processes. The virtual launch event had over 700 attendees.

Overall, WPHF has hosted **23 information sessions** in four languages for CSOs on the objectives of the RRW and application process.

WPHF

As of December 8, 2021, a total of **494 proposals from 56 countries** have been received, indicating the urgent need for this type of support. A total of 100 which have been longlisted for evaluation. 11 shortlisted proposals are currently pending and are either at the Technical Committee review stage or final approval process.

CSO Implementing Partners

Direct Support

Afghanistan
▸ Roya Film House & MIRA (co-implementer)
▸ Afghan Women's Network
▸ Women and Children Legal Research Foundation (WCLRF)

Liberia
▸ Liberia Future Trust Fund (LiFT)

Mali
▸ Alliance pour la recherche et le développement integré (ARDI)

South Sudan
▸ Community Youth for Development Aid (CYDA)

Short Term Grants

Liberia
▸ Liberia Future Trust Fund (LiFT)
▸ Women's NGO Secretariat of Liberia (WONGOSOL)

In 2021, the RRW supported **eight** civil society initiatives in Afghanistan, Liberia, Mali and South Sudan.

In **Afghanistan**, the RRW supported three initiatives:
▸ A WHRD's direct participation in the Track 1 Leadership Committee of the High Council for National Reconciliation
▸ The implementation of a participatory Track 2 Women's Peace Conference in Kabul
▸ An initiative documenting women's direct representation in the Doha negotiations.

In **Liberia**, the RRW covered costs of a consultant for a civil society initiative to strengthen women's participation in monitoring the implementation of the 2009 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report recommendations (which emerged from the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement). Together with INGO partner Conciliation Resources, the RRW is provided support (ongoing) to two civil society projects in Liberia on women's participation in the 2009 TRC report recommendations, including for the establishment of a gender-responsive War Crimes Court.

In **Mali,** the RRW covered the cost of an independent consultant to conduct a consultation-based research initiative (ongoing) on behalf of a CSO partner, on women's participation in monitoring the implementation of the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation.

In **South Sudan,** together with INGO partner Inclusive Peace, the RRW supported the development of a technical document to strengthen civil society monitoring of the implementation of gender provisions in the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

From October-December 2021, the RRW provided one-off **emergency support to nine Afghan women human rights defenders (WHRDs)** who were evacuated following their engagement with the Intra-Afghan Peace Negotiations and events of mid-August 2021.

RRW emergency support to WHRDs recognizes that protection is a key consideration for women's meaningful participation, including in cases where a peace process has been unsuccessful or has resulted in adverse outcomes for women's rights and the safety of WHRDs.

Financial support is transferred for immediate use by WHRDs at their discretion, for costs related to their evacuation, settling safely into a new country, and where possibly continuing their advocacy work.

Support for a further two civil society initiatives was pending during this reporting period (Afghanistan: delayed as a result of changes to the Intra-Afghan Peace Negotiations in May/June and then the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021; Liberia: delayed due to operational setbacks in a procurement process).

The RRW conducted proactive and reactive **outreach efforts** with UN Women and other UN agency country offices in the following contexts: Chad – ahead of a possible national dialogue process; Libya – following women's representation and participation in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum; Sudan – to strengthen implementation of the 2020 Juba Agreement for Peace and further national and sub-national negotiations; and Venezuela – ahead of a possible national dialogue process.

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Mid-Term Review

The RRW also underwent a mid-term operations review from September-November 2021, conducted by an independent consultant. The review included a desk review of RRW documentation and 24 semi-structured interviews with 26 stakeholders, including WPHF Secretariat staff members and consultants ; WPHF Board members; high-level UN Women Program Support Management staff; RRW INGO partners; RRW Technical Committee members beyond INGO partners; and civil society partners implementing initiatives supported by RRW in three countries (Afghanistan; Liberia; South Sudan).

The review includes a summary of priority recommendations for consideration by the WPHF Secretariat and Board in the following areas:

- ▶ Communications and outreach
- ▶ CSO application and RRW review processes
- ▶ monitoring, evaluation, learning and reporting
- ▶ Scope of the RRW
- ▶ Configuration and content of the two RRW streams – Direct Support and Short-Term Grants
- ▶ INGO partnerships
- ▶ Addressing bottlenecks and challenges within the UN system.

Challenges

Overall challenges during the reporting period include: devising and implementing exceptional operations procedures to meet the needs for RRW implementation; adapting and/or delaying civil society initiatives in response to volatile peace negotiations in fragile contexts; attracting a consistent majority of eligible CSO applications for a new, targeted and specific mechanism (the RRW) via outreach and communications activities, including through key partners (UN agencies; INGO partners); poor internet connectivity for CSO partners which inhibited timely and frequent communications about project activities and outputs.

Appendix 2 : RRW Risk Matrix

Risk Area (contextual, programmatic, institutionally, briefly describe)	Risk Level 4=Very High 3=High 2=Medium 1=Low	Likelihood 5=Very High 4=Likely 3=Possible 2=Unlikely 1=Rare	Impact 5=Extreme 4=Major 3=Moderate 2=Minor 1=Insignificant	Mitigation Mitigating measures undertaken during the reporting period to address the risk
Women engaged in the initiatives may face additional security risks if exposed	3	3	5	The RRW Unit managed communications regarding selected CSO initiatives to ensure that any external communications were cleared by the CSO/women. The RRW Unit maintained regular contact with CSO partners to ensure it was aware of security issues and was taking appropriate steps to ensure protection. The RRW Unit communicated regularly with UN country presence and CSO partners to ensure it was informed of political changes that might affect security risks. In one specific context, the RRW implemented a targeted initiative to address security risks faced by WHRDs in a particularly volatile context (an emergency cash support initiative for evacuated Afghan WHRDs to strengthen their protection).
Request is not representative of diversity of women or groups	2	3	2	The template for applications includes a section on inclusive and participatory approach to intersectionality in initiatives. The RRW Technical Committee provided informed and adequate oversight at the CSO application stage and made targeted, practical recommendations to some prospective CSOs to strengthen commitments to the representation of diverse women in their planned initiatives.
Simplified application process and short turnover limits level of quality control and assessment	2	2	3	The mid-term independent review of the RRW included a review of the application package and approval process to benchmark it against good practice and suggest recommendations to improve the processes. The RRW Unit reviewed and revised the application template to help CSOs to self-select their/the initiative's eligibility for support. The RRW's decision-making bodies (Technical Committee and Task Force) were well informed and engaged in a timely manner for decisions, ensuring that they had time to provide detailed feedback and make necessary informational demands of applicant CSOs. This supported CSO initiatives to be strong in quality. The RRW Unit provided capacity-strengthening support to CSOs where necessary to help ensure that revisions to applications were based on clear feedback with rationale and recommendations.
Requests submitted to the Technical Committee and Task Force for approval do not meet the required quorum of 50% of responses	1	1	2	The RRW Unit prepared Terms of Reference for its decision-making bodies (the Technical Committee and WPHF Funding Board Task Force) to ensure they were clear on their responsibilities and timelines for decision making. The RRW Unit provided clear deadlines for responses in its communications with decision-making bodies. Where necessary, the approval time was extended for 1 day until the quorum was met.
WPHF Secretariat does not have adequate programming oversight for RRW grants managed by INGO partners	1	1	3	The RRW Unit uses UN Women processes to implement partnerships with INGO partners, including a capacity assessment. All RRW INGO partners were scored as "low risk" as responsible parties with the ability to sub-grant to CSOs. The RRW Unit held inception calls with all INGO partners, provided a detailed induction package to guide the technical elements of the partnership, and introduced quarterly calls with all partners to strengthen communications and oversight of the grants made by INGO partners to CSOs.
Cash transferred to an INGO partner is not used as intended or reported in accordance with agreements and approved plans	1	1	4	The RRW Unit uses UN Women reporting processes (financial and narrative) on a quarterly basis to ensure that INGO partners are using funds transferred as intended and as reported. The RRW Unit also holds regular bilateral check-ins with INGO partners to agree project activities and identify opportunities to support CSOs through the RRW, as well as quarterly coordination calls with all INGO partners. WPHF Secretariat finance and operations staff joined partnership inception calls with INGO partners to provide guidance on financial reporting requirements.
Efforts are isolated and therefore impact is limited	2	2	3	The RRW Unit communicated regularly with UN country presence, INGO partners, Women Mediators Networks, DPPA and other stakeholders as relevant, to share information, ensure no duplication and the integration of efforts where possible.

Monitoring and Advocacy Strategies for Civil Society Organisations During the Implementation of Peace Agreements

October 2021

Contents

Introduction

1.1 Background

Civil war broke out in South Sudan in 2013, just two years after the country achieved independence. The current agreement, the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), is the second peace agreement concluded to address the conflict. The earlier deal collapsed in 2016, sparking renewed violence and leading to the departure of Riek Machar, one of the two primary political actors and key signatories to the agreement, from the country.

Spurred by the urging and mediation of regional states, peace talks resumed in late 2017, and the parties signed the R-ARCSS in September 2018.[1] The agreement ushered in a ceasefire and laid out a political roadmap that called for the formation of a unity government, the unification of armed forces, and the creation of a new national assembly. The agreement also called for the formation of a transitional court of justice and the implementation of economic reforms.[2] Despite the peace agreement holding as a political instrument, levels of intercommunal violence have increased markedly over the last 18 months.

In 2020, the South Sudan National Dialogue Conference reached consensus on a wide-ranging set of outcomes, including a recommendation that the country's two main political leaders should step down.[3] At the time of writing, however, civic space is now under renewed strain in the country following a tightening of restrictions relating to the activities of civil society organisations, coupled with increased surveillance, extrajudicial arrests, and targeted violence and threats. This has implications for how and what civil society actors can do when it comes to monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement.

As in most conflicts, women and girls in South Sudan have been disproportionately impacted by sexual and gender-based violence and secondary effects of war such as poverty and food insecurity.[4] Additionally, while women in civil society have played an important role during the conflict and peace process, women have been largely excluded from the official peace talks. All those who signed the R-ARCSS on behalf of conflict parties were men while only seven of the 17 civil society signatories were women.[5]

Due in large part to the advocacy of civil society organisations and women's groups, the R-ARCSS features gender provisions which address a variety of topics, with some sections exhibiting

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[1] No author, 'Toward a Viable Future for South Sudan', *International Crisis Group* (2021) [online], available from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/300-toward-viable-future-south-sudan [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

[2] Ibid

[3] Ola Muhajer and David Deng, 'South Sudan's People Have Spoken on Peace. Is Anyone Listening?' *United States Institute of Peace* (2021) [online], available from: https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/04/south-sudans-people-have-spoken-peace-anyone-listening [last accessed 15 September 2021].

[4] Sarah Pelham, 'Born to Lead: Recommendations on Increasing Women's Participation in South Sudan's Peace Process' *Oxfam International*, (2020) [online], available from: https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620934/bp-south-sudan-women-peace-processes-300120-en.pdf [last accessed: 4 September 2021], p. 4

[5] Ibid, p. 2

significantly more specificity and context than others. Many of the gender provisions are vague, especially in comparison to the objectives developed in South Sudan's national action plan on women, peace and security. These provisions will be explored within this document in the third chapter.

Progress in implementing the R-ARCSS has largely been slow. The parties missed two key deadlines before finally forming a unity government, the cornerstone of the agreement, in 2020. While the parliament provided for in the agreement was also recently inaugurated, violence and governmental in-fighting continue, compromising any progress that has been made.[6] In this context, progress on the implementation of the gender provisions of the agreement is also stalled. Monitoring the implementation of these provisions is further complicated by a lack of reliable data and distrust between the government and civil society.

Evidence from other implementation contexts indicates that women and civil society are poised to play a key role in monitoring provisions during the implementation of peace agreements. Women's organisations in South Sudan are eager to contribute to the monitoring process, but they face a number of obstacles, including discriminatory gender norms, entrenched inequality, and a lack of formal education and technical knowledge, as well as general insecurity in the country.

1.2 Objectives and Structure of the Document

The aim of this document is to provide evidence, drawn from Inclusive Peace's comparative research, regarding the possible strategies by which civil society organisations (CSOs), and in particular women's groups, could monitor the gender provisions within the revitalised peace agreement; advocate for the implementation of these gender provisions; and develop, through participatory methods, contextualised indicators for use in monitoring activities. These objectives were developed in coordination with Community Youth for Development Aid (CYDA) and its project partners through a review of the groups' initial proposal and subsequent consultations.

In pursuit of these aims, the second chapter of this document reviews civil society monitoring during peace agreement implementation while the third chapter reviews the advocacy role of civil society during the implementation phase. Finally, the fourth chapter explores the concept of indicators while also narrowing in on the South Sudanese context by presenting and discussing the gender provisions within the R-ARCSS.

1.3 Methods

The findings and strategies proposed are drawn from an earlier analysis of 40 qualitative case studies of negotiation and implementation processes, covering 34 countries and taking place between 1989 and 2014. The case studies assessed do not only consider the implementation phases of peace processes; nevertheless, only findings and strategies relevant to implementation have been included. Additional relevant secondary sources have also been consulted to support in tailoring the findings and strategies to the South Sudanese context.

