


**Submission Form  
To  
Joint Steering Committee**

ANNEX 3



<b>Part A: Meeting Information</b> <i>To be completed by the PBF Secretariat</i>	
SC Meeting No:	Fourth (4 <sup>th</sup> )
Item No:	III
Date of Meeting:	9 August 2008

<b>Part B: Project Summary</b> <i>To be completed by the Recipient UN Organization</i>					
From: <i>Head of Recipient UN Organization</i>  Dominic Sam, UNDP Country Director	Date of Submission:  10 September 2008				
Contact: <i>Telephone number, email</i>					
Proposed Project, if approved, would result in:  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> New Project / Joint Project <input type="checkbox"/> Continuation of previous funding <input type="checkbox"/> Other (explain)	Proposed Project resulted from:  <input type="checkbox"/> National Authorities initiative within Liberia PBF Terms of Reference <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UN Agency initiative within Liberia PBF Terms of Reference <input type="checkbox"/> Other (explain)				
Recipient UN Organization: <b>United Nations Development Programme</b>					
Implementing Partner(s): <b>Land Mine Action</b>					
Theme/Cluster/Priority Area: <b>Critical interventions to promote peace and resolve conflict – Area 2</b>					
Project Title: <b>Tamatu Agricultural Training Programme (TATP)</b>					
Total Project Budget: <b>USD 1,773,500</b>					
Amount requested: <b>USD 1,123,500</b>					
Amount and percentage of indirect costs requested: <b>73,500 (7% UNDP)</b>					
Projected Annual Disbursements:	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>2008</td> <td>2009</td> </tr> <tr> <td>\$</td> <td>\$</td> </tr> </table>	2008	2009	\$	\$
2008	2009				
\$	\$				
Projected Annual Commitments:	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>2008</td> <td>2009</td> </tr> <tr> <td>\$</td> <td>\$</td> </tr> </table>	2008	2009	\$	\$
2008	2009				
\$	\$				

\* The term "Project(s)" is used for projects, Project(s) and Joint Project(s).

*Narrative summary of Project  
Not to exceed 500 words*

**1. Background**

*[Provide brief and concise information on the background of the project. Indicate how originated, refer to request endorsement or approval by relevant (Name of Country) authorities etc. If extension of existing project, provide information on original project, such as number, project amount, date of approval.]*

The Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme (TATP) is an existing project that commenced in February 2008 in Satala District, Bong County, following completion of extensive rehabilitation of the site and a rigorous research phase. This programme offers focused agricultural training, predominantly to ex-combatants, followed by intensive reintegration support and assistance. The ex-combatants are relocated to the training centre from UNMIL designated priority 'hot spots'.

The rationale behind TATP is that it is a distinct intervention for a niche group of ex-combatants which are otherwise difficult to deal with. The programme is not designed to be a replacement for DDRR programmes or a generic model for youth training. It is an intensive programme designed to penetrate ex-combatant groups in 'hot spot' regions who have resisted the DDRR process, are still involved in illegal resource exploitation, and who continue to operate a war economy under warlike command structures. This is the first and only programme of its type in Liberia.

**2. Purpose of Proposed Project**

*[Detail key outcomes, outputs, from project cover sheet and attach detailed project document following format laid out in Annex 2.3]*

The programme has been designed and implemented jointly by Landmine Action (LMA) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), and the first course has been completed for 370 trainees, most of whom are ex-combatants relocated from the Guthrie Rubber Plantation who have not participated in the DDRR programme.

This project proposal requests continuation of funding for two complete training cycles for a total of 800 trainees who will be drawn from Guthrie plantations and other 'hot spot' areas.

**Part C: Technical Review**

*(To be completed by the PBF Secretariat on behalf of the Technical Advisory Panel)*

**Composition of Technical Advisory Panel:**

*Provide names, titles and organizational affiliation of Panel members*

Doris Kleffner, UNMIL (Reintegration Knowledge)

Malin Herwig, RCO, (Peacebuilding Knowledge)

Cardinal Uwishaka, UNIFEM (Gender dimension)

Muriel Nelson, NCDDRR, (Reintegration / Psycho-social knowledge)

Annette Kiawu, Ministry of Gender and Development (Gender dimension)

Wilfred Gray-Johnson, UNMIL (Peacebuilding, National processes)

Secretariat: UN: Jonathan Andrews, MIA: Leah Spigelman

**External TAP**

Jeanine Annan - Yale University

Christopher Ballman - Yale University

Cheyanne Church - RPP - Reflecting on Peace Practice, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

Peter Woodrow - RPP - Reflecting on Peace Practice, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

**Technical Advisory Panel Review Dates:***Provide date(s) of review*

16-18 April 2008 (first TAP review)

21-24 July 2008 (Second TAP review, interactive forum with project team)

**3. Evaluation of Proposal by the Technical Advisory Panel***Provide concise summary evaluation of proposal against:***Overall Recommendation:** APPROVE, with further clarification of critical issues**Comments:** Project addresses issues identified in Area 2 pertaining to "hotspots", employment / livelihood training.

- The value added of UNDP is not demonstrated - how will it contribute meaningfully to the project?
- Gender and minority issues are not adequately addressed
- Does this program include war-affected individuals or just ex-combatants - what is the right balance?
- The specific implementation arrangements for livelihood packages, post-training, need to be spelled out; previous interventions with livelihood packages have resulted in sale/misuse
- Unclear how this builds sustainable capacity in government; NCDDRR needs to be linked
- Can this program be linked with farmer-based organizations, also run by MoA to ensure wider agro-impact
- Project will commence in November - JSC needs to consider how to deal with this implementation timeline
- This project addresses in a 2-3 year timeframe about 1500/20,000 ex-combatants identified as at-risk; this is a costly intervention given scope of problem

<i>i) General principles and selection criteria</i>		
(a)	Is the Project explicitly based on Liberia PBF Priority Plan?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(b)	Does the project build capacity within national institutions?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(c)	Does the project promote and ensure national and local ownership?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(d)	Does the organization have the appropriate system to deliver expected results (also looking at earlier performance and project delivery)?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(e)	Does the project avoid duplication of and significant overlap with the activities of other actors?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>