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[6] Abdi Latif Dahir, 'Deadly Clashes Threaten South Sudan's Shaky Peace Deal', *The New York Times* (2021) [online], available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/09/world/africa/deadly-clashes-threaten-south-sudans-shaky-peace-deal.html [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

These strategies have also been customised to the South Sudanese context through consultations with stakeholders and experts, and through collaboration with project partners. After receiving the proposal from CYDA and meeting with project partners to understand their needs in relation to the document, Inclusive Peace completed a first draft of the document. This version was then presented to all project partners for feedback. Due to connectivity challenges, Inclusive Peace gathered feedback through a variety of methods, including through calls via WhatsApp and Zoom and through the exchange of text messages, voice notes, and emails. To elicit this feedback, targeted questions on the document's structure, substance, and utility in relation to both the technical aspect of monitoring and indicators and the South Sudan context were posed to partners. During this round of consultations, Inclusive Peace interacted with women and men from these organisations and also attempted to schedule additional calls with the leaders of each organisation.

Project partners consulted during the drafting phase include:

- Community Youth For Development Aid (CYDA)
- Global Alliance Innovation for Poverty Eradication Action (GAIPA)
- Enhanced Action
- Community Organization and Mentorship (COM)

Over the course of the drafting and re-drafting phases, Inclusive Peace also consulted with a number of experts on the implementation of the R-ARCSS and the South Sudanese context more generally. These experts included a representative of UNMISS, a representative of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), a former Envoy to South Sudan, and the Young Women Christian Association (YWCA) of South Sudan.

Monitoring

This section defines and explores the concept of monitoring during peace agreement implementation, incorporating a gendered lens throughout. It also examines the key aspects of CSO monitoring during peace agreement implementation, including a detailed focus on the monitoring of gender provisions. Finally, this section assesses the connection between implementation approaches and monitoring.

2.1 Monitoring Peace Agreement Implementation Through a Gender Lens

Monitoring refers to the technical process of collecting information on the basis of which a verification judgment is to be made.[7] Verification is the process of using monitoring information to evaluate compliance with an agreement.[8] Monitoring is a feature of most ceasefire and peace agreements, and effective monitoring can increase the durability of peace agreements by addressing their inherent commitment problems.[9] Monitoring can also serve as a means to ensure that marginalised groups, such as women, are included in the implementation of the peace agreement and that commitments made to these groups are upheld. Conversely, when women and other marginalised groups are excluded or overlooked in monitoring, there is a risk that commitments related to these groups are side lined in the implementation phase.

Any aspect or provision of a peace agreement that is adequately specified in the agreement (or through subsequent negotiations) can be monitored and verified. Adequate specification of a provision requires the development of timelines and indicators/benchmarks/standards against which compliance can be evaluated.[10] Adequate specification of gender provisions is not the norm. Rather, gender provisions are likely to be phrased in vague terms which, in turn, 'can create confusion, disputes and a lack of political will for implementation'.[11] Thus, civil society can play a role in advocating for specificity within gender provisions, and re-negotiating ambiguous provisions. Further details regarding indicators will be provided in the fourth chapter.

The principal civil society actors which tend to be involved in monitoring are local- and national-level, dedicated human, civil, and women's rights organisations and research institutions with close connections to local communities.[12] Civil society's role in monitoring and verification can be both official (provided for in the peace agreement or subsequent legislation) and unofficial. Unofficial monitoring is usually combined with advocacy which can be non-public or public[13] (for further details regarding advocacy strategies, please refer to the third chapter). Women's CSOs, and women peacebuilders and peacemakers, frequently play an informal role in peace processes, often at the

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[7] Trevor Findlay, 'The Role of Monitoring and Verification', *Contemporary Security Policy* 22:3 (2001), p. 170

[8] Ibid

[9] Nick Ross, 'Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences', *Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative* (2017) [online], available from: https://www.inclusivepeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/report-civil-society-monitoring-en.pdf [last accessed: 4 September 2021], p. 6

[10] Findlay, 'The Role of Monitoring and Verification', p. 174

[11] Monash Gender Peace and Security Department, *Towards Inclusive Peace: Mapping Gender Provisions in Peace Agreements*, Workshop Report, (Monash University, 2019), p. 8

[12] Ross, 'Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences', p. 9

[13] Ibid, p. 10

Track II level.[14] While every effort should be made to include women in formal, official capacities, these informal experiences render women well-suited to leading any unofficial monitoring and verification processes and mechanisms in the implementation phase.

A bottom-up monitoring process involving civil society can pave the way for more participatory spaces and, in the long-term, can help to contribute to broader transformative changes. The meaningful participation of women in implementation activities such as monitoring can also contribute to transformative change in terms of gender equality. By actively participating in monitoring activities, women are in a position to hold power-holders to account, a dynamic that challenges historical patterns of women's exclusion from decision-making spaces.

Operative paragraph eight of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 (2000) calls on all actors involved in implementing peace agreements to adopt a gender perspective. Agreements should incorporate clear gender-sensitive modalities for implementation and monitoring, and make provisions for women's active involvement in them. Likewise, subsequent UNSC Resolution 1889 (2009) calls for peace processes to ensure women's participation throughout all stages of the development process and in post-conflict reconstruction, and creates a monitoring mechanism to track how UNSC Resolution 1325 is being implemented. CSOs can use this Resolution to safeguard women's participation at all stages of a peace process, from inception to implementation, and to hold accountable actors who fail to enact these inclusion measures.[15]

Monitoring a peace agreement through a gender lens may require the following actions: identifying provisions within the agreement with a 'gender perspective' (see the fourth chapter of this report); encouraging the leadership and participation of women in implementation bodies and processes; addressing issues 'such as structural discrimination and the disproportionate impact of the armed conflict on women, girls'; and guaranteeing 'equitable access to the programs and benefits' of the agreement.[16] The annual UN Secretary-General's Report on Women, Peace and Security in 2020 highlighted that previous reports called for 'concrete language requiring the meaningful participation of women in the follow-up mechanisms tasked with implementing and monitoring peace agreements'.[17] Indeed, this Report commended the South Sudanese R-ARCSS, praising the commitment to including women in the implementation bodies through a 35 percent women's quota.[18]

Colombia's 2016 peace accord established a Special Forum for the Implementation of the Gender-Based Approach.[19] The Forum demonstrates how women's political and technical engagement in

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[14] Anjali Dayal and Agathe Christien, 'Reframing Women's Roles in Peace Processes: Beyond the Negotiating Table', *Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security* Policy Brief (2020) [online], available from: https://giwps.georgetown.edu/resource/reframing-womens-roles-in-peace-processes/ [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

[15] No author, 'UN Security Council Resolution 1889 on Women, Peace, and Security', *The Institute for Inclusive Security* (n.d.) [online], available from: https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2010_unscr_1889_on_women_peace_and_security.pdf [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

[16] Josefina Echavarria Alvarez et al., 'Towards Implementation of Women's Rights in the Colombian Final Peace Accord: Progress, Opportunities and Challenges: Special Report on the Monitoring of the Gender Commitments', *Barometer Initiative, Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies* (2020) [online], available from: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Towards-Implementation-of-Womens-Rights-in-the-Colombian-Final-Peace-Accord-2.pdf [last accessed: 4 September 2021], p. 5

[17] No author, 'United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security' S/2020/946 (2020) [online], available from: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2020_946.pdf [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

[18] Ibid

[19] Echavarria Alvarez et al., 'Towards Implementation of Women's Rights in the Colombian Final Peace Accord: Progress, Opportunities and Challenges: Special Report on the Monitoring of the Gender Commitments', p. 18

peace agreement implementation can ensure that a gender approach is being integrated throughout the agreement and that women's rights remain on the political agenda.[20] The Forum also acts as a dialogue mechanism between women's groups, the government, civil rights organisations, and others responsible for monitoring the peace agreement, further demonstrating the benefits of monitoring peace agreement implementation in a gender-sensitive manner.

2.2 Approaches to Implementation and Monitoring

In order to ensure a structured implementation of a peace agreement, the negotiating parties usually set up clear plans, timelines and mechanisms. Parties are advised to establish implementation mechanisms that are manageable and effective, as a cumbersome mechanism may provide an excuse for delaying the realisation of certain provisions in the agreement.[21] While some provisions may be implemented by existing governmental entities, the parties may also establish new political and/or technical entities for tasks mandated in the agreement.[22] At the political level, joint commissions or implementation councils – possibly with the inclusion of an impartial chairperson and other third-party or civil society representatives – establish a space for parties to continue to collaborate and offer parties a sense of control over implementation.[23]

Specialised commissions or sub-commissions can be established to ensure the same monitoring and verification mechanisms are provided for gender provisions as for the peace agreement writ large. As evidenced in Colombia, the Sub-commission on Gender was established during the peace talks in September 2014[24] (more than two years before the revised 'Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace' deal was signed on 24 November 2016).[25] This landmark Sub-commission was the first ever 'formalised mechanism to include the gender perspective in peace negotiations'.[26] It is credited with garnering commitments by the negotiators concerning the integration of gender in the peace talks, thus creating an avenue for accountability.

Implementation bodies are usually complemented by monitoring and verification mechanisms to reduce uncertainty in the implementation process. Effective monitoring helps demonstrate compliance with the agreement and thereby could build public support for the process.[27] However, as the Colombia case indicates, greater public awareness around an agreement's provisions and implementation can also provoke significant backlash against gender provisions, with some misconstruing them as being against traditional values.[28] The process of monitoring, particularly when

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[20] Ibid

[21] Ross, 'Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences', p. 7

[22] Ibid

[23] Ibid

[24] Hilde Salvesen and Dag Nylander, 'Towards an Inclusive Peace: Women and the Gender Approach in the Colombian Peace Process', *NOREF* Report, (2017) [online], available from: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Salvesen_Nylander_Towards%20an%20inclusive%20peace_July2017_final.pdf [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

[25] No author, 'Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace', *National Government of Colombia – FARC-EP* (2016) [online], available from: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1845 [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

[26] Salvesen and Nylander, Towards an Inclusive Peace: Women and the Gender Approach in the Colombian Peace Process'

[27] Ross, 'Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences', p. 7

[28] Elizabeth Corredor, On the Strategic Use of Women's Rights: Backlash, Rights-Based Framing, and Anti-Gender Campaigns in Colombia's 2016 Peace Agreement', *Latin American Politics and Society* 63:3 (2021).

coupled with advocacy activities (see the third chapter), can also serve to raise awareness of the peace agreement and its provisions throughout a country.

2.3 Strategies for CSOs to Conduct Monitoring During Peace Agreement Implementation

This section examines the contributions CSOs can make to monitoring, and the strategies through which they may conduct monitoring activities.

<u>What can civil society bring to monitoring activities?</u>

Civil society monitors may offer local knowledge, access to communities, as well as capacity and expertise in monitoring.[29] Women peacebuilders and women-led CSOs in particular often possess a deep understanding of conflict dynamics at the community-level. Civil society may also contribute to the legitimacy of monitoring and verification through the credibility which stems from their status as non-partisan or bipartisan.[30] Conversely, the credibility and effectiveness of monitoring processes is reduced when these mechanisms are dominated by one demographic group, as marginalised groups can perceive that their inclusion is perpetuated in these mechanisms. Civil society that represents diverse constituencies, includes marginalised communities, and acts in an inclusive manner can also foster wider ownership over the agreement's outcomes, thus increasing legitimacy between the broader population and the state.

<u>What strategies can civil society pursue in order to conduct monitoring?</u>

Our comparative research demonstrates that civil society tends to participate in the monitoring and verification of peace agreements in four different ways.[31] We recognize that South Sudanese civil society has a wealth of experience in pursuing similar strategies, though some of these efforts have been frustrated due to constraining factors which characterise the peace process more broadly. For example, the Women's Coalition holds an annual conference on the progress of the peace agreement, and women leaders take part in various official monitoring commissions. As such, the ideas and examples presented here are intended to feed into a reflection amongst relevant civil society actors and coalitions in South Sudan as to what has worked well, what strategies have encountered challenges, and possible alternate approaches seen elsewhere which could be adapted to the context. These can be combined within any given peace process:

Official monitoring commissions or bodies featuring civil society representatives

Certain specially constituted bodies – most often inclusive commissions – can be mandated to assist with elements of a peace process. Their representatives are not limited to members of the government and/or conflict parties; civil society representatives can therefore play an equal role to that of the conflict parties. Inclusive commissions can be responsible for preparing or leading a peace

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[29] Linda Darkwa, 'Enhancing Peace and Development through Compliance Monitoring — Lessons from Ghana's 2013 Sotu Process,' *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 10:3 (2015), p. 107

[30] Catherine Barnes, 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Mapping Functions in Working for Peace', *The International Spectator* 44:1 (2009), p. 138

[31] Ross, 'Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences', p. 9

process. Post-agreement inclusive commissions can be charged with monitoring or implementing part of, or all, the agreement. The implementation of an agreement may also require the creation of inclusive permanent constitutional bodies. Such commissions can have post-agreement monitoring and verification duties as part of their mandate and can exist at the national and at the local level.[32] In many cases, the primary role of these commissions is mediation, with monitoring featuring as a component of this role.

In El Salvador, the National Commission for the Consolidation of the Peace (Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz: COPAZ), established by the 1992 Chapultepec Accords, was a mechanism for the monitoring and verification of the implementation process of the negotiations. It was designed as a guarantee to the opposition party, Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), that the implementation of the Chapultepec Accords would receive multi-partisan support. COPAZ included two representatives from the Government and the FMLN and one representative of each of the parties or coalitions represented in the Legislative Assembly. It was expected that the parties would consult with COPAZ before adopting decisions or measures relating to relevant aspects of the peace agreements. Moreover, COPAZ was given the power to consult the conflict parties at the highest level whenever necessary. It was intended for COPAZ to have access to inspect any activity or site connected with the implementation of the peace agreements. In addition, COPAZ possessed the power to issue conclusions and recommendations relating to the implementation of the peace agreements, and to make these public. In practice, COPAZ was riven by internal disputes.[33]

Official monitoring bodies required to consult with civil society

An official body monitoring the implementation of a peace agreement may be mandated to consult with, or seek input from, civil society (in broad terms) or from specific CSOs through formal or informal channels of consultation.[34]

For instance, in Liberia, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2003 mandated the creation of an Independent National Commission on Human Rights. This Commission was instructed to collaborate with Liberian human rights and CSOs, international human rights organisations and other relevant UN agencies, to monitor and strengthen the observance of human rights in the country (Art. XII.3).[35] This collaboration was slow to emerge, as the Independent Commission was not established until 2010. The selection process for Commission members did not feature consultation with CSOs.[36]

CSOs or groups of organisations conducting independent monitoring

Independent monitoring by CSOs is by far the most common mode of civil society involvement in monitoring peace agreement implementation.[37] Independent civil society monitoring can be formally mandated by a peace agreement or its signatories, but is often unofficial.

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[32] Andries Odendaal, 'The Political Legitimacy of National Peace Committees', *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 7:3 (2012), p. 42

[33] Ross, 'Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences', p. 14

[34] Ibid, p. 10

[35] Ibid

[36] No author, 'World Report 2011: Liberia', *Human Rights Watch* (2011) [online], available from: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2011/country-chapters/liberia [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

[37] Ross, *Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements*, p. 11

One of the most prominent examples of civil society monitoring is the Bantay Ceasefire in Mindanao, Philippines. After the Second Tripoli Agreement in 2001, a broad-based coalition of NGOs and other CSOs created a grassroots mechanism, known as the Bantay Ceasefire, to monitor and report ceasefire violations.[38] The Bantay Ceasefire's approach subsequently developed from ceasefire monitoring to assessing broader social and economic development needs, documenting local peacekeeping efforts,[39] and reporting and investigating alleged human rights violations.[40] The Bantay Ceasefire received support from all sides of the conflict to enter territory and conduct monitoring. Moreover, it has been recognised and commended for its impartiality by the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities which includes representatives of the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

In Kenya, disputes over the results of the 2007 general elections provoked devastating political violence which claimed more than 1,000 lives and caused the displacement of tens of thousands. When the four National Dialogue and Reconciliation agreements were signed in the Spring of 2008, Kofi Annan, the African Union's mediator, invited the private Kenyan think tank South Consulting to provide monitoring data to assess the status of compliance regarding the implementation of the agreement. South Consulting produced regular monitoring reports. In parallel, South Consulting, together with a second private research institution, Ipsos Kenya, conducted regular public opinion polls to assess popular perceptions of the implementation of the different agenda points. The results of this monitoring were published and presented in the media.

Thirdly, think tanks in Guatemala, including the Association of Investigation and Social Studies (Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales: ASIES), the Association for the Advance of the Social Sciences of Guatemala (Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales de Guatemala: AVANCSO), and the Latina American Faculty of Social Sciences (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales: FLACSO), played an important role in the monitoring of the Guatemalan peace agreement, the 1996 Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace.[41] These organisations have produced rigorous studies and analyses of issues related to the implementation of the peace agreement.

Civil society participation in international monitoring missions

A final form of civil society engagement in monitoring entails participation in an international monitoring mission. This can involve local and/or international civil society.[42] In South Sudan, the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) does currently include civil society representation from one of the leading figures in the South Sudan Civil Society Forum.

Based on the experience of the Bantay Ceasefire, the Government of the Philippines and the MILF bolstered their ongoing peace mechanism with a Civilian Protection Component. This mechanism includes an International Monitoring Team (IMT), established in 2002, which provides impartial third-party monitoring with unarmed international monitors. Headed by Malaysia, the IMT includes the Civilian Protection Component, consisting of local and international civil society organisations, to

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[38] Nat J. Colletta, 'Citizen Security – the Role of Ngos and Broader Civil Society in Ceasefire Monitoring: Lessons from Mindanao', *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 2:3 (2006), p. 27

[39] Ibid

[40] Ibid

[41] Sabine Kurtenbach, 'Guatemala: A Dependent and Fragmented Civil Society', in Thania Paffenholz (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment*, (Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 90

[42] Ross, 'Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences', p. 15

prevent acts of violence and abuses of human rights directed against individuals and communities. With their knowledge of the local context and terrain, civil society monitors play an essential role in preventing the occurrence and escalation of incidents. By continuously monitoring the situation on the ground, the IMT can act quickly and it also has the necessary communication channels to address incidents with the parties.[43]

2.4 Factors Which May Enable and Constrain the Capacity of Civil Society to Conduct Monitoring Activities

This section explores the factors which may enable or constrain the capacity of CSOs to conduct monitoring activities during the implementation of a peace agreement.

Safety and security

Human rights defenders and peacebuilders, and in particular women, engaged in activities such as monitoring can be targets of attacks. This increased risk must be mitigated against in order to safeguard the work of civil society monitors and to ensure monitoring activities remain accessible to all. Thus, it is important to build in substantive protection measures, especially at the local level. Additionally, *how* protection measures are built into a peace process at the earliest stages, such as in a ceasefire agreement, are shown to be determinants of how these security issues will be handled at later stages.[44] These measures are especially important in 'the protection of civilians, and strategies against gender-based violence (GBV), which need to be on ceasefire violation lists if they are to be monitored'.[45] Therefore, integrating protection for women human rights defenders and peacebuilders within the earliest stages of peace processes supports their ability to safely monitor the resulting peace agreement.

The International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) and members of the Women's Alliance for Security Leadership (WASL) have developed an 'Operational Guidance to Establish and Enhance the Protection of Women Peacebuilders' which provides guidance to states and multilateral organizations.[46] The recommendations most applicable to safety and security during monitoring include:

- Build mutually beneficial relationships with women peacebuilders; networks can serve as a form of protection.
- Highlight the risks and threats women peacebuilders face, giving priority to their analysis as they are experts on their own situation.
- Enact legislation institutionalising WPS policies and practices, including provisions for the protection of women peacebuilders that include allocation of resources, monitoring, and accountability mechanisms.

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[43] Ibid, p. 16

[44] Jan Pospisil and Christine Bell, '"Securing" Peace: Women and Security Arrangements in Peace Processes', *UN Women* (2018) [online], available from: https://www.politicalsettlements.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Inclusive-peace-processes-Securing-peace-en.pdf [last accessed: 4 September 2021], p. 6

[45] Ibid

[46] No author, 'Operational Guidance to Establish and Enhance the Protection of Women Peacebuilders', *ICAN* (2020) [online], available from: https://icanpeacework.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/ICAN_ProtectingWomenPeacebuilders_Guidance.pdf [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

- Establish protection guidelines and protocols for engagement with women peacebuilders to reduce risk and enable responses to threats as they arise.
- Ensure women peacebuilders' participation is adequately funded to alleviate economic insecurity which exacerbates risks and vulnerabilities.
- Sustain support for women peacebuilders and their participation following the peace process proceedings.[47]

Support structures

Civil society participation in monitoring and verification is more effective when provided with political, technical and financial support.[48] This aligns with comparative research which demonstrates, more broadly, that support structures are crucial in allowing women to make more effective and higher quality contributions to a peace process.[49] Key structures for women include resource centres offering technical support, workshops, and training sessions.[50]

Political influence

Partisan political influence undermine the legitimacy of civil society monitoring and increases the risks faced by civil society actors. A diverse and well-organised alliance of CSOs can better resist political pressures. Independent funding and support by the international community can also ensure greater independence. More broadly, and depending on the context, comparative research also suggests that regional actors in peace processes – as mediators, groups of friends, observers, or even parties to the negotiations – can be highly relevant to ensuring the participation of women.

The nature and wording of provisions

Non-specific provisions for civil society inclusion in monitoring are much less likely to be implemented.[51] As will be reflected upon further in the fourth chapter, indicators must also be specific if they are to be used effectively for monitoring purposes. The more specific gender provisions are, the easier they are to monitor during the implementation phase; conversely, the more ambiguous gender provisions are, the easier it is for those responsible to either not implement the stipulations, or for these provisions to be only nominally implemented. This serves only as a form of 'box-ticking'.[52]

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[47] Ibid

[48] Ross, 'Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences', p. 16

[49] Thania Paffenholz et al., 'Making Women Count - Not Just Counting Women: Assessing Women's Inclusion and Influence on Peace Negotiations', *Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative (The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies) and UN Women* (2016) [online], available from: http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/Making%20Women%20Count%20Not%20Just%20Counting%20Women.pdf [last accessed: 4 September 2021], p. 48

[50] Ibid

[51] Ross, 'Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences', p. 17

[52] Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins, 'Agency and Accountability: Promoting Women's Participation in Peacebuilding', *Feminist Economics*, 22:1 (2016), p. 218

Examples of specific gender provisions are quotas for women's participation in the peace agreement implementation commission or in politics.[53]

Gender provisions that lack context-, cultural-, and country-specificity are less likely to be implemented, largely due to a lack of local support.[54] This is especially true when the international community plays the most prominent role in developing the content of a peace agreement; if gender provisions are viewed as being driven by the international community, they can be seen as no more than an 'add-on', meaning that conflict parties and powerful elites may have little to no interest in their implementation.[55]

Capitalising on the capacity of civil society

The inclusion of civil society in monitoring and verification is most effective when it reflects the capacities and contexts of CSOs.[56] Many of the most successful examples of civil society monitoring and verification have been cases in which the CSOs and individuals concerned had prior experience of monitoring and verification.[57] In contrast, inexperienced CSOs can be more vulnerable to manipulation by the conflict parties which polarises their involvement and also exposes civil society members to the risk of violence or harm.[58] Inexperience and capacity gaps often occur in attempts to implement gender provisions, demonstrating that civil society could benefit from further training in this regard.[59] This does not mean, however, that inexperienced CSOs should be prohibited or discouraged from participating in monitoring and verification. Instead, an awareness of these risks can allow for their mitigation. Furthermore, whether civil society in a country is partisan, bipartisan or non-partisan can affect which form of inclusion in monitoring mechanisms is most appropriate.[60] In contexts of civil society polarisation, for example, civil society positions in a monitoring and verification body may need to be divided to reflect the diversity of civil society.[61]

Coordination of monitoring efforts

Integrated monitoring is more effective than monitoring which is distributed across many organisations. Despite the difficulties in forming civil society partnerships around monitoring and verification, there is evidence that such bodies are more effective than when monitoring is distributed across a diverse range of individual CSOs. When there is no coordinated effort among CSOs to monitor

[53] Ibid, p. 222

[54] Christine Bell, 'Text and Context: Evaluating Peace Agreements for their "Gender Perspective"', *UN Women* (2015) [online], available from: https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2017/8/evaluating-peace-agreements-for-their-gender-perspective [last accessed: 4 September 2021], p. 22

[55] Ibid

[56] Ross, 'Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences', p. 17

[57] Ibid

[58] Michael Mori and Duygu Öztürk, 'Aceh: Failed Initiative for Peace, 1999-2003' [unpublished case study produced during the Broadening Participation in Political Negotiations research project, Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative; available from authors upon request)

[59] Louise Olsson and Madhav Joshi, 'Where are the Women in Peace Agreement Implementation', *PRIO* Blog (2018) [online], available from: https://blogs.prio.org/2018/10/where-are-the-women-in-peace-agreement-implementation/ [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

[60] Ross, 'Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences', p. 17

[61] Ibid

the implementation of an agreement, pro-status quo forces in the country can more easily divide and diminish the influence of CSOs.[62] A broad organisational base is key to effective monitoring and verification by civil society as it provides for more legitimacy and capacity.[63] This aligns with research conducted on women's inclusion in peace negotiations which suggests that coalition-building increases the likelihood of women being heard: women gathered under a collective umbrella, mobilised around common issues and representing a unified, representative cluster can lead to more meaningful inclusion.[64]

Combining monitoring with other functions

CSOs are more effective when they combine monitoring activities with other roles such as mediation and advocacy activities[65] (for further details regarding advocacy, please refer to the third chapter).