(f)	Does the project use strategic entry points that respond to immediate needs and yet facilitate longer-term improvements?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(g)	Does the project build on existing resources, capacities, strengths and experience?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(h)	Can the Project be completed within 18 months?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
<i>ii) Relevance to peacebuilding criteria</i>		
(a)	Are peacebuilding and reconciliation aspects adequately addressed by the proposal?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(b)	Are related gender dimensions taken into account and adequately addressed by the proposal?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(c)	Are the theory of change and strategy for the project appropriate for, and relevant to the particular conflict situation?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
<i>iii) Project design criteria</i>		
(a)	Are the activities appropriate, practical, and consistent with the expected results?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(b)	Are risks taken into account and is this analysis reflected in the structure and design of the logframe?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(c)	Has the role of partners been identified and is their level of involvement and participation in the project satisfactory?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(d)	Does the proposal include realistic provisions for monitoring and are the indicators at impact, outcome and output level adequate?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
<i>iv) Impact and Sustainability</i>		
(a)	Is the project likely to have a tangible/measurable impact on its target groups, especially in terms of building peace and reconciliation?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(b)	Is the project likely to have multiplier effects, including scope for replication and/or extension?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(c)	Does the proposal have mechanisms to ensure that it is sustained beyond the end date?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(d)	Does the proposal have the mechanisms to be fully integrated and mainstreamed into new Projects and projects?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>c) <i>Overall Technical Advisory Panel review of project submission (Recommendations)</i></p> <p><b>Overall Recommendation:</b> APPROVE, with further clarification of critical issues</p> <p><b>Comments:</b> Project addresses issues identified in Area 2 pertaining to "hotspots", employment / livelihood training.</p>		Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The value added of UNDP is not demonstrated – how will it contribute meaningfully to the project?</li> <li>• Gender and minority issues are not adequately addressed</li> <li>• Does this program include war-affected individuals or just ex-combatants – what is the right balance?</li> <li>• The specific implementation arrangements for livelihood packages, post-training, need to be spelled out; previous interventions with livelihood packages have resulted in sale/misuse</li> <li>• Unclear how this builds sustainable capacity in government; NCDRR needs to be linked</li> <li>• Can this program be linked with farmer-based organizations, also run by MoA to ensure wider agro-impact</li> <li>• Project will commence in November – JSC needs to consider how to deal with this implementation timeline</li> <li>• This project addresses in a 2-3 year timeframe about 1500/20,000 ex-combatants identified as at-risk; this is a costly intervention given scope of problem</li> </ul>	
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**Part D: Administrative Review**

*To be completed by the Liberia PBF Secretariat*

**4. Review by PBF Secretariat**

*Date of review:*  
12 September 2008



**Check on Project Proposal Format Contents**

- |                                                                           |                                         |                             |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cover sheet (first page)                         | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework                                | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Project Justification                            | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Project Management Arrangements                  | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Risks and Assumptions                            | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Summary Budget                                   | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Progress Report (for supplementary funding only) | Yes <input type="checkbox"/>            | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Support Cost                                     | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Provide concise summary assessment against:*

- 18 Months Implementation  
*Elaborate*
- Agency indirect support cost  
*Elaborate*
- General evaluation criteria  
*Elaborate*

*Part E: General criteria for prioritising Projects/projects*

(a)	Must be in line with Liberia PBF Priority Plan	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(b)	Recipient Organisation is unable to meet high or urgent priority needs with existing level of funding	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(c)	Addresses high priority activities that have significant impact, and by nature must address seasonal or timing imperatives and considerations.	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
(d)	Supports activities that are likely to improve the overall peacebuilding situation at national and local levels.	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>

S. Recommendation of the PBF Secretariat

*Elaborate*

**APPROVE**

This project has potential to be scaled up and out to other areas if it proves successful. It has a high degree of national institution capacity building and MoA staff are genuinely involved in the ongoing effort. TAP as well as JSC comments and concerns are addressed. The real question of the success of the reintegration and PB impact cannot be determined until the first group of trainees has been reintegrated and is settled and economically stable. However, there are strong indications that this is achievable.

**Part F: Decision of Steering Committee**

*(To be completed by the Steering Committee)*

**5. Decision of the Liberia PBF Joint Steering Committee**

- Approved for a total budget of \$ 1,123,500
- Approved with modification/condition
- Deferred/returned with comments for further consideration
- Rejected

Comments/Justification:

**Part G: Administrative Agent Review**

*(To be completed by the Administrative Agent)*


**7. Action taken by the Administrative Agent: MDTF Office, UNDP**

- Project consistent with provisions of the Liberia PBF Memorandum of Understanding and Standard Administrative Arrangements with donors.





**LIBERIA PEACEBUILDING FUND  
PROJECT DOCUMENT COVER SHEET**



<b>Recipient UN Organisation:</b> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	<b>Liberia PBF Priority Area:</b> Critical interventions to promote peace and resolve conflict – Area 2
<b>Project Manager:</b> UNDP Name: TBC <b>Address:</b> UNDP Monrovia <b>Telephone:</b> 06840429 <b>E-mail:</b> <a href="mailto:aderemi.abinu@undp.org">aderemi.abinu@undp.org</a> or <a href="mailto:npofoou.abdulai@undp.org">npofoou.abdulai@undp.org</a>	<b>Implementing partner:</b> Landmine Action <b>Name:</b> Chris Lang, Country Manager <b>Address:</b> Off UN Drive, Mamba Point, Monrovia <b>Telephone:</b> 06821179 <b>E-mail:</b> <a href="mailto:clang@landmineaction.org">clang@landmineaction.org</a>
<b>Signed:</b> Dominic Sam, UNDP Country Director	
<b>Project Number:</b> 006	<b>Project Duration:</b> 18 months. This breaks down to 2 complete training cycles, each of which is comprised of 2 months of research and preparation, a 5-month training course, and 4 months of reintegration assistance. There is an overlap between the 2 cycles.
<b>Project Title:</b> Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme (TATP)	<b>Project Location:</b> Tumutu, Salala District, Bong County
<b>Project Description:</b> This intervention is an intensive agricultural training and social reintegration DDRR programme, predominantly for ex-combatants that have been relocated from UNMIL designated priority 'hot spots'.	<b>Total Project Cost:</b> <b>PBF:</b> USD 1,123,500 <b>Government Input:</b> USD 25,000 <b>Other:</b> USD 625,000 (DFID) <b>Total:</b> USD 1,773,500
	<b>Project Duration:</b> 18 months (to commence in September 2008)
<b>Peacebuilding Impact and key outcomes:</b> <b>Impact:</b> Improved regional and national security via the removal, retraining and relocation of ex-combatants involved in illegal natural resource exploitation from priority hot spots, hence reducing their vulnerability to engage in criminal activities or to be recruited into illicit military activities. <b>Outcomes:</b> Ex-combatants will be removed from priority hot spot regions; existing chains of command will be broken; illegal natural resource exploitation will be curbed and rule of law established; disaffected youth will be provided with the skills to make legal and sustainable livelihoods; local and national food security will be developed.	
<b>Outputs and Key Activities:</b> 800 suitable beneficiaries (400 for each course) will be identified, relocated, housed, fed and trained at TATP. Training courses will last for 5 months. The curriculum will comprise of: 4 core agricultural subjects; social reintegration training; numeracy & literacy classes; small business skill classes. After graduating the beneficiaries will receive intensive reintegration support and assistance.	
<b>Technical Advisory Panel Review Date:</b> _____ <b>PBF Secretariat Review Date:</b> _____ <b>Joint Steering Committee Approval Date:</b> _____	