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[62] Kurtenbach, 'Guatemala: A Dependent and Fragmented Civil Society', p. 91

[63] Colletta, 'Citizen Security – the Role of Ngos and Broader Civil Society in Ceasefire Monitoring: Lessons from Mindanao', p. 28

[64] Paffenholz et al., 'Making Women Count', p. 41

[65] Ross, 'Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences', p. 9

Advocacy

3.1 Civil Society Advocacy During Peace Agreement Implementation

Advocacy can be summarised as both the articulation of interests, particularly of marginalised groups, and the creation of channels of communication in order to bring these interests to the public agenda and to the agenda of local and national political actors.[66] Advocacy is considered to be one of the core civil society peacebuilding functions[67] and can be effective in creating a space for women's CSOs, networks and groups to raise their concerns and needs with high-level policy-makers. Advocacy is sought in order to raise public awareness, to facilitate debate, and to place pressure upon decision-makers; advocacy can further take both a public and non-public form.[68]

Monitoring and advocacy often accompany one another. International and local groups do not only monitor conflict situations and develop recommendations for policy-makers; such groups can also provide information derived from monitoring activities to advocacy groups, or can themselves use the information gathered for advocacy purposes. Advocacy can be an effective tool in upholding gender provisions, temporary special measures (TSMs) such as quotas, and other mechanisms designed to promote and safeguard the inclusion of women and other traditionally excluded groups.

3.2 Strategies for CSOs to Conduct Advocacy During Peace Agreement Implementation

CSOs can use a wide range of strategies in order to carry out advocacy during the implementation of peace agreements. These strategies can all be used in conjunction with the outputs produced by monitoring activities. In this section, we will explore several key advocacy strategies, offering a range of case studies for illustration.

Public advocacy strategies

Firstly, CSOs can **collaborate with the media**. CSOs can interact with journalists (for instance, by helping to develop story lines and providing interviews), and launch campaigns either to persuade and/or to provide information.[69] By engaging with the media, CSOs can provide opportunities for women and other marginalised communities to express their challenges, needs, and opportunities in their own words to a wide audience. Conversations with our partners in this project revealed that connecting with radio stations, in particular, but also newspapers and magazines, could be one effective way in which local South Sudanese women's groups can share their messages and place pressure upon policy-makers. It is important to highlight, however, that collaboration with the media,

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[66] Christoph Spurk, 'Understanding Civil Society' in Thania Paffenholz (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 24

[67] Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk, 'A Comprehensive Analytical Framework' in Thania Paffenholz (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 69

[68] Ibid

[69] Ibid; Ken Menkhaus et al., 'Somalia: Civil Society in a Collapsed State' in Thania Paffenholz (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 337

by elevating the profile of these groups and their efforts publicly, could raise gendered security risks for CSOs and their staff.

As an example, in Northern Ireland, three weeks following the Good Friday Agreement, a group of citizens, representing a cross-section of society, launched the 'Yes' campaign to encourage the people of Northern Ireland to vote in favour of the peace agreement. The media were engaged with, and an information campaign launched; the idea of voting 'yes' was equated, through language and symbolism, with moving forward. The campaign proved effective: 71.1% voted in favour.[70] Furthermore, in Somalia in the 1990s, many CSOs nurtured close relationships with key media outlets, supporting the creation of story lines and providing interviews, thereby exerting pressure on military leaders.[71]

Secondly, CSOs can **use research, publications and training** for advocacy purposes. There are many examples of this type of advocacy in South Sudan, with groups like CEPO, SSLS, DETCRO, and Born to Lead, a CSO coalition, conducting and publishing research.

CSOs can collaborate with academics to conduct research to highlight the experiences, challenges and needs of society/societal groups. Following these activities, CSOs could publish reports, hold seminars, develop film documentary capacities and release documentaries, and establish websites to communicate information, share written products, raise awareness and fundraise. Lastly, CSOs could hold training workshops for citizens to become involved in advocacy and to raise awareness in the broader community.[72]

In Somalia, for instance, following the two UN operations in the country in the 1990s, CSOs developed 'impressive film documentary capacities', using these skills and this method of dissemination to 'promote awareness of peace and development issues across the country and to give voice to ordinary Somalis'. During this period, CSOs further engaged in participatory action research (PAR) in a bid to establish the lessons learned from successful and failed peacebuilding efforts. The CSOs built a series of rich case studies from these activities.[73] Secondly, in Northern Ireland, during the 'Yes' campaign explored above, CSOs deployed public opinion polls conducted by academics at Queen's University, sharing the results, exploring their implications, and using the findings to reassure political leaders of the popularity of peace.[74] In Sri Lanka, too, research carried out or commissioned by CSOs has highlighted the 'immense economic and human costs of armed conflict', and the findings were referenced by politicians in parliamentary speeches. Furthermore, CSOs, alongside research institutions, formulated a broader vision, suggested potential political solutions to the conflict.[75] As a final example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a women's NGO based in Kakanj, through organising a campaign, helped to initiate the consequential 1998 law on property repossession which greatly accelerated the return of refugees and displaced persons.[76]

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[70] Roberto Belloni, 'Northern Ireland: Civil Society and the Slow Building of Peace' in Thania Paffenholz (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 118

[71] Menkhaus et al., 'Somalia: Civil Society in a Collapsed State', p. 337

[72] Ibid, Belloni, 'Northern Ireland: Civil Society and the Slow Building of Peace', p. 118, Esra Cuhadar and Sari Hanafi, 'Israel and Palestine: Civil Societies in Despair' in Thania Paffenholz (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 219, Camilla Orjuela, 'Sri Lanka: Peace Activists and Nationalists' in Thania Paffenholz (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 310

[73] Menkhaus et al., 'Somalia: Civil Society in a Collapsed State', p. 337

[74] Belloni, 'Northern Ireland: Civil Society and the Slow Building of Peace', p. 118

[75] Orjuela, 'Sri Lanka: Peace Activists and Nationalists', p. 310

[76] Roberto Belloni and Bruce Hemmer, 'Bosnia-Herzegovina: Civil Society in a Semiprotectorate' in Thania Paffenholz (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 142

Thirdly, CSOs can **partner with international actors** to conduct public advocacy. Messages could be shared through international partners, while information, analysis and reports gathered and produced by CSOs could be provided to international actors for dissemination. This is particularly pertinent in contexts in which it is difficult for external actors to access the country, or to access specific regions.[77] This strategy is also relevant in contexts in which there might be security risks for women leaders highlighting violations. These messages, and this information and analysis, could take the form of press releases, 'messages of peace', declarations and reports.

In Turkey, for example, human rights organisations, bar associations and international NGOs based in the country, have monitored rights violations and then issued annual reports in cooperation with international parties such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.[78] In Somalia, many CSOs 'amplified their message' through cooperating with international partners, networks and global media outlets. For example, the National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ), garnered far more attention for its appeals, and placed local authorities under far greater pressure, 'by relaying its criticisms of attacks on the media through the International Federation of Journalists'.[79]

Lastly, **mass movements** can be used for public advocacy. CSOs can mobilise citizens for rallies and demonstrations. Within this category, the organisation of petitions can also be included.[80] For example, in the summer of 2005, in Somalia, community-based women's groups convened public rallies at militia roadblocks to pressure fighters to dismantle the checkpoints.[81] In Sri Lanka, CSOs collected signatures highlighting the need to end violence, protect civilians, negotiate peace, and find political solutions, at times succeeding in placing these themes upon the national political agenda.[82]

Non-public advocacy strategies

CSOs can also pursue non-public advocacy strategies. For instance, CSOs can lobby government and official institutions (including, as was highlighted by our partners, financial institutions) by entering into informal or formal diplomatic channels with members of the political elite. CSOs can also become members of 'peace institutions', if these are established following peace accords, or work as formal or informal consultants for government. Furthermore, CSOs can participate in informal dialogues in order to pursue advocacy.[83]

For example, the peace accord in Guatemala established a series of 'peace institutions' for the implementation of the peace accords. Members of civil society were often named to positions in these institutions and used these roles in order perform advocacy; however, co-optation sparked conflicts within civil society, deepening divisions and fragmentation and lessening the effectiveness of their advocacy efforts through these institutions.[84] We will explore, in greater detail, challenges such as these in the following section.

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[77] Ayse Betul Celik, 'Turkey: The Kurdish Question and the Coercive State' in Thania Paffenholz (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 167, Cuhadar and Hanafi, 'Israel and Palestine: Civil Societies in Despair', p. 219, Menkhaus et al., 'Somalia: Civil Society in a Collapsed State', p. 339

[78] Celik, 'Turkey: The Kurdish Question and the Coercive State', p. 167

[79] Menkhaus et al., 'Somalia: Civil Society in a Collapsed State', p. 337

[80] Paffenholz and Spurk, 'A Comprehensive Analytical Framework', p. 69

[81] Menkhaus et al., 'Somalia: Civil Society in a Collapsed State', p. 339

[82] Orjuela, 'Sri Lanka: Peace Activists and Nationalists', p. 311

[83] Paffenholz and Spurk, 'A Comprehensive Analytical Framework', p. 69, Sabine Kurtenbach, 'Guatemala: A Dependent and Fragmented Civil Society' in Thania Paffenholz (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), pp. 91-2

[84] Kurtenbach, 'Guatemala: A Dependent and Fragmented Civil Society', pp. 91-2

3.3 Constraints on the Capacity of CSOs to Perform Advocacy During Peace Agreement Implementation

Despite the range of strategies available to CSOs to pursue advocacy, there also exists a range of constraints on the capacity of CSOs to perform advocacy during peace agreement implementation. An awareness of these challenges, however, provides the opportunity for CSOs to consider context-appropriate mitigation strategies. Challenges frequently faced by CSOs in their attempts to perform advocacy are grouped, listed and will be explored in this section; those challenges which pertain in particular to South Sudanese CSOs and women's groups will be highlighted.

Challenges pertaining to political actors

Firstly, a number of challenges exist which relate to political actors. For instance, post-peace accord political institutions may be unresponsive or even paralysed due to factors such as nationalist gridlock. Furthermore, in warring societies, political elites may be entrenched in networks of patronage and corruption, lessening the likelihood of their responding to the demands of CSOs. Local and national political actors may also coerce and/or co-opt CSOs and political processes[85] while women's organisations may face particular exclusion in post-conflict societies. This may especially be a challenge if the peace agreement did not include gender provisions or commitments to ensuring women's meaningful participation in reconstruction efforts.

In the previous section, we have already seen that CSOs in Guatemala faced challenges of this nature. As a second example, in Nigeria in the early 2000s, members of the political elite were deeply enmeshed in the 'corrupt and violent status quo', perpetuating the disempowerment of civil society and rendering mass organisation and mobilisation 'extremely elusive'.[86]

Challenges pertaining to the international community

Secondly, several barriers relate to the international community. To begin, if the advocacy space is dominated by international organisations, it may prove difficult for local and national CSOs to enter this sphere. Furthermore, if the advocacy space is overwhelmed by international organisations, CSOs may come to view international actors as their primary interlocutors as opposed to national and local government. Indeed, heavy involvement by international actors in the peace process may disempower citizens and CSOs, lessening the likelihood that the public will respond to advocacy conducted by CSOs. Finally, if CSOs collaborate with international organisations which, as we have seen in the previous section, is a commonplace approach to advocacy, these organisations may face reputational attacks.[87]

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[85] Belloni and Hemmer, 'Bosnia-Herzegovina: Civil Society in a Semiprotectorate', p. 142, Kew and Obi, 'Nigeria: Dilemmas of Militarization and Co-optation in the Niger Delta', p. 371, Thania Paffenholz, 'What Civil Society Can Contribute to Peacebuilding' in Thania Paffenholz (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 388

[86] Kew and Obi, 'Nigeria: Dilemmas of Militarization and Co-optation in the Niger Delta', p. 371

[87] Belloni and Hemmer, 'Bosnia-Herzegovina: Civil Society in a Semiprotectorate', pp. 142, 150, Paffenholz, 'What Civil Society Can Contribute to Peacebuilding', p. 384

In particular, women's organisations advocating for an enhanced role risk being denigrated as proxies for foreign actors or agendas. Further risks could include SGBV and character assasination.

For instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, analysts have claimed that CSOs tended to focus upon lobbying international NGOs as opposed to national politicians and that this, in turn, 'impeded the development of a democratic relationship between civil society and politicians' and may have 'cut short' CSO-led efforts to find creative solutions for the post-conflict era.[88] Moreover, in Somalia, CSOs have been accused of 'being spies for the West' after partnering with external actors in order to conduct advocacy.[89]

Challenges pertaining to conflict and insecurity

Finally, a number of challenges stem from conflict and insecurity. During periods of violence, even following the negotiation of an accord, CSOs may face threats together with physical and verbal attacks. Indeed, public advocacy can render CSOs exceptionally vulnerable to threats and violent reprisals.[90] Women peacebuilders, and women's human rights defenders, may face particularly high levels of threats and targeted attacks; indeed, conversations with our partners in this project indicated that women peacebuilders in South Sudan must contend with an intimidating array of risks, including physical violence and isolation from family and community. South Sudanese women in rural areas, in particular, were characterised as frequently being deprived of a voice due to the endemic discrimination they face.

Furthermore, factors such as poverty, unemployment, ethnic divisions, gender inequality, polarisation and political apathy – all of which are often characteristics of conflict-torn societies – can render it difficult for CSOs to mobilise mass support. Additionally, in warring communities, or communities scarred by war, CSOs may be more likely to be constrained by limited resources and capacities, hindering their ability to perform advocacy and other peacebuilding functions. In a similar vein, post-conflict, CSOs may face restricted media freedoms, negatively impacting upon their ability to perform advocacy.[91]

In Nigeria, 'gripping poverty, high levels of youth unemployment and ethic divisions' rendered it extremely difficult for CSOs to perform advocacy by uniting and galvanising mass movements.[92] In Sri Lanka, peace advocates 'have been accused of being unpatriotic', activists have faced threats, and public events have been attacked; in turn, this has limited the abilities of CSOs to engage in advocacy. In Sri Lanka it has also proven difficult to mobilise cross-cutting mass support due to societal polarisation.[93]

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[88] Belloni and Hemmer, 'Bosnia-Herzegovina: Civil Society in a Semiprotectorate', p. 150

[89] Menkhaus et al., 'Somalia: Civil Society in a Collapsed State', p. 339

[90] Ibid, p. 340

[91] Kew and Obi, 'Nigeria: Dilemmas of Militarization and Co-optation in the Niger Delta', p. 372, Paffenholz, 'What Civil Society Can Contribute to Peacebuilding', p. 388

[92] Kew and Obi, 'Nigeria: Dilemmas of Militarization and Co-optation in the Niger Delta', p. 371

[93] Orjuela, 'Sri Lanka: Peace Activists and Nationalists', p. 318

3.4 Factors Which May Enable the Capacity of CSOs to Perform Advocacy During Peace Agreement Implementation

Despite the constraints facing CSOs, comparative research also reveals a number of factors which can support CSOs in performing advocacy. Firstly, advocacy campaigns may prove more effective when combined with monitoring activities and, furthermore, networking between several CSOs can help amplify advocacy.[94] In relation specifically to mass mobilisation, the development of a clear, shared goal can be crucial.[95] Lastly, although there can be risks associated with partnering with international organisations, as the previous section demonstrated, such actors can protect CSOs, can provide funding, and can support policy analysis and technical assistance where needed.[96]

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[94] Paffenholz, 'What Civil Society Can Contribute to Peacebuilding', p. 388

[95] Ibid, p. 389

[96] Belloni and Hemmer, 'Bosnia-Herzegovina: Civil Society in a Semiprotectorate', p. 144

Developing Contextualised Indicators

4.1 Gender Provisions in the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)

The R-ARCSS features several provisions which pertain to gender and women. The majority of these provisions stipulate that particular governmental bodies and transitional commissions will include a certain percentage or number of women. Other provisions seek to tackle gender inequality, gender-based and sexual violence, and the specific needs and aspirations of women and girls in relation to transitional justice and constitutional reform.

Several of these provisions in the R-ARCSS lack specificity. For instance, precisely how women may apply and be selected for the various governmental bodies and transitional commissions are not explored, while ambiguous terms, such as 'involved' or 'women's groups', appear frequently. As a further example, while funding is guaranteed for women-led businesses, the extent of this funding is not specified, and the process by which women entrepreneurs might secure this funding is also not detailed. Developing a series of indicators by which the implementation of these provisions might be monitored could also serve to develop the gender provisions in the R-ARCSS, and to add greater precision to the clauses. Developing a series of indicators could further provide an opportunity to consider the possible impact of these clauses.

The table below presents the gender provisions contained within the R-ARCSS. The table groups these provisions thematically and, beneath each group, also lists relevant 'Strategic Actions' and 'Performance Indicators' drawn from the South Sudan National Action Plan (NAP) on UNSCR 1325 (2015 – 2020). The 1325 NAP was developed by the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MGCSW) through 'a participatory process that included broad consultations with various peace and security stakeholders'. The drafting process was also supported by UN Women while the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) served as the Co-Chair of the development process, 'collecting and harmonising views from government institutions, development partners, United Nations agencies, civil society organisations, women's groups and religious and traditional leaders'.[97] While the South Sudan 1325 NAP includes an 'implementation matrix', featuring objectives, actions, intended outcomes, indicators, key actors and a timeframe, the plan was not given an allocated budget; instead, implementing actors were tasked with developing a 'financing plan'.[98]

In June 2019, ahead of the UN conferences 'Beijing +25' and 'Commission on the Status of Women 64',[99] South Sudan delivered a report assessing the achievements made, and challenges encountered, in the state's 'progress towards gender equality and the empowerment of women' between 2014 and 2019. The analysis of the report is not guided by the indicators which appear in the 1325 NAP; nevertheless, the report does provide a relatively detailed assessment of the status of gender equality

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[97] No author, 'South Sudan', *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom: Monitoring and Analysis of National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security* (n.d.) [online], available from: http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/index.php/south-sudan/ [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

[98] Ibid

[99] These conferences were scheduled for March 2020 but, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, were suspended until further notice (No author, 'CSW64/Beijing +25 (2020)', *UN Women* (2020) [online], available from: https://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/csw64-2020 [last accessed: 4 September 2021])

in South Sudan.[100] The South Sudan 1325 NAP expired in 2020 and a second plan has not yet been drafted.

Finally, one of our South Sudanese partners drew our attention to the '7-Point Agenda', developed by the South Sudanese Women's bloc in 2016. This agenda could serve to inform any contextualised indicators developed, and could be elaborated upon and integrated within the table which follows. We have marked with a star where there is overlap between this agenda and Table a). The agenda is reproduced below:

Diagram a) South Sudanese Women's Bloc 7-Point Agenda

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[100] No author, 'Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women and Adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), National Review of the Implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995): Republic of South Sudan', (no publisher) (n.d.) [online], available from: https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/csw/64/national-reviews/south%20sudan.pdf?la=en&vs=5535 [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

Table a) Gender Provisions in the R-ARCSS and Accompanying South Sudan NAP 1325 Strategic Actions and Indicators

R-ARCSS Gender Provisions: Gender Quotas and Participation
The incumbent Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) shall nominate no fewer than 6 women to the Council of Ministers; the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) shall nominate no fewer than 3 women; and the SSOA shall nominate no fewer than 1 woman (1.4.4). In selecting their nominees, the Parties shall consider national diversity, gender and regional representation (1.4.6).[101]
On establishment, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) shall establish transitional justice institutions; 35% of the members of these institutions will be women (5.1.1).*
The Vice President (nominated by Former Detainees (FDs)) will be a woman (1.5.2.4).
The TGoNU will nominate a deputy speaker, who will be a woman (1.14.3).
The Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) Board membership will include one representative of the women's bloc and one representative of women's groups (2.4.8.4).
Women's groups will be involved, by the RTGoNU, in efforts to fight corruption and to raise public awareness to strengthen the capacity of the public to resist and prevent corruption (4.4.1.5).
The Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH) will be composed of 7 Commissioners; 4 will be South Sudanese and, of these, 2 will be women; the remaining 3 will be from other African countries and of these 1 will be a woman (5.2.3.2).
The Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA) will be composed of an Executive Body. This body will include representatives of women's groups (5.4.2.2.2).

South Sudan NAP 1325 Strategic Actions Relevant to Gender Quotas and Participation	South Sudan NAP 1325 Indicators Relevant to Gender Quotas and Participation
	No. of gender-sensitive national policies developed and implemented at all levels of government to encourage women's leadership.
	No. of gender mainstreaming training sessions held to empower leaders and technical officers to confidently involve and deploy women as leaders and managers.

[101] The Peace Agreement Database 'PA-X' has analysed the R-ARCSS and identified and grouped all gender provisions contained within the agreement. The presentation and grouping of the gender provisions in the R-ARCSS in this table is partially based upon the coding completed by researchers working on the PA-X database. Their results can be found at the following site: No author, 'Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)' [online], available from: https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/2112/Revitalised%20Agreement%20on%20the%20Resolution%20of%20the%20Conflict%20in%20the%20Republic%20of%20South%20Sudan%20(R-ARCSS) [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

Develop and implement policy measures to ensure women's active and meaningful participation in decision-making positions and deployment in field-based operations including international.[102]	Reports on training organised to build the confidence of women and girls to take on leadership and management roles.
	No. of women elected or appointed in political leadership and decision-making positions.
	No. of women role models who are willing to mentor other women and girls in leadership and management.[103]
Identify and recommend competent women in politics and those in decision-making positions in the public service and offer them the required skills training and appropriate opportunities in order to competently retain their positions and advance their career goals.[104]	No. of women identified and recommended for in-service training.
	No. of women appointed to positions of power and decision-making in key government placements.
	No. of women promoted and deployed for higher positions, including international deployment.[105]
Ensure implementation of the 25 percent gender quota to address the persistent under-representation of women in leadership and decision-making positions at all levels of government, including the legislative assemblies, state and local governments, and commissions, and in peace mediation and peacekeeping missions.[106]*	No. of women in leadership and decision-making positions.
	No. of training sessions held for women occupying leadership and decision-making positions.
	No. of women recruited, retained, and promoted in government ministries and commissions, including the armed forces and judiciary.[107]

R-ARCSS Gender Provisions: Gender Equality
A federal and democratic system of government will be established which will guarantee gender equity (6.2.2).
A Women's Enterprise Development Fund will be established. This Fund will provide subsidised credit for women-based enterprise development and capacity building of women entrepreneurs (4.15.1.5).

South Sudan NAP 1325 Strategic Actions Relevant to Gender Equality	South Sudan NAP 1325 Indicators Relevant to Gender Equality
Provide women with easier access to lending institutions and financial markets so they are able to access substantial funding to establish bigger	No. of entrepreneurial and business development skills training sessions delivered to women at all levels.

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[102] No author, 'South Sudan National Action Plan 2015 – 2020 on UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and Related Resolutions', *Republic of South Sudan* (2015) [online], available from: http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/SS-NAP-1325.pdf [last accessed: 4 September 2021], p. 35

[103] Ibid

[104] Ibid, p. 36

[105] Ibid

[106] Ibid, p. 38

[107] Ibid

businesses and take advantage of larger opportunities, including securing government tenders and contracts.[108]	No. of financial markets and banking institutions working with women and offering their financial services.
	No. of women entrepreneurs who have been awarded government tenders and contracts.
	Reports of advocacy and information sharing activities of an association of women entrepreneurs of South Sudan.[109]

R-ARCSS Gender Provisions: Gender-based and Sexual Violence	
The Parties shall refrain from acts and forms of sexual and gender-based violence, including sexual exploitation and harassment (2.1.10.2; 5.3.2.1.4; 2.1.10.2)*	
South Sudan NAP 1325 Strategic Actions Relevant to Gender-based and Sexual Violence	**South Sudan NAP 1325 Indicators Relevant to Gender-based and Sexual Violence**
Include gender, human rights, women's rights and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in all training of new recruits, induction and of career advancement courses to enable officers in the security sector institutions (SSIs) to unlearn previous practices hostile to human rights and the rule of law.[110]*	Revised curricula for each security institution incorporating gender, human rights and women's rights, and these modules are developed and used.
	Gender is mainstreamed in all operations and in the training of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) and prison services, and there is sufficient personnel and more visible results of gender policies.
	Reports of training done.[111]
Establish gender reporting mechanisms with SSIs.*	A well-qualified gender equality adviser is recruited in the Human Resources department of each of the security institutions.
Ensure that all staff and officers of all ranks undergo mandatory sexual harassment and gender-awareness training.*	An assessment of gender sensitivity in performance evaluations.
All senior leaders establish and enforce a culture in their units of non-tolerance of sexual harassment.*	Evaluation of individuals is based on their approaches and results in respect of gender analysis and the inclusion of women.[112]
Introduce the position of gender equality adviser.[113]*	
The Parties will record the experiences of victims, including those of women and girls (5.2.2.3.5)*	

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[108] Ibid, p. 46

[109] Ibid

[110] Ibid, p. 52

[111] Ibid

[112] Ibid, p. 58

[113] Ibid

Train staff, officers and men in the SSIs about SGBV and trauma management so they are more sensitive to survivors of SGBV when handling cases related to domestic, sexual, or any other form of violence involving women and children.[114]*	No. of training programmes initiated and conducted and type of assistance offered to SGBV survivors.
	Percentage increase in resources allocated for training programmes.
	No. of staff trained.[115]
Collect information and data on all SGBV cases in SSIs in order to gauge the magnitude of SGBV and design effective measures to deal with it.[116]*	Data collected, analysed, and acted upon.[117]
Document the experiences of women and girls in armed conflict, such as cases of violence against women and girls and including their economic, social, and cultural rights, e.g. right to food, shelter, education, health, care, and social welfare and also harmful traditional practices.*	South Sudan Human Rights Commission (SSHRC) Annual Report on the Human Rights Status of South Sudan.
Strengthen the SSHRC so that it is able to address human rights violations that took place during conflict and continue to occur.[118]*	Operational SSHRC offices in each of the ten states.
	Documentation of the violation of women and girls' rights in South Sudan.
	No. of published reports and documentary videos produced.
	No. of dissemination activities, e.g. meetings, media reports, etc.[119]
The Parties will protect the needs of women and girls (2.1.10.7.5)*	
Enact and enforce national laws to eliminate SGBV, such as domestic violence, sexual offences, trafficking and slavery of women and children and child marriages.*	No. of laws enacted.
Reform outdated and irrelevant laws that do not conform to international human rights standards and humanitarian and international criminal law.*	No. of laws reformed to conform to international standards.
Align the domestic legal framework with international human rights standards, especially by revising the criminal codes.[120]*	Sexual Offences Act enacted.
	Domestic Violence Act enacted.
	Family laws amended.