Signature

Date

Name/Title


  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dominic Sam, Country Director

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Amelal Johnson, Minister

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Jordan Ryan, DSRSG (RG)

25-09-08

## THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Results	Measurable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p><b>PEACEBUILDING IMPACT</b></p> <p>Improved regional and national security via the relocation and training of ex-combatants involved in illegal natural resource exploitation from priority hot spots, hence reducing their vulnerability to engage in criminal activities or to be recruited into illicit military activities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reduction in security related problems at hot spots in question.</li> <li>- Level of success in implementation of rule of law and return of ownership to government.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- UNMIL RRR monitoring reports on hot spot activity.</li> <li>- Status report on nationwide security sector reform.</li> <li>- Report on transparency and legality of financial management of natural resources.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Beneficiaries are willing to stop illegal activities and consider alternative livelihoods.</li> <li>- Beneficiaries are willing to relocate to training centre for duration of training.</li> <li>- Beneficiaries will not return to hotspots after training and continue illegal activities.</li> </ul>
<p><b>OUTCOMES:</b></p> <p>i. Hot spots exhibit improved security and implementation of rule of law.</p> <p>ii. Ex-combatants, formerly dependent on illegal livelihoods, pursue legal and sustainable livelihoods.</p> <p>iii. Beneficiaries are better citizens, with greater respect for rule of law and improved social and communication skills.</p> <p>iv. Ex-combatants reinserted and reintegrated into communities away from former hot spots.</p> <p>v. Government assume full ownership and management of training centre.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Frequency/severity of illegal activity in hot spots before and after ex-combatant removal.</li> <li>- Proportion of ex-combatants who return to hot spots after training and continue former illegal activities.</li> <li>- Proportion of ex-combatants who move to a new (non hot spot) community after training.</li> <li>- Proportion of ex-combatants successfully undertaking agricultural activities after completion of training.</li> <li>- Comparison of activities and livelihoods of ex-combatants to those who haven't been through the training course.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- External monitoring and evaluation report by sub-contracted local partner.</li> <li>- Long term external monitoring and evaluation report through the Yale University Department of Political Science &amp; Economics (ref. attached Note to File).</li> <li>- External Mid Term and Terminal Project Evaluation report.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- UNMIL and Government action required after removal of ex-combatants from hot spots to implement rule of law and legal and transparent management structures.</li> <li>- Government of Liberia make land available for secure reintegration (as per MOU between LMA and the Ministry of Agriculture).</li> </ul>
<p><b>OUTPUTS:</b></p> <p>i. Fewer ex-combatants involved in illegal activities in hot spot regions; command structures dismantled.</p> <p>ii. 800 beneficiaries with new skill sets, enabling them to pursue sustainable livelihoods. Local and national food security improved.</p>	<p>i). % reduction in number of ex-combatants involved in illegal activities.</p> <p>ii). Number of beneficiaries trained</p> <p>iii). Number or % of beneficiaries meeting specified criteria for desired social and behaviour skills.</p>	<p>Quarterly and Mid Term monitoring and review reports</p>	<p>As below</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>iii. 800 beneficiaries with improved social and behavioural skills.</li> <li>iv. Improved chance of beneficiaries successfully reintegrating into their communities.</li> <li>v. Capacity building of Government via the handover of the staff, materials and management responsibilities of the training centre.</li> </ul>			
<p><b>ACTIVITIES:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Relocation of ex-combatants from hot spot regions.</li> <li>ii. Agricultural training courses.</li> <li>iii. Social reintegration training.</li> <li>iv. Intensive reintegration assistance and support.</li> <li>v. Phased handover of training centre to government control.</li> </ul>	<p><b>INPUTS:</b></p> <p>Financial. See budget in annex 2.A</p>	<p>Financial report</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. There will be no resistance to removal from hot spots.</li> <li>ii. and iii. The course will not be hampered by: blockages in supply chains for training materials; force majeure causing damage to training centre; disruption to training course due to major disciplinary problems; staff strike action etc.</li> <li>iv. There will be no resistance from communities in receiving beneficiaries and making land available.</li> <li>v. There will not be disinterest or apathy from government towards the handover process.</li> </ul>

## 1. Background and problem statement

**BACKGROUND:** The Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme (TATP) is an existing project that commenced in February 2008 in Salala District, Bong County, following completion of extensive rehabilitation of the site and a rigorous research phase. This programme offers focused agricultural training, predominantly to ex-combatants, followed by intensive reintegration support and assistance. The ex-combatants are relocated to the training centre from UNMIL designated priority 'hot spots'.

The rationale behind TATP is that it is a distinct intervention for a niche group of ex-combatants which are otherwise difficult to deal with. The programme is not designed to be a replacement for DDRR programmes or a generic model for youth training. It is an intensive programme designed to penetrate ex-combatant groups in 'hot spot' regions who have resisted the DDRR process, are still involved in illegal resource exploitation, and who continue to operate a war economy under warlike command structures. This is the first and only programme of its type in Liberia.

The programme has been designed and implemented jointly by Landmine Action (LMA) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), and the first course has been completed for 370 trainees, most of whom are ex-combatants relocated from the Guthrie Rubber Plantation who have not participated in the DDRR programme.

This project proposal requests continuation of funding for two complete training cycles for a total of 800 trainees who will be drawn from Guthrie plantations and other 'hot spot' areas.

**PROBLEM STATEMENT:** 'Hot Spot' locations encompass situations with the specific and outstanding reintegration challenges of war-affected populations, including ex-combatants, who are pursuing mostly illegal activities in resource-rich areas of the country, such as illegal mining, rubber theft and sale, illegal logging and hunting. While there is no indication of the existence of any national network of former faction leaders, there are several locations where previous command structures have been adopted and are functioning for illegal economic reasons. Young men and women working under these command structures do not enjoy the benefits of decent working conditions and remain vulnerable to recruitment into armed activities in the region. This project will provide permanent alternatives to current illegal activities, facilitating their reintegration into society, ensuring sustainable and legal livelihoods, thus contributing positively to enduring peace in Liberia and the region.

Although the dissemination of the hotspot UNMIL report is limited when the detailed planning for the hotspot courses is conducted, LMA will work on the target hotspot in discussion with UNMIL.