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[114] Ibid

[115] Ibid

[116] Ibid, p.61

[117] Ibid

[118] Ibid, p. 74

[119] Ibid

[120] Ibid, p. 63

	Inclusion within the Constitution the minimum age of marriage at 18 years to protect girls from early marriages.
	Laws on land and succession that promote and protect women's rights to own and inherit property.
	A National Plan of Action on the Child Act of 2008 developed and implemented to, among other aims, end child marriage.
	Trafficking In Persons law enacted to stop child trafficking and child prostitution in South Sudan.
	Sections on SGBV offences in the Penal Code amended.
	National Gender Policy of 2013 implemented at all levels.
	A well-facilitated National Assembly.[121]
Ratify international and regional human rights instruments, including the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Convention against Torture, the African Protocol, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.*	No. of ratified and domesticated international and regional conventions and instruments.
Comply with UNSC resolution 1325 and all the successive treaties on women, peace and security.[122]*	Parliamentary records.
	Report of South Sudan to the CEDAW committee.
	Report of South Sudan on the implementation of UNSCR 1325.[123]
Strengthen the capacity of the National Legislative Assembly and state legislative assemblies to guarantee women's rights under national law, produce and implement gender-sensitive legislation, review and amend old national laws and regulations that sustain inequality and promote violence against women.[124]*	No. of gendered capacity-building programmes developed for the two assemblies.
	No. of capacity-building programmes conducted at the state and national levels.
	No. of parliamentarians trained in gender and women's rights.

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[121] Ibid

[122] Ibid, p. 64

[123] Ibid

[124] Ibid, p. 66

	No. of gender-sensitive laws enacted by the National Assembly.
	No. of old national laws reviewed and amended.
	Report on implementation of gender responsive laws.[125]

R-ARCSS Gender Provisions: Transitional Justice	
The CTRH shall implement measures to protect victims and witnesses; in particular, women (5.4.2.1)	

South Sudan NAP 1325 Strategic Actions Relevant to Transitional Justice	**South Sudan NAP 1325 Indicators Relevant to Transitional Justice**
Provide support services and programmes to guarantee that legal aid is available and that women witnesses and complainants are treated fairly.[126]	No. of women witnesses and complainants accessing legal aid.[127]
Ensure that there is assistance for survivors and witness protection.[128]	Mechanisms for protection of survivors and witnesses to SGBV cases.[129]

R-ARCSS Gender Provisions: Constitutional Reform	
The Executive of the RTGoNU shall reconstitute the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) and will consult with women's groups before doing so. In these consultations, the experiences of women and girls will be sufficiently documented and the findings of these consultations will be incorporated in the resultant legislation (6.6).	

South Sudan NAP 1325 Strategic Actions Relevant to Constitutional Reform	**South Sudan NAP 1325 Indicators Relevant to Constitutional Reform**
Review all laws (statutory and customary) that undermine or hinder women's participation in decision-making and governance in their bid to actively engage in South Sudan's recovery, development, and democratic processes.[130]	No. of laws reviewed.
	No. of sensitisation campaigns held to consult with and inform traditional leaders and communities on negative cultural practices that hinder women's leadership potential.
	No. of women actively involved in governance and recovery processes.
	A gender-sensitive constitution that is cognisant of international human rights standards and respect for women's rights.[131]

We have developed a second version of this table, presented in Appendix A, which includes additional rows and columns. These have been left blank, and could be completed with contextualised indicators once these have been developed.

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[125] Ibid

[126] Ibid, p. 70

[127] Ibid

[128] Ibid, p. 71

[129] Ibid

[130] Ibid, p. 34

[131] Ibid

4.2 Exploring the Concept of Indicators

In order to monitor the gender provisions within the R-ARCSS, it will be necessary to develop a series of indicators.

<u>How can indicators be defined?</u>

Indicators can be thought of as measurements which can be used to assess performance. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) has described indicators as 'signposts of change';[132] they are tools which can help actors understand where they are, where they are going, and how far they remain from their goal. In the previous section, we have seen several instances of indicators: for example, in the South Sudan 1325 NAP, indicators include the number of women actively involved in governance and recovery processes, the drafting of a report on the implementation of UNSC 1325, and the enactment of a Domestic Violence Act.

What are the characteristics of effective indicators? Firstly, it is important for indicators to be specific, measurable, attainable, realistic and time-bound.[133] Secondly, indicators should do more than provide a means to measure the enactment of an activity; they should also provide a way to measure anticipated impacts and outcomes.[134] Thirdly, it is crucial that indicators are relevant to the context for which they are intended;[135] in South Sudan, for instance, it may be appropriate to develop different sets of indicators to monitor the gender provisions with the R-ARCSS which relate to the realities of each state or, even, each county. For instance, in developing indicators contextualised to the sub-national level, actors could reflect on the following: how have different states and counties experienced the effects of corruption and how might women's groups, from these different states and counties, wish to participate in efforts to fight corruption? How will these efforts need to be differentiated at the state- and county-level in order to be effective and, therefore, what activities and changes will women's groups need to monitor? As a second example, how do opportunities for women-led enterprises vary according to state? How might their capacity building needs also vary, and what might the expected effects of such capacity building be in each state?

Finally, indicators pertaining to gender must reflect the fluctuating realities of the lives of women and men, girls and boys, accurately revealing their varied and often unequal roles in society, the economy

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[132] No author, 'Indicators and Monitoring: Women, Peace and Security', *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* (n.d.) [online], available from: https://www.peacewomen.org/security-council/WPS-indicators-and-monitoring [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

[133] No author, 'Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan Development Toolkit', *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* (2013) [online], available from: https://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/national_action_plan_development_toolkit.pdf [last accessed: 29 August 2021], p. 10

[134] Aisling Swaine, 'Assessing the Potential of National Action Plans to Advance Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325', *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law* 12 (2009), p. 423

[135] Zsuzsanna Lippai and Angelic Young, 'Creating National Action Plans: A Guide to Implementing Resolution 1325', *Inclusive Security* (2017) [online], available from: https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/publication/creating-national-action-plans-a-guide-to-implementing-resolution-1325/ [last accessed: 29 August 2021], pp. 4, 10, 12

and the private spheres.[136] Such indicators should be attuned to the differing experiences and challenges, and the specific and diverse rights, aspirations and demands, of women and girls.

What data is needed to monitor indicators, and how might these data be gathered?

In addition to developing contextualised indicators, it is also crucial to consider the data – or information – which will be needed in order to assess whether these indicators have been met. It is also important to consider precisely how these data will be gathered, by whom, and how these data will then be analysed, reported upon and disseminated. In this section, we will explore two case studies in order to provide options and examples for South Sudanese actors.

Monitoring Colombia's Peace Agreement: The Barometer Initiative

Following four years of negotiations in Havana, Cuba, the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a left-wing guerrilla movement, finally struck a peace agreement in September 2016. The accord was put to a popular vote: in October 2016, the electorate rejected the agreement.[137] The negotiators reconvened, signing a revised peace accord in November 2016.[138] The Barometer Initiative monitors the implementation of this revised agreement.

The Barometer Initiative is led by the Kroc Institute at the University of Notre Dame in the US; as it became apparent, in the latter stages of the negotiations, that an agreement would soon be reached, researchers at the Kroc Institute 'proposed a new methodology of real-time, holistic implementation assessment' to the Colombian government and to FARC.[139] According to the Kroc Institute, the purpose of the new methodology was to 'provide a high quality, proactive, and responsive mechanism for assessment of implementation aimed at innovation and early preventative action'.[140]

Between 2016 and 2017, the researchers assessed the 579 stipulations contained within the revised 2016 accord, categorising and grouping these within 18 themes and 70 sub-themes.[141] In order to monitor the implementation of these stipulations, the team gather data in order to award each stipulation one of four scores (these scores function as indicators):
- 0 indicates that implementation of the stipulation has not been initiated
- 1 indicates that the stipulation has reached a minimum level of implementation, signalling that some action is underway to comply with the stipulation
- 2 indicates that the stipulation has reached an intermediate level of implementation
- 3 indicates that the stipulations has been fully implemented or completed[142]

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[136] No author, 'Gender Responsive Indicators', *UNDP* (2019), p. 2; No author, 'Indicators of Gender Equality', *UN Economic Commission for Europe* (n.d.) [online], available from: https://unece.org/DAM/stats/publications/2015/ECE_CES_37_WEB.pdf [last accessed: 4 September 2021], p. 1

[137] Eduardo Posada-Carbo, 'The Difficult Road to Peace in Colombia', *Current History* 116:787 (2017), p. 74

[138] June Beittel, 'Colombia Adopts Revised Peace Accord: What Next?', *Current Politics and Economics of South and Central America* 11:1 (2018), p. 100

[139] No author, 'Methodology for Monitoring Implementation of the Colombian Peace Agreement', *Peace Accords Matrix* (n.d.) [online], available from: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/barometer/methodology [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

[140] Ibid

[141] Ibid

[142] Ibid

The researchers began a collaboration with a team of specialists in Colombia who collect information in coordination with the conflict parties, the peace agreement implementing agencies, civil society leaders, social leaders in rural territories, representatives of the international community, and academics.[143] This information, which includes reports from Colombian state entities, news articles, and interviews with civil society representatives, is combined to calculate the level of implementation of each of the stipulations, and each stipulation is awarded one of the four scores listed above.[144] Following the analysis phase, the team prepares annual reports and periodic briefings which are presented to the International Component of Verification (CIV) and the Commission to Monitor, Promote, and Verify Final Accord Implementation (CSIVI) and released to the public.[145]

The 2016 accord 'includes commitments with the potential for structural change to reduce gender inequalities and make progress in women's rights in the Colombian countryside'.[146] The team of researchers at the Kroc Institute, together with their Colombian partners, have conducted analysis and released reports which specifically consider the implementation of stipulations which pertain to gender (of the 578 stipulations in the peace agreement, 130 have been identified as having a gender perspective).[147] In order to measure the implementation of these gender stipulations, the team deploys the same series of indicators (the scores ranging from 0 to 3).[148] However, the reports produced also include detailed analyses 'of how women and their organizations have supported aspects of implementation of gender commitments'.[149] The reports further contrast the implementation of the gender stipulations with the implementation of the more general stipulations included in the peace agreement.[150]

Monitoring the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro in the Philippines: The Third Party Monitoring Team

The Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) was formally established in 2013 during the peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The task of the TPMT is to observe and report on the implementation of the agreements signed to conclude the peace process in 2014. The TPMT is 'composed of representatives from two international and two domestic non-governmental organisations'; the government and the MILF nominated one representative for one category each. The TPMT is headed by a Chair; the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the TPMT provide for the selection of an 'eminent international person' jointly nominated by the parties to serve as a Chair, Convenor and Spokesperson of the TPMT. The monitoring body convenes every two months, or as often as is necessary, to assess the implementation of the peace accord.[151]

Thus far, the TPMT has convened on 39 occasions in the Philippines to conduct monitoring activities, and provides confidential reports to the government and to the MILF following each set of

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[143] Ibid

[144] Ibid

[145] Ibid

[146] Alvarez et al., 'Towards Implementation of Women's Rights in the Colombian Final Peace Accord: Progress, Opportunities and Challenges: Special Report on the Monitoring of the Gender Commitments', p. 1

[147] Ibid, p. 5

[148] Ibid, p. 6

[149] Ibid, p. 8

[150] Ibid

[151] Armi Beatriz E. Bayot, 'Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Philippines Case Study', *Stabilisation Unit, UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office* (2018) [online], available from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766040/Philippines_case_study.pdf [last accessed: 4 September 2021], pp. 24-5

consultations. The TPMT further issues an annual public report. The TPMT is given access to 'all reports and activities connected to the implementation of the agreements' and is permitted 'to observe the meetings of all bodies concerned with the implementation of the agreements'.[152] Furthermore, the TPMT regularly meets both Panels and other bodies associated with the peace process, senior figures in the government, the MILF, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), members of Congress, regional and local government officials, members of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority, ministers of the Bangsamoro government, commanders of Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces of the MILF, civil society organisations, religious leaders, representatives of the diplomatic community, the private sector, and academics. Meetings take place across the country,[153] and it is through these meetings that the TPMT gathers data which reveal the extent of the implementation of the peace agreement. Data are thus gathered through observations and interviews. The TPMT does not, as the Barometer Initiative does in Colombia, assess the implementation of the 2014 agreement against a series of indicators. Furthermore, the agreement does not feature gender provisions[154] and, therefore, separate assessments and reports regarding the implementation of the stipulations pertaining to gender have not been conducted.

4.3 Strategies for Developing Contextualised Indicators to Monitor the Gender Provisions in the R-ARCSS

This chapter has explored the gender provisions within the R-ARCSS, the corresponding actions and indicators contained within the South Sudan 1325 NAP, and the concept of indicators and the types of data which could be gathered to monitor the implementation of peace agreements. It was noted, in the previous section, that indicators must be tailored to the local context. Therefore, this final section will explore how such indicators could be developed, and will consider which bodies and organisations might need to be involved, the questions which would need to be deliberated, and the techniques which could be applied in order to draft a contextualised monitoring framework.

Possible partners

This sub-section will briefly explore the following question: with which partners could CYDA, GAIPA, COM and ENHANCED-Action collaborate to develop contextualised indicators to monitor the implementation of the gender provisions in the R-ARCSS? We suggest that the first set of partners with which CYDA and their partners would need to consult would be South Sudanese women's groups, organisations and networks at the national, state and community levels. Such groups will best understand how the effects of the gender provisions might be felt and experienced by women, men, girls and boys, and will be able to provide rich perspectives on the most appropriate shape of the indicators developed. Such groups will possess local, current knowledge regarding how the provisions could be measured, and how those monitoring the agreement could determine whether the provisions had indeed been implemented and had achieved their desired effects.[155]

A number of monitoring and verification bodies and mechanisms for the R-ARCSS already exist: these include the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), the CTSAMVM, and

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[152] No author, 'TPMT: Sixth Public Report', *TPMT* (2020) [online] available from: http://tpmt.ph/tpmt-sixth-public-report-march-2019-to-october-2020/ [last accessed: 4 September 2021], p. 6

[153] Ibid, p. 7

[154] According to coding completed by researchers at the PA-X Database.

[155] No author, 'Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan Development Toolkit', p. 9

the MGCSW. These bodies have not yet developed contextualised indicators for monitoring the gender provisions in the peace agreement but they do, nevertheless, possess deep expertise in tracking the implementation of peace agreements. The RJMEC, for example, meets monthly to 'discuss and exchange views on the status of implementation', providing opportunities for faith-based leaders, women's groups, civil society, business groups, academics and youth representatives to scrutinise the government. The commission further receives 'regular reports from implementing institutions and mechanisms' and possesses six thematic sub-committees which 'systematically evaluate implementation of the Agreement, task by task and chapter by chapter'.[156] Furthermore, the RJMEC publishes regular reports, presenting their assessments.

It would also be relevant to explore the extent to which such an initiative could draw on the collective expertise of relevant members of the South Sudanese Civil Society Forum and the Women's Coalition. This would also help ensure that the initiative informs the collective advocacy efforts of CSOs and that it would engage in other fora related to the peace agreement, including associated monitoring mechanisms.

Additional individuals and groups could also provide expertise. For example, we have seen, in the two case studies provided in the previous section, the crucial roles played by academics and research institutes in developing indicators, gathering data, and producing analyses and reports. Both South Sudanese researchers together with overseas experts could be consulted in the development of the indicators. Finally, international agencies, such as UN Women, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and UNMISS, could be called upon for support. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, UN Women and UNMISS have already provided advice in the development of the South Sudan 1325 NAP, and UN Women and WILPF boast considerable, comparative expertise in the drafting, implementation and monitoring of 1325 NAPs, many of which include some form of indicators or monitoring frameworks. It would be crucial to ensure, however, that any indicators developed remained appropriate for the local context; after all, 'there is the possibility that an external organisation, such as the UN, may drive the process based on its own agenda in an attempt to keep up with its own international obligations rather than reflect the national interests of the specific state'.[157]

Possible topics and questions to be considered

If CYDA and partners were to seek to develop a series of contextualised indicators for monitoring the implementation of the gender provisions in the R-ARCSS, a series of questions and topics could be explored with local women's groups across the country. These questions could include:

1. What are the gender provisions in the R-ARCSS?
2. What do these gender provisions mean for different local communities in South Sudan? How might both awareness of these provisions together with their effects reach local communities?
3. What might the effects of these provisions be in different local communities in South Sudan? How would communities know that these provisions had been successfully implemented? Can the answers to these questions be developed into precise and measurable indicators?

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[156] Stephen Oola, 'The Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission's Role and Perspective on the South Sudan Peace Process', *Peace Policy* (2019) [online], available from: https://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2019/12/10/the-reconstituted-joint-monitoring-and-evaluation-commissions-role-and-perspective-on-the-south-sudan-peace-process/ [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

[157] Swaine, 'Assessing the Potential of National Action Plans to Advance Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325', p. 417

- o In relation to points 2 and 3, it would be crucial to disaggregate the responses according to gender, age and geography. This would allow for reflection on the varying experiences and perspectives of different societal groups.
4. To what extent do these indicators and their anticipated effects relate to broader perceptions regarding community security, reconciliation, and social cohesion? Could these perceptions continue to be tracked over time, in concert with the monitoring of the gender provisions, in a bid to understand their possible interrelationship?
5. What data would be needed to measure these indicators? How could these data be collected, how often will these data be collected, who will collect these data, and who will collate and analyse these data? Would quarterly data collection be feasible or would more regular feedback be required? Given the relatively high number of gender provisions within the R-ARCSS, should certain provisions be prioritised?
   - o If data included the perceptions of citizens, it would once more be important for the results to be disaggregated by gender, age and geography to allow for reflection on the varying experiences and perspectives of different societal groups. Moreover, understanding the perspectives of men and boys, in addition to women and girls, regarding the implementation of the gender provisions could allow for the identification of resistance to the gender provisions while actors could begin to consider how this resistance could be challenged.
6. How will the results of indicator-monitoring activities be used for advocacy purposes? With whom should communities work to share and publicise their findings, and to place pressure upon decision makers?
7. How will the risks and challenges outlined in Sections 1 and 2 of this document be mitigated against? How will the opportunities outlined in Sections 1 and 2 of this document be capitalised upon?

By exploring these questions, it would be possible to raise awareness of the gender provisions among communities of women in South Sudan, and to begin to understand what these gender provisions mean for these communities. By examining what the possible effects of these gender provisions could be, it is then also possible to start to think about how women's groups in South Sudan could start to monitor the implementation of these provisions. The next and final section will explore in greater detail precisely how these questions could be explored with local women's groups.

Techniques and strategies for developing contextualised indicators

There are various practical strategies which could be used to explore the questions listed above with local women's groups and to develop contextualised indicators. These include conducting interviews, focus groups and surveys, and convening Participatory Action Research (PAR) workshops. These strategies could be conducted either online or in-person although conversations with our South Sudanese partners have indicated that online methods will prove more difficult. South Sudan has the lowest access to the internet across the East African region, with just 7.8% of individuals able to use the internet in 2017, and those who are able to access the internet struggle with limited, slow connectivity.[158]

Within interviews and focus groups, and through surveys, the questions formulated above – together with further questions deemed appropriate by our South Sudanese partners and the women's groups

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[158] No author, 'Individuals using the Internet (% of Population) – South Sudan', *World Bank* International Telecommunication Union (ITU) World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database [online], available from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=SS [last accessed: 5 September 2021]

in their networks – could be posed, and the results gathered, thematically analysed, and transformed into indicators in partnership with the various actors suggested in the first sub-section within Section 4.3. However, where possible and appropriate, PAR workshops may prove the most equitable, fruitful and effective approach to this task, particularly when collaborating with the local women's groups which these indicators are intended to serve. In brief, PAR is a methodology which enables 'researchers to work in partnership with communities in a manner that leads to action for change':[159] 'at its heart is collective, self-reflective inquiry that researchers and participants undertake, so they can understand and improve upon the practices in which they participate and the situations in which they find themselves'.[160] Participants gather and examine data and then determine the actions which should be followed. Crucially, in PAR, the 'researched' – in this instance, local South Sudanese women's groups – 'become the researchers'.[161] They are partners in the endeavour, meaningfully guiding the research from its conception through to dissemination. By adopting an egalitarian approach to the development of contextualised indicators, the indicators are likely to be more accurate, and to comprehensively reflect the experiences and perspectives of South Sudanese women. Moreover, an egalitarian approach will further ensure that the act of monitoring the gender provisions, and advocating for their implementation, is itself gender-sensitive and conducted in a manner in which women can seize the opportunity to lead the process.

In Appendix b) we have included an implementation plan which outlines these possibilities in a table. Our suggestion is that this table could be used by CYDA and partners in the next phase of their work; however, the actions outlined would need to be explored in greater detail, and all columns completed.

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[159] Fran Baum et al., 'Participatory Action Research', *Journal of Epidemiology Community Health* 60:10 (2006)

[160] Ibid

[161] Ibid; Yoland Wadsworth, 'What is Participatory Action Research?', *Action Research International* Paper 2 (1998)

Conclusion

This report has explored evidence, drawn from Inclusive Peace's comparative research, concerning the various ways in which South Sudanese CSOs, and women's groups in particular, might be able to monitor the gender provisions contained within the R-ARCSS and advocate for their implementation. The final chapter has examined the gender provisions in detail, considering how they might be 'translated' for the sub-national level; we have suggested how a series of indicators, contextualised for the different states and counties of South Sudan, could be developed using participatory methods. Throughout, the report has included the insights and reflections of our South Sudanese project partners, and its objectives were shaped in collaboration with our partners.

Nevertheless, questions and challenges remain, and CYDA and their partners can pursue several different pathways and face a number of decisions. We would suggest that, as CYDA and their partners proceed, it would be important to consider the following:

- How might CYDA and their partners collaborate with the variety of South Sudanese actors already engaged in monitoring the peace agreement and advocating for its implementation? Which strategies and ideas contained within this report have already been attempted by other South Sudanese organisations, and what lessons and insights might these actors have for CYDA and their partners?
- How does this report resonate with CYDA and their partners? Do the strategies and suggestions made appear to be feasible? Would it be valuable to explore specific ideas or sections in greater depth?
- How could this report function as a starting point for CYDA and their partners? What are the next steps which need to be taken? In particular, could the ideas contained in the fourth chapter, and the table in Appendix A, represent the beginning of efforts to develop contextualised indicators to monitor the gender provisions within the R-ARCSS? How precisely will an array of local women's groups be involved in the project as it proceeds?
- How can the table in Appendix A be adapted to render it more useful for the aspirations of, and next steps envisioned by, CYDA and their partners?

The introduction to this report noted that the implementation of the R-ARCSS, and thus of its gender provisions, has been slow. Violence and internal divisions within the government persist. Nevertheless, as this report demonstrates, there exists an array of strategies by which CYDA and their partners may be able to contribute to the monitoring of the gender provisions and, crucially, in a manner closely tailored to the specific and diverse experiences of local communities. The precise route forward, however, must be formulated.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Table b) Gender Provisions in the R-ARCSS, Accompanying South Sudan NAP 1325 Strategic Actions and Indicators, and Rows for Contextualised Indicators

R-ARCSS Gender Provisions: Gender Quotas and Participation
The incumbent Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) shall nominate no fewer than 6 women to the Council of Ministers; the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) shall nominate no fewer than 3 women; and the SSOA shall nominate no fewer than 1 woman (1.4.4). In selecting their nominees, the Parties shall consider national diversity, gender and regional representation (1.4.6).[162]
On establishment, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) shall establish transitional justice institutions; 35% of the members of these institutions will be women (5.1.1).
The Vice President (nominated by Former Detainees (FDs)) will be a woman (1.5.2.4).
The TGoNU will nominate a deputy speaker, who will be a woman (1.14.3).
The Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) Board membership will include one representative of the women's bloc and one representative of women's groups (2.4.8.4).
Women's groups will be involved, by the RTGoNU, in efforts to fight corruption and to raise public awareness to strengthen the capacity of the public to resist and prevent corruption (4.4.1.5).
The Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH) will be composed of 7 Commissioners; 4 will be South Sudanese and, of these, 2 will be women; the remaining 3 will be from other African countries and, of these, 1 will be a woman (5.2.3.2).
The Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA) will be composed of an Executive Body. This body will include representatives of women's groups (5.4.2.2.2).