The government's poverty reduction strategy (PRS) places considerable focus on increasing Liberia's agricultural productivity in order to move away from its dependency upon imported foodstuffs, particularly in light of the increase in global food prices. This component of the PRS is severely hindered by the fact that the country's agricultural potential has been highly neglected

and existing agricultural training facilities have been destroyed during the war years. There is currently insufficient MoA and general Government capacity to undertake training in agriculture and there is currently no national capacity to provide alternative livelihoods to ex-combatants and other war-affected populations in 'hot spot' areas. This project, therefore, provides the added benefit of helping to deliver food security at the individual, local and national levels and is a key element of the MoA long term strategy for improving nationwide food security. During a visit to this project in March 2008, President Johnson-Sirleaf stressed the importance and capacity of this training centre in providing both sustainable livelihoods to ex-combatants and in assisting Liberia to obtain its agricultural objectives.

With a focus throughout the project in supporting MoA skills and capacity, the site will remain capable of running courses for the indefinite future, making the reduction of illegal hotspots feasible with the attended positive peacebuilding effect.

**THE TRAINING CENTRE:** The training centre is located in a 500-acre MoA rubber farm in Salala District, Bong County. During the war the site was used as an IDP camp. Over the years the farm had fallen into a state of total disrepair. The recent rehabilitation included the construction and renovation of sufficient buildings and infra-structure to accommodate, feed and train up to 400 students per course and is now one of the best equipped training facilities in Liberia. LMA has also established seed beds, nurseries and animal housing for all teaching activities on the site.

An onsite health clinic at TATP caters to the 490 students and staff, providing free treatment for seven days a week. The clinic is registered with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and contributes to health provision in the local community by taking some strain off the local clinics.

**PARTICIPANTS:** The participants of the training courses are predominantly ex-combatants who are relocated from the 'hot spot' locations. After a detailed research and sensitisation phase, the ex-combatant participants will be relocated from the highest priority 'hot spots', which are to be determined under the leadership of the Government, the UN and other stakeholders. One key benefit of this training centre is the availability of the onsite boarding facilities, which means that ex-combatants can be relocated from anywhere in the country depending on which regions are deemed of highest priority and are difficult to access.

A number of local war-affected community members will also attend the course as day students. However, it is important to keep in mind that the key purpose of the programme is to penetrate peace-resistant ex-combatants; the programme was not designed for war-affected groups. Further into the future, as the hot spots are dealt with, the focus may well shift to other vulnerable and minority groups.

Around 5% of the ex-combatants on the current course are women. Before the course began it was anticipated that there would be a higher percentage. However, when it came to moving the ex-combatants from Guthrie to Tumutu, many of the women who had initially been identified as potential trainees chose not to attend; the main reason was cited as the requirement to look after children. LMA will endeavour to bring as many women onto the courses as possible. However, the vast majority of the ex-combatants from the groups that this programme targets are men, and therefore it is only logical that the gender percentages reflect this fact.

LMA also accepts couples onto the course, so long as both partners are ex-combatants. Private accommodation for couples is provided. LMA provides a full-time childminder to look after the children of couples or single mothers that are too young to attend school.

A small number of ex-child soldiers (under 16s) are attended the first course. After graduation,

LMA will endeavour to return these children to their families, arrange for them to attend an Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP) in order to continue their education, and assist them in starting small scale farming activities (such as animal husbandry), which complements the work UNICEF is undertaking in this area.

There is no requirement to mitigate for the risk of people not wanting to participate in these courses. The first course was approached by over 2,000 people applying for a vacancy. There is a serious national lack of employment and educational opportunities, particularly in hotspot and rural areas. The evidence faced by LMA is that poor Liberians are desperate for this sort of opportunity.

**TRAINING CYCLE:** Each training cycle consists of a five-month integrated training phase in:

- Rice production
- Vegetable production
- Animal husbandry
- Rubber culture.

The curriculum is predominantly practical and is supported by classroom-based sessions. Trainees are assessed periodically throughout the course and provided with additional coaching if specific weaknesses are identified. Trainees are expected to adhere to the high standards of the training centre and will be asked to leave the course if their level of attendance is unsatisfactory or they do not abide by the rules and regulations.

The ex-combatants will receive intensive psycho-social counselling provided by a sub-contracted local NGO, the National Ex-combatants Peacebuilding Initiative (NEPI), in order to prepare them for social reintegration. This aspect of the course will be reinforced by the trainees' inclusion in the management committees and the running of the farm. They will also receive reintegration specific training in literacy, numeracy and small business skills. They will be housed, fed, clothed and provided with medical facilities for the duration of the course.

Agriculture is a full time endeavour and learning the agricultural, business and social skills taught on the course is full time. Skills include village technology construction, as well as the literacy and numeracy skills necessary to operate in an agriculture business. Trainees are taught how to store rice as part of their training. Malaria avoidance, sexual health and social skills are also taught. The preparation, management and development of crops and animals is a full time job, there is no requirement to teach trainees additional skills to fill their time. The agriculture taught is designed to be multi-layered, to produce short, medium and longer term financial returns; the reintegration pack includes a financial component to enable the trainee to survive for the first two months after return, whilst tending to their crops and animals prior to them becoming ready for consumption and sale.

Trainees are taught basic money management as part of the literacy and numeracy course. This includes the running of a cash book and basic financial planning.

From the first course of graduates in September 2008 reintegration activities will be complete in February 2009. The evaluation report to the current donor will be completed, in the timescale agreed with the donor, in March 2009. This report will combine the lessons identified from the first training course and its subsequent reintegration.

**TEACHING STAFF:** A majority of the teaching staff at the training centre have been seconded from the Ministry of Agriculture, including its subsidiary Central Agricultural Research Institute (CARI) and the Liberian Rubber Development Authority (LRDA). Staff was carefully selected

and their instructional capacity developed through training workshops to ensure the best tuition possible. The training included the skills and mindset required to deal with ex-combatants.

**REINTEGRATION:** The reintegration phase consists of two key stages:

1. **Pre-graduation.** Before students graduate from the training centre they will each be interviewed to establish their post-graduation aspirations and preferred communities of relocation. Using this information, LMA mobile field teams will visit the recipient communities in question in order to 'prepare the ground' for the trainees' return and to discuss the availability of suitable agricultural land. Prior to completing the course, each student will have agreed a bespoke reintegration plan detailing their community of relocation, their agricultural objectives, and the content of their reintegration package. The reintegration package may include seeds, animals, fertilisers, tools etc., as required to undertake the subject(s) of their choice.
2. **Post-graduation.** After graduating each beneficiary will be inserted back into their chosen community. Before they leave the training centre each beneficiary will be given the first batch of their reintegration materials, as agreed in their individual reintegration plans. They will be provided with sufficient tools and materials to allow them to prepare and clear the areas required for crop production or to construct animal pens. A few weeks after graduation, LMA's field teams will visit each beneficiary to assess their progress. Provided that they demonstrate progress in the abovementioned tasks, they will be given the next batch of materials such as seeds and animals (i.e. this process is to discourage sale or misuse of the first batch of materials). If they require further in situ technical assistance this will be arranged. The beneficiaries will receive at least 4 months of phased and supervised logistical, technical and material support to ensure sustainability of his/her farming activities. Reintegration activities will be community focused to facilitate successful and smooth reintegration with a visible agricultural development benefit for the community.