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[162] The Peace Agreement Database 'PA-X' has analysed the R-ARCSS and identified and grouped all gender provisions contained within the agreement. The presentation and grouping of the gender provisions in the R-ARCSS in this table is partially based upon the coding completed by researchers working on the PA-X database. Their results can be found at the following site: No author, 'Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)' [online], available from: https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/2112/Revitalised%20Agreement%20on%20the%20Resolution%20of%20the%20Conflict%20in%20the%20Republic%20of%20South%20Sudan%20(R-ARCSS) [last accessed: 4 September 2021]

South Sudan NAP 1325 Strategic Actions Relevant to Gender Quotas and Participation	South Sudan NAP 1325 Indicators Relevant to Gender Quotas and Participation
Develop and implement policy measures to ensure women's active and meaningful participation in decision-making positions and deployment in field-based operations including international.[163]	No. of gender-sensitive national policies developed and implemented at all levels of government to encourage women's leadership.
	No. of gender mainstreaming training sessions held to empower leaders and technical officers to confidently involve and deploy women as leaders and managers.
	Reports on training organised to build the confidence of women and girls to take on leadership and management roles.
	No. of women elected or appointed in political leadership and decision-making positions.
	No. of women role models who are willing to mentor other women and girls in leadership and management.[164]
Identify and recommend competent women in politics and those in decision-making positions in the public service and offer them the required skills training and appropriate opportunities in order to competently retain their positions and advance their career goals.[165]	No. of women identified and recommended for in-service training.
	No. of women appointed to positions of power and decision-making in key government placements.
	No. of women promoted and deployed for higher positions, including international deployment.[166]
Ensure implementation of the 25 percent gender quota to address the persistent under-representation of women in leadership and decision-making positions at all levels of government, including the legislative assemblies, state and local governments, and commissions, and in peace mediation and peacekeeping missions.[167]	No. of women in leadership and decision-making positions.
	No. of training sessions held for women occupying leadership and decision-making positions.
	No. of women recruited, retained, and promoted in government ministries and commissions, including the armed forces and judiciary.[168]

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[163] No author, 'South Sudan National Action Plan 2015 – 2020 on UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and Related Resolutions', *Republic of South Sudan* (2015) [online], available from: http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/SS-NAP-1325.pdf [last accessed: 4 September 2021], p. 35

[164] Ibid

[165] Ibid, p. 36

[166] Ibid

[167] Ibid, p. 38

[168] Ibid

This section of the table can be completed with contextualised outcomes and indicators relating to the gender provisions in the R-ARCSS listed above. The data – or information – required to assess whether these indicators have been met can also be entered below, together with any barriers which might prevent implementation of the gender provisions at the local level.	
Contextualised Anticipated Outcomes:	**Contextualised Indicators:**
Contextualised Anticipated Risks or Hurdles:	**Data Required to Verify:**
Indicators Met?	
Implemented	
Partially Implemented	
Not Implemented	
R-ARCSS Gender Provisions: Gender Equality	
A federal and democratic system of government will be established which will guarantee gender equity (6.2.2).	
A Women's Enterprise Development Fund will be established. This Fund will provide subsidised credit for women-based enterprise development and capacity building of women entrepreneurs (4.15.1.5).	
South Sudan NAP 1325 Strategic Actions Relevant to Gender Equality	**South Sudan NAP 1325 Indicators Relevant to Gender Equality**
Provide women with easier access to lending institutions and financial markets so they are able to access substantial funding to establish bigger businesses and take advantage of larger opportunities, including securing government tenders and contracts.[169]	No. of entrepreneurial and business development skills training sessions delivered to women at all levels.
	No. of financial markets and banking institutions working with women and offering their financial services.
	No. of women entrepreneurs who have been awarded government tenders and contracts.
	Reports of advocacy and information sharing activities of an association of women entrepreneurs of South Sudan.[170]
This section of the table can be completed with contextualised outcomes and indicators relating to the gender provisions in the R-ARCSS listed above. The data – or information – required to assess whether these indicators have been met can also be entered below, together with any barriers which might prevent implementation of the gender provisions at the local level.	
Contextualised Anticipated Outcomes:	**Contextualised Indicators:**

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[169] Ibid, p. 46

[170] Ibid

Contextualised Anticipated Risks or Hurdles:	Data Required to Verify:
Indicators Met?	
Implemented	
Partially Implemented	
Not Implemented	
R-ARCSS Gender Provisions: Gender-based and Sexual Violence	
The Parties shall refrain from acts and forms of sexual and gender-based violence, including sexual exploitation and harassment (2.1.10.2; 5.3.2.1.4; 2.1.10.2)	
South Sudan NAP 1325 Strategic Actions Relevant to Gender-based and Sexual Violence	**South Sudan NAP 1325 Indicators Relevant to Gender-based and Sexual Violence**
Include gender, human rights, women's rights and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in all training of new recruits, induction and of career advancement courses to enable officers in the security sector institutions (SSIs) to unlearn previous practices hostile to human rights and the rule of law.[171]	Revised curricula for each security institution incorporating gender, human rights and women's rights, and these modules are developed and used.
	Gender is mainstreamed in all operations and in the training of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) and prison services, and there is sufficient personnel and more visible results of gender policies.
	Reports of training done.[172]
Establish gender reporting mechanisms with SSIs.	A well-qualified gender equality adviser is recruited in the Human Resources department of each of the security institutions.
Ensure that all staff and officers of all ranks undergo mandatory sexual harassment and gender-awareness training.	An assessment of gender sensitivity in performance evaluations.
All senior leaders establish and enforce a culture in their units of non-tolerance of sexual harassment.	Evaluation of individuals is based on their approaches and results in respect of gender analysis and the inclusion of women.[173]
Introduce the position of gender equality adviser.[174]	
The Parties will record the experiences of victims, including those of women and girls (5.2.2.3.5)	

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[171] Ibid, p. 52

[172] Ibid

[173] Ibid, p. 58

[174] Ibid

Train staff, officers and men in the SSIs about SGBV and trauma management so they are more sensitive to survivors of SGBV when handling cases related to domestic, sexual, or any other form of violence involving women and children.[175]	No. of training programmes initiated and conducted and type of assistance offered to SGBV survivors.
	Percentage increase in resources allocated for training programmes.
	No. of staff trained.[176]
Collect information and data on all SGBV cases in SSIs in order to gauge the magnitude of SGBV and design effective measures to deal with it.[177]	Data collected, analysed, and acted upon.[178]
Document the experiences of women and girls in armed conflict, such as cases of violence against women and girls and including their economic, social, and cultural rights, e.g. right to food, shelter, education, health, care, and social welfare and also harmful traditional practices.	South Sudan Human Rights Commission (SSHRC) Annual Report on the Human Rights Status of South Sudan.
Strengthen the SSHRC so that it is able to address human rights violations that took place during conflict and continue to occur.[179]	Operational SSHRC offices in each of the ten states.
	Documentation of the violation of women and girls' rights in South Sudan.
	No. of published reports and documentary videos produced.
	No. of dissemination activities, e.g. meetings, media reports, etc.[180]
The Parties will protect the needs of women and girls (2.1.10.7.5)	
Enact and enforce national laws to eliminate SGBV, such as domestic violence, sexual offences, trafficking and slavery of women and children and child marriages.	No. of laws enacted.
Reform outdated and irrelevant laws that do not conform with international human rights standards and humanitarian and international criminal law.	No. of laws reformed to conform to international standards.
Align the domestic legal framework with international human rights standards, especially by revising the criminal codes.[181]	Sexual Offences Act enacted.
	Domestic Violence Act enacted.
	Family laws amended.

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[175] Ibid

[176] Ibid

[177] Ibid, p.61

[178] Ibid

[179] Ibid, p. 74

[180] Ibid

[181] Ibid, p. 63

	Inclusion within the Constitution the minimum age of marriage at 18 years to protect girls from early marriages.
	Laws on land and succession that promote and protect women's rights to own and inherit property.
	A National Plan of Action on the Child Act of 2008 developed and implemented to, among other aims, end child marriage.
	Trafficking In Persons law enacted to stop child trafficking and child prostitution in South Sudan.
	Sections on SGBV offences in the Penal Code amended.
	National Gender Policy of 2013 implemented at all levels.
	A well-facilitated National Assembly.[182]
Ratify international and regional human rights instruments, including the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Convention against Torture, the African Protocol, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.	No. of ratified and domesticated international and regional conventions and instruments.
Comply with UNSC resolution 1325 and all the successive treaties on women, peace and security.[183]	Parliamentary records.
	Report of South Sudan to the CEDAW committee.
	Report of South Sudan on the implementation of UNSCR 1325.[184]
Strengthen the capacity of the National Legislative Assembly and state legislative assemblies to guarantee women's rights under national law, produce and implement gender-sensitive legislation, review and amend old national laws and regulations that sustain inequality and promote violence against women.[185]	No. of gendered capacity-building programmes developed for the two assemblies.
	No. of capacity-building programmes conducted at the state and national levels.
	No. of parliamentarians trained in gender and women's rights.

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[182] Ibid

[183] Ibid, p. 64

[184] Ibid

[185] Ibid, p. 66

	No. of gender-sensitive laws enacted by the National Assembly.
	No. of old national laws reviewed and amended.
	Report on implementation of gender responsive laws.[186]

This section of the table can be completed with contextualised outcomes and indicators relating to the gender provisions in the R-ARCSS listed above. The data – or information – required to assess whether these indicators have been met can also be entered below, together with any barriers which might prevent implementation of the gender provisions at the local level.

Contextualised Anticipated Outcomes:	**Contextualised Indicators:**
Contextualised Anticipated Risks or Hurdles:	**Data Required to Verify:**

Indicators Met?	
Implemented	
Partially Implemented	
Not Implemented	

R-ARCSS Gender Provisions: Transitional Justice	
The CTRH shall implement measures to protect victims and witnesses; in particular, women (5.4.2.1)	

South Sudan NAP 1325 Strategic Actions Relevant to Transitional Justice	**South Sudan NAP 1325 Indicators Relevant to Transitional Justice**
Provide support services and programmes to guarantee that legal aid is available and that women witnesses and complainants are treated fairly.[187]	No. of women witnesses and complainants accessing legal aid.[188]
Ensure that there is assistance for survivors and witness protection.[189]	Mechanisms for protection of survivors and witnesses to SGBV cases.[190]

This section of the table can be completed with contextualised outcomes and indicators relating to the gender provisions in the R-ARCSS listed above. The data – or information – required to assess whether these indicators have been met can also be entered below, together with any barriers which might prevent implementation of the gender provisions at the local level.

Contextualised Anticipated Outcomes:	**Contextualised Indicators:**
Contextualised Anticipated Risks or Hurdles:	**Data Required to Verify:**

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[186] Ibid

[187] Ibid, p. 70

[188] Ibid

[189] Ibid, p. 71

[190] Ibid

Indicators Met?	
Implemented	
Partially Implemented	
Not Implemented	

R-ARCSS Gender Provisions: Constitutional Reform	
The Executive of the RTGoNU shall reconstitute the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) and will consult with women's groups before doing so. In these consultations, the experiences of women and girls will be sufficiently documented and the findings of these consultations will be incorporated in the resultant legislation (6.6).	

South Sudan NAP 1325 Strategic Actions Relevant to Constitutional Reform	South Sudan NAP 1325 Indicators Relevant to Constitutional Reform
Review all laws (statutory and customary) that undermine or hinder women's participation in decision-making and governance in their bid to actively engage in South Sudan's recovery, development, and democratic processes.[191]	No. of laws reviewed.
	No. of sensitisation campaigns held to consult with and inform traditional leaders and communities on negative cultural practices that hinder women's leadership potential.
	No. of women actively involved in governance and recovery processes.
	A gender-sensitive constitution that is cognisant of international human rights standards and respect for women's rights.[192]

This section of the table can be completed with contextualised outcomes and indicators relating to the gender provisions in the R-ARCSS listed above. The data – or information – required to assess whether these indicators have been met can also be entered below, together with any barriers which might prevent implementation of the gender provisions at the local level.

Contextualised Anticipated Outcomes:	Contextualised Indicators:
Contextualised Anticipated Risks or Hurdles:	**Data Required to Verify:**

Indicators Met?	
Implemented	
Partially Implemented	
Not Implemented	

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[191] Ibid, p. 34

[192] Ibid

Appendix B

Table c) Draft implementation plan

The table below starts to list the possible steps which might need to be conducted by CYDA and their partners to develop contextualised indicators. These actions will need to be elaborated upon while CYDA and their partners are best-placed to decide upon a timeline, the division of responsibilities and the budget required.

Action	Benchmark(s)	Timeline	Responsible Party or Parties	Budget
1. Identify and build relationships with partners (local South Sudanese women's groups, monitoring and verification bodies for the R-ARCSS, members of the South Sudanese Civil Society Forum and the Women's Coalition, academics and research institutes, and international agencies)				
2. Consider and decide upon the questions and topics to be explored with local women's groups in order to develop contextualised indicators				
3. Consider and decide upon the best method(s) to develop contextualised indicators in partnership with local women's groups				
4. Make the logistical arrangements for the method(s) selected in Step 3)				

5. Conduct the method(s) selected in Step 3)				
6. Analyse the results of the method(s) selected in Step 3)				
7. On the basis of the method(s) selected in Step 3) and conducted in Step 5), draft the contextualised indicators and the strategies for data collection and analysis				
8. Verify the document with the partners selected in Step 1)				
9. Revise the contextualised indicators where necessary				