Some beneficiaries will chose to establish group or cooperative ventures. Beneficiaries are encouraged to join forces where they are from the same or neighbouring communities in order to take advantage of the various associated benefits, such as equipment and knowledge sharing. The Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) has visited TATP to teach the trainees about the theory and benefits of cooperatives and will do so again for future courses.

LMA and the MoA will endeavour to facilitate job placements for beneficiaries who do not have land available to them. Examples of job placements are: technicians for private concessions or farms; extension workers for the MoA or its constituent bodies.

A small group of trainees have previously completed their high school education and have expressed an interest in furthering their studies. LMA and MoA are currently investigating the feasibility of arranging for them to attend the BWI Polytechnic in Kakata.

In order to prepare the communities for new members to reintegrate, they are all visited in advance by the Field Teams and are carefully sensitized on the return of the trainees to that community. For the current course, the community response has been overwhelmingly positive - of the 146 trainees whose communities have been approached to date, there has been 100% acceptance of the return.

With regards to gaining access to land for those reintegrating, the Field Teams' visits to the communities identify the individual or family named by the trainee as the person they wish to return to. Once acceptance of the trainee has been confirmed the issue of land is discussed. In



the majority of cases families agree to provide land, sometimes with caveats, but mostly willingly, not least because the trainee will return with much needed skills and a meaningful reintegration pack from which the family will benefit. At no stage to date has there been any potential conflict over land – the trainees are returning to family or close friends who are happy to receive them. At no stage will the project allow a conflict to be caused by a return. Efforts will also be continued with the MoA, and other Government agencies to secure more land for reintegration.

Almost all of the trainees will return to communities where there are existing markets. The subjects taught were selected by the MoA because national shortfalls exist. Where students indicate a desire to return to places where markets do not exist, LMA will weigh up the benefits of eased reintegration into the community with the lack of a market to decide what is in the best interest of the student. This process is carefully discussed with the student and wherever possible the student is advised to consider entering a co-operative with other trainees where there is a ready market.

## 2. Project Rationale and expected results

**PROJECT RATIONALE:** The Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) outlines six conflict factors that have been identified as those most likely to cause future violent conflict unless urgently addressed and alleviated. This project will have positive impacts on the following:

1. *Youth – Young men and women have been denied education, have had their transition from childhood to adulthood interrupted by war, have few skills and are often burdened with many of the responsibilities of adults, particularly as heads of households and income earners. Unreal expectations with the group could trigger significant social unrest, not only in Liberia, but across the region.*

Most ex-combatants selected for this programme will have been denied education due to commitments to their wartime factions. Hence, most have few skills, and what 'skills' they do have are used for illegal purposes – i.e. rubber tapping or mineral mining. They are disillusioned about their futures due to unfulfilled promises made by their wartime commanders, soaring countrywide unemployment rates, and the lack of vocational opportunities. The group of youth that this programme focuses on – those who have resisted previous DDRR opportunities and are involved in illegal natural resource extraction – are perhaps the most susceptible to turning this disillusionment into violence.

2. *Management of natural resources – Liberia's wealth of natural resources has not benefited society as a whole but has served to create inequalities and resentment...*

Removal and relocation of peace-resistant ex-combatants from areas like the Guthrie Rubber Plantation will greatly assist the government in re-implementing state authority and rule of law. These ex-combatants will only agree to peacefully cease their illegal moneymaking activities if they are offered a genuine sustainable alternative. Agriculture is the most viable and realistic alternative.

3. *Land Conflicts – Land disputes have become a manifestation of conflict over identity and citizenship issues. There is a proliferation of land disputes over tenure and ownership, the reintegration of refugees and ex-combatants into communities in relation to property...*

Prior to relocating the trainees to their chosen communities (in most cases their pre-war homes) LMA will visit each community to prepare the ground, identify any potential

resistance, and discuss the possibilities of making land available for agricultural purposes. Therefore, ex-combatants will not be returning to communities demanding land; in the majority of cases cordial arrangements will have already been made and suitable areas already identified.

4. *The State and its citizens – The Liberian State historically has been more predatory in nature than protective of its citizens; it created and exacerbated social divisions by marginalizing and denigrating certain social groups...*

Ex-combatants are a marginalized group and looked down upon by society as a whole. To allow them to affect change in this perception, the social reintegration aspect of the programme aims to teach the ex-combatants the importance of good citizenship. A change in conduct and reduction in antisocial behaviour is essential if they are to successfully reintegrate into their chosen communities. This project also provides a concrete opportunity for the State to demonstrate good will and make land available and secure for people.

**EXPECTED RESULTS OF TATP:** As described above, this programme is multi-layered in the respect that it addresses more than one conflict factor, even though the primary peacebuilding impact is felt by the 'cooling' of priority hot spots. More specifically, the outcomes of the project are as follows:

1. **Peacebuilding.** The peacebuilding impact will be felt in the following ways:

- a) *Short-Term.* The relocation of ex-combatants from priority areas to the training site will have an immediately positive peacebuilding effect; existing chains of command will be dismantled and illegal activities will be reduced. Trainee relocation to the training site will immediately reduce their vulnerability to exploitation and illegal recruitment activities.
- b) *Medium-Term.* In the medium term, hotspots will be cooled because of the enduring absence of the trainees at the training site; during the reintegration phase they will be very busy preparing their land and establishing their agricultural businesses. This nine-month window will permit the resumption of state authority and a peaceful environment. Reconciliation with other community members will be promoted through inclusion of the latter in the training, whilst community reintegration is at the heart of the post-course reintegration programme.
- c) *Long-Term.* The reintegration phase is designed to ensure long-term peace building sustainability as ex-combatants and other war-affected youth reintegrate into their communities and develop a sustainable and lucrative legal livelihood. While most DDDR programmes stopped at training, this project offers carefully considered and continued assistance to the students for a number of months after their graduation in order to give them the best chance to reintegrate into their chosen community. In this regard, this is a unique model that offers an innovative solution to an old problem.

2. **Improvements in local and national agricultural capacity.** 800 people will be trained (400 in each training cycle) in all four of the above-mentioned agricultural subjects. Beneficiaries will be reintegrated into their communities and will enjoy a steady income while contributing to food production at the local level.

Local agricultural capacity will be built by trainees in their receiving communities. Course agricultural techniques will be disseminated, improving local food security, thereby contributing

to national food security and peacebuilding in Liberia.

**3. Capacity Building.** The project will strengthen the capacity of the MoA at the managerial and instructional level. The planning capacity of the MoA will be developed through participation of their staff in the management processes. This project provides the continuation of the only national agriculture training site in Liberia, allowing the Ministry to teach and disseminate best practice through its graduates. This capacity is replicable in other vulnerable areas in Liberia.

LMA currently employs over 100 national staff and 3 specialist international staff. Capacity building is a key principle of the organisation's strategy and sustainability in Liberia.

**4. Lessons Identified.** The monitoring and evaluation process will identify specific and detailed lessons for the implementation of similar projects in Liberia and in the wider peacebuilding context. This process and report will be of enduring value to the peacebuilding process.

**5. Indirect Beneficiaries.** The indirect beneficiaries from this project are numerous. All communities receiving graduates should see a subsequent increase in local food production and variety. Over time, employment opportunities will be created, particularly where cooperative ventures are established. Satala District, in particular, will see a boom in its food productivity since a number of its community members will graduate from the course. Communities in and around the hot spots should experience a noticeable improvement in security as illegal resource extraction decreases and government control is established.

### **3. Partnerships and Management Arrangement**

#### ***PARTNERSHIPS:***

The success of this project depends upon an alliance between a number of partners and stakeholders:

- 1. The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA):** Liberia's MoA has been involved in the project design since its inception. A panel of technical experts from the MoA helped LMA to design the syllabus for the five agricultural subjects that make up the curriculum. This panel met on a weekly basis before the course began. Most of these technical experts are now instructors at TATP, seconded from the MoA for a few days each week.

An Assistant Deputy Minister from the MoA chairs the TATP Project Management Committee. This committee convenes on a monthly basis to discuss the high level progress and strategy of the project and to resolve key issues and difficulties. The MoA is briefed in detail on issues and progress and is actively involved in the decision making process. As it progresses through subsequent training cycles, the project will seek to increasingly involve and hand over responsibility to the MoA for all aspects of training and reintegration.

The MoA will assume full ownership and management of the training centre once sufficient capacity has been built, and proven, repeatable procedures have been established. The gradual handover from LMA to the MoA will be achieved through a phased approach. For example, for the second course the MoA will assume full responsibility of the TATP teaching staff. A phase handover will be an 'acid test' for how well the capacity of the MoA has developed.

Technicians from the Liberian Rubber Development Authority (LRDA) and the Central

Agricultural Research Institute (CARI) – both subsidiary organisations of the MoA – are also hired as instructors at TATP and their senior representatives sit on the Project Management Committee. The capacity of both of these organisations was seriously depleted during the war, and so the opportunity for their staff to be plying their trade and revising their skills is of genuine benefit to them.

2. **UNMIL RRR:** UNMIL RRR provides LMA with guidance in regard to the relative priorities of hot spots, and hence is integral in determining where the beneficiaries for each course should be relocated. The priorities of hot spots may vary over time due to a number of factors and so it is important that there is regular reassessment of priority areas. UNMIL RRR also ensures that this project ties into NCDDRR's national strategy and that the latter is fully briefed on its progress. NCDDRR's job placement schemes may be drawn upon if the MoA cannot facilitate a sufficient number of job placements for beneficiaries who require this provision.
3. **UNDP:** UNDP's role as the executing agency is defined and governed by UNDP's standard guidelines and operational procedures. UNDP will also provide oversight, control and monitoring and general project coherence in light of UNDP's larger role in reintegration in Liberia.
4. **National Ex-combatant Peacebuilding Initiative (NEPI):** NEPI is a national NGO that has been sub-contracted to undertake social reintegration training at TATP. NEPI staff lives on the site and thus are always on hand to help deal with conflict or behavioural problems. Many of the counsellors are themselves ex-combatants. NEPI was formed in the year 2000 and specialises in conflict transformation, trauma healing and peacebuilding. They have worked on projects throughout Liberia in partnership with a number of INGOs and IOs, and have international recognition. The sub-contracting of NEPI has the added benefit that national expertise replaces the need to bring in international staff, hence making this a more cost-effective arrangement.
5. **The Office of the District Commissioner, Salala District:** LMA has maintained close ties with representatives from the district of Salala from the very start of the programme. Prior to the rehabilitation of the site there was apprehension from the local community arising from the idea of having an ex-combatant training programme brought to their doorsteps. However, this perception has since changed now that the people of Salala have realised the benefits that this programme brings to them and have seen that the trainees can peacefully coexist in the community. Examples of these benefits are:
  - Employment opportunities: during construction the vast majority of the workforce was taken from the community, and currently all of the guards and cooks are locally hired.
  - Training opportunities: some places will be made available on all courses to local people, particularly war-affected youth.
  - Economic opportunities: the agricultural productivity of the district will increase and a greater variety of produce will be more readily available. Given the position of Salala on the main Monrovia-Gbarnga highway, Salala produce has a readymade market once its productivity and variety increase.The District Commissioner offers his close support to the programme and a representative from the district of Salala sits on the Project Management Committee.
6. **Yale University** will provide evaluation and monitoring support considering this project within a larger study on ex-combatant reintegration and recovery in Liberia

### **MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS:**

The project will be implemented using Direct Execution (DEX) modality. This means that UNDP assumes overall management responsibility and accountability for project implementation. This further means that all procurement of goods, services and civil works would be done in keeping with UNDP rules. All recruitment will also be done in keeping with UNDP rules. In both cases, the relevant partners would participate in the aforementioned processes as much as possible. In order to support implementation, UNDP will assign a Project Officer whose costs would be covered by the project.

LMA provides the core project management such as: project conceptualization and design; project implementation; logistics; human resource management, while the UNDP provides oversight functions and financial and budgetary control.

The MoA provides: agricultural expertise; instructors; quality assurance; government and stakeholder liaison; and high level programme oversight with UNDP's support.

A Project Management Board will be established comprising of representatives from UNMIL, UNDP, LMA, MoA, Ministry of Internal Affairs, ILO, and the Ministry of Labour for the purpose of oversight and strategic guidance.

The Project Management Board will:

- Provide overall guidance and direction to the project to ensure the project proceeds according to the work plan;
- Provide advice on project implementation when need arises;
- Contribute to establishing mechanisms for project sustainability;
- Call for a review and consider monitoring and evaluation information;
- Review work plan and budget proposed by the project management team;
- Assist in the recruitment of staff of the project.

Joint decision-making has been an attribute of the project since its inception. As mentioned, the design phase was a sharing of ideas and knowledge between LMA and the Ministry of Agriculture, and this has continued with the Project Management Committee.

The next level down from the Project Management Board is the Farm Management Committee. This technical working group convenes on a weekly basis to discuss the day-to-day management issues and requirements of the training centre. This joint meeting is chaired by LMA and ensures that there is shared decision-making, inclusiveness and transparency of all routine management decisions taken at the training centre.

Trainees are included in the low level management structures and in the running of the farm. This teaches them management skills and cooperation and ensures that they have a safe, structured forum for expressing their issues and concerns.

LMA also has an internal control framework which manages issues such as trainee discipline. Risk analysis is inbuilt within this framework. Standard programme management risks such as blockages in supply chains, security threats, staff disputes etc. are monitored and managed at head office via regular staff meetings and feedback sessions. The principal potential risk to the project itself is disturbance and disorder from the trainees. Daily reports from the project staff are received by the Programme Manager and so any such issues are identified and dealt with.

immediately. UNMIL are informed of any significant security related issues.

#### 4. Monitoring & Evaluation

LMA, UNDP Liberia Country Office M&E unit and external evaluation partners (Yale University) will assume responsibility for monitoring and evaluation of the project.

This is a new and innovative approach to peacebuilding and as such indicators will determine:

1. The peacebuilding effect of an agricultural programme in a post-conflict context.
2. The success of the programme in achieving reintegration.
3. The success and extent of national capacity building in all project phases and with all participating groups.
4. The best possible practices (management and partnership structures) for the implementation of agricultural peacebuilding programmes.
5. The performance of different comparison groups attending the programme, such as; ex-combatants / non ex-combatants; women / men; different age groups; ex-combatants from different 'hot spots'.

A parallel study undertaken through the Yale University Department of Political Science & Economics proposes to evaluate the long-term impact of this intervention. In order to assess the true peacebuilding impact of such a project it is necessary to track the beneficiaries for a number of years to observe their eventual life choices, and to compare these people to control groups who have not been through the process.

Quality control of the course itself is undertaken by both LMA and the MoA. MoA instructors examine the trainees periodically throughout the course to ensure that they have absorbed the theoretical and practical skills. Evening classes are laid on, if necessary, to assist those trainees who require additional tutoring. Trainees must pass the course in order to graduate – Ministry of Agriculture certifications are expected to be earned and not just given away at the end.

UNDP will bolster the overall project quality assurance by conducting onsite spot-checks. Quarterly, Mid Term and Annual Project reviews will be conducted in line with the UNDAF and PRS M&E frameworks.

LMA ensures that a high standard of lesson delivery is maintained and that the agreed syllabus is strictly adhered to.

LMA is currently producing a document of lessons identified from the planning and running of the first course. This was a pilot course and so the identified lessons will be learned and incorporated into subsequent courses.

#### 5. Sustainability of the project

Sustainability has been a core aim of the project since its inception. The extensive rehabilitation of the training centre was costly and so it is imperative that these facilities are used by the MoA appropriately for many years to come.

The project is designed to develop the farm to be self-sustaining. Agricultural produce will become sufficient to supply the site with the majority of its food needs, provide sufficient agricultural material for reintegration packs and ultimately to be able to sell agricultural products

and extension services to ensure its financial viability. LMA is currently producing a business plan for the site to detail how much produce will/can be yielded and how this measures up against the sustainability objectives. This business plan will be ready before the start of the next course. It would be premature to put an exact timeframe around the self-sufficiency plan until the business plan has been completed.

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Joint Steering Committee (JSC), has commented on the expensive nature of this project. Whilst it is true that person-for-person this is currently more expensive than many DDDR projects, there are two key factors to bear in mind. The first of these factors has been discussed: in order to effectively deal with the niche group of the most problematic ex-combatants that this project targets an intensive intervention has been deemed necessary. The second factor is that this agricultural project has certain facets that differ from most other DDDR related training programmes: whilst the set-up and running costs may be high, there is the unique benefit that substantial produce can be generated which, if managed correctly, can in time make sustainability a reality. As the courses progress, more and more land will be farmed and more crops and animals produced. The current food costs will decrease as the produce is used in the kitchen, and other running costs will be met through sale of crops and animals. The farm already has 40 plots of rice, many acres of vegetables, and hundreds of pigs, rabbits and chickens – all this after just 3 months of the first course. By the end of the 3<sup>rd</sup> course it is anticipated that the training centre will have taken major steps towards sustainability and subsequent courses will be run for a fraction of the costs, although as mentioned this will become clearer once the business plan is complete. Investment is required now in order to achieve this goal.

LMA will support the MoA to become full manager and in a short possible time frame. As that capacity is built a phased handover will commence. Landmine Action's role will lessen and its national and international staff costs – a substantial part of the budget – will decrease accordingly over time.

As the programme progresses it will become possible to budget for less food. The creation and development of a sufficient food base takes some time. It is expected that the site will start to show a reduction in the food budget by the end of the second course cycle.

LMA and the MoA are planning to replicate this model in other parts of the country. Currently the construction of a second training centre is planned in Sinoe County to address the hot spot issues and lack of agricultural capacity in the South-East of Liberia. The MoA is very keen to see more such training centres established beyond these two.

## **6. Project Implementation with timeline**

### **I. Research and preparation for course 2**

Duration: 2 months

Dates: October to November 2008

Outputs/Milestones: Hot spot regions identified; potential beneficiaries interviewed, sensitised and recorded; beneficiaries for course 2 selected; beneficiaries moved to training centre; training centre prepared for course; course equipment purchased, recorded and transported to training centre.

### **II. Course 2**

Duration: 5 months

Dates: December 2008 to April 2009

Outputs/Milestones: 400 beneficiaries trained, evaluated and certified (agriculture, social reintegration, literacy & numeracy, small business skills); reintegration aspirations and requirements established for course 2 trainees; lessons learned documented; monitoring and evaluation of course 1 beneficiaries commenced; self-sustainability business plan completed.

**III. Reintegration phase for course 2**

Duration: 4 months

Dates: May 2009 to August 2009

Outputs/Milestones: 400 beneficiaries reinserted into their chosen communities; beneficiaries revisited and assessed in their communities; second batch of reintegration materials provided to course 2 beneficiaries (upon demonstration of progress); further reintegration assistance provided, where required.

**IV. Research and preparation for course 3**

Duration: 2 months

Dates: May 2009 to June 2009

Outputs/Milestones: Hot spot regions identified; potential beneficiaries interviewed, sensitised and recorded; beneficiaries for course 3 selected; beneficiaries moved to training centre; training centre prepared for course; course equipment purchased, recorded and transported to training centre.

**V. Course 3**

Duration: 5 months

Dates: July 2009 to November 2009

Outputs/Milestones: 400 beneficiaries trained, evaluated and certified (agriculture, social reintegration, literacy & numeracy, small business skills); reintegration aspirations and requirements established for course 3 trainees; lessons learned documented; monitoring and evaluation of course 2 beneficiaries commenced.

**VI. Reintegration phase for course 3**

Duration: 4 months

Dates: December 2009 to March 2010

Outputs/Milestones: 400 beneficiaries reinserted into their chosen communities; beneficiaries revisited and assessed in their communities; second batch of reintegration materials provided to course 3 beneficiaries (upon demonstration of progress); further reintegration assistance provided, where required.

**7. Summary Project Budget (Annex 2.4)**

**8. Detailed workplan (Annex 2.5)**



## SUMMARY PROJECT BUDGET

The budget would utilise the Standard Format\* agreed by UNDG Financial Policies Working Group with necessary modifications to suit the expected PBF project activities.

Budgets could be presented in the following Atlas (UNDP financial system) compatible format:

CATEGORY	ITEM	Rate (USD)	Unit	Quantity	TOTAL COST (USD)
1. Personnel <i>Including staff and consultants</i>	1.1 International staff**	4,000	Months	25	100,000
	1.2 National staff	Various	Personnel	100	200,000
	1.3 Technical Advisory	4,000	Months	6	24,000
2. Contracts <i>Including companies, professional services, grants</i>	2.1 NEPI	5,000	Courses	2	10,000
	2.2 Ministry of Agriculture Staff	1,000	Personnel	20	20,000
3. Training	3.1 Course costs	15,000	Courses	2	30,000
	3.2 Professional Development	Various	Various	Various	10,000
4. Transport	4.1 Fuel	12,000	Vehicles	10	120,000
	4.2 Vehicle maintenance & spares	2,000	Vehicles	10	20,000
5. Supplies and commodities	5.1 Food	60,000	Courses	2	120,000
	5.2 Medical (TATP and staff)	10,000	Courses	2	20,000
6. Equipment	6.1 Reintegration packages	50,000	Courses	2	100,000
	6.2 Course equipment	50,000	Courses	2	100,000
7. Travel	7.1 R&R travel	2,000	Flights	8	16,000
	7.2 National travel allowance	140	Staff	100	14,000
	7.3 Local Staff DSA	10	Nights	2,000	20,000
8. M&E**					50,000
9. Miscellaneous	9.1 Office & Utilities (Monrovia)	1,500	Months	18	27,000
	9.2 Office & Utilities (Technical Advisors)	1,400	Months	18	25,200
	9.3 Communications (Monrovia)	1,000	Months	18	18,000
	9.4 Communications and publications (Technical Advisors)	Various	Various	Various	5,800
Sub-total					1,050,000
10. Agency Management Support	10.1. 7% UNDP				73,500
<b>TOTAL (USD)</b>					<b>1,123,500</b>

\* Full time LMA international staff, not consultants.

\*\* Initial discussions with Yale (C. Blattman) indicate USD 4,500,000 is required for a full comprehensive evaluation over several years for the national effort on this type of intervention and its effectiveness in addressing security and reintegration (social) needs. The World Bank have expressed interest in this and have funding for 10 or 10 applications around the world. 10% of this cost is sought as an initial catalytic contribution from this project to this overall evaluation (teaming for Liberia).

## Detailed Work Plan for 18 Months 2008-2009

Outcome/Output	Activities	Inputs	Budget	Delivery Date
i. Hot spots exhibit improved security and implementation of rule of law. ii. Ex-combatants formerly dependent on illegal livelihoods pursue legal and sustainable livelihoods. iii. Beneficiaries are better citizens, with greater respect for rule of law and improved social and communication skills. iv. Ex-combatants reinserted and reintegrated into communities away from former hot spots. v. Government assume full ownership and management of training centre.	i. Removal of ex-combatants from hot spot regions. ii. Agricultural training courses. iii. Social reintegration training. iv. Intensive reintegration assistance and support. v. Phased handover of training centre to government control.	n/a	Not possible to logically divide the budget by project activities	i. 01/08 to 11/08 and 05/09 to 06/09 ii. 12/08 to 04/09 and 07/09 to 11/09 iii. 12/08 to 04/09 and 07/09 to 11/09 iv. 05/09 to 08/09 and 12/09 to 03/10 v. 10/08 to 03/10
	<b>Grand Total</b>		See budget	

Dates	6 Month Benchmarks	Indicators of Progress
First 6 Months October 2008 to Mar 2009	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Course 2 hot spot regions identified.</li> <li>2. Course 2 potential beneficiaries identified.</li> <li>3. Course 2 beneficiaries selected.</li> <li>4. Course 2 beneficiaries moved to training centre.</li> <li>5. Training centre prepared for course 2.</li> <li>6. Course 2 equipment purchased.</li> <li>7. Course 2 commenced.</li> <li>8. Course 2 mid-term evaluations complete.</li> <li>9. Course 2 reintegration planning commenced.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 400 beneficiaries attending course 2.</li> <li>- Beneficiaries for course 2 are predominantly ex-combatants and from priority hot spots.</li> <li>- Training centre adequately equipped for course 2 delivery.</li> <li>- Internal quality control of course 2 delivery.</li> <li>- Results of course 2 mid-term evaluations.</li> </ul>
Second 6 Months April 2009 to Sep 2009	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Course 2 reintegration planning complete.</li> <li>2. Course 2 complete.</li> <li>3. Course 2 beneficiaries graduated.</li> <li>4. Course 2 beneficiaries relocated to chosen communities with reintegration materials.</li> <li>5. Course 2 reintegration complete and final reintegration materials provided.</li> <li>6. Course 2 monitoring and evaluation commenced.</li> <li>7. Course 3 hot spot regions identified.</li> <li>8. Course 3 potential beneficiaries identified.</li> <li>9. Course 3 beneficiaries selected.</li> <li>10. Course 3 beneficiaries moved to training centre.</li> <li>11. Training centre prepared for course 2.</li> <li>12. Course 3 equipment purchased.</li> <li>13. Course 3 commenced.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reintegration plans documented and signed off for course 2.</li> <li>- Results of course 2 final examinations.</li> <li>- Initial reintegration success for course 2.</li> <li>- 400 beneficiaries attending course 3.</li> <li>- Beneficiaries for course 3 are predominantly ex-combatants and from priority hot spots.</li> <li>- Training centre adequately equipped for course 3 delivery.</li> <li>- Internal quality control of course 3 delivery.</li> </ul>
Third 6 months Oct 2009 to Mar 2010	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Course 3 mid-term evaluations complete.</li> <li>2. Course 3 reintegration planning complete.</li> <li>3. Course 3 complete.</li> <li>4. Course 3 beneficiaries graduated.</li> <li>5. Course 3 beneficiaries relocated to chosen communities with reintegration materials.</li> <li>6. Course 3 reintegration complete and final reintegration materials provided.</li> <li>6. Course 3 monitoring and evaluation commenced.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Results of course 3 mid-term evaluations.</li> <li>- Reintegration plans documented and signed off for course 3.</li> <li>- Results of course 3 final examinations.</li> <li>- Initial reintegration success for course 3.</li> </ul>